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Abstract 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, the prominent role of ‘Octobrists’ – former left wing 
student activists from the 1970s – has become increasingly evident in 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. Some Octobrists have played 
leading or supporting roles in key moments of political transition, such as the 
1992 urban middle-class movement for democracy, various social movements 
throughout the mid-1990s, the political reform process of the late 1990s, and the 
rise of the Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai) government under Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2001.  But over the course of the past ten years, these former 
student activists have become increasingly divided, amidst the protracted conflict 
between ‘Yellow shirt’ (anti-Thaksin) and ‘Red Shirt’ (pro-Thaksin) forces in 
Thai politics. Octobrists have defended opposing political stances and severely 
attacked one another across the political divide.  
 
This thesis examines why the Octobrists have managed to remain a significant 
force in Thai politics, despite the collapse of left wing politics in the late 1970s, 
and why they have experienced deepening internal divisions and a crisis of 
legitimacy over the course of the past decade. This thesis argues that the 
Octobrists successfully exploited shifts in the structure of political opportunities 
over the 1980s and 1990s which allowed them to overcome constraints on their 
involvement in politics. These former left wing student activists successfully 
made use of the political skills, social networks, and progressive language which 
they had developed and refined since the 1970s, in order to gain access to new 
channels of political influence and power. Above all, they managed to reframe 
their earlier history as leftist failures and to craft a new political identity as 
‘Octobrists’, as heroic fighters for democracy and against authoritarian rule in the 
1970s. In examining the rise and deepening of conflicts among the Octobrists, 
moreover, this thesis traces the shifts in political environment which accompanied 
the ascendancy and entrenchment of the Thaksin government and the rise of anti-
Thaksin mobilisation over the past decade, which undermined the loose unity 
among Octobrists and created new sources of tension and conflict in their midst. 
The thesis also shows how the notion of ‘Octobrists’ shifted from an effective 
rubric for forging a shared identity among former student activists to a rhetorical 
device for conflict and contestation among former comrades-in-arms. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
  
The transliteration of Thai proper names into the Roman alphabet in this thesis may 
seem inconsistent. There is as yet no universally accepted system of romanisation of 
Thai words1. What I have done in this thesis is firstly follow the Royal Thai General 
System of Transcription of the Royal Institute of Thailand. Secondly, from time to time, 
I follow some widely-used and well-known transliterations in order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion for readers accustomed to these romanised forms. Lastly, I 
follow the transliterations used by the persons or organisations who own the names. 
Throughout the thesis, I try to provide readers both the romanisation and the translation. 
In the case of the names of books and songs, I give the romanisation and then add a 
translation in brackets. But for political parties and organisations, I instead, put the 
translation followed by the romanisation.  
 
 
                                               
1 ‘The current official version of the Thai Royal Institute is constrictive, rigid, and hence highly disputed. 
Other attempts to find a consensus on this controversial and slippery issue have so far ended in vain. 
Without a pre-existing satisfactory alternative, one has no choice but to invent one’s own system’ (Kasian 
2001, xiv). 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction to the Revival of 1970s Thai Octobrists in Contemporary Politics 
 
 
The Octobrists (khon duean tula) once were, as young activists, a prominent political 
force in the anti-authoritarian movement on 14th October 1973, which successfully 
brought about the end of a two-decade-long dictatorship. And between 1973 and 1976, 
they continued to work closely with left wing labour, farmer and other grassroots 
movements. However, the escalation of anti-communist suppression measures and the 
growing ultra-right wing movement ended their efforts with the massacre in Bangkok 
on 6th October 1973. Subsequently, more than 3,000 student activists eventually joined 
the revolutionary mission of the Communist Party of Thailand (phak communist haeng 
prathet thai - CPT). But after the collapse of the CPT in the mid-1980s, most returned 
home as political failures under a political amnesty granted by the Thai state. 
 
From the end of the 1980s onward, these former student activists reappeared in public, 
as neither former student activists nor leftist failures, but as ‘Octobrists’. Although the 
term had been earlier used by these former student activists themselves and the media 
from time to time, it was officially established and publicly used when Seksan 
Prasertkul, a former 14th October student leader, coined this term during his talk at the 
20th anniversary of 6th October 1976. His initial intention was to use this term as means 
to lessen the ideological and historical gap and reunify the 14th and 6th October 
generations (Harnsak n.d., 70–71; MR 2003d)3
                                               
3 The term ‘Octobrist’ is used in the same way that ‘Septembrist’ refers to the mob that took part in the 
September Massacre of the imprisoned royalists in Paris in September 1792, or that ‘Setembrista’ refers 
to supporters of the successful revolution in Portugal of September 1836, or that ‘Decembrist’ refers to 
the 3,000 soldiers who rebelled against Nicholas I’s ascendance to the Russian throne in 1825, or that 
‘Octobrist’ (in Russian ‘Oktyabrist’) refers to members of the conservative-liberal Russian 
. However, as both 14th October 1973 
and 6th October 1976 incidents happened in the same month and were interconnected 
both in terms of people and sequence of events, the term ‘Octobrist’ (khon duean tula) 
was later popularised and used as a generic term for people acting to support the 
people’s movements or involved in either incident. It became a term to distinguish and 
differentiate the 1970s activists from other groups and other generations involved in 
political party, 
the Union of October 17. 
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politics. And above all, the reintroduction and utilisation of the term ‘Octobrist’ became 
part of the process of legitimising and democratising this group of people. 
 
More and more Octobrists gradually reappeared as young and outstanding personalities 
in different careers and professions, and have since revitalised their roles in different 
political transitions. Several individuals reached top positions in various political 
parties, governments, cabinets and state agencies as young blood politicians, spin 
doctors and government officials. The loose network among these Octobrist politicians 
was one of the few factions in Thai politics which was bound by ideological concerns 
and occasionally acted behind the scenes to influence certain progressive policies 
(Ockey 2004, 34-35). Outside state power, many became successful businesspeople and 
executives in various prestigious private companies. Countless numbers of them worked 
as outstanding journalists in local and international newspapers and television channels, 
and as prominent intellectuals in various universities and research institutes (Hirsch 
1997; Missingham 2003; Rungrawee 2004; Somchai 2006; Praphat 1998).  
 
Not only managing to establish themselves in their careers, many also participated in 
different stages of modern Thai political development. By 1992, countless numbers of 
Octobrist businesspeople, non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers, medical 
doctors, progressive politicians, etc., both in Bangkok and the provinces, participated 
and played crucial roles in mobilising the mass uprising against the revival of military 
influence in electoral politics in May 1992 (Anek 1992; Bamber 1997, 240-242; 
LoGerfo 2000, 221-252; Mukdawan 1992; Nuannoi 2002; Ockey 2004, 151-171; 
Thitinan 1997, 216-232).  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Octobrists played vital roles in the rise of social movements 
(Hewison 2003, 144-145; Missingham 2003, 30; Phumtham 1986, 24-25; Prudhisan and 
Maneerat 1997, 199-201; Simpkins 2003, 255; Suthy 1995, 121-122; Giles 2003c, 291). 
Octobrists worked as NGO workers, radical academics and high-ranking staff in the 
Ministry of Interior who initiated and implemented many community and sustainable 
development projects (Sangsidh 1998). Many Octobrist progressive businesspeople 
were involved in environmental mass protests. And those in high-ranking positions in 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment also supported movements from 
within the bureaucracy (Hirsch 1997). Many Octobrist NGO activists, journalists, 
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senators, academics, businesspeople and Buddhist monks helped in mobilising support 
for the Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) (Hirsch and Lohmann 1989; 
Kanokrat 2003; Missingham 2003, 50-1, 91, 105, 131, 135, 148-152, 162-5; Praphat 
1998; Rungrawee 2004, 552; Somchai 2006, 60-63). Missingham (2003) argues ‘Of the 
twenty or so NGO activists and academics who work most closely with the AOP, there 
are a handful, about six or seven, who participated in the flourishing student movement 
of the mid-70s and joined the CPT insurgency in the forest’ (2003, 100-106). 
 
In the political reform of the late 1990s, the role of Octobrists and their networks 
became even more visible. In the initial stage of the reform, many Octobrist academics 
and public intellectuals, like Thirayuth Boonmee, became the pioneers in constructing 
the discourse on ‘good governance’ and urging cross-class collaboration and interaction 
among civil society and political institutes for political reform (Connors 2003, chapter 
9; Giles 2002). During the reform campaign, Octobrists from various organisations 
including the Women’s Constitution Network (khrueakhai phuying rathathamanun), the 
Campaign for Popular Democracy (khana kamakan ronarong phuea prachathipatai - 
CPD) and the Confederation for Democracy (samaphan phuea prachathipatai – CFD), 
the People’s Network Against Corruption (khrueakhai prachachon tan khorapchan), the 
Rural Doctors Society (munlanithi phaet chonnabot), 30 NGOs working on health 
issues, and business groups also actively participated in support of the movement 
(Naruemon and Jaran 2002, 492). After the triumph of the campaign, several of them 
benefitted from the 1997 reformist constitution by accessing state power through new 
mechanisms created by the reform. Many ran for election as senators. Others obtained 
positions as members of the National Human Rights Commission (khana kamakan sithi 
manut - NHRC), and others joined various special governmental advisory committees. 
 
The political power of the Octobrists reached its peak during the 2000s during the rise 
of the Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai - TRT) government. Many Octobrist 
politicians, spin doctors, campaigners, academics and NGO workers were either directly 
recruited into the TRT Party or indirectly integrated into political public-policy strategic 
units or as candidates to become Members of Parliament (MP) (McCargo and Ukrist 
2005, 93-99; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 66-69, 144-150). There were efforts among the 
Octobrists to mobilise their political experience and the networks built during the 1970s 
to formulate successful populist policies and mass support for Thaksin Shinawatra’s 
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government (2001-2006) (Kasian 2004; Giles 2001). And after the landslide victory of 
the TRT Party in the 2001 election, many obtained prominent positions in the party and 
in the cabinet.  
 
On the other hand, amidst the conflict between the Yellow Shirt (anti-TRT) and Red 
Shirt (pro-TRT) movements from 2006 onward, Octobrists became divided. Octobrist 
politicians and activists who had been inside and in support of the TRT turned 
themselves into leaders of the National United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship 
(no pho cho - UDD – the Red Shirts). Others who had been dissatisfied with the 
government opted to promote anti-TRT campaigns. In advocating these movements, 
they not only fought against the counter movement, but they also severely attacked and 
mobilised all kinds of means and ideological strategies, even conservative and right 
wing ones, to delegitimise their former comrades standing on the opposite side. This 
brought about open conflict among Octobrists and the degradation of the reputation of 
Octobrists in politics.  
 
Against this backdrop, the survival of the Octobrists and the conflict among them pose a 
crucial question about the development and transformation of left wing activists in a 
changing world. While the CPT collapsed and Leftist movements at the global level fell 
into a sharp decline over the 1980s and 1990s, why did these former left-leaning student 
activists manage to survive, become revitalised and adapt accordingly? Why are these 
people still so important and influential after all these years, even when there is no space 
left for leftist and radical movements in the Thai political context? Nonetheless, after 
long efforts in building up new power and roles, why did they end up in conflict and a 
crisis of legitimacy during their participation in the Red-Yellow conflict?  
 
A number of scholars have attempted to answer these questions. In explaining the 
revival process of the Octobrists, these scholars have focused on three major causal 
factors: the opening up of new political opportunities; success in mobilising political 
resources; and their ideological transformation.  
 
The first set of studies argues that successful economic development from the 1960s to 
the 1980s and political liberalisation in the 1980s provided the conditions for an 
increase in the roles of Octobrists (Pasuk and Baker 1997, 32-35). By the 1980s, due to 
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the increase in technical and financial support from international funding, and the 
government’s demand for support from NGOs in development schemes, the NGO 
sector was expanding rapidly. This opened new space for independent politics, and 
opportunities to learn new skills while retaining their commitment to social change 
(Gawin 2004; Shigetomi 2004). Also by the early 2000s, new opportunities offered by 
TRT power demonstrated the outstanding role of student activists (McCargo and Ukrist 
2005; Pasuk and Baker 2004). 
 
A second set of studies attributes their success to the mobilisation of their 1970s 
political skills, networking and activism, as well as their recently constructed middle 
class and new political status. The progressive appeal of Octobrist politicians trusted by 
public was based on their 1970s reputation (Ockey 2004, Chapter 2). The success of 
Octobrists in current politics is partly due to the accumulation of political experience 
since 1973 (Nuannoi 2002; Bamber 1997). Octobrists in the NGO sector continued their 
1970s activism in pushing forward social change (Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997, 199). 
Not only their 1970s assets, but the elitist political status obtained from their current 
careers and professions also explain their success and access to political power and elite 
networks. The uniqueness of the medical doctor’s network has helped some Octobrists 
to access the royal family network and successfully promote their reformist agendas 
(Bamber 1997; Nuannoi 2002).  
 
The last and most distinguished group of writers has explained the success of the 
Octobrists as an adjustment to and adoption of non-radical ideas, strategies and 
alliances. In acquiring successful political career paths, those within state mechanisms 
successfully adjusted to bureaucratic systems and norms. Although many of these 
Octobrists had initially attempted to work with progressive political parties and 
supported policies benefiting the underprivileged, they were barely able to deliver real 
change in political and policy processes. Those in party politics collaborated with 
corrupt politicians and aligned with political cliques and parties. They adjusted to the 
norms of coalition and money politics. During the Thaksin government, Octobrist 
politicians and political advisors inside the TRT government strongly insisted on 
supporting the TRT government and Prime Minister Thaksin in spite of strong evidence 
of corruption and abusive measures by the government (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 93-
95; Giles 2001; Giles 2003b, 211).  
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In increasing and retaining political roles in and power for the social movement and 
political reform process, Octobrists shifted toward a liberal reformist direction rather 
than pushing forward radical change and acting as agents of that change. Successful 
Octobrist government officials, especially those in the medical sector, shifted to allying 
themselves with the liberal reformist elites and promoted reformist campaigns both 
inside their own organisations and in national political reform campaigns. They touched 
only on apolitical activities, such as community work, which was rather more reformist 
than ‘politics’ (Bamber 1997). Octobrists in the NGO sector were then dominated by 
neo-liberalism and liberal democratic politics. Many of them transformed themselves 
into neo-liberal service providers and some even promoted a neo-liberalist agenda in 
their development work (Giles 2003c). They shifted toward collaborating with the 
reformist elite and government, as in the collaboration between NGOs and the National 
Economic and Social Development Broad (sapha phathana sangkhom lae setthakit 
haeng chat - NESDB). Prominent Octobrist intellectuals like Seksan Prasertkul and 
Thirayuth Boonmee, former 14th October student leaders, cooperated with the Local 
Development Institute (sathaban phathana thongthin) led by liberal reformist elite and 
leading figures in the school of localism in promoting a localism agenda in development 
work at the grassroots level. Moreover, through human rights organisations like the 
Union for Civil Liberty (samakhom sitthi seriphap khong prachachon), they moved 
from leftist ideas toward moderate civil society and a humanist left. They collaborated 
with liberal humanist intellectuals and activists in advocating democracy through the 
perspective of institutionalised human rights (Connors 2003, 216-241). In responding to 
the economic crisis in 1997, many in the NGO and academic sectors (Anek 1993b; 
Seksan 1995; Thirayuth 1998) echoed and advocated the same message with alternative 
rural localism, communitarian-liberalism, reformism and liberal nationalism in rejecting 
global capitalism, consumerism and neo-liberal ideas and mechanisms like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Hewison 2002, 147-149; Narong 2000a and 2000b; 
Giles 1997, Chapter 7; Giles 1998; Giles 2003a; Yuk Sri-Ariya 1998). At the same time, 
they accepted the logic of the ‘free market’, promoting community businesses as niches 
in the world market (Giles 2003b).  
 
In promoting the 1990s social movements, Octobrists working in extra-parliamentary 
politics rejected the grand narrative of socialism and abandoned earlier ideas of 
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revolutionary and class-based movements including seizing state power, organized 
political parties, and hierarchical and centralised structures (Pasuk 2002, 33; Praphat 
1998, 86; Giles 2003a, 13-17; Giles 2003c). Firstly, they applied a different democratic 
discourse including direct, participatory and grassroots democracy to legitimise non-
state actors in the political process (Naruemon and Jaran 2002, 495). Secondly, they 
promoted a ‘New Social Movement’ discourse, non-violent strategies and concepts of 
civil society, (Baker 2000, 17-18; Missingham 2003, 30; Pasuk 2002, 25; Simkins 2003; 
Suthy 1995, 121-122; Giles 2003c). They applied cross-class networking strategies and 
identity/cultural politics, ran single-issue campaigns, and built a loose organisational 
network, all as parts of the stratagems for their movement (Baker 2000; Missingham 
2003; Nalinee, Sulaiporn, Siriporn 2002, 188; Naruemon and Jaran 2002, 468; Pasuk 
2002, 25; Praphat 1998; Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997; Rungrawee 2004; Sayamol, 
Atchara and Kritsada 2002). Thirdly, they developed a new approach toward ‘the state’. 
They argued that it was possible to seize the state without a revolution; they believed 
that they could change the state from within and developed a strong alliance with 
reformist technocrats and business sectors (McCargo 2002a, 4-5). Fourthly, Octobrist 
NGOs were influenced by and worked in mainstream liberal and moderate ideas of neo-
liberalism, nationalist localism, communitarianism, moderate civil society and the 
humanist left, post-modernism, anarchism, autonomism, etc., in NGO development 
work (Connors 2003, 231-233; Hewison 2002, 144-145). 
 
In the political reform movement and the drafting of 1997 constitution, Octobrists from 
various sectors joined hands with a liberal reformist elite in pushing forward reform 
nationalism and an ‘elitist perspective–ideal of electoral democracy’ (Somchai 2002). 
They were in support of the constitution which tended to exclude the military, 
politicians and the uneducated lower classes as sources of corruption and money politics 
from electoral politics. They advocated several liberal elitist components of the 1997 
constitution, including the requirement for MP candidates to have a university degree, a 
party list electoral system, non-elected independent political and expert functions, etc., 
(Ockey 2004, 166–170). Even Octobrists who had worked with radical NGOs and 
social movements, like the Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP), also 
went along with the reformist movement. They actively facilitated the participation of 
the AOP in constitution drafting and consultation through the ‘School of Politics’ 
(Missingham 2003, 159-162). Despite initially representing radical elements in the 
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reform process, these Octobrists were able to insert almost no progressive and radical 
goals into the 1997 constitution. Their support for the process turned them into 
instrumental agents in the reform (Connors 2002, 38-39, 44-45 and 49-52). 
 
In addition to coalition politics and liberal reformism, many Octobrists even took a non-
democratic and liberal royalist direction 
. In the anti-TRT campaign, Octobrists marched to de-legitimise the elected corrupt 
government of the TRT. They condemned electoral politics as a part of Thailand’s 
political problem. They played leading roles in advocating conservative, right wing, 
‘quasi-monarchist’ and royalist ideas to strike against Thaksin and their former 
comrades in the TRT as anti-monarchist and republican as a tactic to block the power of 
the TRT government (McCargo 2009, 11 and 19).  
 
Aside from the rise of Octobrists, this literature attempts to explain the conflict and 
divergent trajectories among the Octobrists. However, it focuses mainly on their 
ideological transformation and deviation from former radicalism. Furthermore, it treats 
these shifts as sources of the recent conflict and paths of their regressive ideological 
moves.  
 
Firstly, the remaining conservative and dogmatic impulses during the 1970s shifted 
Octobrists toward reformist and conservative ideas. Decisions to join political parties 
led by capitalist and nationalist businesspeople, particularly the TRT, were stated to be 
the result of ideas for seizing state power which developed in the 1970s. The pursuit of 
cross-class alliances with ‘progressive capitalists’ over and above ‘class struggle’ was 
influenced by the Stalinist politics of the CPT, which pushed for a revolution of ‘the 
national democratic state’ (Giles 2001). The legacy of ‘Leftist Nationalism’ from 
Maoist and Stalinist ideas reappeared among and laid the ideological basis for Octobrist 
NGO workers in supporting nationalist ideas and allying with a wide ‘democratic’ 
coalition dominated by domestic capitalists and small businessmen in an anti-IMF 
movement in the 1997 economic crisis (Giles 1998; Giles 2003a). 
 
Secondly, the shift toward non-radical ideas was a decision to abandon the leftist ideas 
dominated by the Maoist-CPT. During the 1970s, student activists did not have 
sufficient opportunity to explore different shades and schools of leftist ideas owing to 
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the rigid radicalisation of Maoism, problematic violent revolutionary strategies and the 
top-down/undemocratic/hierarchical command structure of the CPT (Giles 2003b). 
Subsequently, amidst the decline of the CPT, these left-leaning activists found 
themselves in an ideological and leadership crisis without other leftist ideological 
options. This ideological crisis forced them to abandon earlier leftist ideas and search 
for alternative ideas and organisations. Some who went into further education after 
abandoning the CPT learnt new ideas and criticisms of the Maoist and Soviet left 
(Hewison 2002, 144-145). Some even rebuilt leftist ideas along Stalinist lines (Giles 
2003b). Octobrist NGO workers moved to autonomist ways and anarchist ideas of New 
Social Movement, non-violent strategies, and ideas of post-modernism and civil society 
rather than a unified structure to avoid militant political strategies with the rigid Maoist 
authoritarian structure of the CPT and dogmatic left wing organisations of the past 
(Baker 2000, 17-18; Simpkins 2003; Giles 2003c). 
 
Thirdly, changing political conditions after the collapse of the CPT, when liberal 
democracy became the only game in town, transformed Octobrists in a non-radical 
direction (Anderson 1993; Ranee 1999). After returning home, they faced conservative 
coalitions and state-promoted capitalist liberal democracy. They found out that there 
was no room for the Left (Giles, Suthachai et al. 2001). With the rise of the liberal 
democratic government in the 1980s, Thai politics moved away from a military-
authoritarian regime. The Thai state started a conciliation process with student activists 
through a political amnesty, promoted local development and opened space for electoral 
politics (Hewison 2002, 144-145). It seemed unnecessary to struggle against the state 
with the same confrontational and militant strategy (Connors 2003, Chapter 11). Class 
analysis as learned from the Maoist CPT was no longer a useful tool for challenging 
state power (Ranee 1999). By the 1990s, the global and domestic context shifted toward 
liberal reformist, pluralist ideas and neo-liberalism, and the Thai state successfully re-
articulated its interests according to these new conditions. Octobrists shifted in these 
directions accordingly. Initially, they argued that this shift was only for tactical reasons. 
They assumed that by strengthening civil society, developing a network and gaining 
acceptance from business and the bureaucracy through the issues of rights, participatory 
democracy and sustainable development, they could reduce state power from within 
(Giles 2003c). This group of leaders contended that the transformation of their 
ideologies and practices was actually the result of their failure in challenging the state 
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and elite politics.  Somsak Jeamteerasakul (2007b) argues that after two decades, the 
Octobrists in the anti-TRT campaign had already become reconciled with the monarchy 
and military, rejecting electoral politics, and promoting localism and nationalism. 
Unfortunately, in doing so, they came to look at the state as neutralised by various 
independent forces. Giles (2003b) argues that the state is not neutral. Instead, it is 
dominated by a capitalist class. Thus, instead of radically challenging the state and 
ruling elite, their only course of action was negotiating and avoiding conflict with state 
power (McCargo 1998, 5-9; Somchai 2002).  
 
Fourthly, the clash among these Octobrists in the late 2000s was long developed 
through a path for survival and promotion of their new interests. The Octobrist middle 
class and businessmen who sprung up in the early 1990s were shaped by consumer 
capitalism and their concerns were mainly based on their economic interests rather than 
democracy (Ockey 2004, 151-171; Giles 2003a, 18). Those in party politics affiliated 
with conventional corrupt and capitalist political parties were in it purely for their 
personal gain from party political games (Giles 2003b). In the same vein, those 
Octobrists who collaborated with the Thai state, downplayed political issues, and shifted 
toward more reformist ideas of participatory democracy and alternative development 
did so because they relied on international funding, won acceptance from business and 
the state, avoided conflict with the state, and achieved their desire to be seen as 
legitimate actors and to be involved in major policy formation (Connors 2002, 49-52; 
Giles 2003a, 13-17). Also, in sustaining organisations and movements, they turned 
themselves into cheap neo-liberal service providers and followed the agendas of 
international funding agencies (Kanokrat 2003; Sanguan and Surapon 2001, 15-21).  
 
Although this earlier literature offers us guidelines and a starting point for examining 
why and how these Octobrists resumed their importance and eventually clashed in Thai 
politics, there are two general limitations. Firstly, these writings are not based on any 
serious empirical research. Most rely on limited sources of information and methods of 
data collection. Furthermore, the scope of these studies is limited to a particular set of 
Octobrists rather than taking different groups into account.  
 
Secondly, there is no comprehensive theoretical framework integrating various factors 
in the analysis of these Octobrists. In analysing the revival of Octobrists, each of these 
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readings chooses to look at Octobrists through a selective approach. As for the question 
of conflict among the Octobrists, the explanation was directed by specific political 
methods rather than systematic research directed at the quest of conflict. The first group 
comprises the works of liberal and modernist agitators. Although they recognise these 
people with a student activist background from the 1970s, they treat and explain their 
rise in contemporary politics through a modernist approach as newly emerging in a 
liberal democratic context. Their explanation is mainly dominated by newly opening 
opportunities in democratic politics and the liberal world and specific tangible assets 
from the 1970s which are relevant to the demands including skills and networks. They 
mention only broadly leftist ideas, political networks and skills, and then apply them in 
static terms in explaining how these activists re-emerged and rose to prominence by 
exploiting these resources (Ockey 2004, 34). Moreover, these liberal advocates are 
content to explain the de-radicalisation among the Octobrists as a progressive step 
abandoning earlier violent and extremist leftist views for a more liberal and democratic 
direction (Gohlert 1991; Hirsch 1997; Seri 1986). The second set of literature was 
produced by the Octobrists themselves and chooses to consider merely subjective data 
and factors. These reflect their personal experience in returning to politics and their 
disappointment with their former comrades who became less radical, at least when 
compared to themselves. The last set of literature is an effort by leftist scholars and 
advocates who carry expectations that the Octobrists would continue to be radical 
actors. They look at deviation from the radical direction of the Octobrists as 
disillusionment. In illustrating the return and changes among these people, they focus 
mainly on factors explaining what went wrong with radicalisation during the 1970s, 
why they rejected the idea of class struggle as an agent for changing the state, and how 
hegemonic elite ideologies of neo-liberalism and reformism dominated their revival and 
eventually caused conflict and deviation from earlier aims and goals. 
 
In summary, with a lack of systematic research, excessively personal attitudes and 
political agendas, earlier writings focus mainly on specific explanatory factors. They 
could not construct a comprehensive analysis of how the Octobrists managed to 
continue their political activities and influence, and why they ended up in a crisis of 
legitimacy. On the one hand, each set of literature misses opportunities to consider and 
integrate a wider range of explanatory factors. On the other hand, through limited data 
and analytical views, earlier studies are prone to treat the Octobrists as a homogenous 
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group. They overlook the diversity among them which brings about a process of 
contestation in their post-activist lives.  
 
 
1.1 Social Movement Theory framework and the Octobrists 
 
In filling gaps in the literature mentioned above and constructing a more comprehensive 
analytical framework, this thesis finds inspiration from social movement theory. The 
scholarly literature on social movements provides useful analytical tools for 
understanding the emergence, development and transformation of the Octobrists. For 
example, writings on ‘cycles’ of mobilisation offer guidance by showing that 
mobilisation and demobilisation of social movements unfold in a predictable fashion. 
This is a useful starting point for understanding the Octobrists, not only in terms of their 
mobilisation but also their demobilisation. In the mobilisation phase, the cycle of 
contention begins when political opportunities are opened for well-placed ‘early risers,’ 
when their claims resonate with those of significant others, and when these give rise to 
objective or explicit coalitions among disparate actors and create or reinforce instability 
in the elite. In understanding the emergence and evolution of Octobrists and their 
mobilisation, this literature suggests we should consider heightened conflict, broad 
sectoral and geographical diffusion, the expansion of the repertoire of contention, the 
appearance of new organisations and the empowerment of old ones, the creation of new 
‘master frames’ linking the actions of disparate groups to one another, and intensified 
interaction between challengers and the state, lending to particular state responses a key 
pivoting role in determining which direction the cycle will take. In understanding the 
decline of the Octobrists, social movement theorist Sidney Tarrow identifies several key 
factors, including exhaustion and fractionalisation/polarisation, institionalisation and 
violence, and repression and facilitation (Tarrow 1998, 144-150).  
 
In explaining the cycle of mobilisation and demobilisation of the Octobrists, this thesis 
selectively draws concepts from the social movement literature including political 
opportunity structure, mobilisation structures, and framing. These terms provide 
systematic frameworks in exploring the origin, emergence and transformation of, and 
conflict among, Octobrists. Rather than emphasising the grievance-based conceptions of 
social movements, it takes issues, actors, and constraints as given, and focuses on how 
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the actors develop strategies and interact with their environment to pursue their interests 
(Canel 1992, 38-39), and mobilisation processes and the formal organisational 
manifestations of these processes (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 3-4). 
 
First of all, notion of political opportunity structure helps to identify political 
opportunities for collective action by the Octobrist movement and the constraints 
affecting conflict among them. The term ‘political opportunity structure’ means a set of 
conditions that shape the prospects for collective action and the forms of movements, 
foremost among which were the opportunity-threat to challengers and facilitation-
repression by authorities. The model focuses on an interaction of movement and 
institutionalised politics (McAdam, McCarthy and Zale 1996, 2-3; Tilly 1978, Chapter 
3, 4, 6). Political opportunity is significant as a key explanatory variable of the timing of 
collective action and outcomes of movement activity (McAdam 1996a, 24-31). Social 
movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and 
opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zale 1996, 2-3). 
 
Scholars of social movements argue that shifts in political opportunity are crucial for 
enabling and impelling mobilisation. Proponents of the model (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 
1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978) say the timing and path of a movement 
is largely dependent upon the opportunities afforded insurgents by the shifting 
institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power. The political 
opportunity is also created and increased by movements and for themselves (McAdam 
1996a, 23 and 34; Tarrow 1994, 82).  
 
At the domestic level, the change in nature of the state power structure and life-course 
of the Octobrists was crucial. In understanding changes in state attributes, one needs to 
observe six different classifications of political opportunity structure including the 
reduction in the degree of repression by the state (Tarrow 1998, 80), the opening of 
institutional access to new actors, realignment/shifts within elite politics, new potential 
elite alliances, splits/conflicts/divisions within the elite, and the decline of the state’s 
capacity and facility in policy implementation (Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1994, 761; Tarrow 
1996, 53; Tarrow 1998, 71).  
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A second element of the literature on social movements which helps to illuminate the 
trajectory of the Octobrists is the notion of ‘mobilising structure.’ Here the focus rests 
on the collecting, assembling and use of resources (material and/or non-material), and 
the dissemination of information within a movement, above all for sustaining movement 
activities and achieving its goals and the explicit purposes of a movement’s interests 
(McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 3; McCarthy 1996, 141; Rucht 1996, 186-187). 
For movement to start and survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring 
organisational structure to sustain collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
1996, 13).  
 
In analysing the process of the re-establishment of the Octobrist movement, this focus 
on ‘mobilising structures’ helps us to explore the ability of the Octobrists to recruit and 
sustain mobilisation among former activists. In the case of the Octobrists, this thesis 
identifies ‘pre-existing social networks’ (McAdam 1988; Snow et al. 1980), especially 
‘schoolboy’ networks (Tarrow 1994, 135), as important infrastructures4
 
. These personal 
networks drew on previous experiences of collective action, facilitated communication 
and exchange, and kept the movement’s identity alive even when public campaigns 
were not in progress (Diani 1992, 110-111). Furthermore, informal and personal 
networks contained strong ‘netness’, the denseness of their social relationship 
foundations linking movement constituencies to movement institutional ties (McCarthy 
1996, 142-143; Tilly 1978). Above all, these informal networks were a source of ‘social 
capital’. Personal networks and commitments counted for much in the maintenance of 
activism among the Octobrists, much like the 1960s activists who were still active in 
Western Europe or the United States (US) in the 1980s, who were embedded in 
networks of former activists, and who kept their faith by keeping in touch. Those who 
lacked such networks, whether for ideological or organisational reasons, were less likely 
to remain active in politics in the long term (Tarrow 1998, 168-169). 
Furthermore, scholarship on ‘mobilising structures’ draws attention to the dynamism of 
the mobilising structures of the Octobrists in terms of formal and/or informal processes, 
                                               
4 Learning from emergence and organization of American independent movement and France’s 
revolution, American civil rights movement and American New Left, the informal settings, friendship 
networks and relationships, and loosely tied networks involved across groups and classes are important, 
sometime even more important than to the tightly knit ones in explaining the accomplishment of the 
movements (McAdam et al. 1996, 4; Tarrow 1994, 49; Tilly 1978). 
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mechanisms or organisational bases. The form of organisation, it has been noted, can be 
influenced by the history of organisational infrastructures and the relationship between 
organisational form and type of movement (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 4). For 
example, loose and informal networks may function well during a period of 
demobilisation and repressive conditions when one has no legal status (Tarrow 1994, 
49). However, the informal can be developed into formal collective structures. Changes 
in repressive and supportive conditions cause alternation between informal and formal 
forms of organisation (Tarrow 1994, 49). The formalisation of a movement is a part of 
organisational development and a by-product of professionalisation, internal 
differentiation and integration in order to increase their capacity in mobilising political 
resources to sustain the movement. At the initial phase, organisational networks tend to 
be informally structured. However, gradually they learn that an informal movement 
linked by personal networks is rather difficult to organise and vulnerable to external 
conditions compared to other formal structures and links (Diani 1992, 110-111). In 
order to strengthen the movement and attract public attention to their cause, they have to 
create their constituency and elite patronage on their own either by explicit consensus 
mobilisation or simultaneously (Kriesi 1996, 154).  
 
The specific mobilising structures of the Octobrist movement have functioned to 
mobilise resources and promote collective action. Firstly, different individuals, groups 
and organisations within the Octobrist networks have functioned as connecting points in 
exchanging information and resources in order to support the revival of the Octobrist 
movement in three major dimensions including inter-organisational exchanges, 
individual/social movement organisation exchanges, and personal exchanges/networks. 
Inter-organisational exchanges have consisted of direct exchanges through personal ties 
of friendship or overlapping membership in developing a common understanding of the 
problem issues they confront. From time to time, they join forces to lend resources to 
other groups and access the media.  
 
Secondly, all actors, organisations and networks within the Octobrist movement have 
collaborated in forming what scholars call a ‘movement family’. A ‘movement family’ 
is a free-standing protest campaign group which links networks, organisations, and 
caucuses together in order to coordinate events and efforts (McCarthy 1996, 143-144). 
Under this concept, we then understand how different actors within the Octobrist 
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movement created specific lobbying groups which connect and bring together their 
diverse membership to support the movement. 
 
Finally, the Octobrist movement has functioned by alternately using various types of 
movement technologies. At the broadest level, the movement has functioned through a 
strategy package of ‘action technologies’, sets of knowledge about how to carry out a 
particular action and what its consequences are likely to be. There are two types of 
action technologies. Production technologies are sets of knowledge about ways of 
achieving goals, such as lobbying, demonstrations, strikes, or attending public hearings. 
Mobilisation technologies are sets of knowledge about ways of accumulating the 
resources (such as time and money) necessary for production technologies. In pushing 
forward specific goals, different actors within the Octobrist movement have selectively 
chosen either ‘insider’ tactics (e.g., lobbying, litigating) or ‘outsider’ tactics (e.g., 
demonstrations, attempts to get media coverage) according to the nature and degree of 
conflict in the political environment they have faced, internal organisational resources, 
the character of their membership, principal sources of financial support (Oliver and 
Marwell 1992, 251-255), and past knowledge and experience of mobilisation 
technology.  
 
The third notion of the literature on social movement is ‘framing’. It helps to explain 
how the Octobrists constructed and utilised cognitive and discursive frames to promote 
their movement as well as how these processes triggered changes and conflicts among 
them. A ‘frame’ is any set of ideas, beliefs, problem issues, and movement symbols 
which were raised in the movement (Zald 1996, 262). Frames are the specific 
metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast 
behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action 
(Zald 1996, 261–262). A framing process is a process in which frames are constructed 
in response to the particular purposes and goals of the movement (Tarrow 1994, 123). 
Here the thesis focuses on two major dimensions of the framing process: framing as a 
resource mobilising strategy; and framing as a means of collective identity and 
movement construction.  
 
First of all, ‘strategic framing’ and ‘framing alignment’ offer useful concepts in 
explaining forms of resource mobilisation. Literally, strategic framing is a process in 
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making a linkage between culture, ideology and frame. Practically, a frame assigns 
meaning to and interprets relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to 
mobilise potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystanders’ support, and to 
demobilise antagonists. Strategic framing guides us to understand how a frame is used 
as an active tactic and strategy in constructing meaning and legitimacy, and defining a 
pathway for initiating, promoting, and sustaining change for the movement (McAdam 
1996b, 338-339).  
 
Framing alignment is a process by which participants in social protests and movements 
construct any given set of ideas, beliefs, problematic issues and symbols, and put these 
into function (Snow 1986). It functions both in bringing the movement’s ‘message’ 
(demands and grievances) to power holders and the public (Snow and Benford 1992, 
136), and in providing motivation-generating energy for participation in the movement 
(Zald 1996, 265). The process can range between interpretations from context and from 
the flow of pre-existing ideas or beliefs, and the inherited culture and values of the 
target population, as well as those related to the new frames and values of the movement 
in responding to the particular purposes and goals of the movement (Baud and Rutten 
2004, 1-18 and 197-217; Snow 1986; Tarrow 1994, 123).  
 
To be more specific, there are four framing alignment processes which help us to 
understand the Octobrist movement. The first is frame bridging, which involves the 
linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames 
regarding a particular issue or problem. It manages to create the sense of ‘we-ness’ 
among people with different orientations through overlap of individual political 
identities and the collective identity of a movement (Klatch 1999, 6). The second is 
frame amplification. It refers to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive 
frame on a particular issue, problem or set of event. The third is frame extension. It 
involves the expansion of the boundaries of a ‘movement’s primary framework so as to 
encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of 
considerable salience to potential adherents’. The fourth is frame transformation. This 
refers to a redefinition of ‘activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful 
from the standpoint of some primary framework, such that they are now seen by the 
participants to be quite something else’ (Snow et al. 1986, 467-474).  
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Second of all, the framing process helps in the construction of a collective identity 
among participants and in the formulation of a movement structure. It builds up a 
collective identity as an incentive to participate in the movement and interpretive 
orientations linking individuals and the movement. Collective identities provide 
congruent and complementary sets of individual interests, values, and beliefs and 
movement activities, goals, and ideology (Snow 1986; Snow et al. 1986, 464; Friedman 
and McAdam 1992, 156). This overcomes the argument that individuals join collective 
action only when they expect the private benefits of participation to exceed the cost. In 
reality, there is also a collective identity benefit in being part of the movement. The 
nature of collective identities produced by social movements changes over time. 
Initially, framing works in attracting new recruits and sustaining supporters. A 
successful movement usually does not create attractive collective identities from 
scratch. A new collective identity is planted in the soil of pre-existing collective 
identities, and to an extent it is embedded within them. The most important decision is 
to define the boundaries of the group, whether inclusive or exclusive. Eventually, a 
collective identity becomes a public good and faces the free-rider problem. Once a 
movement has managed to fashion an identity, it is difficult to control its consumption 
unless it is a highly exclusive one. In effect, the collective identity becomes a public 
good that all can consume without contributing to its production (Friedman and 
McAdam 1992, 156-157 and 161-169). 
 
However, not all framing efforts manage to mobilise resources and constituencies. The 
term ‘frame resonance’ helps in analysing how and why the Octobrist movement 
successfully mobilised on some occasions while at other times the framing efforts fell 
on deaf ears and may even have been counterproductive (Snow and Benford 1988, 198-
210). Frame resonance comprises core framing tasks, infrastructural constraints of belief 
systems, and phenomenological constraints. ‘Core framing’ tasks mean robustness, 
completeness and thoroughness of the framing efforts (Klandermans 1984). The success 
of a mobilising campaign relies upon its ability to effectively produce ‘diagnostic’, 
‘prognostic’ and ‘motivational’ framings. ‘Diagnostic framing’ involves identification 
of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality. ‘Prognostic framing’ is a 
proposed solution to the diagnosed problem as well as identification of strategies, 
tactics, and targets which need to be pursued. ‘Motivational framing’ is a call to arms 
and rationale for engaging in ameliorative or collective action and to go beyond the 
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diagnosis and prognosis. Since the agreement about the causes and solutions to a 
particular problem does not automatically produce collective action, it follows that 
consensus mobilisation does not necessarily yield to mobilisation (Snow and Benford 
1988, 200–202).  
 
The second component of framing resonance is the infrastructural constraints of belief 
systems comprising levels of centrality and interrelatedness. With respect to centrality, 
the effectiveness of the framing process depends upon the larger belief system. If the 
values or beliefs the movement seeks to promote or defend are of low importance 
within the larger belief system, the mobilisation potential is weakened considerably. 
With respect to interrelatedness, if the framing effort links to only one core belief or 
value, then the movement is vulnerable to being discounted. In order to deal with this 
dilemma and expand their potential constituency, movements may extend the 
boundaries of their primary framework by incorporating values that were initially 
incidental to its central objectives (Snow and Benford 1988, 205-206).  
 
The third feature is phenomenological constraints. The successful frame needs to 
consider the relevance of the frame to the world and life situation of the participants. 
There are three interrelated but analytically distinct constraints that bear upon the issue 
of relevancy including empirical credibility, experiential commensurability and 
narrative fidelity. Empirical credibility refers to the fit between the framing and events 
in the world. Experiential commensurability relates to whether the frame can compete in 
a framing dispute. Does it suggest answers and solutions to troublesome events and 
situations and harmonise with the things which participants have been or are currently 
experiencing? Or is the framing too abstract and distant from the everyday experiences 
of potential participants? Narrative fidelity is a framing that resonates with cultural 
narrations, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s 
cultural heritage (Snow and Benford 1988, 207–210). 
 
Furthermore, the success of the framing process in promoting the rise to prominence of 
the Octobrists has relied heavily on how far it is able to open up new political 
opportunities. One significant purpose of the framing process is to promote changes in 
the prevailing cultural climate, the history of the country and issues of concern. In short, 
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inserting new framing should help in promoting a new political climate and expanding 
cultural opportunities (Gamson and Mayer 1996, 279). 
 
Beside benefits from the framing process, it is necessary to consider another of its 
consequences toward both the movement and its frame specialists5
 
. At the movement 
level, de-radicalisation and changes of political goals were the consequences of playing 
roles as popular intellectuals and specialists in the framing process. A social movement 
is the product of the interaction of different social and political groups. Therefore, 
acting as popular intellectuals in a social movement, the Octobrists had to attract many 
groups with different backgrounds. At the same time, they had to compromise with 
diverse alliances, opponents and media. During this process, they ran the risk of losing 
their ideological coherence, or being incorporated into hegemonic politics and 
mainstream society. From time to time, in extending their frame to link with the wider 
belief system of liberal democracy, they overextended the frame in a liberal direction 
(Snow and Benford 1988, 205–206).  
At an individual level, one has to bear in mind that politics is personal. Personal 
consequences and disillusioned memories of post-intensive participation in a political 
and revolutionary movement affected individuals differently. On return from a 
revolution, individuals faced a ‘rebound effect’ or threw themselves into a public and 
private life which was different from their time with the movement. Furthermore, they 
encountered disillusionment, due to the gap between the ambition of their earlier leftist 
movement and actual outcomes (Tarrow 1994, 164-165). 
 
In addition, the transformation of the Octobrists came as a result of the integration of 
new ideas they learnt from their political exile, new class status and new political 
settings. The construction of post-1970s networks often went beyond the activists’ 
original movement membership. The framing process suggests post-revolutionary life 
turned activists upside down and brought them to connect with new social ties which 
immediately took them away from their radical lifestyles and ideas. Their private sphere 
was expanded. Furthermore, new social institutions established on their return forced 
                                               
5 A framing specialist is person who develops, borrows, adapts, and reworks interpretive frames that 
promote collective action and that define collective interest and identities, rights and claims (Baud and 
Rutten 2004, 6).  
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these people into a new type of political socialisation. This allowed activists to select a 
good deal from past positions and to be engaged in networks of international debate to 
internal party politics, and to socialism as theory and praxis (Hite 2000, 129). 
Furthermore, changes in class affiliation bring about a transformation of political 
stances among activists. The political behaviour and the diversity of the leftist 
movement were also in some measure determined by their class character (Mars 1998, 
39-40).  
 
Aside from transformation, the framing process also caused conflict among the 
Octobrists. Although the framing process may help a social movement to forge a 
collective identity and specific form of solidarity, social movements are diverse and 
heterogeneous, and they change over time. A social movement is an outcome of 
constant tension between diverging orientations and different sets of belief and culture 
(Diani 1992, 111-112). Therefore, a frame is generated by a diverse set of actors in 
relation to a variety of audiences inside and outside a movement. Often, the framing 
process is competitive and contested (Diani 1992, 111-112; Gamson and Mayer 1996, 
283; Zald 1996, 269). Thereafter, in participating in these frame competitions, the 
Octobrists were naturally at risk of fighting against each other in promoting their 
agendas and ideas.  
 
In summary, the scholarly literature on social movements provides an analytical 
framework for understanding how the Octobrists successfully maintained their political 
significance. As we shall see, the Octobrists exploited shifts in the structure of political 
opportunities over the past few decades while drawing on the strengths of the 
mobilising structures developed in the 1970s. The Octobrists also engaged in a process 
of constructing and utilising frames in reviving their political roles upon their return 
from the failed revolutionary mission of the 1970s. The social movement literature also 
helps to explain how competition and confrontation among Octobrists eventually 
developed.   
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1.2 Research methods and techniques  
 
In conducting research on the Thai Octobrists, this thesis pays attention to three major 
interrelated approaches and methods to gather information for analysis: press reports 
and other written documentary materials, oral histories, interviews, and discourse 
analysis.   
  
First of all, this thesis draws on documents written by outsiders from various 
perspectives including newspapers, related research, printed matter and archives. The 
thesis draws on interviews, self-written documents (diaries and short stories), 
organisation materials of different political clubs and movements during the 1970s 
(pamphlets, meeting minutes, papers and political statements), and other documents 
related to their recent revival, political transition and commemorative celebrations of the 
1970s events. In addition to documentary research, this research has also drawn on 
ethnographic and participant observation. By attending reunion parties of these 
Octobrists, commemoration ceremonies of revolutionary bases, exclusive political 
meetings, and 6th October commemorative conferences, the author managed to find 
additional sources of information and insight beyond written materials otherwise 
available.  
 
Secondly, the thesis draws upon oral histories. Through in-depth interviews, the author 
gathered information on a specific period or a single aspect of an individual’s political 
biography and socialisation over his/her life course by which individuals construct a 
core self that is political (della Porta 1992, 168–172; Klatch 1999, 6). On the one hand, 
these interviews provide insight into the individuals’ own understanding of their 
political life trajectories, including why they came to think about politics and their 
political roles as they did. On the other hand, the interviews relate the individual 
narratives to the broader questions of political identity formation in changing historical 
and political contexts (Hite 2000, xix). In this research, oral history is a method of 
studying the construction and transformation of an individual’s political identity and 
activism.  
 
However, in drawing on oral histories, the thesis confronts several problematic issues 
including the reliability of sources, the representation of the sample, the comparability 
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of the results of interviews, and the degree of manipulation in the presentation and 
interpretations of the results. To overcome these difficulties, one should compare 
different biographies, use an ‘inter-disciplinary approach’ to evaluate interviewees 
interpretations (della Porta 1992, 181) and cross-check data from interviewees with 
other sources of information that consider key informants from different types of social 
groups, gender and form of participation. Thereafter, while acknowledging the value of 
memories, the thesis is based on a critical examination of the correspondence between 
interviewees’ accounts and other sources of information.  
 
Although it was impossible to conduct interviews with all Octobrists in this project, as 
there are more than 3,000 of them, the author tried to cover a wide range of people who 
can represent the diversity of the Octobrists. Firstly, representatives from both the 14th 
and 6th Octobrist generations were approached and interviewed. The generation who 
actively participated in the 14th October anti-military movement in 1973 represents 
those who were socialised through a wide range of political ideologies ranging from 
liberal-royalist, social democratic and New Left. The 6th Octobrist generation comprises 
those who were radicalised after 14th October 1973 and focused mainly on Maoist ideas. 
Furthermore, in each generation, the author tried to cover people with different 
functions including both student leaders and rank-and-file members of various political 
clubs, socialist-oriented parties, and informal leftist groups. Secondly, the author 
interviewed Octobrists who either joined the armed struggle of the CPT after 6th 
October 1976, or secretly supported clandestine activities of the revolutionary 
movement in the cities, or even those who kept a low profile. This research has tried to 
select people who worked in as many different revolutionary bases, functions and 
positions as possible. The last selection criterion was the political setting and degree of 
political engagement on return to contemporary politics. Efforts were made to select 
people from as many different political settings as possible both in parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary politics. Also, the author interviewed Octobrists with different 
degrees of success and effort in recovering political power and status as well as in 
participating in 4 major democratic developments and transitions: the mass movement 
and pressure groups in the 1992 May event; the development of the Assembly of the 
Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) and people’s democracy; the constitutional drafting 
process during the political reform of 1997; and the rise of the Thaksin Shinawatra 
government. The interviews covered Octobrists ranging from those who became leading 
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political figures, popular intellectuals, and prominent NGO workers, to rank-and-file 
participants in different political transitions and activities of the Octobrist movement.  
 
In conducting interviews, this project started with contacts and names of activists found 
through archival research. Octobrists were then located according to the different 
criteria mentioned above. The interviews took place from November 2006 to May 2007. 
Each interview lasted from one to six hours. Some informants were interviewed twice. 
Further interviews were conducted after the first draft to obtain current information 
about many activists in the sample. The texts of the intensive interviews form the basis 
of the conceptualisation of individual political identities and their relationship to the 
political process. Unreferenced quotations from activists come from the researcher’s 
interviews. Pseudonyms for those who chose to remain anonymous have been used 
throughout the thesis to maintain continuity.  
 
In conducting the interviews, there are two main difficulties particularly when 
interviewing leading Octobrist figures. First of all, the research took place during the 
peak of political conflict among Octobrists where those in the anti-TRT movement were 
using right wing tactics attacking the leftist background of those in the TRT 
government. Therefore, many leading Octobrist politicians declined to give interviews 
on their past and the current political conflict situation. Secondly, many prominent 
Octobrist popular intellectuals and NGO workers refused to give an interview after 
reviewing the interview and research questions. They insisted that they had repeatedly 
answered these questions several times in their writings and in the press, even though 
many questions challenged their earlier writings and interviews. Those who agreed to 
talk either repeated what they had already said in their earlier work and avoided 
responding to critical questions about their past leftist history and background as well as 
the problematic process of Octobrist construction. On the one hand, one can argue that 
this problem is a limitation of the research. On the other hand, by saying nothing or 
saying the same thing, leading Octobrist figures demonstrated their intention to keep the 
image of Octobrists that they had already constructed and the way they want us to 
understand their past and present. This is similar to Ross’s findings in her studies of the 
social memory and amnesia of May’68 in France. She decided not to conduct 
interviews. She argues that those people who benefit from the re-writing of 1968 history 
did not want to talk about it. In dealing with this limitation, this research follows 
38 
 
suggestions from Ross by relying on the public record (Ross 2002, 17). Especially in 
case of leading Thai Octobrists and prominent figures, there are countless examples of 
testimonies, writing, diaries, documentary footage, memoirs, and interviews.   
 
In-depth interviews focused on six sets of issues. The first took up the demographic 
background of activists including family background and dynamic, parent’s political 
beliefs, and early political and gender socialisation. The second set centred on political 
involvement as well as networks, skills and ideological development during their time 
with the 14th October anti-military movement, the leftist movement between 1973 and 
1976, and the clandestine activities and conflict within the CPT. The third set of 
questions focused on their political revival after the decline of the CPT from the end of 
the 1980s onward. The questions asked about the struggle to recover their social and 
political status in a new setting, and political participation and positions during the 1992 
May people’s uprising, the rise of social movements, the late 1990s political reform, 
and the rise of the Thaksin government. The fourth set was their interpretation and 
standpoint amidst the conflict during the rise of the Thaksin and the anti-Thaksin 
movement and above all conflict among the Octobrist generation. The fifth looked at 
their roles and attitudes toward the construction of an Octobrist identity and discourse. 
The last was their views on their own ideological transformation by recounting their life 
histories and then discussing their views of democracy, new social movement, and 
socialism, and their vision and concerns for Thailand’s future.  
 
The last method to be employed in the thesis was discourse analysis. This method was 
used to unpack the political ideologies and world views of Octobrists, and how they 
have linked these to particular structural problems in their political activities. Donati 
(1992, 143-147) suggests that the process of discourse analysis can be undertaken 
through ‘frame analysis’: topic selection and definition, text and frame.      
 
As mentioned earlier, the role and significance of the Octobrists’ political assets in these 
processes have been underestimated. Thus, this thesis focuses on the influence of left 
ideologies and their integration within the new political discourse in their participation 
in the May 1992 incident, the drafting of the People’s Constitution of 1997, political 
reform, and the formulation of Thaksin’s populist policies. In this method, the newly 
emerging political discourses and activities of Octobrists during the 4 political 
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transitions are analysed, by exploring the new political discourse that Octobrists used in 
legitimising and empowering their political activism, including terms like ‘democracy’, 
‘new social movement’, ‘people politics’, ‘civil society’ and ‘political reform’. The 
author then collected related political materials including documents written by 
Octobrists and their organisations, political statements on related discourse, and 
interviews with the Octobrists who were pioneers in framing these discourses and those 
who turned this rhetoric into action. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis and chapter outline 
 
In illustrating how one analytical framework drawn from the literature on social 
movements explains the survival and dynamic of Octobrists in contemporary Thai 
politics between 1990s and 2000s, this thesis is divided into eight chapters, partly 
chronological and partly arranged by topic. This first chapter contains the rationale of 
the research, and the significance of the thesis topic and its research questions. It 
explores how earlier literature seized and missed opportunities to develop a 
comprehensive analysis of the revival of the Octobrists in a changing political context. 
In addition, it explores and develops the theoretical framework and methodologies in 
filling earlier gaps.  
 
Chapter Two sets the stage by tracing the origins and development of the Octobrists 
during the 1970s. It sketches and outlines the international and domestic context which 
affected and encouraged the participation of Octobrists in the anti-military and socialist-
oriented movement between 1973 and 1976 and the clandestine activities of the CPT. It 
also examines the process of their ideological radicalisation, organisation, networks and 
skills development. This chapter not only presents the historical background of the 
Octobrists but also provides a crucial foundation for understanding the political assets 
and problems that influenced their return and transformation in contemporary politics. 
On the one hand, firsthand experience and participation in the anti-authoritarian 
movement, campaigning for socialist-oriented political parties, mobilising people at the 
grassroots level, and working on confidential missions for the leftist movement in cities 
enabled the Octobrists to develop cross-sector networks and various political skills. On 
the other hand, a leftist historical background and problematic radicalisation within the 
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CPT obstructed the Octobrists’ return to Thai liberal democratic politics and halted 
leftist ideological development after the collapse of the CPT. 
 
After the historical background, chapters Three to Seven explore the revival and 
development of the Octobrists in different political dimensions and settings during the 
last two decades through an analytical framework drawn from the social movement 
literature. Chapter Three stresses the roles of framing in the struggle of the Octobrists in 
the realm of cultural politics. It explores the processes by which they reclaimed their 
political space in a changing political context. The chapter argues that after an initial 
failure to recover and reunify on their return, they succeeded by the early 1990s in 
rewriting their failed leftist background and democratising 14th and 6th October history, 
as well as replacing their earlier image as losing leftists with that of ‘the 1970s 
Octobrist–democratic fighters’. 
 
Chapters Four and Five emphasise Octobrists who became politically active in both 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. This involves those Octobrists who 
successfully turned themselves into politicians, spin doctors, NGO workers, academics, 
journalists, singers, artists, political activists and business people. These people still 
actively worked in politics, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary. The chapter 
examines the integration of their past and present political assets, skills, and networks. 
In addition, the chapter notes the role of newly opening political opportunities for their 
career achievements and revitalising their political role in three major political 
transitions and developments in contemporary politics: the people’s uprising in May 
1992, the rise of social movements in the mid-1990s, and the political reform process in 
the late 1990s. At the same time, the chapter analyses the framing process which they 
used in enhancing their resource and power. The chapter shows how new structural 
constraints and limitations on terms of political opportunity, mobilising structure and 
frames influence their transformation into less radical and more liberal and reformist 
directions.  
 
Before the concluding chapter, chapters Six and Seven provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the phenomenal battle among different groups of Octobrists during the rise 
of the Thaksin government and the anti-Thaksin movements in the 2000s. These two 
chapters explicitly explain how the Octobrists utilised their unique political activist 
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assets including skills, networks and newly framed ‘Octobrist’ identity in promoting 
themselves in new political conflicts. The chapters also chronicle their transformation 
and conflict. Whilst many Octobrists wholeheartedly used their political skills to 
support the establishment of the TRT Party and its policies, others joined the anti-
Thaksin movement led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (phanthamit – PAD) to 
attack the party and their former comrades inside the party on corruption and abuse of 
power. Eventually, those in the PAD even took a right wing direction by applying 
royalist and conservative political strategies and undemocratic means in overthrowing 
the TRT government. This development brought about fragmentation and irreconcilable 
conflict among different groups within the Octobrists.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Emergence, Evolution and Decline of 
the Thai Student Movement during the 1970s 
 
 
In the 1970s, Thailand witnessed the rise and fall of the student movement. The initial 
formation started by the late 1960s. Loose networks of student activists gradually 
developed into a powerful democratic movement, which successfully brought about an 
end to the two-decade-long dictatorship on 14th October 1973. The movement reached 
its peak between 1973 and 1976, becoming more radical and unified. However, the 
retaliation of the ultra-right wing groups which ended with the October 1976 massacre 
and military coup forced more than 3,000 of these radical student activists to join the 
armed struggle of the Communist Party of Thailand (phak communist haeng prathet thai 
- CPT). By the early 1980s, the 1970s student movement had gradually declined in line 
with the collapse of the CPT. The 1970s thus served as the basis for the rise of the 
Octobrists.  
 
To understand the Octobrists’ post-activist life in the rest of this thesis, this chapter 
provides a comprehensive historical background of their activist life, as a basis to 
understanding its legacy. How did they emerge and evolve? How should we understand 
their complex and varied experiences, activism and ideological development? And how 
did their activist life and movement end? In answering these questions, this chapter 
begins with a retrospective account of the future 1970s radicals, as this background 
history would later affect the evolution of the Octobrists. Then it reveals the emergence, 
development and decline of these radical young people during the 1970s: their initial 
formation prior to 14th October 1973; the big leap toward a radical and unified student 
movement between 1973 and 1976; and a revolutionary mission with the CPT and its 
decline in the years after the student massacre and military coup of October 1976.  
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2.1 Pre-1970s radical movements  
 
Thailand has been viewed by many historians as a country with a lack of radicalism. 
Thailand never experienced a social revolution that swept the land or an independence 
movement that liberated it from colonial oppression. This was the result of the absence 
of a colonial past, and the domination of the Anglophile conservative royalism of the 
Chakri dynasty, as well as geography, religion, and shrewd leadership (Kasian 2001a, 3 
and Chapter 2; Reynolds 1987, 9). Nonetheless, alongside its conservative history, there 
were the ebbs and flows of many local anti-state movements, communist groups, radical 
politicians and intelligentsia. Since the Ayutthaya kingdom, several small regional mass 
uprisings sprang up challenging the Thai state (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 12). And 
from the mid-1880s or from the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) onward, a few 
democratic and reformist forces, both in the court and among middle class circles, 
started countering the traditional polity of absolutist monarchy. A new generation of 
princes, nobles, journalists and progressive commoners began to express political ideas 
that challenged the polity’s traditional basis of authority and legitimacy, although the 
King’s reform of the executive branch successfully prevented moves toward democratic 
ideology (Kullada 2004; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 12-13). However, none of these 
movements was systematically organised in advocating radicalism or succeeded in 
accessing state power. Only in the late 1920s, alongside the triumph of the anti-
monarchical People’s Party (Khana Ratsadon) in ending the 150-year absolute 
monarchy under the Chakri Dynasty on 24th June 1932 and turning Thailand into 
constitutional monarchy, were there formations of several better-organised leftist and 
radical forces. These included the left wing leagues within the People’s Party, the leftist 
intelligentsia group and the communist movement (Somsak 1991). And their legacies 
remained as sources of inspiration for later generations of radical movements especially 
during the 1970s. 
 
Under the leadership of Pridi Banomyong, the civilian leader of the 1932 coup, the 
leftist league within the People’s Party put much effort into inserting leftist elements 
into the national agenda. His draft constitution of June 1932 followed the Soviet and 
Sun Yat-sen models. His 1933 economic plan was something far more radical than 
anything that the communists of the period would think of. The university that he 
44 
 
founded in early 1934, the University of Moral and Political Science, usually known as 
Thammasat University, became the most important institutional centre for the advocacy 
and defence of democratic and egalitarian ideas for Thai society. However, their radical 
efforts caused great fear among conservative and palace circles. They not only turned 
down these radical proposals, but also ended Pridi’s future with allegations of being 
‘communist’ and ‘anti-royalist’ (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 16; Morell and Chai-
anan 1981, 79; Somsak 1991, 85-128).  
 
The second group was a leftist intelligentsia who actively advocated radicalism and 
socialism from the 1930s to 1950s. In responding to the crises and failures of pre-
existing political systems, many new generation journalists and writers including Kulap 
Saipradit, Supha Sirimanond, Samak Burawat, Sakchai Bamrungphong, Itsara 
Amatakun, etc., collectively attacked snobbery and class discrimination. Through their 
writings in various newspapers and novels, they propagated the virtues of democracy, 
equality, and social justice (Kasian 2001a; Reynolds 1987, 9-42). These both directly 
and indirectly supported the 1932 revolution (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 15-16; 
Nakharin 2010, 109-112 and 117). Against the backdrop of post-war political 
liberalisation in Thailand, this urban-based Thai intelligentsia was inspired by 
materialist philosophy, social realism and the achievements of post-revolutionary 
Russia and China. Their works became more radical. They engaged in the Thai 
transmutation of Marxism, Socialism and Communism through their prominent 
Socialist Realist novels. The Aksonsan (written message), a literate and progressive 
monthly magazine which had appeared from 1949 to 1952 edited by Supha Sirimanond, 
became a key journal aggressively advocating Marxist ideas, and was mostly written by 
communists and their sympathisers outside the CPT (Kasian 2001a; Reynolds 1987, 14-
15 and 25-26; Somsak 1991, 11-12). Between 1955 and 1958, Jit Phumisak published a 
number of path-breaking works on radical Thai history and literature (Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 33). His utterly innovative work, the Real Face of Thai Feudalism 
Today focusing on an analysis of the social system and political economics in the 
Marxian sense, appeared in the euphoric atmosphere of 1957. Although small and less 
powerful, their works laid the foundation of radical literature and later became a source 
of political inspiration for student activists during the 1970s. Their influence remains 
strong even to the present day (Reynolds 1987, 11).  
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The third and final group was the Thai Communist Party (communist thai)6. Although 
in comparison with communist parties and movements in other Southeast Asian 
countries, the Thai communist movement and party were relatively small, this was the 
only radical movement which managed to survive and continue to function as an 
organisation from the 1920s until the early 1980s. According to an official statement of 
the CPT, the first generation of Thai communist groups began in 1927. From the 
beginning, they were obstructed by both the anti-leftist sentiment of the Thai state7 and 
the Chinese ethnic stereotype of being non-Thai (Bowie 1997, 61-62; Kasian 2001a, 
Chapter 3; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 77-79; Somsak 1991, Chapter 1; Turton, Fast 
and Caldwell 1978, 158). Their real heyday came during the political openness during 
the post-war Pridi Banomyong years (1946-1947). The Thai government was forced by 
the Soviets to abolish the Anti-communist Act as a prerequisite for Thailand’s 
admission into the United Nations (UN). Subsequently, the party was permitted to 
operate more freely in the parliamentary system (Bowie 1997, 61-62; Morell and Chai-
anan 1981, 79; Reynolds 1987, 14-15 and 25). The Thai Communist Party successfully 
developed a very good relationship with the leftist elements in the People’s Party 
(Somsak 1991, 7-10, 182-183 and 216-219)8
                                               
6 In 1952, the Thai Communist Party organized its second congress and formally adopted the name of the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 80). 
. Even during the ascendancy of Pridi after 
the 1947 coup of Phibun Songkhram and the growing power struggle among Phibun 
Songkhram,Sarit Thanarat and Phao Sriyanond (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 18), 
the Thai Communist Party still managed to establish itself in the interstices between the 
power domains of the members of the Coup Group. On top of this, the Thai Communist 
Party advanced in localising and Thai-ifying its organisation and activities to include 
ethnic Thais as well as the labour and farmer movements. The Thai Communist Party 
spent much energy in the Thai cultural market. They established their own printing 
houses and produced a considerable number of printed materials (Kasian 2001a, 
7 This started even prior the twentieth century. King Chulalongkorn expressed his concern about the 
danger of communism as early as 1881. And as early as 1912, even prior to the Soviet revolution, the 
Thai government was concerned with the threat of Bolshevism (Bowie 1997, 61-62; Morell and Chai-
anan 1981, 77-78; Turton and Coldwell 1978, 158). 
8 Many of the leading figures in the Thai Communist Party regularly had political conversations with 
Pridi Banomyong. Even after the 1949 coup, there were efforts by the party to collaborate with Pridi’s 
group in pushing for a joint coup against Phibun Songkhram-Phin Choonhavan, although its effort failed 
at an early stage (Somsak 1991, 7-10, 182-183 and 216-219).  
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Chapter 4; Reynolds 1987, 26; Somsak 1991, 7-10, 17-22, 182-183, 188-208, 218-219 
and 126-127). 
 
These three radical forces collaborated in promoting several radical campaigns and 
movements. Under the pro-Japanese Phibun Songkhram government, many journalists 
and writers and the communist group joined with the left wing groups in the People’s 
Party to promote the underground resistance to the Japanese and the Phibun government 
in the name of the Free Thai Party (seri thai or khana thai isara). Also, while leftist 
intellectuals and journalists played leading roles in promoting the ‘Peace Rebellion 
(kabot santiparp)’ of 1950-1952 against the government’s decision to support the US in 
the Korean war, their campaigns and arguments were highly influenced by Marxist-
Leninist theories of imperialism, communism and their close sympathisers (Kasian, 
2001a, 3 and Chapter 3; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 79; Reynolds 1987, 27; Somsak 
1991, 11-12, 38-40, Chapter 3, 129-120 and 134-137).  
 
However, their heyday came to an end after the two coups of October 1957 and October 
1958. These coups enabled Sarit Thanarat to resolve the power rivalries and emerge as 
an unchallenged military dictator (Reynolds 1987, 34-35; Thak 1979, Chapter 2). 
Amidst the massive suppression campaigns of Sarit, many CPT leaders and personnel 
were arrested and prosecuted. Thereafter, the entire party permanently went 
underground and established an emphasis on secret organisation and recruitment in rural 
areas. Dozens of intellectuals, writers, and progressive politicians were imprisoned, 
jailed, and driven into exile (and in one or two cases executed). Others eventually joined 
the armed revolution with the CPT. For instance, in 1965, Jit Phumisak went 
underground and eventually joined the communist underground after being released 
from jail. Nonetheless, in spite of these suppression measures throughout the late 1950s 
and 1960s, their legacy continued and eventually revived during the rise of new radical 
forces in the 1970s (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 19 and 33; Morrell and Chai-anan 
1981, 81; Reynolds 1987, 25).  
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2.2 Formation and development of the pre-14th October 1973 student movement 
 
Under the political restrictions between 1932 and 1968, the role of students in politics 
was rather minimal, manipulated and apolitical (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 137-139). 
Only in the late 1960s did the country start to witness a new generation of radical 
movements led by students. The political frustrations and unmet aspirations generated 
by the volatile economy, the erosion of authoritarian leadership, the termination of 
political liberalisation, the negative impacts of US military intervention and the wave of 
successful anti-Vietnam War protests awakened the political consciousness of these 
newly privileged middle-class students. Gradually, they started forming a loose but 
powerful movement structure and cross-sector alliance in promoting political campaigns 
against an illegitimate dictatorship and calling for social and political changes. To do so, 
they successfully equipped themselves with New Left ideas and a hybrid discourse of 
liberalism-monarchism-nationalism. 
 
The politically active younger generation of the 1970s was a by-product of the 
expansion of higher education and a new economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Under the ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’ process of the Sarit Thanarat-Thanom 
Kittikachorn-Prapas Jarusathien era and supervision of American advisors and Thai 
technocrats, there was a massive expansion of education at all levels, especially 
universities and technical colleges, both in Bangkok and the regions (Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 16-17 and 177; Prajak 2005, 43). This policy generated significant 
social mobility and offered young people from different classes and backgrounds 
opportunities to access higher education. Once entering the university, this minority 
educated class in Thai society automatically obtained new status which was seemingly 
synonymous with membership in the middle class and national elite. New bourgeois 
strata emerged outside the old feudal-bureaucratic upper class (Anderson 1977, 13 and 
16-17; Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 22; Prajak 2005, 43 and 94-99). 
 
The end of the 1960s boom was a pretext for increasing the initial frustration among 
students. Throughout the 1960s, the war-related economic boom - US financial support 
for military regimes (and Japanese investment) - and national development created 
constant economic growth and enormous expectations among these students about their 
future career prosperity in both the private and public sectors after they graduated 
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(Anderson 1977, 14-16; Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 20-21; Morell and Chai-anan 
1981, 75). But by the late 1960s, this long boom had come to an end. In 1971 and 1972, 
the Americans began to withdraw their troops from Indochina. Their huge financial 
support to the Thai government dropped sharply, together with war-related business. 
The earlier expansion of employment in the public sector, which increased by 10 
percent each year between 1957 and 1967, started dropping to only 2 percent each year 
from 1968 onward (Pasuk and Baker 1993, 512 and 625; Prajak 2005, 93). University 
degrees no longer guaranteed high-status employment. Thai society started witnessing 
waves of demonstrations in response to rising economic frustrations. In 1968, the very 
first demonstration since the Sarit Thanarat era protested an increase in bus fares. About 
2,000 students and citizens marched to the Prime Minister’s residence. Between 
December 1972 and January 1973, a series of campaigns against luxurious and 
extravagant consumption and Japanese goods was promoted by student groups from 
different universities and spread to other provinces. In addition, the campaign noted the 
close ties between foreign economic domination and segments of the Thai military elite. 
The Thanom-Prapas regime was targeted as a major part of the economic problem, 
because of its reputation for blatant corruption and inability to maintain economic 
prosperity as in the Sarit era (Anderson 1977, 18; Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 36-
37; Chanwit 2000, 10; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 75-76, 90 and 143; Saneh 2001, 10-
13). 
 
The crisis of legitimacy of authoritarian government at the end of 1960s brought about 
increasing demands from students for the establishment of democracy. The new 
educated middle class suffered from political suppression by the rigid authoritarian 
regimes of Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) and Thanom-Prapas (1963-1973) (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 50-51). Under Sarit, political participation at the university level and 
access to political activities and positions at the national level were dominated by a 
small number of corrupt and inefficient bureaucratic- military political crony families 
(Prajak 2005, 13-14). Nonetheless, there was no real organised mass student movement 
against authoritarian governments in over a decade. After the death of Sarit in 1963, the 
regime was replaced by the Thanom-Prapas-Narong military government (1963-1973) 
which had less unified power and dictatorial character in comparison with the Sarit 
regime. The censorship imposed by Thanom and Prapas was weaker than under Sarit 
(Anderson 1977, 17-18). Students were allowed to organise socially relevant activities 
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(such as summer work camps in rural areas) for the first time. In 1968, the first 
university election took place at Thammasat University. In addition, between 1969 and 
1970, Thammasat and Chulalongkorn University students who were concerned with 
problems on their own campuses organised many protests against corruption within 
their universities (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139 and 142).  
 
At the same time, under pressure from the US and other governments, the military 
government was forced into political liberalisation9
 
. A more democratic constitution 
was promulgated in 1968 and national elections were allowed in 1969. A few days after 
the new constitution was promulgated, the first student protest in ten years took place 
against the arrest of ‘Hyde Park’ stars giving speeches on the increase in bus fares. 
About 2,000 students and citizens marched to Government House. The release of the 
Hyde Park speakers and reduction in bus fares marked the beginning of student political 
activism. Before and during elections between 1968 and 1969, students organised 
several seminars and panel discussions on democracy and the electoral process, and also 
formed the Election Observer Group (klum sangketkan kan lueak tang) with more than 
3,000 students from fifteen universities and colleges to observe and monitor local and 
national elections (Jaran 2003, 3-5; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 141).  
However, the dream of democratisation was destroyed by the 1971 auto-coup of Prime 
Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn in consolidating absolute power. The coup 
abolished the constitution, parliament, and political parties (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 
90). This move not only provoked immediate anxiety among university students and the 
public (Jaran 2003, 3-5, 106 and 351; Prajak 2005, 459 and 517), it also kindled the 
proliferation of anti-military sentiments and campaigns among students. One of the 
biggest campaigns was against the delayed retirement of Thanom from the military and 
control over politics, as well as the ‘Thung Yai’ scandal - the crash of an overloaded 
helicopter which high ranking police and military officers had used for a personal and 
illegal hunting trip with movie stars in Thung Yai national forest reserve at the 
beginning of 1973. After the expulsion of nine students from Ramkhamhaeng 
University for producing a satirical booklet about these scandals, more than fifty 
                                               
9 At the international level, the sudden rapprochement between Peking and Washington (symbolized by 
Nixon’s visit in February 1972) drastically undermined the credibility of one major rationale for military 
domination ever since 1947 (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 35-36).  
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thousand students marched to the Democracy Monument. They staged a sit-in protest 
for three days that successfully forced the government to allow the students to return to 
school and extended their demand for a new constitution within six months (Jaran 2003, 
154-160; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 145-146; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 133-134). 
 
The anti-authoritarian protests and campaigns for democracy proliferated throughout the 
early 1970s. By early 1973, several turning points brought about a people’s uprisings 
which successfully brought down the two-decades-old authoritarian regime. By mid-
1973, the ‘Constitution Appeal Group (klum riakrong rathathamanun)’ was initiated by 
a group of student leaders like Thirayuth Boonmee, the former Secretary-General of the 
National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai - 
NSCT). It managed to mobilise a petition for a democratic constitution signed by 100 
prominent politicians and intellectuals. On 6th October, thirteen members of the 
Constitution Appeal group were arrested while distributing pamphlets. Promptly, 
hundreds of thousands of students and their allies both in Bangkok and upcountry 
started protesting. In parallel with the principal demand for the immediate release of the 
detainees, the students also demanded completion of the drafting of the new constitution 
within six months (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 146-147; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 
133-134). Without a response from the government the protests expanded. Students at 
Thammasat University decided to call off their final examinations and started gathering 
in protest on their campus. On the morning of October 13th, approximately 500,000 
people gathered in the area around Thammasat University and then marched towards 
Ratchadamnoen Avenue and the Democracy Monument. Early in the morning of 14th 
October, news of the release of the thirteen and the promise of a constitution finally 
reached the demonstrators. However, as they were preparing to disperse, violence broke 
out throughout Bangkok. Over one hundred students and others were killed and several 
government buildings were burned. Finally, on the evening of 14th October news of the 
resignation and exile of Thanom Kittikachorn, Prapas Jarusathien and Narong 
Kittikachorn and the appointment of Sanya Dharmasakti, Rector of Thammasat 
University, as the new Prime Minister calmed the violence by late on 15th October 
(Haberkorn 2007, 35-36; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 145-147) and created a landmark 
of the success of the pre-1970s student movement. 
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Alongside their political campaigns and activities leading up to 14th October 1973, 
student activists developed a loose but powerful movement structure and cross-sector 
alliance. By the early 1970s, they formulated themselves as a loose network of 
unorganised conversation groups and independent political clubs, coffee house councils 
(sapha kafae)10, university societies (Jaran 2003, 8)11, and cross-university 
associations12
 
. In spite of the small numbers of each group, they were active and 
became very well organised and influential (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 141). Students 
often worked with and belonged to more than one organisation and developed cross-
organisation networks. These networks functioned as conjunctions where activists from 
different faculties and universities discussed ideas critical of mainstream political and 
cultural norms, and promoted political activities at both university and national levels. 
Countless activities against the oppressive culture, increases in tuition fees, apolitical 
and extravagant social activities among university students including football matches, 
as well as other political protests against Japanese goods and the Vietnam War (Prajak 
2005, 90-93), were initiated by these small groups of university students (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 144). The people gathered at Thammasat University before 14th 
October comprised students from various universities and schools through these 
networks built earlier.   
For instance, the  Thammasat University Dome Assembly (Sapha Na Dome), located at 
Thammasat University, was a gathering of the most active student activists from many 
clubs and universities of the early 1970s. It promoted political activities including 
                                               
10 Coffee House Forum (sapha kafae) were informal groups of students who gathered regularly in a coffee 
shop to discuss current social and political issues. 
11 Many formal student clubs particularly regional societies, development camps and 
composition/literature clubs, also became places where students shared and expressed their political and 
social frustrations (Jaran 2003, 8). 
12 The most important independent clubs included the Thammasat University Dome Assembly group 
(sapha na dome), the Dharma Economics group (setthatham), Legal Studies (niti sueksa) and the 
Thammasat Women’s Group (klum phu ying thamasat), the New SOTUS (fuenfu SOTUS mai) group at 
Chulalongkorn University, Coffee House Forum (sapha kafae) and Economics Factory group (rong ngan 
setthasat) at Kasetsart University, the Signal View Group (walanchathat) group at Chiang Mai University, 
the New Generation club (khon run mai) and Sons of Ramkhamhaeng club (luk pho khun) at 
Ramkhamhaeng University. As well as in Thailand, political groups and networks were formed among 
Thai students in the USA, Germany, etc., including the Coffee House Forum at Cornell University and 
the We Miss Thailand group (khit thueng muang thai) in the US (Prajak 2005, 46, 89 and 268-273).  
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producing handmade political books which disseminated radical ideas among university 
students, organised rural and labour study groups, and supported progressive and radical 
candidates and political parties at both university and national level (Jaran 2003, 70-80 
and 94-97). At Chulalongkorn University, an older and more conservative university, 
New SOTUS (fuenfu SOTUS mai) emerged, a loose gathering of students who 
disagreed with and aimed to abolish the conservative seniority and hierarchical 
traditional code of SOTUS (acronym for Seniority, Order, Tradition, Unity, and 
Sincerity). They went even further to attack the root cause of the conservative seniority 
system in the undemocratic and corrupt bureaucratic system in Thailand (Prajak 2005, 
88-90). At the same time, the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit 
naksueksa haeng prathet thai), the first formal university network organisation 
established in late 1969, became active in supporting the student movement (Jaran 
2003, 150), even though it had been initially criticised by independent political clubs as 
an apolitical, regressive and non-radical organisation13
 
.  
Besides networking among themselves, student activists successfully allied with and 
mobilised support from various citizen’s groups, and liberal-royalist-radical elite 
networks in late 1973. Sulak Sivarak, a 1960s liberal-monarchist intellectual, was the 
most important point of access to networks and support from the liberal-royalist 
intellectual elite. Due to his upper middle-class family connections, education and 
activities in England, and his prominent reputation upon his return as a social critic and 
writer, Sulak became a bridge among different groups of people (Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 26; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-140). The parithatsan sewana 
(Dialogue Review) group which he founded became a site where 1970s activists 
regularly met and exchanged political and social concerns and mobilised political 
support from progressive intellectuals and the elite13F14. Furthermore, many leading 
students developed connections with senior liberal and socialist politicians, especially 
those from the Democrat Party (Prachathipat) and Economist Party (Setthakon) during 
election monitoring and political campaigning in support of progressive parties and 
                                               
13 When it was organized in 1965, the National Student Centre of Thailand’s main function was to make 
contact with foreign university students, primarily in the context of an exchange programme. The group 
was generally inactive until its revival in 1969 (Jaran 2003, 150; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 141). 
14 During the 1963-1968 period, most of those who became leaders of the October 14, 1973 uprising were 
conscientised and politically inspired by reading Sangkhomsat Parithat (Social Science Review), and 
joined the Parithatsan Sewana group (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-140).  
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candidates (Jaran 2003, 27, 42-43 and 93-95). The office of the Thamma Rangsri law 
firm belonging to Kaiseng Suksai, a progressive former Nakhon Phanom MP, became a 
gathering place where student activists and progressive politicians discussed and 
promoted democratic and anti-authoritarian campaigns. At the same time, they obtained 
strong support from people in different sectors, such as the Lawyers Association of 
Thailand and several newspapers, in applying pressure on the government (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 145).  
 
In terms of ideological framing, a foundation of New Left ideas and a hybrid discourse 
of liberal-monarchist-nationalism was laid underneath the proliferation of student 
activism. The successful experiences and protest technologies of New Left student 
protests and the global anti-war movement during the 1960s were crucial sources of 
political inspiration. Radical Thai students learnt that fellow young people in America 
and France had successfully forced two presidents from power, forced the withdrawal of 
American troops from Indochina, and toppled De Gaulle’s authoritarian Fifth Republic 
in the heady days of May 1968 (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 29-30). In advocating 
the New Left, Marxism and communism, they obtained support from both other liberal 
intellectuals and the CPT15 (Jaran 2003, 150-151 and 216; Prajak 2005, 109-111 and 
120-134; Somsak 2001, 59-64 and 92-93). However, rather than the theoretical or 
philosophical debates of the European tradition of the likes of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin16, their emphases were more on rebellious political culture and the tactics of the 
young. They advocated the integration of liberalism and the New Left of ‘student 
power’ as a force in both the anti-war and anti-authoritarian movements in other 
countries17
                                               
15 The CPT supplied literature of 1950s Thai radical intellectuals and other non-western revolutionary 
movements and heroes in China, Vietnam and Latin America including Mao, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, 
Che Guevara, Lu Xun, CPT, etc., to clubs and student organizations and through their own media, the 
Asia weekly newspaper. Moreover, its ‘The Voice of the People of Thailand’ (VPT) radio station was a 
source of radical inspiration in guiding students in more radical directions (Jaran 2003, 150-151 and 216; 
Somsak 2001, 59-64 and 92-93). 
. They also emphasised a romantic Marxism especially presenting Marxism 
16 A few radical student activists such as those in the Dharma Economics group (sethatham) and 
Thammasat University Dome Assembly (sapha na dome) clubs tried to use Marxist analysis to study Thai 
society. Morell and Chai-anan (1981, 142 and 287) argue that several top student leaders were naïve 
about communism, as only a few of them had had direct contact with the CPT. 
17 As for New Left ideas, countless writings both in Sangkhomsat Parithat (Social Science Review) and 
hand-made books of various political clubs popularised the New Left during the rise of the international 
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through Western18
 
, Third World (Jaran 2003, 219; Prajak 2005, 438-442) and the 1950s 
Thai leftist thinkers (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 32). Above all, they learned to 
familiarise themselves with a rebellious culture and new protest tactics including sit-ins, 
sleep-ins, blockades, and so forth. 
Furthermore, their political campaign was framed in the hybrid discourse of liberalism-
monarchism-nationalism. Firstly, ‘liberal democracy and nationalism’ were bridged. 
Student activists in parallel with liberal/royalist elites and the CPT19
                                                                                                                                         
anti-war movement and proliferation of vibrant student uprisings throughout the world during the 1960s 
and early 70s. Songs with anti-war content and rebellious ideas and singers who promoted anti-war and 
other civil rights movements were mainstreamed and provided political inspiration among activists and 
university students (Prajak 2005, 170-171, 250-251, 299, 266-267 and 303-305). 
 constructed a new 
liberal-nationalist frame in delegitimising nationalist ideas constructed by military 
governments with the support of the US government against communism (Prajak 2005, 
38 and 210-211; Suthachai 2000). They urged strong anti-American nationalism and 
anti-Vietnam War campaigns by highlighting the negative impact of the presence of US 
military bases in the form of serious social problems including rampant prostitution, 
fatherless mixed-race babies, drug addiction, pollution and sleazy commercialisation, as 
well as Thailand’s involvement in an unjust war (Anderson 1977, 22; Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 17-19 and 30-31; Chanwit 2000, 10; Prajak 2005 140-157, 166-70 and 
180-183). They then labelled the US as an oppressive imperialist power sustaining an 
undemocratic military government in Thailand. They condemned the Thai government 
for betraying their nation by selling out national autonomy in favour of their own 
interests and support in sustaining their power. In overcoming these problems the Thai 
people had to fight against the military regime and call for democracy. This hybrid 
frame dominated ideas in promoting campaigns against the Vietnam War and Japanese 
goods, appealing for a democratic constitution and above all campaigns against the 
Thanom-Prapas government (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 35; Jaran 2003, 34-5; 
18 The influences of the New Left on Thai student activists were evident in reference to thinkers like 
Martin Luther King, Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon and Angela Davis. Writings about these people were 
popularized among non-mainstream magazines and newsletters circulated among university students 
(Prajak 2005, 170-171, 250-1, 299 and 303-305).  
19 From time to time, the CPT mentioned its efforts to craft a nationalist approach in reappropriating and 
reclaiming Thainess from the Thai authoritarian regime and in opposition to US imperialism in Thailand, 
which related to the concerns of these student activists (Prajak 2005, 210-1).  
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Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-144 and 287; Prajak 2005, 157, 249-255, 264-277, 
345-353 and 530-532)20
 
.  
This liberal-nationalist frame was reproduced by and among students through their 
alternative media which provided a powerful and influential means for communicating 
and exchanging information. These included books, newsletters and journals that they 
made themselves (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-140), public talks at protest sites, 
anti-military songs, posters, wall books, radio programmes, leaflets, films and plays 
(CPT 2003, 191). Prior to the peak of the anti-authoritarian movement in October 1973, 
the Sangkhomsat Parithat (Social Science Review) and other books produced by the 
Thammasat University Dome Assembly (Sapha Na Dome), Signal View 
(Walanchathat) group (at Chiang Mai University) like Phai Khao (White Menace)21, 
Phai Khiao (Green Menace)22
 
, and so forth, systematically released information and 
writings about Indo-China and the Vietnam War, as well as the linkage between the 
Indochina war and the authoritarian regime (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-140; 
Prajak 2005, 257-277). 
This hybrid frame helped to conceal earlier disagreements and conflicts among different 
groups of students. It offered a common basis for expressing frustration with an 
oppressive political power and culture under authoritarian military governments for 
                                               
20 Liberal and neo-nationalist ideas had been advocated by the younger generation in their social and 
political activism since the mid-1960s. Many 1960s young writers and artists used existentialism and 
surrealism to express and advocate a liberal sense of boredom, alienation and political impotence. Others 
vividly championed ancient ‘Old Siamese’ culture and literature against what it regarded as decadent and 
superficial Westernisation. In addition, at the beginning of the 1970s, naïve reformist zeal, an American 
spirit of utilitarian idealism, and social volunteerism were promoted among university students by Puey 
Ungpakorn, a liberal economist, as well as other liberal-oriented groups and student organizations like the 
Parithatsan Sewana (Dialogue Review) group, the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit 
naksueksa haeng prathet thai), etc. (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 35; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-
140). 
21 In their anti-American and anti-war campaigns, Thammasat University Dome Assembly group (Sapha 
Na Dome) produced Phai Khao (White Menace), the title of an influential book published in 1971 which 
sharply attacked the United States as an imperialist power in Thailand (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 36-
37). 
22 In 1971 a group of students at Chiang Mai University also published a magazine called phai khiao 
(Green Menace), referring to green military uniforms, which was sharply critical of the military’s deep 
involvement in politics (Haberkorn 2007, 66; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 144). 
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groups with different ideological orientations. It temporarily concealed the differences 
between the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng 
prathet thai - NSCT) and independent groups regarding the leadership, objectives and 
strategies of the movement, and encouraged the students to unify in pushing forward the 
anti-authoritarian movement (Somsak 2001, 63-68; Somsak 2004)23
 
. 
Secondly, a ‘nationalist-democratic-monarchist’ discourse was framed and used 
throughout the 14th October uprising (Prajak 2005, 379 and 528-529). While acting as a 
radical force for change, the students in the early 1970s were sympathetic and close to 
the institution of the monarchy. In promoting their campaign, they used monarchism as 
a powerful ideological tool. In the process of recovering its power after a long decline 
during the early part of the 20th century, the monarchy also managed to reconnect itself 
with university students. Through friendly behaviour towards and activities with many 
universities, including the conferring of university degrees, presenting music by himself 
and his family, and giving annual speeches, the popularity of the monarch among 
university students increased. The result was a view among students of the monarchy as 
a supportive and humanised institution when compared with authoritarian governments. 
The King either perceived the student movement as an ally in balancing the power of 
authoritarian regimes or was genuinely sympathetic toward the younger generation.  
The King himself even indirectly encouraged universities to participate in politics. 
Between 1970 and 1973, he counselled students on current issues and the political 
situation, such as corruption, democracy, the generation gap, the significance of youth, 
etc. Even amidst the rise of the student movement in 1972, the King did not discourage 
                                               
23 The mass mobilisation was initially led and unified by independent groups. However, after twelve 
members of the Constitution Appeal group (klum riakrong rathathamanun) were arrested, many former 
National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai – NSCT) members 
joined the mass command unit in negotiating with the government over the release of the protestors. 
Nevertheless, the NSCT confined the objectives of the movement to the release of the protesters and the 
call for a democratic constitution, while independent groups insisted, in line with the demands of the 
demonstrators, on fighting for the overthrow of the authoritarian regime and argued that conforming the 
military government meant accepting its authority. Thus, even after achieving the first two objectives, the 
independent groups still did not stop the demonstration. Subsequently, the NSCT criticised and 
condemned the independent groups, particularly Seksan Prasertkul, as extremist and communist. 
Conflicts and differences among these activists resulted in confusion and miscommunication among the 
leadership of the movement and was part of the reason for the protest after the decision to disband the 
demonstration on the morning of 14th October 1973 (Somsak 2001, 63-68; Somsak 2004). 
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mobilisation by students but instead encouraged them to unite with other parts of 
society and improve the country (Prajak 2005, 464-477 and 491-492). 
 
Furthermore, liberal royalist intellectuals, especially Sulak Sivarak, played a crucial role 
in mainstreaming liberal royalist ideas among their young compatriots. His countless 
articles glorifying the past virtues of Thai monarchs while comparing and attacking the 
corrupt and ineffective authoritarian government were circulated in many journals and 
welcomed among student activists. Furthermore, he regularly invited royalist 
intellectuals and figures to join editorial boards and to contribute writings on their good 
memories of the monarchy in the past (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 139-140; Prajak 
2005, 475-80).  
 
In promoting their anti-authoritarian campaign, student activists linked monarchism 
with democracy and nationalism by constructing a discourse of a ‘democratic king’, 
delegitimising the undemocratic military regime (Prajak 2005, 469, 536-537). The 
historical image of a weak, ineffective and undemocratic monarchy was revised. In their 
newly revised account, the Thai monarch had been the initiator and protector of 
democracy (Prajak 2005, 491 – 99; Somsak 2001, 9–19). For instance, the front page of 
the newsletter issued by the Constitution Appeal group (klum riakrong rathathamanun) 
posted a quotation from the will of King Rama VII in promoting democracy and 
disagreeing with autocracy or authoritarian regimes, without mentioning other historical 
facts24
 
. What they saw in this document was content which was ‘highly relevant’ to 
their demands and which differed totally from that in the document. Furthermore, on the 
morning of 6th October 1973, students called for the power which the authoritarian 
government had immorally taken from the Monarch. Also, on 13th October, the NSCT 
intentionally used the monarchy as a symbolic tactic in legitimising and protecting the 
mass demonstration of 500,000 people, especially during their march out of Thammasat 
University, by holding the national Thai flag and portraits of the King and Queen 
(Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 147; Somsak 2001, 9-19 and 59-64). 
 
                                               
24 ‘I am willing to abdicate the power which earlier belonged to me to all the [Thai] people. However, I 
will not allow my power to be transferred to any particular person or group of people having absolute 
authority without listening to the real voice of the people’ (Constitution Appeal Group 1973). 
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2.3 Radicalisation and unification of the student movement between 14th October 
1973 and 6th October 1976 
 
The triumph of the 14th October incident boosted popular confidence in student power 
(Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 155-156). The new liberal situation, distrust of 
parliamentary politics, the rise of Communist movements both at home and abroad, and 
threats from ultra-right wing movements shifted student activists beyond liberal 
democratic campaigns into leftist directions. The organisation and activities of their 
movement became more and more unified and they started associating with the CPT. 
The polarised situation ended up with the massacre on 6th October 1976 which forced 
thousands of student activists to flee to the communist movement in the jungle.  
 
In the aftermath of the 14th October victory, the appointed liberal government (October 
1973-February 1975) of Sanya Dharmasakti, a retired Thammasat University rector, 
replaced the dictatorship. The government directed their initial efforts toward political 
liberalisation. It promised democracy, free elections (in January 1975 and April 1976), 
the right to organise, freedom of the press and so forth (Anderson 1977, 18 and 22; 
Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 37). At the same time, elite politics after the Thanom 
Kittikachorn and Prapas Jarusathien period experienced a power vacuum. General Krit 
Srivara, the new army commander-in-chief, was reluctant to assume a dominant 
leadership role. This was not only because of the continuing power of Thanom and 
Prapas in certain sections of the army, but also his intention to avoid being attacked by 
the students and the public. His faction was perfectly happy to encourage students and 
the NSCT to attack the ‘three tyrants’ and to leave students in the delusion that they had 
become the prime movers in this political situation. Most of their demands were being 
met by the civilian Sanya government (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 149-150 and 258-
259). These were greeted with great excitement among the student and people’s 
movements, prompting strikes and unrest among labour, farmers, and teachers, calling 
for their rights which had not been respected for decades25
                                               
25 More than 264 pressure groups appeared and 390 demonstrations took place. In labour unrest alone, 
there were 399 strikes from October to December 1973 and 350 from January to December 1974. This 
figure was higher than that for the previous 15 years. Each strike and demonstration gathered tens of 
thousands of people. Before 1973, labor disputes had never exceeded 34 in any one year. Yet in 1973 
there were 577 labor disputes, with over 500 ending in a strike, with nearly 178,000 workers involved. 
. The role of the students 
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became more prominent both inside and outside parliament. At the onset of the 14th 
October victory, student activists were rather optimistic about and very close to the 
appointed liberal royalist government of Professor Sanya Dharmasakti. Some said that 
student leaders could even make a direct telephone call to the Prime Minister if there 
was any matter they would like to discuss with him (Prachachat 17 October 1974, 19-
26). Many student leaders like Thirayuth Boonmee and Pramoj Nakornthap were 
invited to join the constitutional drafting committee. The government provided funds 
and opportunities for the universities to play a leading role in the nationwide 
Democracy Propagation Programme (khrongkan phoeiphrae prachathipatai) Sub-
committee. The elected governments of Seni Pramoj (February-March 1975 and April-
October 1976) and Kukrit Pramoj (March 1975-January 1976) were also initially 
accepted by students due to their liberal and democratic reputations. 
 
In spite of the initial political popularity, the liberal governments and their socialist-
oriented coalition parties were hard pressed to respond to the immense demands of the 
student and people’s movements because of the political instability of weak coalition 
governments. Their reform programmes were far too modest for the students (Morell 
and Chai-anan 1981, 131-132, 193, and 261-268; Suthachai 2001, 66-67). On some 
issues, the government ended up compromising with former ruling and business cliques 
rather than responding to the demands of the majority of the population (Saneh 2001, 3-
4). Students became distrustful of the parliamentary and liberal democratic system and 
started opting for more radical alternatives.  
 
The increase in radicalisation among student activists after 14th October 1973 came of 
age in the shadow of the Communist victories at both the international and regional 
levels. While the pre-14th October 1973 movement was inspired by the rise of western 
leftist movements after 1968, after 14th October 1973, student activists became more 
radicalised amidst the triumphs and expansion of communist governments and 
Communist-style guerrilla warfare in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. This created a 
surge of sympathy towards radicalism among students (Kasian 1984a, 46; Giles 2003b; 
Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 152-153). Furthermore, after 14th October 1973, information 
and knowledge about China entered more freely and circulated openly among Thai 
                                                                                                                                         
Seventy-three percent of these strikes occurred after the October 1973 uprising. In 1974, 358 strikes saw 
over 100,000 workers involved (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 187; Mallet 1978, 80-82).  
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activists and the public. This was partly because the Thai governments shifted toward a 
foreign policy more sympathetic toward China in line with the eastward foreign policy 
of the US26
 
. This responded to the desire and curiosity of students for radical political 
inspiration from nearby communist countries like China (Suthachai 2001, 68-69).  
In addition, the escalation of anti-communist suppression measures of ultra-right wing 
movements taken against the political activities of student activists and social 
movements left active students with no middle ground but radicalism (Prudhisan 1987; 
Suthachai 2001, 118). The straitened economic circumstances and political instability 
created by mass movements turned businessmen and the middle class, who earlier had 
supported the mass demonstrations of October 1973, toward right wing sentiments to 
the extent that they even welcomed the return to dictatorship three years later. With 
little experience in politics and unsophisticated ideas about government, it is easy to 
blame the economic deterioration on the increase in the number of strikes and worker 
irresponsibility. The growth of socialist and revolutionary elements within student and 
social movements particularly on the issues of the anti-Thai feudalism and anti-
monarchism also created fear among royalist forces (Anderson 1977, 9, 18 and 23; 
Somsak 2001, 9-15 and 96-97). Above all, the level of tension increased greatly after 
the victory of revolutionary communism throughout Indochina in the spring of 1975. 
The abolition of the Laotian monarchy at the end of 1976 aroused enormous alarm in 
conservative, military and royalist circles27
 
. To protect themselves from the rise of 
leftist and communist movements, royalist forces, conservative politicians and capitalist 
groups organised ultra-right wing movements from all social strata and promoted anti-
communist measures against radical elements within the growing social movements 
(Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 268-269; Sarakadee 2000, 73; Somsak 2001, 9-15, 96-97, 
and 167-170).  
                                               
26 By the early 1970s the People’s Republic of China became a permanent member of UN Security 
Council and Nixon made a formal visit to China in 1972. In response to this, in 1974 and 1975 the Sanya 
Dharmasakti government signed a trade agreement with China, and PM Kukrit Pramoj made a formal 
visit to China. In early 1975 Bangkok began to normalize relations with the new Indochinese states. 
27 The communist and genocidal Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975. Not even two 
weeks later, on 30 April 1975, Saigon fell to the Vietnam People’s Army. The Pathet Lao established the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic on 2 December 1975 (Anderson 1977, 17 and 23-24; Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 39; Haberkorn 2007, 228; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 4 and 163). 
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A variety of new rightist organisations emerged. Principal among them,  ‘New Force 
(nawaphon)’, an ultra-right wing propaganda think-tank, aggressively advocated anti-
communist ideas in public. It comprised right wing middle-class intellectuals, writers, 
and priests, members of military wives clubs, government officials, etc. Some, like the 
monk Kittivudho, overtly claimed that ‘killing communists was not a sin’ (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 235-252). The ‘Village Scouts (luk suea chaoban)’ were initially 
organised by the Border Patrol Police in rural areas to counter the CPT. However, 
between 1973 and 1976, it integrated more well-to-do groups, the middle-aged, 
provincial officials, rural notables, middle and high income peasants and the urban 
nouveaux riches in small towns and later in Bangkok. At its peak, around two million 
people out of forty million of Thai citizens registered as Village Scouts. These people 
were bound by ‘semi-fascist’ ideas, mythical rituals of patriotism, disaffection with the 
excesses of democracy and fear of the emerging communist threat. Furthermore, under 
the divide-and-rule strategy, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) 
spawned the ‘Red Gaurs (Krathing Daeng)’, a militant anti-communist student network. 
It recruited vulnerable young members of the petty bourgeoisie, especially vocational 
and technical school students who were caught in a time of widespread unemployment, 
with little hope of obtaining government jobs and scornful of factory work. They were 
ideologically aroused by extreme anti-communist ideas and financially supported to stir 
up violence against all activities and demonstrations by university student and social 
movements (Anderson 1977, 20 and 27-28; Bowie 1997; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 
235-252; Somsak 2001, 147-8; Suthachai 2001, 128-134). 
 
One major direction of the anti-communist campaign was against student activists and 
their activities through both ideological campaigns and violent action. They generalised 
all reformist, radical and leftist ideas as communism. They convinced the public that 
students and political activists were traitors to the nation, had adopted foreign 
communist ideas, and had obtained external support. Stories of connections between 
student leaders and financial support from the KGB and military training in Hanoi were 
repeated in all right wing media. Rightwing media persistently depicted socialist-
oriented activities as a plot to overthrow the royal institution (Suthachai 2001, 126-128 
and 131-133). Leaflets were distributed all over the country accusing student leaders 
and Socialist Party, Socialist Front, and New Force politicians of being communists 
who wanted to destroy the ‘nation, religion, and monarchy’ (Morell and Chai-anan 
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1981, 4 and 172). Physical attacks, arrests and assassinations in both group and 
individual cases regularly occurred. Media censorship was widespread, including the 
closure of publishing houses and newspapers. 
 
Information was revealed in February 1975 about two controversial mass killing cases 
including the ‘Na Sai village’ and ‘Red Oil Drum (thang daeng)’ cases, where 3,000 
people were assassinated by being burned alive by either the military, the police or the 
Internal Security Operations Command. The Red Oil Drum cases occurred in southern 
Thailand, particularly Phatthalung Province, involving those accused of being 
communist. In early 1976, Dr. Boonsanong Punyodyana, Secretary-General of the 
Socialist Party of Thailand (sangkhomniyom haeng prathet thai) and a figure respected 
among student activists, and a New Force Party MP from Lopburi Province were 
assassinated. Also during the peak of anti-US base demonstrations in Bangkok in March 
1976, the Krathing Daeng threw bombs into the protests causing 4 deaths and more than 
70 injuries. Many leaders of anti-dam protests were assassinated in July 1974 (Anderson 
and Mendiones 1985, 38; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 263-264; Suthachai 2001, 101-
103 and 125).  
 
This two-year-long polarised conflict between right wing groups and the growing the 
left wing student movement eventually came to an end with the massacre on the 
morning of October 6th 1976. Amidst efforts by conservative members of elite and 
royalist groups to bring the Thanom Kittikachorn-Prapas Jarusathien regime back to 
Thailand, the student movement struck back. The National Student Centre of Thailand 
(sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai) collaborated with the National Labour 
Council of Thailand in a prolonged nationwide protest. The final act of the crisis opened 
on September 25th in Nakhon Pathom Province west of Bangkok with the hanging of 
two activists after they had been stopped by police for distributing anti-Thanom 
Kittikachorn posters. Students rallying at Thammasat University held a mock hanging 
to dramatise the deaths of the two workers. Whether by design or unfortunate accident, 
the makeup applied to one of the young actors left him with a resemblance to Crown 
Prince Vajiralongkorn. Rightist newspapers, radio stations, political parties and groups 
demanded the immediate punishment of those responsible for this act of lèse majesté 
(Anderson 1977, 13; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 274).  
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On the night of 5th October 1976, a militant group of Red Gaurs (Krathing Daeng) 
attacked students at Thammasat University all night long. In the early morning of 6th 
October, hundreds of armed police, several heavily armed Border Patrol Police units 
and thousands of Village Scouts (luk suea chaoban), Red Gaurs, and other vigilantes, 
opened fire and tried to force their way into the Thammasat University campus. Some 
students were burned alive and lynched from nearby trees. Hundreds were killed and 
wounded. And around 3,000 students were arrested (Anderson and Mendiones1985, 39; 
Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 274-275; Somsak 2001, 155-160). That evening the 
military took power once more, and shortly afterwards the extremist right wing regime 
of Tanin Kraivixien, an ultra-conservative judge specialising in anti-communist policy, 
was installed. Books published by radical students were burned and banned. Student 
political activities were prohibited (Chanthana 1987, 230; Connors 2003, 91-92; Thikan 
2005, 16-20). In the wake of these events, thousands of left-leaning intellectuals, 
writers, students, and politicians went underground, many of them seeking refuge 
eventually with the Communist Party of Thailand in the jungles of the North, Northeast, 
and South (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 39). 
 
In promoting these political activities throughout this period, the student movement 
became more unified and radical than before 14th October 1973. Student organisations 
and activities in high schools, universities and political parties became dominated by 
radical activists. At the high-school level, huge numbers of schools, particularly in 
Bangkok, were organised and radicalised by the Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang 
nakrian haeng prathet thai - SCT). These high school students campaigned against the 
culture of corruption and called for political participation at their schools. By mid-1975, 
these radical students took control over student councils, clubs and societies at their 
schools, and then turned them into political mechanisms for the wider radical movement 
(Cheep and Parakorn, interview by author, 21 March 2007 and 7 February 2007, 
Bangkok). At the same time, they provided support for university students and farmer 
and labour movements. The Student Centre of Thailand also arranged to spread their 
radical high school members to as many universities as possible to advocate radicalism 
in upcountry and less well-known universities, as well as moderate groups within the 
prominent universities (Jariya and Ped, interview by author, 24 February 2007 and 25 
November 2006, Bangkok; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 162; Somsak 2001).  
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At the university level, by mid-1975, students who had turned radical succeeded in 
transforming student councils, societies and clubs into leftist organised units. Right after 
14th October 1973, radical and leftist student parties started establishing and attracting 
more members in nearly all universities. Furthermore, they managed to radicalise 
moderate parties into a more leftist direction. Another important symbolic victory was 
success in seizing power in the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit 
naksueksa haeng prathet thai - NSCT) in 1975 (Cheep, Ped and Pha, interview by 
author, 21 March 2007, 25 November 2006 and 3 March 2007, Bangkok; Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 162; Somchai P., interview by author, 29 March 2007, 
Mahasarakham). After competing with moderate forces, a group of leftist students led 
by Kriengkamol Laohapairoj, a radical candidate who was supported and influenced by 
radical rank-and-file supporters and secretly by CPT members managed to win the 
position of NSCT secretary-general over moderate and liberal candidates. Under his 
leadership, the NSCT became a radical umbrella organisation helping to consolidate the 
radical student movement in a unified direction (Somsak 2001, 94-95; Suthachai 2001, 
114).  
 
In promoting radical activism, students associated themselves with the liberal 
government and socialist-oriented parties. Several radical members of the NSCT 
became the driving force behind campaigns for social and political reforms (Anderson 
and Mendiones 1985, 37). In the constitutional drafting process, many leading students 
actively participated in its research and public participation subcommittees (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 109-111). Furthermore, many of them played crucial roles helping 
socialist politicians in setting up and running as MPs for the Socialist Party of Thailand 
(sangkhomniyom haeng prathetthai) in late 197428
 
. 
Aside from working in alliance with liberal elites and political parties, student activists 
were strongly engaged with the rise of the farmer and labour movements. Starting from 
the nationwide Democracy Propagation Programme (khrongkan phoeiphrae 
                                               
28 The Socialist party of Thailand (sangkhomniyom heng prathetthai) was an amalgamation of the 1969-
1971 Social Democrat party (sangkhom niyom prachathipatai) then led by former MP Col. Somkhit 
Sisangkhom, and the People for Democracy group (prachachon phuea prachathipatai) headed by 
Thirayuth Boonmee, a former secretary-general of the National Student Centre of Thailand. Somkit was 
elected the new party’s leader. Former radical MP Kaiseng Suksai became deputy leader, and Dr. 
Boonsanong Punyodyana, secretary-general (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 111). 
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prachathipatai), the NSCT collaborated with the State University Bureau in promoting 
democracy and rural development. Later on, the Federation of Independent Students of 
Thailand (sahaphap naksueksa seri) under the leadership of Seksan Prasertkul, initiated 
a rural visit programme. Hundreds and later thousands of university students were sent 
for in-depth visits to the most remote and poverty-stricken rural parts of the country. 
However, instead of advocating democracy, many students turned to organising farmer 
movements and promoting social revolution. They started lecturing puzzled farmers 
about the evils of capitalism, the threat of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
the need for class struggle. Using the grievances accumulated from years of neglect, 
they were able to convince many farmers to organise themselves in order to place 
effective pressure on the government to act on their behalf and to fight oppression by 
local landlords or government officials. In empowering the farmers, students inspired 
them with the success of the 14th October uprising. They described how an organised 
group of students - without arms - had succeeded in bringing down a seemingly 
omnipotent military regime (Haberkorn 2007, Chapter 4: 175-176, 180-181, and 191-
198; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 151-154 and 213-215; Suthachai 2001, 112; Yuangrat 
and Wedel 1987, 150). From early 1974 onwards, the student organisations became 
crucial supporters of a large-scale network for the farmer movement. In March 1974, 
with support from the NSCT, farmers staged their first large-scale protest, gaining 
nationwide attention for their demands for higher rice prices. By the end of 1974, with 
support from student activists, the National Assembly passed the Land Rent Control Act 
and the Farmers’ Federation of Thailand (FFT) was set up to monitor implementation of 
the law and mobilise farmers throughout the country (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 
37; Haberkorn 2007, 211; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 223-224; Yuangrat and Wedel 
1987, 150).  
 
Even other student groups with less radical elements shifted into a more radical 
direction. Many formerly liberal-oriented students like Seksan Prasertkul and Thirayuth 
Boonmee eventually broke away from liberal student groups like the NSCT and formed 
their own radical organisations. Seksan formed the Federation of Independent Students 
of Thailand to work directly with labour and farmers’ movements. Thirayuth set up 
People for Democracy group (prachachon phuea prachathipatai) to promote activities 
which were more leftist than what he had carried out before 14th October 1973 (Kasian 
1996, 78-80; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 149-150 and 218-219; Yuangrat and Wedel 
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1987, 150-151). Jiranan Pitpreecha, a female Chulalongkorn University student leader 
during 14th October, became involved in the radical movement. After 1973 she became 
a kind of unofficial spokeswoman for the radical movement on women’s issues and 
used communist and revolutionary language in her writings (Morell and Chai-anan 
1981, 154, 159-161, 189-190 and 196; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 142-143).  
 
Student activists formed alliances and worked hand in hand with labour and urban poor 
groups. The Federation of Independent Students of Thailand concentrated its work on 
slum dwellers in the capital and cooperated with emerging trade union leaders to 
campaign for higher wages and better working conditions. The NSCT worked hard in 
supporting the first major strikes of textile industry workers in June 1974 which 
included thousands of workers from about 600 factories. Most importantly, they played 
a significant role in the first explicit formation of the samprasan, a tripartite alliance of 
students, farmers, and workers. Students went to the villages and mobilised many 
Central Plain farmers to lend support to the demonstrations of labourers. This political 
coalition, unprecedented in Thailand, caused much alarm among counterinsurgency 
agencies (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 154, 159-161, 189-190 and 196). 
 
In addition to collaboration with farmers and labourers, student activists in environment 
and natural resource conservation clubs mobilised a radical environmental movement. 
They successfully linked environmental problems with class and state exploitation and 
US imperialism. They argued about collaboration between the Thai state and capitalist 
class against the people in their campaigns against deforestation, petro-chemical 
industry pollution, pollution of the Mekong River caused by a factory, a reservoir in 
Chonburi Province storing water for Pattaya tourist town but putting more than 2,000 
households under water. Furthermore, the environment conservation clubs from 37 
institutes, the NSCT, the Law Study Club Thammasat University, and other groups 
mobilised more than 10,000 protesters to promote campaigns against the impact of the 
illegal concession to the Temco mine in Southern Thailand and the planned construction 
of a US military radar station in northern Thailand. They highlighted US imperialism as 
a major threat to the Thai environment and fought for the autonomy of the Thai 
environment (Suthachai 2001, 122-126). 
 
The student movement became closer to the CPT both in organisation and ideology. 
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Through a wide range of media channels including printing houses, newspapers, weekly 
magazines, underground booklets and a radio station (Voice of the People of Thailand – 
withayu siang prachachon heng prathetthai), Maoist ideas and CPT political strategies 
became the only leftist ideas which were comprehensively and fully translated into Thai 
(Suthachai 2001, 117). Newspapers like Asia and Pituphum (The Fatherland), which 
were secretly supported by the CPT branch in Bangkok, became the main source of 
information about China, the CPT, and above all Marxist-Maoist ideology and 
revolutionary strategies (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 287-288; Somsak 2001, 59-64). 
When the government recognised the People’s Republic of China in early 1975 and 
began to normalise relations with the new Indochinese states after April of that year, 
publications of militant leftist literature expanded even further. Some handbooks used 
by the CPT to train its cadres were openly on sale in Bangkok’s bookstands and 
university bookstores. Party pamphlets such as Chiwathat Yaowachon (Youth’s View of 
Life), written by a member of the CPT politburo, were distributed freely on university 
campuses (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 163).  
 
Their messages were spread and reproduced by and among students. Hundreds of 
pamphlets and books on Marxism and Maoism were published in Thailand and widely 
read by secondary and college students. By late 1975, most active students - leaders of 
the NSCT, the Student Centre of Thailand and various student unions in major 
universities - had become committed to the pursuit of a revolutionary path. The 
statements of student leaders came to resemble the CPT’s policy guidelines. Both 
groups stressed the struggle for independence and attacked US imperialism, foreign 
capitalists and investors, feudal elements, the military, bureaucratic capitalists, and the 
liberal democratic form of government. Student publications emphasised their interest 
in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and used leftist terminology, such as ‘US imperialists’, 
‘capitalists’, ‘feudalists’, ‘warlords’, ‘exploitation’, ‘armed struggle’, ‘cultural 
revolution’, and so forth. Even a magazine published by the Buddhist Thai cultural 
group of a Bangkok high school declared that Thai youth had to be united and 
coordinate their struggle with the masses in order to destroy ‘the rotten and reactionary 
social system’ and establish ‘a new social order with real independence and freedom.’ A 
writer with the pen name ‘Revolutionary Youth’ in another student magazine, Yuwathat 
(Youth View), appealed to students to take up arms against ‘capitalists, feudalists and the 
bourgeoisie.’ By mid-1975, Athipat (Sovereign), the NSCT newspaper, supported the 
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CPT’s stand and published articles and editorial columns arguing that the only way to 
improve society was through revolutionary means, not through democracy or an 
evolutionary course. In one issue Athipat went so far as to publish a column explaining 
exactly how to use the Russian-made AK-47 machine gun, the CPT’s basic weapon. 
Thirayuth Boonmee had become well versed in Marxism and Maoism and had 
translated into Thai a book, The Chinese Path to Socialism (bon sen thang su sangkhom 
niyom chin), written in English. New revolutionary cultural objects mushroomed and 
echoed the revolutionary massages. University ‘songs for life’ bands started composing 
and performing revolutionary songs and those which had been composed by leading 
Thai revolutionaries affiliated with the CPT. Several of the CPT’s own songs were 
played on the party’s clandestine radio station to which many of the students listened, 
and were whistled and sung openly on university campuses (Morell and Chai-anan 
1981, 162-163, 172, 288-290). These helped in simplifying complicated Maoist texts 
and enhancing sentiments for the revolutionary mission (Suthisak, interview by author, 
13 December 2006, Bangkok). 
 
Several scholars argue that by early 1973, student activists and their organisations 
became counterfeit Maoist organising units and part of the CPT force (Kasian 1984a, 
44-45; Somsak 2001, 59-64). Students turned to promoting political activities in line 
with CPT ideas. Activists in nearly all universities collaborated with the Farmers’ 
Federation of Thailand which appeared to be a front organisation of the CPT. Political 
study groups organised among students clearly functioned as a means of teaching and 
spreading Maoist ideas and promoting the revolutionary mission rather than as 
intellectual debates and exercises as before 14th October (Cheep and Ped, interview by 
author, 21 March 2007 and 25 November 2006, Bangkok; Kasian 1984a, 44-45). By 
early October 1976, nearly 1,000 students and half or more of their leadership had 
already been in contact with CPT members (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 289-290). 
 
Underneath the unified picture of a radical student movement and its shift toward a 
radical direction with the Maoist-Communist discourse of former liberal students, the 
organisational relationship and ideological integration between students and the CPT 
was complicated and contested. At the same time, activism and the ideological framing 
process were not strictly confined. The contest and competition among different shades 
of student activists continued. 
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The organisational domination and ideological guidance of the CPT over students was 
loose, decentralised and distant through a unit cell structure rather than by direct line of 
command. Before the 14th October uprising, the CPT had little interest in the student 
movement due to its rural policy focus and awareness of anti-communist suppression 
measures and its illegal status (Kanok 1981, 305-306; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 286-
287). There were few CPT members in urban areas who developed secret connections 
with a few student leaders. Many CPT members helped to push forward the Group 
Appealing for a Constitution and urged their children and people in labour unions to 
join the demonstration. They also worked behind several people in newspapers and 
publishing houses to collaborate in support of the student movement (Somsak 2001, 59-
64). However, in doing so, the CPT had to maintain security. Direct communications or 
a direct relationship between students and the party was limited (Jaran 2003, 218-221).  
After the success of the student movement on 14th October, the central committee of the 
CPT began to take an active interest in the student movement (Morell and Chai-anan 
1981, 286-287; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 152-153). But their focus was still on a rural 
militant revolutionary strategy. For the CPT, the revolution in the city by students was 
an inspiration for the revolutionary movement but not the correct political strategy 
(Somsak 2001, 59-64). Right before 6th October 1976, there were still only small 
numbers of students recruited into the formal CPT organisation (Somsak 2004).  
 
The activities of radical students did not focus only on rural and militant strategies. In 
parallel with mobilising rural farmers, their work also emphasised alliances with the 
progressive bourgeoisie, support for the labour movement, promotion of electoral 
democracy and environmental issues (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 159-161). 
 
Many student leaders who had matured politically before 14th October 1973 still 
perceived themselves as a successful student force independent from the CPT and were 
radicalised through various political ideas including liberal royalism, New Leftism, and 
social democracy. (Kasian 1984a, 43; Kasian 1996, 78-80; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 
152-153). Many of them insisted on supporting the approaches of parliamentary 
politics, civil disobedience and non-violence. From time to time, liberal-socialist 
students and their approach were condemned by more radical students, particularly 
those who were radicalised through Maoist ideas after 14th October 1973. They were 
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labelled by their younger fellows as ‘liberal reactionaries’, ‘petite bourgeoisie’ and 
‘self-proclaimed liberal heroes’. The debates among different groups of students 
normally ended up as ideological dialogues in alienating and disempowering liberal 
ideas in the movement and opening a space for CPT ideology to lead the student and 
people’s movement (Kasian 1996, 80). 
 
In terms of ideology, the success of the CPT in achieving a dominant role was not 
merely in promoting Maoism and Communism. But the framing process also integrated 
a ‘nationalist’ ideology and highlighted the 1950s Thai left heroes. The CPT 
emphasised a strong sense of anti-Westernism and antagonism against the Thai state 
which had developed among students before 14th October (Thongchai 1994, 10). At the 
same time, the party added to this earlier broad nationalism a neo-nationalism which 
mainly focused on anti-US imperialist ideas and promoted international socialism, 
particularly alliances with eastern states like China (Suthachai 2001, 94-101).  
 
The glorification of the 1950s Thai left helped in linking the younger student activists 
with the CPT. In entering the post-1973 new radical period, students searched for a 
history of their own. While a Thammasat literary group stumbled onto Jit Phumisak’s 
work and started excavating his works (Reynolds 1987, 39), the CPT intentionally 
distributed information about Thai left intellectuals (Somsak 1991, 22-37). The party 
handed in manuscripts to student activists and published Jit’s works and biography 
through the party publishing houses (Prajak 2005, 312-314; Somsak 2004). Between 
1973 and 1976, Jit’s poems, music, reviews, essays, and scholarly studies as well as 
those of other progressive writers of the 1950s were popularised among students 
(Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 33 and 38; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 300; Reynolds 
1987, 14-16; Somsak 1991, 22-37). This discovery and the reprinting of his works made 
possible linkages between the 1950s and 1973-1976 which helped to define and fortify 
the emergent post-1973 consciousness, while the CPT was something far away. The 
1950s intelligentsia were closer in educational background and in age. And Jit’s life 
brought them closer to armed struggle and the CPT. Even though Jit Phumisak and Pridi 
Banomyong had neither been party members in their lifetimes nor had a smooth 
relationship with the party, the CPT made Jit a party member only after his death to 
produce a biography of him after October 1973 to capitalise on his growing popularity 
(Reynolds 1987, 14-17). Nonetheless, the CPT succeeded in romanticising and 
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portraying a linkage and interwoven history between the CPT and 1950s Thai radical 
intellectuals. The party portrayed persons like Jit and Pridi as Thai radical intellectuals 
who eventually agreed with the CPT’s militant strategy, and who chose to join and 
dedicate their lives to the armed struggle of the CPT (Prajak 2005, 312-314; Somsak 
1991). They released more and more information about the residency of Assanee 
Polachantra (Nai Pee - Mr. Ghost) in the jungle with the CPT, the death of Jit Phumisak 
at Phu Phan, a CPT revolutionary stronghold. Subsequently, students took a more and 
more romanticised view of a revolutionary with the CPT in the jungle and became 
convinced that militant revolution was the only option.  By the late 1970s, these older 
home-grown Marxists had largely replaced the international New Left as the central 
influence. Jit Phumisak became the model of how to be a ‘revolutionary intellectual’ for 
left wing students of the 1973-1976 period. Revolutionaries like Assanee Polachantra  
who turned himself into a militant fighter in the jungle became legends (Somsak 2004). 
 
 
2.4 Life with the armed struggle and the decline 
 
The political polarisation between the student movement and ultra-right wing groups 
between 1973 and 1976 ended with the massacre of students at Thammasat University 
on the 6th October 1976. The massacre and the military coup that followed in its wake 
marks the beginning of student participation in the armed struggle of the CPT. The 
continuing threat of the ultra-right wing movement and the welcoming policy of the 
CPT encouraged most radical students to flee to the jungle and join the revolutionary 
struggle. However, life in the revolutionary bases was different from their expectations. 
They were assigned to propaganda work and other mundane activities, rather than 
ideological and intellectual exercises. They experienced ideological conflicts with the 
CPT and among themselves during the Indochina conflict. The collapse of the CPT and 
the shift of the Thai government in a more moderate direction by 1980 eventually drove 
all students home.  
 
The direct experience of the massacre at Thammasat University, the series of arrests and 
threats and the later domination of an ultra-conservative government and forces, made 
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both liberals and radicals understand that there was no space left for them in Bangkok29 
(Anderson 1977, 24; Haberkorn 2007; Kasian 1984a, 43; Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 
277-278). In the meantime, the CPT, which had reached its peak both in terms of 
support from Communists in Indochina30 as well as expansion of its military activities 
and areas throughout the country (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 159, 195 and 295), 
immediately condemned the sakdina (aristocracy), royalists, business elites and US 
imperialists as the forces behind the killings on 6th October (Thikan 2005, 21-25). It 
affirmed that joining the armed struggle and revolutionary movement of the CPT was 
the only way to survive and win against the conservative regime and right wing 
movements. This sympathetic move impressed and convinced the vast majority of 
radical students. An estimated 3,000 students, farmer leaders, labour leaders, leftist 
politicians, nurses and intellectuals, gave up their university places, civil service jobs, 
union posts, and teaching positions and fled to the hills into the arms of the insurgent 
movement (Jiranan 2006, 214-216; Kasian 1984a, 43; Kasian 1996, 80-82; Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981, 285-293 and 299-300; Thikan 2005, 1, 21-25 and 44)31
 
. 
The processes and routes by which student activists reached the revolutionary bases 
varied. Some fled directly to the jungle through earlier connections with CPT members, 
while others had to roam around different places searching for contacts. Through 
                                               
29 More than 3,094 students were arrested on 6th October 1976. 2,000, 200, 700 and 100 were detained in 
Bangkhen, Chonburi, and Nakhon Pathom prisons and police stations, respectively. Although most were 
released on bail, 19 leading activists and labor unionists were tried on communism charges in military 
courts. These students and unionists were detained for 710 days before being released without charge.  
30 With full support from communist neighbours in Indochina between 1975 and 1978, the CPT 
dramatically expanded its military activities, not only in military supplies, but also in the availability of 
secure rear bases in which to train party cadres, soldiers, and hospitalise the wounded (Kanok 1981, 384-
385). By 1975, estimates of the armed threat showed some 8,000 to 10,000 full-time armed insurgents, 
supported by some 6,000 to 7,000 unarmed civilian activists in the CPT infrastructure (Morell and Chai-
anan 1981, 195 and 295). 
31 Many left-wing student activists were temporarily imprisoned or fled abroad. While official statistics 
from ISOC stated around 1,000 students went into the jungle, other independent and radical media gave 
estimates ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 and more who joined the armed struggle of the CPT. Because those 
who were in the Southern revolutionary base alone were more than 1,000, and more than around 500- 
1,000 postponed enrollment at Thammasat University the following year (Jiranan 2006, 214-216; Morell 
and Chai-anan 1981, 285-286, 291-293 and 299-300; Thikan 2005, 1 and 44). And recently, Kasian 
(1996, 80-82) mentioned on the 20th anniversary of 6th October that at least 3,000 students joined the 
armed struggle of the CPT after 6th October 1976.    
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different routes, some near and some far, students were spread out at various 
revolutionary bases throughout the country (Thikan 2005, 47-48).  Upon arrival, the 
students were impressed by the warmth and courtesy of the CPT in sharing their anger 
and bitterness (Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 152-153). This was the most enjoyable 
period of their revolutionary experience. It was the first time they had met real 
communists and the revolutionary base communes of the CPT which they had only 
dreamt of or read about. They were excited by the unfamiliar culture of the CPT, and 
they were soon calling each other ‘comrade (sahai)’ and coining pseudonyms. They 
were moved by the support of local people for the CPT. In the south in particular, most 
local villagers sent their children to join and provided the required resources for the 
CPT (Thikan 2005, 72). Above all, they gained courage with the influx of more student 
friends (Vi, interview by author, 8 December 2006, Chiang Mai) and official 
declarations and news of student leaders joining the revolutionary struggle led by the 
CPT (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 296-297; Thikan 2005, 70 and 87-88). 
 
Upon arrival at revolutionary bases, students had to join Military and Political Training 
Schools which had been specially organised for them. The theoretical classes and 
reading groups at these schools were mainly dominated by the strict ideas and history of 
the Maoist CPT32
                                               
32 Readings were limited to Maoist literature, CPT declarations and agreements, and other CPT thinkers’ 
writings which focused on and covered mainly CPT’s analysis of Thai society as semi-colonial and semi-
feudal, the revolutionary strategies of the CPT in promoting a revolutionary people’s war in rural areas 
and democratic war in urban areas, etc. Moreover, the learning process in theoretical classes in the jungle 
was more instructive than interactive (Thikan 2005, 25-40 and 49; Ungpakorn 2003b, 204). 
. These mostly functioned to confirm the understanding and loyalty of 
students to the CPT ideological direction rather than promoting leftist ideological 
dialogues (Kanok 1981, 305-309). Students had already seen and heard most of the 
literature read in group discussion before joining the CPT (Rue-dee 1996, 173; Thikan 
2005, 28-30, 65-67 and 171-177). The main focus at the schools was basic practical and 
military skills training for their survival and military combat. Students were trained for 
propaganda work. They learned how to work independently in mobilising the process of 
listening to problems - building up friendship - establishing and living with/in the 
community – persuading - organising people to stand up to fight against the Thai state. 
Students with special training, particularly those with medical and musical 
backgrounds, were also sent to Vietnam and China for further specialised training. They 
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were expected to return and provide long-term support for the revolutionary war (Kanok 
1981, 314–317; Thikan 2005, 124–128). 
 
After a brief introduction at the schools, rank-and-file students were placed in small 
groups of five to ten to work in different functions in some of the 250 liberated villages 
where the CPT was in full control (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 296-297; Yuangrat and 
Wedel 1987, 161-162). In the liberated zones, students worked actively as 
‘supplementary’ teams for the party in various capacities. They were mostly assigned 
according to the skills and professions which they had developed and established prior 
to entering the jungle (Thikan 2005, 48-51).  Their work ranged from activities in the 
cultural and music division, military action, alliance development, medical services, 
advocacy and mass mobilisation, and producing radio programmes for Voice of the 
People of Thailand (withayu siang prachachon heng prathetthai) and newsletters for 
revolutionary bases, research and theoretical studies etc (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 
296-297). Furthermore, they used their professional skills to work for the community 
and production sections in support of the CPT and local people in the liberated zones. 
While some organised schools and provided medical services, others provided technical 
support for these remote communities including electricity, water systems, etc. (Jiranan 
2006, 156; Working Committee of Phoo Payak Monument 2005, 60-90 and 129-133). 
 
Later, some who proved tough enough to join frontline units would be assigned to join 
the ‘armed propaganda units’ with the armed forces - the People’s Liberation Army of 
Thailand. Their mission was to expand the external relations of the CPT among rural 
farmers and ethnic minorities in new areas (Thikan 2005, 124-128). Students had to 
perform four major duties, namely, propaganda, medical services (bare-foot doctors), 
entertainment and self-defence. When visiting a village, unit members responsible for 
propaganda presented the CPT’s ideology and policies and criticised the government, 
the medical activists provided medical services to villagers, the entertainers staged a 
play and performed revolutionary music for villagers, while the self-defence corps 
protected the unit from government forces (Kanok 1981, 387-404). 
 
Student leaders, particularly those who had produced intellectual work and were 
involved in print media, were recruited to work closely with senior CPT members in 
producing printed media for the revolutionary bases and radio programmes for the 
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Voice of the People of Thailand clandestine radio station (Thikan 2005, 54-62 and 66-
67). With the support of students, more than 20 newsletters were regularly distributed in 
various revolutionary bases (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 296-297; Thikan 2005, 57-
59)33
 
. The productions of the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station were more 
effective. Student singers, musicians and artists started working in the art and culture 
division. They organised revolutionary bands and worked for cultural units in producing 
revolutionary songs, plays and other cultural activities both for entertaining rural people 
and asserting communist and revolutionary ideas in the context of their work. 
Apparently, their news stories, songs, poems, articles and interviews became one of the 
major sources of content for the Voice of the People of Thailand clandestine radio 
station (Thikan 2005, 48-53 and 63-64). 
The participation of these students expanded the revolutionary bases of the CPT five-
fold (Thikan 2005, 50, 54 and 193). However, the experience of revolutionary struggle 
did not advance their leftist ideology or theory. Instead, students obtained practical and 
political mobilisation skills working with marginalised and poor people as well as in-
depth knowledge and understanding about problems and characteristics of rural 
Thailand which not even the Thai state managed to access (Thikan 2005, 124-125). 
Through sharing work and life in war zones and revolutionary bases, students also 
developed strong friendships, social connections and networks with their student 
fellows, farmers, local politicians, senior CPT comrades, and ethnic minorities. 
 
The honeymoon period between students and the CPT did not last long. The students’ 
initially favourable impression of the CPT was diminished by intractable working 
conditions, a centralised command structure and increasing conflicts. Many students 
became dissatisfied with difficult working conditions and conflicts at the operational 
level. Not only were they incapable of adjusting to working with limited resources, in 
physically demanding and dangerous work, but many young student recruits also found 
the psychological pressures and demands to follow revolutionary morality and 
discipline unbearable. Many could neither tolerate expectations to be tougher, more 
                                               
33 At their peak, Fire Lam Tung, one of the most popular newsletters in Southern Thailand, was printed in 
more than 5,000 copies. At No. 61 base various groups of leading student activists produced Athipat 
(Sovereign) newsletters and ran NSST in a revolutionary situation (Thikan 2005, 57-59). Thirayuth 
Boonmee was editing Samakhi Surop (United to Fight), a magazine circulated among students and 
intellectuals both in Thailand and abroad (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 296-297). 
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disciplined, and more obedient than the average peasant recruits, nor the discipline of 
everyday life as revolutionaries. They suffered in that they had to atone for their sins of 
bourgeois materialism, middle-class consciousness and liberal individualism (Kanok 
1981, 306-307; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 161-162).  
 
Many leading student activists later claimed that they suffered from unequal treatment 
and exploitation by a nepotistic, hierarchical structure (Kasian 1996, 80-82) and 
centralism within the CPT. Nepotism and authoritarianism in the Party made the 
radicals feel that the system was unfair, not only for them, but also for other cadres who 
had been working hard in the revolutionary movement. They felt that only those who 
were generally more Chinese or had been sent to study in China gained faster promotion 
within the party political hierarchy. But for those without revolutionary seniority or 
family connections with the top, complaints were useless. Praise and promotion seemed 
channelled along family lines. Many of those who were close to the CPT leadership 
were protected (Jiranan 2006, 272). Very few students were allowed to become full 
CPT members. The party organisation, and consultation and decision-making 
procedures were undemocratic and non-deliberative. Subsequently, a number of 
students felt that the party would never be able to bring democracy to the country even 
if it were successful in seizing power (Kanok 1981, 309-311; Yuangrat and Wedel 
1987, 162-163 and 183-188). Many student leaders, former socialist politicians, and 
leaders of student organisations who had joined the CPT as independent allies in the 
expectation of equal partnership with the CPT in fighting against the Thai state and in 
protecting sovereignty, democracy and social justice disagreed with the CPT on its 
centralised command over the revolutionary movement, its hierarchical structure and 
the privileged status of CPT members (Kasian 1984a, 43; Kasian 1996, 80-82; Thikan 
2005, 74-80, 87-88 and 248). The proposal of former left student politicians to establish 
a shadow government comprising several socialist parties and the CPT was rejected by 
the CPT (Thikan 2005, 75 and 272). 
 
Other conflicts at the operational level and tactical issues with local and CPT members 
also discouraged student activists from completing their revolutionary mission with the 
CPT. Students complained that they spent most of their time on subsistence cultivation 
rather than the revolution (Caravan 2000, 32-33). Moreover, disputes over tactics and 
strategy in improving working conditions, administering the revolutionary bases and 
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expanding rural mass support disappointed huge numbers of radical students who 
decided to abandon the CPT. Within less than a year, most of the students who were 
dissatisfied with the CPT and their assignment either left the CPT or moved to their own 
bases. 
 
These problems at the operational level eventually turned into uncompromising 
ideological conflict with and distrust of the leadership of the CPT after the outbreak of 
the war among communist states in Indochina and the change in Chinese foreign policy 
leading to more friendly relations with the Thai government (Kanok 1981, 340-341). 
Amidst the concurrent ideological disputes between the Chinese and the Soviet Union, 
between 1978 and 1979, there was the extraordinary first open war between communist 
states in world history (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 40). While Vietnam and the Lao 
PDR were closely allied with the Soviet Union, the Khmer Rouge sided with the 
People’s Republic of China. Vietnam’s decision to invade Cambodia in December 
1978, its dominance within Laos and the overthrow of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge 
government shortly thereafter was embroiled in fierce Sino-Soviet competition, leading 
to the strike by China against North Vietnam. Even though the earlier survival and 
expansion of the CPT between 1975 and 1978 relied heavily on military and financial 
supplies from Vietnam and Lao (Kanok 1981, 384-385; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-
168), the CPT was closer to China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both in 
term of its history and ideology (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 304-305). After initial 
efforts to be neutral in this conflict, the CPT was eventually pressured to publicly 
announce its support for China and its ‘Three World’ theory in going against the USSR, 
Laos and Vietnam. With the CPT’s pro-Chinese orientation and its decision to stay on 
an anti-Vietnamese course, by the end of 1979, the Vietnamese and Lao communist 
parties formally pledged not to support the insurgency in Thailand and demanded that 
all CPT bases be withdrawn from Lao territory (Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-168). 
All large CPT supporting facilities in Laos and Vietnam including major political 
schools, military training camps and hospitals were closed and moved to less secure 
‘liberated’ areas within Thailand. The CPT also lost many ethnic Lao and Vietnamese 
cadres, fighters and sympathisers. All routes of supply from China through Vietnam and 
Laos for the CPT were terminated (Kanok 1981, 384-385; Thikan 2005, 90-95, 160; 
Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-168). 
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Many students and lower ranking members were uncomfortable with shortages of 
supplies as well as having to fight against Lao and Vietnamese comrades who had 
earlier closely collaborated with them and had provided valuable support (Thikan 2005, 
90-95, 160). At the same time, the Indochina conflict was also a psychological loss for 
the students. Many had grown up with and were encouraged to join the insurgency by 
the Communist victory in the Vietnam War against the United States and above all the 
idea of international left wing solidarity. Without support both from China, the Lao 
PDR and Vietnam, they were discouraged and their morale deteriorated (Anderson and 
Mendiones 1985, 4-41; Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-168). 
 
Worse than the suspension of supplies from Laos and Vietnam, the new Chinese 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping switched policies from revolution toward more open 
market-oriented policies after the death of Mao. In carrying out its ‘Four 
Modernisations’, China opened its door to the Thai government (Thikan 2005, 90-95, 
160). China sold oil to the General Kriangsak Chomanan government (1977–1980) 
during a serious fuel shortage, for instance. In foreign policy, the CCP worried more 
about the practicalities of containing Soviet influence along China’s southern borders 
(Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-168). Protecting Cambodia from Vietnam and Laos 
was their crucial mission. In doing so, they used Thai territory to transport troops, 
weapons and other ammunition to Cambodia in the fight against the Lao and Vietnam 
communist movements. In exchange for this access, the CCP agreed to reduce its 
collaboration with and support for the CPT (Kanok 1981, 385-387). Aside from a 
reduction in support for the CPT, Chinese officials advised the CPT to ease its criticism 
of the Thai government and reverse their anti-capitalism (Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 
164-168 and 170-175). This put the CPT in an impossible position. These abrupt twists 
in Chinese ideology and foreign policy and the CPT’s rigid adherence to the Chinese 
position immediately caused tremendous fissures among the CPT leadership and lower 
ranking soldiers. Above all, this infuriated many students. The leading CPT members 
split. For instance, some challenged the CCP’s order to not use the Voice of the People 
of Thailand radio station as a means of attacking the Thai government and decided to 
move the radio station to another location. Others insisted on toning down the message. 
However, after a brief fight, the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station which had 
been used by the CPT for over quarter of a century to attack the Thai government was 
eventually forced to discontinue its broadcasts. 
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These changing conditions not only brought disappointment, but also led to severe 
ideological disagreements and disillusionment among students toward the CPT. 
Students started being disillusioned with the party’s dependence on Chinese support, the 
CPT’s unquestioned allegiance to Maoism and ignorance of other interpretations of 
Marxism (Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 164-169), its foreign policy and its analysis of 
Thai society and revolutionary ideas and direction (Thongchai 1994, 12; Yuangrat and 
Wedel 1987, 172). First of all, the student activists were concerned about the dominance 
of Mao’s thought on the differentiation of the Three Worlds theory (Yuangrat and 
Wedel 1987, 164-175). They argued with the decision of the CPT to pursue the Three 
Worlds theory, to support China against the USSR, Laos and Vietnam as a new threat to 
the revolutionary mission pushed the CPT into too close a reliance on China (Thikan 
2005, 100-102). 
 
Second, the student activists argued that the total ideological dependence on the 
Chinese-Maoist pattern had caused the CPT to misinterpret Thai society and to pursue 
the wrong revolutionary strategy (Jiranan 2006, 214-215; Kanok 1981, 349-350; Thikan 
2005, 248). Influenced by Maoist guidelines, the CPT viewed Thai society as semi-
feudal and semi-colonial, which was favourable to an armed revolution in rural areas, 
like in China in the 1930s. The CPT perceived Thai society before 1855 as a feudal 
society with a natural or self-sufficient economy and political power controlled by the 
King. However, from 1855 onwards, Thailand was gradually transformed into a semi-
feudal, semi-colonial society by imperialist powers, particularly Great Britain and 
France. As feudalism declined, a capitalist economy gradually emerged. However, 
capitalist development was limited to urban areas, while rural areas remain under feudal 
domination, especially with respect to the relations of production. The system of 
government and consciousness of the people was still feudal in character. In other 
words, capitalism had not yet fully developed and feudalism had not yet been 
completely destroyed in Thailand. According to this analysis, the CPT held that the 
peasants – the majority of the Thai people - were subjected to the exploitation of 
imperialists, feudalists, and bureaucratic-capitalists (Kanok 1981, 216-227 and 373-
378). In launching the revolution against these powers, the CPT adopted a Maoist 
strategy, namely, the ‘countryside encircles the town’ strategy, through armed struggle 
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among rural peasants (the main force of its revolution) (Kanok 1981, ii-iii; Yuangrat 
and Wedel 1987, 175-176). 
 
The analysis of Thai society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal was unconvincing for the 
students (Jiranan 2006, 214-215; Thikan 2005, 248). For them, Thailand had more of a 
capitalist nature. The capitalist mode of production had developed widely in urban areas 
during the previous ten years and the feudal character of Thai society had been mostly 
destroyed (Thirayuth 1981, 26). Capitalist exploitation in the cities made the middle 
class, the intellectuals, and labourers, ripe for class struggle (Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 
181-182).The idea of the country encircling the cities was obsolete because of the 
modern weaponry of the Thai state. In addition, Thailand is much smaller than China, 
so the ruling class can manoeuvre its repressive might in all regions, making it difficult 
to expand the revolutionary war. Therefore, the revolution should start in the cities with 
the middle class as a crucial revolutionary force (Kanok 1981, 376-379; Yuangrat and 
Wedel 1987, 175-176). Alongside ideological clashes, there was also a generation gap 
between the liberals of 14th October and 1950’s CPT revolutionaries (Jiranan 2006, 206-
208). Overall, because of their diverse liberal and socialist ideological socialisation 
before 14th October 1973, many students of 14th October could hardly stand being 
forced to follow the CPT’s strictly Maoist ideas and interpretation (Giles 2003b, 205 
and 208). 
 
In arguing against the CPT, many student leaders initially drew up and proposed 
constructive ideological and strategic suggestions through the party’s internal 
deliberative process (Thikan 2005, 160, 177-218, 206 and 239). For the most part, the 
response of the CPT toward these proposals and criticisms was rejection and harsh and 
alienating retaliation. The acceleration of these conflicts caused many of these student 
activists eventually to abandon the CPT in disgust. Those who either tried to propose 
alternative ideas through newsletters like Sueksa (Educate) and Phu Buk Boek (Pioneer) 
or overtly criticised the party and its leadership, faced social sanctions such as 
censorship of their works, condemnation as soviet reactionaries and revisionists, 
isolation, or even threats from militant CPT members. Because of these suppressive and 
distressing reactions from the CPT toward their criticisms, many students felt that there 
was no room for compromise as the party put pressure on them to conform. Many 
became disillusioned with the Party and started to defect from the party from the early 
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1980s with extreme anguish  (Thikan 2005, 160 and 177-218; Jiranan, 2003, 272-273; 
Yuangrat and Wedel 1987, 189-191). 
 
After leaving the CPT, many students lined up to insult the party in public (Thikan 
2005, 222). Several major figures like Yuk Sri-Ariya (Tienchai Wongchaisuwan), 
Boonsong Chareatorn and Thirayuth Boonmee gave interviews and wrote a series of 
articles for various major magazines attacking the CPT (Kanok 1981, 329-341; Morell 
and Chai-anan 1981, 304-305; Thikan 2005, 124-128). It was the first time the CPT had 
been criticised and challenged publicly (Kanok 1981, 329-341). Discrediting the CPT 
through a nationalist approach successfully discredited and alienated the CPT among 
the Thai public. They attacked the party for not being the legitimate leaders of the Thai 
revolutionary movement because it was dominated by the Chinese and used by China to 
control Third World countries. For them, the party was dominated by a ‘Jin Jaa’ 
(strongly pro-Chinese) ambience and Chinese-oriented staff who were of Chinese 
ancestry, educated in China and hardly spoke Thai. Furthermore, several students went 
even further by joining the CPT’s opponents, such as the Communists in Laos and 
Vietnam, to form a new Thai communist party, condemned by the CPT as pro-Soviet 
reactionaries (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 304-305; Thikan 2005, 91, 97-98, 100-102, 
128 and 134-141, 242-247). 
 
Amidst these changes and conflicts, the CPT began to review and improve the party as 
well as reducing tensions. However, its efforts were too little, too late. Many studies, 
discussions and seminars within the CPT were conducted at various levels to collect the 
opinions and ideas of its cadres concerning the revolution (Kanok 1981, 329-341). The 
4th General Assembly of leading members of the CPT was organised. But, instead of 
solving the problems, more disagreements, unpromising hopes for improvement and 
undemocratic processes during preparation for the meeting only worsened the situation. 
Many leading and lower-ranking party members resigned from the CPT (Thikan 2005, 1 
and 7).  
 
The internal conflicts and decline of the CPT not only caused confrontation between 
radical students and CPT members but it also brought about tremendous fragmentation 
and polarisation among students (Jiranan 2006, 123-125; Thikan 2005, 156). Not all of 
them went against the CPT. Many still stood on the side of the CPT and continued 
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working to support the revolutionary missions led by the CPT amidst the conflicts. The 
first groups of students were mainly concentrated among the 6th October 1976 
generation who were organised through Maoist ideology even before entering the armed 
struggle. They thus neither had problems with nor questioned the strict Maoist ideas and 
self-discipline processes indoctrinated into them by the CPT. Secondly, there were those 
who were satisfied with their supportive working conditions. Living in bases with small 
communities, with sufficient support from local people, successful experiences in 
expanding rural mass, respectable and dedicated CPT leaders, and assigned missions 
suitable for their interests and professional background, and with no Chinese or CPT 
leadership intervention in their work, they believed in and built and strengthened 
supportive relationships with the CPT. Thirdly, those who lived in remote, isolated and 
small military bases were not informed and had no access to information about the 
conflict.  
 
At the initial stage of the conflict, students who were still loyal to the CPT perceived 
these disputes as minor, short-term problems. The decision of the CPT to support the 
CCP in the Indochina war and the closure of the Voice of the People of Thailand were 
just short-term policies and would not cause long-term problems (Jaran, interview by 
author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok). Furthermore, they did not look at the 
confrontation between students and CPT members in the revolutionary bases as a 
structural problem but instead as a set of personal and marginal issues. Allegations 
against the party were exaggerated (Somsak 2001, 49-51). Even if some started 
questioning the ideas and strategies of the CPT, they treated their hesitation as a minor 
issue and told themselves that every revolution faces obstacles. Subsequently, they 
soldiered on working for the CPT. They condemned their fellow students who had 
problems with the CPT as liberal individualists who could not manage to adjust to the 
party’s discipline. Meanwhile, critics disparaged their fellow student activists as naïve 
and dogmatic CPT loyalist children (Jiranan 2006, 141-143; Thikan 2005, 57-60). 
 
Eventually, the collapse of the CPT and the shift of Thai security policy into a moderate 
direction encouraged students to return home, whether they were supportive of or 
antagonistic to the CPT. By the early 1980s, with the withdrawal of support from China, 
Laos and Vietnam, internal conflict and the failure of revolutionary ideas and strategy, 
the CPT gradually deteriorated. By the mid 1980s, most CPT strongholds and 
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revolutionary bases had been destroyed by the Thai military. Leading CPT members 
moved out of the revolutionary bases and eventually many were arrested (Jaran, 
interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok; Suthisak, interview by author, 13 
December 2006, Chiang Mai). There were still many students who insisted on 
remaining in the liberated areas and fighting to protect their military bases and the local 
people to whom they felt obliged until very last moment. Nonetheless, when other 
nearby bases were destroyed and no leading CPT members remained, they were 
eventually all forced to leave and return home (Porn-narong, interview by author, 7 
March 2007, Bangkok). Unlike those who disagreed with the CPT, these groups of 
radical students left the CPT and said farewell with respect, sympathy and 
understanding of their limitations. These people returned home humiliated, as they had 
to admit that the CPT was no longer a potential revolutionary organisation; they gave up 
on the revolution, and returned home. 
 
At the same time, the political ambience back home had become politically more liberal 
and the government’s anti-communist policy had been moderated. By the end of 1977, 
under the leadership of General Kriangsak Chomanan, a young pragmatic military and 
elite ousted the ultra-right wing government of Tanin Kraivixien. This coup gave the 
signal that the ‘Dark Age’ of modern Thai politics had ended. The curfew was ended. 
More open expression of views in the press and on university campuses were allowed, 
although by no means representing freedom of speech. In 1978, a more liberal 
constitution was passed and in 1979 an election was allowed. The government relaxed 
its earlier extremist anti-communist policies and pursued a more neutral foreign policy 
toward conflicts in Indochina. For instance, General Kriangsak reopened 
communications and eventually secured the collaboration of China and Vietnam in 
blocking the CPT, as mentioned above. Under the subsequent government of General 
Prem Tinsulanonda, these moderate policies continued (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 
277-279). Most importantly, from 1978 onward, the Kriangsak government started 
offering an amnesty to students, intellectuals and others involved in the October 6, 1976 
events who had gone to the hills. And amidst the degeneration and deterioration of the 
CPT, to persuade students and local CPT military units to abandon the CPT, the Prem 
government issued order 66/23, a Communist amnesty measure which returned student 
status to all students who decided to return home (Jiranan 2006, 270; Thikan 2005, 20-
21). This policy offered the choice of returning home to all students. By 1981, whether 
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apathetic or sympathetic to the CPT, the majority of students who had fled in 1976 were 
back to where they came from (Anderson and Mendiones 1985, 40; Morell and Chai-
anan 1981, 303).  
 
Without preparations by the CPT or student activists, the student movement was 
dispersed and left unorganised in Bangkok and elsewhere. Upon return, many student 
activists still hoped to revise their revolutionary strategy and organise a new political 
movement in urban areas (Thikan 2005, 97-98 and 128). They perceived the destruction 
of revolutionary bases and arrests of CPT members as short-term, low tide conditions 
for revolution. Their plan was to wait until the situation improved to revive their 
revolutionary struggle at an opportune moment (Cheep, Jariya and Pha, interview by 
author, 21 March 2007, 24 February 2007 and 3 March 2007, Bangkok; Somchai P., 
interview by author, 29 March 2007, Mahasarakham; Suthisak, interview by author, 13 
December 2006, Chiang Mai). However, without a focus on, or serious groundwork in, 
urban areas, the CPT was unable to revive its work in the cities or to reconnect with 
those who had fled after the revolutionary bases had been destroyed (Thikan 2009). By 
mid-1985, when the CPT structure had vanished and most leading figures were arrested, 
all students had to admit that the CPT as well as their expected revival of their 
revolutionary struggle had definitely collapsed and could not be revised for the 
foreseeable future. Furthermore, continued fragmentation and distrust obstructed 
attempts by student activists to reorganise themselves. Those who were supportive of 
the CPT carried on blaming their student activist opponents for the decline of the CPT. 
Eventually, by the mid 1980s, all student activists were left disappointed and had to 
abandon their revolutionary dreams and continue their lives like other ordinary people 
(Jaran, Lert and Pha, interview by author, 15 February 2007, 7 February 2007, 3 March 
2007, Bangkok; Khaen Sarika 1987, 55-56 and 65-66).  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The 1970s was the decade that marked the birth of the Thai Octobrists. Their activist 
lives during that period were full of controversy. They went through periods of both 
success and failure. Their movement started as a loose network. It became a strong and 
unified student movement, and eventually dissolved after the dispiriting collapse of the 
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revolutionary leadership of the CPT. In promoting their movement and activism, they 
forged different alliances, ranging from the liberal-royalist elite, farmers and labour 
groups, to the Communist movement. Their radicalisation and their framing process 
were based on a variety of problematic ideologies and discourses ranging from liberal 
democracy, the New Left, national-royalism, and Maoism-Communism. Above all, 
their dream of promoting social and political change ended with ideological disillusion 
and open conflict among themselves. 
 
The 1970s students were a by-product of the baby boom. Their first political move was 
a result of their frustration with corrupt and ineffective authoritarian regimes that could 
hardly handle the end of the long war-related economic boom of the late 1960s. Their 
movement was influenced by the global New Left and anti-war movements, liberal 
politicians as well as their supposedly democratic King. Their initial efforts in small 
politically active student groups gradually developed into strong networks allied with 
various liberal reformist elites. Their success was marked by their leading roles in the 
anti-military movement which forced the authoritarian government out of the country 
on 14th October 1973. 
 
There was a big leap after the 14th October incident. Amidst political liberalisation, 
student activists’ political activities proliferated and their significance increased. They 
collaborated to promote farmer, labour and anti-imperialist movements. These student 
activists turned more radical under the shadow of an increase in power of the 
Communist movement both outside and inside the country and increasing suppression 
from the growing ultra-right wing movement. Their organisation was strong and under 
the full control of radical forces. They used Marxist-Maoist-Communist ideas and 
discourse under the long distance guidelines of the CPT. 
 
Their radical activities in urban areas ended in the 6th October 1976 massacre. Most 
radical students fled to join the armed struggle with the CPT with the hope of 
continuing their movement. Under the strict control of the CPT, they were assigned to 
work in support of Maoist-CPT ideas and missions. The students who had been 
socialised through different ideologies and had organised independently were 
dissatisfied and in conflict with their own fellow students in their opinion of the party. 
Many became disillusioned with the party and its revolutionary mission after the CPT 
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followed the Chinese Communists in becoming sympathetic toward the Thai 
government in exchange for support to attack their Communist neighbours. With an 
amnesty granted by a new more moderate Thai government, many groups abandoned 
the party. Those who had been supportive of the CPT were also forced to leave their 
revolutionary bases because of the collapse of the party by the mid 1980s. With no CPT 
groundwork in the urban areas and continuing conflict among the Octobrists, they were 
left disorganised. This marked the dissolution of the student movement of the 1970s, but 
not the end of the Octobrists as a force in Thai politics.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The revival and construction of Octobrists from ‘1970s failed leftist student 
activists’ to ‘1970s Octobrists-democratic fighters’ 
 
 
This morning, I went to pay respect to the 14th and 6th October heroes, as 
I usually do every one or two weeks. I always buy two wreaths to pay respect 
at the monuments commemorating the people’s uprising against dictatorship 
on 14th October 1973 and the student massacre on 6th October 1976 in front of 
the main auditorium of Thammasat University.  
I place one wreath in the hand of the statue representing the 14th October 
heroes and press my hands together and bow in memory of ‘rights and 
liberty’.  
I put the other wreath on top of the granite memorial to the 6th October 
heroes and press my hands together and bow in memory of ‘social justice’.  
Indeed, 30 years ago, ‘social justice’ was interpreted as meaning the 
same as ‘socialism’ before the political crisis of the Thai revolutionary 
movement led by the CPT and the ideological crisis of international socialism 
during the last two decades made this interpretation fade away.  
But the dream of ‘social justice’ remains.   
(Kasian 2006, 6) 
 
After their return from the failure of the armed struggle led by the Communist Party of 
Thailand (phak communist haeng prathet thai – CPT), the Octobrists gave up their 
revolutionary struggle and continued their lives like other ordinary people. Several 
initial efforts to revive the leftist movement failed. Their ongoing gatherings during the 
1980s were rather divisive and apolitical and functioned merely as a means of 
maintaining their old boy networks. Only from the early 1990s did the Octobrists 
gradually succeed in reunifying their earlier political networks, recovering pride in their 
1970s political history and securing public acceptance of their generation. Instead of 
leftist failures, they then became known as the Octobrist-democratic heroes of the 
1970s. More and more people from this generation came out to reveal themselves in 
public and to claim to be Octobrists. The public and media also followed suit. By the 
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end of the 1990s, commemorations of their 1970s leftist history were treated almost as 
national celebrations of democracy.  
 
In unpacking the causes behind these developments and trends, this chapter attempts to 
answer two major questions. Firstly, why did the initial attempts to recover the leftist 
movement among Octobrists fail during the 1980s? Secondly, how and why did they 
then succeed in reunifying and regaining public support under the new political identity 
of ‘Octobrists: democratic fighters’? Regarding the initial failure, this chapter argues 
that there were three major causes: the hostile political conditions against leftist 
movements amidst the collapse of the CPT; the loose and divisive organisational 
structure of the leftist movement which hindered their revival in the post-CPT era; and 
the uncompromising conflicts among them since the mid 1970s and during the decline 
of the CPT regarding the past failure and future direction of the movement. With respect 
to the second question, three major interrelated conditions brought about the success of 
the 1970s student activists in reinventing themselves under the new identity of 
Octobrists and heroes of democracy. The first condition was the emergence of new 
political conditions. The end of the Cold War and the decline of the CPT made the Thai 
government stop perceiving these student activists as a political threat. Domestic 
political liberalisation by the late 1980s, including the rise of the democratic mass 
movement against the return of the military into parliamentary politics in 1992, the rise 
of the social movement throughout the 1990s, and the political reform in the late 1990s, 
provided a supportive and fluid political environment for the Octobrists to revive their 
political activities. The second condition was the successful political and social 
positions of these Octobrists which enhanced their means and status in stating their 
message to the public as well as promoting their new identity among the elite and 
middle class. The last and most important was the comprehensive process of 
democratising their leftist history and elements of the 14th and 6th October incidents, 
normalising their leftist reputations and cultural legacy, and institutionalising 
‘Octobrism’ with their reconstructed democratic historical background.  
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3.1 Initial failure in revitalising the leftist movement among 1970s student activists 
 
At the onset of the return from armed struggle in the mid 1980s, some Octobrists tried 
to keep their leftist background hidden and refused any further participation in activities 
in the name of leftist movements. Others who still wished to work for leftist movements 
failed either to reconnect with the CPT, or to convince their former comrades to 
continue the revolutionary movement, or to reconcile conflicts among themselves.  
 
At the global level, the Cold War continued. In spite of a ‘rollback’ of direct 
intervention by US troops in the Vietnam War in 1973 due to their military failure, a 
weakened US economy, and rising domestic anti-war movements, the US revived its 
newly vindicated role and pushed the world and the region into a ‘Second Cold War’ 
(1979-1985). While the focus of the First Cold War (1946-1979) on ideological conflict 
ended by 1979, the Second Cold War shifted toward a new level of confrontation and a 
conventional struggle for power centred in the Third World between the US and the 
USSR. US military outlays for the period 1981-1986 expanded. While the Soviet Union 
continued to support the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978, the 
US continued to back an insurgency on the Thai-Cambodian border. In parallel, the US 
developed a closer relationship with the Chinese government. In pursuing a balanced 
diplomacy, the Thai government recovered and maintained good relations with China 
(Buszynski 1982; Halliday 1984). In this new stage of the Cold War, the break between 
the CPT and the CCP became permanent. Thailand remained very much of a "front-line 
state" in the Cold War. Under such conditions, the state still kept an eye on Octobrists 
upon their return, and this created an ambience which obstructed the revival of radical 
politics (Ciorciari 2010, 64-66 and 86). 
 
At the domestic level, in spite of more relaxed political conditions than in the late 
1970s, the dominant role during the semi-democratic polity during the 1980s of the 
military and several conservative elements mobilised in the 1970s restricted the former 
activists from reviving their role. By 1977, the ultra-right wing government of Prime 
Minister Tanin Kraivixien (1976-1977) was forced to step down in a coup and was 
replaced with more moderate soldiers in General Kriangsak Chomanan (1977-1980) and 
later General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988). Under pressure from their supporters, 
the Young Turks (a group of middle-ranking military officers) in the case of Kriangsak 
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and the Democratic Soldiers in the case of Prem, both governments pushed more 
moderate policies, including Order 66/2523 which granted an amnesty for insurgents 
who surrendered, and a new combination of military and political methods in counter-
insurgency. Nonetheless, conservative forces both within military and royalist circles 
still maintained a dominant position. Prem turned to the more senior and conservative 
military and embraced direct political consent from the palace. By the early 1980s, the 
more moderate forces, especially the Young Turks, were marginalised, especially after 
their attempted coup against the interference of older ultra-right wing figures in the 
Prem government in 1981. And shortly after his moderate move, the Prem regime 
prepared new laws to retain a dominant role for the army in Parliament, the possibility 
of a non-elected Prime Minister, a nominated Senate, and electoral rules favouring the 
military (Chai-anan 1982, 22-65; Charoemkiet 1992, 75-99; Pasuk and Baker 2002, 
330-349; Surachai 1982). 
 
Aside from parliamentary politics, freedom of the press and political activities were still 
constrained in the 1980s. In the post-1976 era, the government empowered the Ministry 
of the Interior to use Decree 42 to closely monitor the press and implement various 
repressive measurements against critical journalists. Between 1979 and 1984, forty-
seven journalists were assassinated and in some cases the police were directly 
implicated. In the public sphere, even though political activities were allowed, arrests of 
leading CPT members continued even in the late 1980s in order to give warning signals 
to former communists (Chai-anan 1982, 136-137; Pasuk and Baker 2002, 331 and 388-
389).  
 
Against this backdrop, most Octobrists considered the grim political atmosphere as the 
ebb in the revolutionary struggle. Thus, they suspended their political activities, first 
temporarily and later permanently, and kept a low profile. Many who had just begun 
their lives in the private sector and started families preferred to keep a distance from 
their leftist backgrounds and other leftist political activities. They worried that a leftist 
profile would negatively affect their future career and family life. For example, Vipa 
Daomanee, a former activist from the Faculty of Science, Chulalongkokrn University, 
later became a successful marketing and advertising executive in various companies and 
had to conceal her leftist identity by presenting a false CV when first applying for jobs 
in private companies to cover up the years she spent in the jungle. During social 
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gatherings of her Chulalongkorn University activist circle, called ‘Friends of Chula’, 
many of her friends faced difficulties in explaining the background of this leftist 
network to their husbands or wives. Some even had to lie to their families about 
participating in these gatherings (Vipa, interview by author, 28 January 2007, 
Bangkok). 
  
In addition to the changes in political environment, the initial failures of the student and 
revolutionary movements were also affected by their loose structural organisation and 
lack of a prepared strategy for work in the cities. Before the 6th October incident, the 
organisational structure among student activists was kept loose and secret, even among 
individual members. Their networks were loosely defined by their political clubs, 
schools and working functions. Even during their time in the revolutionary bases of the 
CPT, only a few students were recruited as CPT members. They were divided by 
working function and revolutionary base. These were really remote from each other. 
Amidst the decline of the CPT, they did not prepare any formal structure or process for 
reviving their work in the cities. These loose informal structures became one of the 
major obstacles to the reunification and revival of political activities among these 
Octobrists (further details in Chapter 2).  
 
Countless Octobrists would still have liked to carry on their revolutionary activities 
even after leaving the CPT and their revolutionary bases. However, upon their return, 
they were disconnected from one another and from the CPT. For example, Somchai 
Phatharathananunth, an activist from Ramkhamhaeng University and recently Dean of 
the Faculty of Political Science, Mahasarakham University, left his revolutionary base 
in the very last minutes of the CPT in 1985 with sympathy toward many CPT members, 
in spite of several disagreements over political strategies and ideas. However, upon his 
return, no CPT member contacted him while he struggled to survive by himself in 
Bangkok. He said that he did not give up on the CPT, but the party gave up on him 
(Somchai P., interview by author, 29 March 2007, Mahasarakham). Similarly, Lert 
Edison (leftist pseudonym) was a student at Chiang Mai University and worked as a 
prominent technician for the CPT in Northern Thailand. He was sent back to the city 
when his revolutionary base was destroyed. Nonetheless, he still had vivid hopes for his 
revolutionary mission. Upon his return the CPT ordered him to wait to be contacted 
about being sent to a new location. After a year’s wait in Chiang Mai, no one contacted 
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him. He thus returned home to Ratchaburi Province and lost touch with the CPT (Lert, 
interview by author, 7 February 2007, Bangkok). Porn-narong Pattanaboonpaiboon, a 
medical doctor from Mahidol University, and Suthisak Pavarathisan, a medical 
technology student from Chiang Mai University, spent most of their time during the 
revolution training in various medical schools in China. They and other friends who 
were sent to China experienced great difficulty in reconnecting with other leftist friends 
and eventually lost contact with the CPT upon their return because they were all sent 
back at different times and to different hometowns (Porn-narong, interview by author, 7 
March 2007, Bangkok; Suthisak, interview by author, 13 December 2006, Chiang Mai). 
 
Furthermore, others who were still able to connect with their student friends and tried to 
revive the revolutionary movement faced difficulties both in persuading their friends to 
resume the revolutionary struggle and mediating conflicts among different factions 
among the students themselves. Watchari Paoluangthong and Jariya Suanpan, who 
joined the CPT as students from Thammasat University and high school, experienced 
similar problems in their efforts to organise retreats among people from the same 
revolutionary base and chain of command. Watchari’s revolutionary base was in a very 
remote area which kept her isolated from - and in ignorance of - the conflicts and 
decline of the CPT. Combating the situation at her revolutionary base and working with 
Hmong people were rather promising. However, she had to leave her revolutionary base 
because her husband needed to be hospitalised in town. Consequently, she came home 
eager to continue working with the leftist movement. However, she was disappointed 
because her senior commanders gave up and went back to continue their lives in the city 
rather than support her efforts to continue her activities. In the same way, Jariya found 
many meetings among people from her revolutionary base ended up with no conclusion 
about future solutions. Finally, most people drifted away from the circle and continued 
with their normal lives (Jariya and Watchari, interview by author, 24 February 2007 and 
18 January 2007, Bangkok). 
 
The third obstacle was uncompromising ideological conflict as well as the controversial 
impact of their leftist experience on their lives after their return. Protracted conflicts and 
disagreements among the Octobrists which lasted from the mid 1970s until their return 
became major constraints preventing them from reunifying and continuing their 
revolutionary mission.  
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The unreconciled ideological conflicts between the 14th Octobrists and the 6th Octobrists 
before all were propelled to join the CPT, and between the students and CPT members 
during the armed struggle, left huge gaps and a lack of trust among the Octobrists. The 
14th Octobrist generation were activists radicalised through various ideas from 
conservative liberalist, New Leftist and social democratic ideologies in the early 1970s, 
and played leading roles in the triumph of the anti-authoritarian movement on 14th 
October 1973 (Kasian 1996, 70-74; Pirun, interview by author, 2 February 2007, 
Bangkok; Thanon Nangsue 1985a, 38-42) and became the predominant political force 
after the 14th October incident (Cheep and Jariya, interview by author, 21 March 2007 
and 24 February 2007, Bangkok)., while the 6th October generation was radicalised 
through extreme Maoism. The later condemned 14th Octobrists as ‘petit bourgeois’ and 
reactionary. The 14th Octobrists criticised the 6th Octobrists as Red Guards and extreme 
Maoists. Conflicts which had started after 14th October continued even when both sides 
joined the armed struggle with the CPT (further details in Chapter 2).  
 
On top of this, more serious conflicts over problems with the CPT and life during the 
revolutionary struggle made relationships among Octobrists rather divisive and difficult 
to reconcile after they returned. Friction over difficult working conditions, biased 
sentiment toward the commanding and organisational structure of the CPT, its policy 
towards the CCP against their Indochinese communist neighbours, and the 
interpretation of revolutionary ideas and strategy for Thai society, mentioned in chapter 
2, did not stop when the students left the Party. These activists carried these 
controversies back home with them. With these confrontations and the unfriendly 
environment among former leftists, Octobrists encountered many disagreements among 
themselves on whether the revolutionary struggle should be discontinued or further 
improved. Many like Tanet Charoenmuang, a leading 14th Octobrist figure from the 
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, found it difficult to talk to 
friends who complained bitterly about the CPT and attacked those who still wished to 
support the CPT and hoped for a revival of the revolutionary movement (Tanet, 
interview by author, 14 December 2006, Chiang Mai). Pirun Chatwanitchakul and Phra 
(monk) Suthep Chinwaro34
                                               
34 Suthep Lakkhanawichian ordained as Buddhist monk in 1988. He was then known as Phra Suthep 
Chinwaro. 
, long-term Communist mentors even before 14th October 
1973 from Chulalongkorn University and Kasetsart University, realised the mistakes of 
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the CPT but still argued that these could be rectified. However, after their release from 
jail and return home, they did not want to argue with their friends who left the CPT with 
sympathetic feelings (Phra Suthep, interview by author, 16 December 2006, Chiang 
Mai; Pirun, interview by author, 2 February 2007, Bangkok). Somchai 
Phatharathananunth faced division and disagreement among friends from his 
revolutionary base. One group gave up. Another would like to carry on the revolution 
but stick with the old Maoist ideas while others shifted toward new ideas including 
electoral politics, localism, or even support for military coups (Somchai P., interview by 
author, 29 March 2007, Mahasarakham).  
 
Students with contrasting experiences in the jungle returned with discordant views of 
the CPT and the future direction of their movement. Some with fortunate lives in the 
jungle returned home sympathetic toward the CPT and initially looked forward to 
reviving and improving the revolutionary movement (Cheep, Jariya and Lert, interview 
by author, 21 March 2007, 24 February 2007 and 7 February 2007, Bangkok). Others 
who had a difficult time with CPT members left the CPT with a bad impression. They 
wanted neither to look back at their past experience with the CPT nor reconcile with 
those with whom they had fought (Parakorn, interview by author, 7 February 2007, 
Bangkok). As a result, Octobrists were apparently divided and some did not even trust 
each other. Their relationships became more and more complicated and fragile. 
Interactions among different groups mostly ended up in confrontation, and gatherings 
were unable to come up with any common agreement on past problems and future 
prospects.  
 
For example, at one extreme, we have someone like Kasian Tejapira, a radical activist 
during the 6th October incident from the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat 
University, who had many difficulties with and painful memories of CPT members and 
criticised the lack of internal democracy and the Maoist and Leninist domination of the 
CPT. In his analytical writing on the decline of the CPT in 1994, he even called the CPT 
‘out-of-date Communists’ as they dehumanised and de-intellectualised student activists 
during their time in the jungle (Kasian 1984b, 83-84; Kasian 1994b, 70). At the other 
end, there were people who still believed in the CPT and argued strongly against those 
who criticised the party as reactionary and accused them of precipitating the decline of 
the party. Suthisak Pavarathisan, who was socialised through Maoism since high school, 
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did not find Chinese domination over the CPT a problem. He instead criticised the 
members of the 14th October generation like Seksan Prasertkul, and Thirayuth 
Boonmee, as problems for the party (Suthisak, interview by author, 13 December 2006, 
Chiang Mai).  
 
Aside from conflicts during the armed struggle, the impact of their activist lives and 
patterns of struggle gave rise to contradictory perspectives among Octobrists after their 
return. Those who did not suffer much after they returned tended to be politically more 
active with other Octobrists. Suthisak Pavarathisan, with little conflict in his unit during 
his time in the CPT, returned with a rather sympathetic attitude toward the CPT. 
Furthermore, with his relatively wealthy family background and the advantage of a 
medical education obtained during his time with the CPT in China, he did not have to 
struggle like others. He thus found himself with courage to support the CPT in urban 
areas and organised several meetings among former activists until the CPT’s dissolution 
(Suthisak, interview by author, 13 December 2006, Chiang Mai). 
 
Nevertheless, there were many people who did not have family support or lost the 
benefit of their education as a result of their participation in the revolutionary struggle. 
These people found themselves struggling in their post-revolutionary lives without any 
support from the CPT. Consequently, some who were still sympathetic to revolutionary 
ideas were forced to spend their time making a living rather than being involved in 
political missions to regroup. At the same time, others who viewed their experience 
with the leftist movement as negative turned their backs against their student fellows 
who wanted to revive the revolutionary movement. Some had the view that they wasted 
years in the jungle on a pointless mission; other students of the same generation had 
already achieved middle-ranking positions in many organisations. Others found that a 
leftist identity caused many problems in starting life as ordinary people. Many took a 
long time to adjust to life in the cities after many years of living in primitive conditions. 
As a result, many of them did not want to waste their time on further fruitless political 
activities. Phra Suthep Chinwaro, a leading Octobrist figure who did not officially 
report to the Thai government upon his return, encountered many problems in pursuing 
life as an ordinary person. In addition, because of his radical reputation, he did not want 
to contact other friends, as he did not want to cause them trouble and difficulties (Phra 
Suthep, interview by author, 16 December 2006, Chiang Mai). For Porn-narong 
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Pattanaboonpaiboon, his years in medical school in China did not count in the Thai 
university system. He thus had to start again from scratch. He found that his former 
leftist networks were not supportive in his career. He had to work as a street vendor to 
support his studies (Porn-narong, interview by author, 7 March 2007).  
 
Against this backdrop, the gatherings and remaining connections among Octobrists 
during the 1980s were rather divisive, apolitical and inactive. Gatherings were 
concentrated among people who had a common political attitude in the same political 
clubs, revolutionary bases, political functions, universities and schools. Furthermore, to 
conceal ongoing conflicts and maintain friendly relationships, most gatherings were not 
politically oriented but similar in nature to other alumni gatherings. The meetings 
functioned only as ‘group therapy’ for the psychological wounds caused by the decline 
of the leftist movement. Occasional parties on special occasions like weddings and 
funerals were common meeting points. Organising activities which would support 
future careers were promoted from time to time. For example, student musicians who 
had had opportunities to study at music schools in China with CPT support organised a 
Saturday Music School to instruct friends who did not have an opportunity to go 
(Sukhum 2010).  
 
By the late 1980s, in spite of bigger attendances, more formal structures and the 
accumulation of wider groups of friends, these gatherings of Octobrists remained 
divisive and non-political. For instance, several key 14th Octobrists started putting 
efforts into reconnecting the whole 1970s generation through an annual gathering in the 
name of ‘Friendship, Sisterhood and Brotherhood (pheuan phong nong phi)’. Despite 
this inclusive and politically neutral rubric for concealing differences and conflicts as 
well as hiding their leftist identity, the group was merely a social gathering among the 
14th October generation. Without a common political agenda, these were merely annual 
alumni meetings in big hotels and functioned mainly to maintain networks among 
participants who were then moving into different political and social settings. As Jaran 
Dhitthapichai, one of the most radical 14th Octobrist figures, said, the Friendship, 
Sisterhood and Brotherhood annual meetings kept him in touch with his Octobrist 
friends (Jaran, interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok). In addition, these 
meetings offered an opportunity for these activists to help each other and to connect 
with new non-Octobrist networks they had recently developed.  
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Besides the meetings in Bangkok and other cities, many reunions at various 
revolutionary bases became common meeting places among former student activists and 
local comrades. Nonetheless, there was no movement toward any common political 
initiatives through these gatherings. From the early 1990s onwards, annual reunions at 
revolutionary base sites were formalised in many areas. Most activities concentrated on 
cultural and charitable purposes. Memorial rituals, construction of monuments for the 
dead, and fundraising for former farmers and ethnic comrades who were left in poverty 
were common practices at nearly all revolutionary sites. Efforts to remobilise ethnic 
minorities and peasants as a political force in former revolutionary base areas were 
mainly for non-radical purposes, particularly electoral politics (Chatri, interview by 
author, 5 May 2007, Bangkok; Prida, interview by author, 11 December 2006, Nan).  
 
In summary, during the first decade after their return from the armed struggle with the 
CPT, the Octobrist networks were divided and apolitical. As a result of the oppressive 
political conditions against leftist movements, and uncompromising ideas and conflicts 
among Octobrists themselves about the future of the leftist movement, the initial efforts 
to revitalise the Octobrists as a political force in again promoting the leftist movement 
after the decline of the CPT did not succeed.  
 
 
3.2 Later success: transformation of ‘extreme student activists’ to ‘Octobrist: 
democratic fighters’  
 
After these initial failures, by the early 1990s the former activists had successfully 
revitalised their networks and regained public acceptance. This was a result of the new 
political structures and new social status of the Octobrists. Most importantly, these 
former activists successfully transformed their political identity from leftist-leaning 
students to ‘Octobrists: 1970s democratic fighters’.  
 
In contrast to the 1980s, by the early 1990s, the five-decade-long Cold War had come to 
an end. The Communist-led revolutionary threat had gone, both nationally and 
internationally. This set the pretext for rendering the 1970s radical activists less 
threatening as a historical memory. The conflicts between the US and the USSR were 
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reconciled. The Communist bloc collapsed and shifted toward political and economic 
liberalisation. By 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the reformist political and 
economic policies of glasnost and perestroika. In 1989, there was a dramatic mass 
movement against the Communist Chinese government which ended in a massacre. In 
1990, East and West Germany reunified. Eventually in 1991, the USSR was dissolved. 
At the regional level, the Communist Party of Vietnam started implementation of the 
‘Doi Moi’ free-market reform process and eventually agreed to withdraw its troops fully 
from Cambodia after the demise of the Soviet Union and its growing need for Western 
investment, trade and assistance. In Thailand, most leading figures of the CPT were 
arrested and their revolutionary bases were destroyed. By 1991, there were almost no 
reports of political activities by the CPT (Battersby 1998; Chai-Anan 1997; Ciorciari 
2010, 83-88).  
 
Furthermore, the initial stage of domestic political liberalisation by the late 1980s 
provided a supportive political context for former activists to revive their political 
activism. The Prem Tinsulanonda regime gave way to an elected coalition government 
led by Chatichai Choonhavan and the role of parliament and political parties 
subsequently expanded (Hewison 1997). In the public sphere, the printed media again 
reasserted its independence and role as a public watchdog. For example, in 1991, the 
press successfully campaigned for the revocation of Decree 42 which allowed officials 
to arbitrarily close any newspaper without legal recourse. This campaign created 
considerable enthusiasm (Pasuk and Baker 2002, 389-390; Thitinan 1997, 221-224).  
 
A liberal political environment was created, with an increasing role for new provincial 
politicians in party politics, for the business sector in the policy-making process, and for 
the local/urban poor and civil society groups in campaigns for their political agenda 
(Pasuk and Baker 1997). The success of the middle class mass movement in opposing 
the return to power of the military in 1992, the proliferation of radical social movements 
of marginal people throughout the 1990s in response to the negative impact of economic 
development, and the vibrant political reform process of the 1990s, all signalled the 
emergence of a new political environment within which the Octobrists could participate 
in politics and revive their political identity.   
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One further point to be considered in understanding the revival of the Octobrists in the 
1990s was their new social and political status. By the early 1990s, many of them had 
become successful academics, politicians, writers, singers, businesspeople, etc (further 
details in Chapter 4 and 5). Inevitably, this new status provided them new academic and 
authoritative power in constructing a new political identity. In doing so, they 
successfully rewrote the history of 14th and 6th October, romanticised life in the jungle 
with the CPT, and instituted their new identity as ‘Octobrists’. 
 
Recasting the 14th and 6th October histories 
 
The process of reconstructing the histories of 14th and 6th October in a democratic and 
moral perspective had been long advocated through the annual commemorations since 
the late 1970s. Only by the 1990s was the repositioning of their histories from leftist 
failures to democratic heroes realised. They successfully rewrote their 1970s history 
from the mixed picture of liberal conservatives and extreme Maoist activists to unified 
innocent progressive students fighting for justice and democracy against authoritarian 
regimes but forced by the violence and injustice of the Thai state to join the armed 
struggle of the CPT.  
 
 
Democratising 14th October 1973 
The process of democratising the 14th October 1973 incident started right after the 
incident itself. In spite of the initial lack of success due to the restrictive political 
conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, these ongoing efforts left a fruitful legacy 
for later success during the 1990s. The celebration of the first anniversary on 14th 
October 1974 was named the ‘1st year after the revolution by the people’ and 
emphasised mass democracy and people power overthrowing an authoritarian regime 
(Prachachat 1974). However, between 1973 and 1976, the events were quickly replaced 
by a leftist image and conflict among students in vibrant political activities. On the 2nd 
anniversary on 14th October 1975, there were questions about the legitimacy of the 
students (Prachachat 1975). Even until the early 1980s, the annual memorial 
ceremonies were still relatively marginalised. Only a small group of friends, relatives 
and the younger generation of student activists participated in commemorating the 
deaths of fellow students as the loss of loved ones (Parithatsan 1981). Despite the quiet 
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celebrations, messages highlighting democratic elements and concealing leftist elements 
and their conflicts during the 14th October incident were constantly presented to the 
public. For example, in 1981, the 8th anniversary of 14th October, Ssu Anakhot (Toward 
the Future), a political magazine run by several former student activists, argued in an 
editorial for ‘the democratic soul of 14th October’, and emphasised the meaning of 14th 
October as:  
 
‘…this incident [14th  October] brought us the term ‘14th October Spirit’ 
whose essence was directly the desire for democracy and using the efforts of 
all to get it. All hoped that democracy would be the best way to set national 
policy through the wisdom of the majority’.  
(Su Anakhot 1981a) 
 
At the same time, there was the message arguing that 14th October 1973 was not an 
accident; it was political problems which forced the people to stand up. The positive 
consequences of 14th October weakened authoritarian and bureaucratic politics (Su 
Anakhot 1981a).  
 
The democratisation of 14th October was realised in the early 1990s. The celebrations 
shifted from small annual events among relatives, friends and small groups of younger 
activists, toward better organised series and packages of events in promoting democratic 
and other moral issues. The 20th anniversary of 14th October in 1993 was a crucial 
turning point. The pre-celebration meeting of 14th Octobrists on 9th October 1993, at the 
luxurious Imperial Hotel on Wireless Road in the heart of Bangkok, was a major 
symbol of the return and revival of the 14th October generation to the public stage, 
because it managed to gather more than 500 14th Octobrists who were then successful 
academics, politicians, writers, singers, businesspersons, etc., as well as other non-left 
allies of the 14th Octobrists (MS 1993f). A picture of Seksan Prasertkul and Thirayuth 
Boonmee, who were then dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat 
University and political and social commentator at the Faculty of Sociology, 
Thammasat University, respectively, at the 20th October 14th anniversary celebration 
dominated the front cover of several newspapers and political magazines, such as, 
Matichon Sutsapda (Public Opinion Weekly), one of the most prominent Thai political 
weeklies (MS 1993c, front cover). Subsequently, countless seminars, celebrations and 
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political campaigns were promoted. All were deliberately arranged to serve one 
common goal, which was to depict the 14th October people’s uprising as a historic 
victory in Thai democratisation. In achieving this goal, three major strategies and 
processes were pursued in parallel.  
 
Firstly, they restated the democratic element and importance of students in pushing 
forward the democratic transition in the 14th October people’s uprising. To do so, the 
democratic version of the history of 14th October was systematically redrafted and 
popularised. There was a seminar series on revising the history of 14th October 1973 
like the round table seminar on the ‘historical position of the events of 14th October 
1973’ at the 20th anniversary of 14th October. Not only 14th Octobrists themselves, but 
also the famous liberal historian, Chanwit Kasetsiri played a key role in revising 
democratic history of 14th October (MS 1993f). Countless books and articles from 
individual experience repeated the same message of the victory of the 14th October 
democratic movement to the public (Jaran 2003; Jaran 2004, 40; Prasarn 1993, 31–32; 
Wittayakorn 2003). Moreover, there were campaigns to incorporate the history of 14th 
October in the school curriculum (KT 2002a; MR 1999; MS 1993e; Prajak 2005, 10-12), 
to establish 14th October as the official ‘Day of Democracy’, and to construct the 14th 
October monument. These efforts were nothing new as many 14th Octobrists had long 
struggled to institutionalise the dead from the 14th October incident as martyrs and had 
been calling for a ‘Martyrs’ Monument’ since the 1970s (Matuphoom Raiwan 1983b; 
MR 1983; MR 1989; MR 1993a; NS 1997a; NS 1997b; Su Anakhot 1981b). Only during 
the early 1990s did these efforts succeed, particularly since many Octobrists held 
influential positions in the cabinet, academia and business. For example, Adisorn 
Piengket, a former student activist from Ramkhamhaeng University who was Deputy 
Education Minister during the 20th anniversary of 14th October played a crucial role in 
persuading the government and cabinet to support construction of the 14th October 
monument (NS 1997a; NS 1997b).  
 
Secondly, they interpreted 14th October as part of the process of contemporary 
democratisation in Thai politics together with the landmark Black May 1992 incident. 
While 14th October 1973 marked the success of the student movement in mobilising a 
mass movement to end the 15-year-long series of authoritarian governments including 
those of Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) and Thanom Kittikachorn-Prapas Jarusathien-
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Narong Kittikachorn (1963-1973), May 1992 saw the triumph of a popular protest led 
by the middle class in stopping the revival of military intervention in parliamentary 
politics. The mass demonstrations both in Bangkok and other major cities successfully 
forced the non-elected Prime Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon to step down and 
secured the return of electoral democracy. The similarities of both events as mass 
movements against military-oriented governments opened space for 14th October in the 
newly constructed process of Thai democratisation. In response to the reshaping of the 
history of Thai democracy after the May 1992 incident, many prominent 14th Octobrists 
wrote about the significance of 14th October in the process of Thai democratisation 
(Suwit 2007, 331). Some argued even further that the success of the 14th October 
incident established the necessary conditions and strong political will for the triumph of 
the people’s movement in May 1992 (Tanet 1992). By this time, it became known that 
the history of Thai democratisation comprised three major stages: the transition from an 
absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1932 was the triumph of 
collaboration between civil and military groups; the successful overthrow of an 
authoritarian regime and establishment of electoral democracy on 14th October 1973 
was the success of ‘people power’ led by student activists; and the middle class mass 
uprising fought to protect democracy from the return of a military regime in May 1992. 
 
Furthermore, they emphasised the connection between the democratic element of the 
1970s and May 1992. In doing so, they succeeded in democratising their 1970s leftist 
history. Many 14th Octobrists argued that the middle class in the 1992 May incident 
largely came from a background and experience shared with the 1970s activists, even 
though there was no proof that many of the Octobrist middle class participated in or 
contributed to the success of the May 1992 mobilisation. These former students 
successfully made use of this interpretation in democratising their histories. Both 
Thirayuth Boonmee and Anek Laothamatas, two prominent Octobrist academics at 
Thammasat University, presented similar messages. Thirayuth (1994) argued that the 
1990s Thai middle class was consistently pro-democracy because of its Octobrist 
background.  
 
‘Those of my generation are people who have experienced the most political 
crises, starting with the October 14th uprising, through the October 6th 
bloodshed, to the May 1992 event. We are contemporaries of the rebellious 
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young men and women around the world who turn against the ruling 
‘system’ and power…’ 
(Thirayuth 1994, 14) 
  
In the same vein, Anek (1993a) explained ‘we should keep our eyes on the business 
executives aged between 30-39 years old, as they were people who participated in and 
were witnesses to the 14th and 6th October incidents’ (Anek 1993a, 185).  
 
Lastly, the celebrations of 14th October in the early 1990s successfully incorporated 
other liberal ideas which gave them the appearance of a peaceful movement for ‘rights 
and liberty’. This helped to engage liberal academics and members of the elites in 
legitimising their rituals. A number of non-14th Octobrists participated in the 
preparation meetings for the 20th anniversary to show their sympathy and solidarity (MS 
1993d). Anand Panyarachun (1991-1992), a liberal Prime Minister, mentioned his 
sympathy with the history of 14th October as it helped in reducing the power of the 
bureaucratic polity and expanding the space for economic liberalisation (MS 1993c). 
 
However not everyone agreed with the reduction of the meanings and facts of 14th 
October into merely a democratic movement fighting for ‘rights and liberty’. Many 
Octobrists put effort into revealing the differences and conflicts during the 1970s. 
However, they were little heeded and marginalised. The article series ‘Lost Memory of 
a Youngster’ by Bandit Jansrikham, known by his pseudonym of ‘Khaen Sarika’, a 
former activist from Ramkhamhaeng University who was then administrative editor of 
the Nation Sutsapda (Nation Weekend), detailed the different ideological streams of 
ideas, including leftist ideas, among Octobrists before 14th October 1973. Somsak 
Jeamteerasakul, the 6th Octobrist from Thammasat University who later became a 
prominent radical historian, revealed various conflicting ideological streams among 
students before 14th October and argued that they came to be united only on 14th 
October. Right after 14th October, differences and conflicts reappeared (Somsak 2001). 
One of the most outstanding examples was the effort by Kasian Tejapira, a prominent 
6th Octobrist political scientist, in debates with the 14th Octobrist generation and other 
liberal historians about how to define and name 14th October. While other 14th 
Octobrists like Thirayuth Boonmee and liberal academics like Chanwit Kasetsiri 
insisted on naming 14th October as ‘Rights and Liberty Day’ or ‘Democracy Day’, 
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Kasian Tejapira found it unacceptable to define 14th October merely in terms of political 
rights and liberty, because it would limit the meaning of 14th October to anti-
authoritarianism, and above all conceal the ideas of anti-feudalism and anti-capitalism 
and the struggle for social justice and equality which had been the real causes for people 
to stand up against the regime. He even further argued that 14th October was a 
‘movement of radicalism from below’ (in Thai he translated it as ‘left from below’). He 
even further challenged liberal interpretations by sarcastically proposing 14th October as 
‘Bourgeois Revolution Day’. Nevertheless in the meeting, his ideas caused anxiety for 
Thirayuth and Chanwit. Thirayuth disagreed and argued that the anti-capitalist ideas and 
movement emerged six months after 14th October 1973 and he would like to count the 
14th October only until midnight of that day. Chanwit even closed the meeting by 
insisting that 14th October should be the day for ‘yellow bird-innocent democratic 
student’ and he would not allow it to be hijacked by any ‘red bird-leftist student 
activists’ (KT 1998b). Nonetheless, questioning voices like these were marginalised and 
went unheard. The process of democratising and liberalising 14th October was 
established and became the dominant discourse.  
 
From the 25th anniversary onward, the reinterpretation and framing of October 14th in 
term of ‘democratisation’ has become rooted and successfully mobilised wider support 
from new elite groups of politicians, businessmen, etc (Thamrongsak 2010). In the 
special lecture of Seksan Prasertkul for the 30th anniversary celebration in 2003, he 
strongly and firmly urged the continuing advocacy of what he called the ‘14th October 
Spirit (chetanarom sip si tulakhom)’, the political will to stand up to fight against 
dictatorship and appeal for electoral democracy, as well as social justice, peace and 
harmony for society (NS 2003b).  
 
The idea was warmly welcomed by all, even among non-Octobrist intellectuals. In 
preparation for the 25th anniversary ceremony, prominent 14th Octobrist academics and 
politicians like Thirayuth Boonmee, Pinit Jarusombat, Chamni Sakdiset, Chaturon 
Chaisang, Sutham Saengprathum, Adisorn Piengket, Kriengkamol Laohapairoj, 
Phumtham Wechayachai and others, acted as a coordinating committee (MS 1998). 
Through their networks, more and more people from various sectors, who in fact were 
neither students nor directly involved in 14th October, agreed to support the celebration. 
Chuan Leekpai (former Prime Minister and leader of the Democrat Party), Anand 
105 
 
Panyarachun (former Prime Minister), Uthai Pimjaichon (prominent politician) agreed 
to be co-chairs. Also, Thanphuying Phoonsuk Banomyong (wife of Pridi Banomyong), 
Puey Ungpakorn (liberal and prominent academic), Sem Pringpuangkeaw, Saneh 
Jamarik (Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission), Prawes Wasi, Sulak 
Sivarak, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Bhichai Rattakul and Dhanin Chearavanont 
(owner of CP company) agreed to be honorary committee members. With support from 
powerful political and public figures, many projects, including the monument 
construction and inclusion of 14th October in the school history curriculum made 
significant progress (MR 1999; MS 1993e; MS 1998; NS 1997c). At the peak of the 
Octobrists’ influence, the 30th anniversary of 14th October in 2003, when many 
Octobrists were in parliament and the Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai - TRT) 
cabinet35
 
, they obtained a budget of more than US$1.5 million from the government to 
organise the commemoration (Chaiwat 2003; MR 2003b).  
Above all, they partly succeeded in making the 14th October history official. Their 
initial proposal was to push parliament to commemorate 14th October as national ‘Day 
of Democracy’ or ‘Rights and Liberty Day’. While other non-Octobrist elements within 
the Thaksin government counter-argued that the name would undervalue other days like 
24th June 1932 (the date of the transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy). After a long negotiation, the result was a compromise of ‘14th October: 
Democracy Day’ (MR 2003c; Prajak 2005, 6; TN 2003).  
 
 
Moralising the leftist history of 6th October 1976  
While the 14th Octobrists had their own stories of victory and democracy, the 6th 
Octobrists found themselves left with a rather painful history of failure and a reputation 
as extreme leftists, which many of them preferred to forget (Penchan 2003). 
                                               
35 In 2003, PM Thaksin Shinawatra appointed many Octobrists, including Chaturon Chaisang, as 
members of a committee to consider 14th October as National Democracy Day. He was also supported by 
many other Octobrists in the TRT party including Prommin Lertsuridej (Minister of Energy), Surapong 
Suebwonglee (Minister of Technology), Pinit Jarusombat (Minister of Science), Praphat Panyachatrak 
(Minister of Natural Resources), Somsak Pisana-anantakul (Deputy House Speaker), Adisorn Piengket 
(Deputy Government Whip), Surachat Banroungsook, Kothom Nawarat and Pitsanu Warunyu (MR 20 
August 2003). Also, there were other Octobrists in the Senate including Karun Saingarm (TN, 20 August 
2003, 3A) 
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Nonetheless, after a long effort, they gradually succeeded in repositioning the history of 
6th October by erasing their extreme leftist background, distancing themselves from the 
CPT and Maoist history, and dropping the story of conflict with the liberalist 14th 
October generation. Moreover, they represented themselves in terms of democracy and 
morality by portraying themselves as innocent and heroic student activists who fought 
for underprivileged people and social justice and protected the democracy that had been 
established after 14th October 1973.  
 
Their long march in repositioning 6th October, which started right after the incident, was 
disorganised and hardly succeeded in gaining public acceptance. In the celebration of 
ultra-right wing success after 6th October, there was no political space left for them. For 
instance, Red Gaurs (Krathing Daeng) and New Force (Nawaphon), militant right wing 
groups, dominated the scene in Bangkok and forcefully demonstrated against the first 
anniversary of 6th October in 1977. The first anniversary served as an occasion for a call 
for the release of students from jail and condemnations of the violence of the 6th 
October massacre (Anti-authoritarian Alliance 1977; Athit 1977).  
 
The situation was better in 1978, when the leading 18 student leaders were released 
from jail and there was a public announcement of their innocence of the allegation of 
being communist. From then on campaigns began against the state’s violence, 
highlighting the deaths of innocent student activists on 6th October without referring to 
or mentioning their leftist ideas and backgrounds. The 2nd anniversary at Thammasat 
University focused on ‘6th October: Bright Thai youngsters forever lost’, ‘The brave: 
worship the 6th October martyrs’, etc. (Athit 1978b). The 18 former student prisoners 
marched out revealing their experience of the violence that day (Sutham 1979a; Sutham 
1979b; Sutham 1979c; Sutham 1979d). By the early 1980s, after their return from the 
jungle and at the beginning of political liberalisation, many Octobrists and especially 
the 6th Octobrists repeatedly condemned the violence at the 6th October incident. For 
instance, Su Anakhot (Toward the Future), a weekly political journal run by many 
Octobrists, every year mentioned the massacre and called for both the ultra-right and 
extreme left wings who were involved in violence on 6th October 1976 to take 
responsibility (Su Anakhot 1981a). At the same time, the reinterpretation of 6th October 
as a step in the democratisation of Thai politics after 14th October was highlighted. On 
the 10th anniversary of 14th October, the post-14th October period was interpreted as the 
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most vibrant democratic period in Thai history. But this democracy was ended by 
violence perpetrated by a right wing government against students and other working 
class people who played leading roles in defending democracy on 6th October 1973 
(Matuphoom Raiwan 1983a; Matuphoom Raiwan 1983c). Despite these efforts to 
reposition 6th October, during the 1980s, most 6th Octobrists were still not able to unify 
and recover from their leftist public reputation.  
 
The process of institutionalising democratic and moral elements of 6th October was 
genuinely rooted from the 20th anniversary in 1996 onward. The turning point was a 
campaign initiated by Thongchai Winichakul, a leading figure during the 6th October 
incident, calling for a revision of the history of 6th October and claiming back public 
space for the 6th Octobrists. Open letters to his 6th Octobrist friends and countless public 
talks and writings before the 20th year anniversary inspired and brought many 6th 
Octobrists back together. Thongchai argued that the history of 6th October 1976 was a 
tragedy which both the Thai authorities who were involved in the violence (MR 1995) 
and the victims tried to forget. For him, there were three major reasons for the silence 
among both perpetrators and victims of the massacre. Firstly, many members of the 
political elite who had been involved in the conspiracy leading to the killings remained 
very powerful at least until the late 1990s. Secondly, perpetrators or victims were 
ambivalent due to self-doubt and a sense of moral dilemma. While those involved in the 
violence tried to distance themselves from this painful memory as they were later 
questioned and blamed by society as perpetrators of mass killings, the victims were 
blamed as communists, the cause of chaos, and a danger to the ‘Nation, Religion and 
Monarchy’. Also many of those who later joined the CPT returned home with no pride 
in their past radicalism, but instead suffering, guilt and grief. Lastly, there was no pre-
existing discourse of ‘state violence’ in the Thai historical perspective. It was hard to 
place the 6th October massacre in a Thai historical context. Under the idea of a unified 
nation under a benevolent monarch, a massacre by the state was an alien concept 
(Thongchai 2001, 3-5). Thongchai called for a ‘war of memory’ for the 6th October 
incident both at the structural and individual levels in overcoming these problems and 
re-establishing the history of 6th October. At the structural level, the annual celebration 
and commemoration of 6th October must be carried on to institutionalise the memory in 
the long term. At the individual level, Thongchai encouraged victims to stand up and 
reveal their painful memories (NS 2001). At the 25th year anniversary in 2001, 
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Thongchai appealed for a revision of the history of 6th October and for the October 
generation to pay attention to the stories of ‘little’ people, the victims and their relatives. 
Many other Octobrists called for publication of the pictures of mutilated corpses on 6th 
October (Makdawan 2001; KS 2001e).  
 
Nonetheless, not every 6th Octobrist agreed with this inclusive idea and process in 
moralising 6th October as proposed by Thongchai Winichakul. In Kasian Tejapira 
(1996, 70-74), there are three major contesting streams of ideas in redefining and 
constructing this history. Firstly, the broad and inclusive 6th October history proposed 
by Thongchai tried to energise the new meaning of 6th October hero and ‘idealist’ 
without mentioning ideology (Kasian 1996, 68). Kasian argued that in doing so, 
Thongchai diminished and blurred the leftist elements, ideologies and identity of the 6th 
Octobrists in order to create a common broad value. The objectives of this process were 
to extend the alliances of the 6th October commemoration in the wider public. In doing 
so, Thongchai was well aware of two major problems he wanted to overcome. The first 
was the political constraint of the limited space for leftist ideology and heroes. The 
second concerned the changes in both ideas and social status of former 6th Octobrists, or 
what Kasian called ‘mindfulness of the turbulent and diverse politico-ideological 
aftermath of the 6th October incident’. However, for Kasian, this is, on the one hand, a 
strategy for urgently mobilising the power of those who would help to remember the 6th 
October incident. On the other hand, it is rather subversive because it attempted to 
disguise the political conflict between left and right (Kasian 1996, 70-74). 
 
Secondly, there was an exclusive meaning of 6th October imposed by Somsak 
Jeamteerasakul, in arguing against the first stream of Thongchai. For Somsak, 
commemorating 6th October was to celebrate and remember student activists who 
fought for the socialist movement, and in his opinion, the ‘6th October hero’ was equal 
to the brave who are prepared to die for socialist principles.  
 
‘The 6th October incident was the most outstanding symbol in Thai society 
because it was the incident that genuinely demonstrates the beliefs and 
ideology of the student activists and people and the struggle to advocate 
socialist principles. This was different from 14th October [1973] and May 
1992’.  
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(MD 1995) 
 
Somsak’s strategy was not to expand alliances but to remember 6th October correctly. 
For him, it was better not to remember than remember incorrectly.  
 
Thirdly, there was an idea of a debatable radical history of 6th October proposed by 
Kasian Tejapira himself. He agreed neither with Thongchai Winichakul in ignoring the 
socialist elements in 6th October nor with Somsak Jeamteerasakul on what Kasian 
argued was a rigid and unsophisticated perspective toward socialist elements inside the 
6th October movement. He instead firstly argued that the 6th Octobrist movement was 
neither consolidated under the guidance of ‘the CPT’ nor under the broader definition of 
the western ‘socialist’ movement. For him, the 6th October movement was defined as a 
‘Thai socialist’ movement which was formulated through three main contesting 
ideological streams including the anti-government movement, Maoism and the 1960s 
Thai left. However, conflicts among these three different streams burst out when all 
gathered under the CPT. Kasian further argued that amidst this process they even 
formulated not only ‘October socialism’ but also ‘October nationalism’ (Kasian 1996, 
68-69 and 80-82). Subsequently, the 6th October is a history of contesting ideological 
movements. 
 
During the debates among these three approaches, the first broad and inclusive approach 
of Thongchai Winichakul became dominant and was influential in the process of 
repositioning the history of 6th October. At the structural level, most leftist elements 
subsided. Liberal and moderate progressive ideas were integrated into the process. Its 
official legacy and declarations were reconstructed through a rhetoric of peace, 
freedom, democracy, ethics, social responsibility, social justice, etc (20th anniversary 
6th of October preparation committee 1996; Boonlert 1996). The whole celebration was 
overwhelmed by statements, seminars, exhibitions, etc., which portrayed the 6th October 
incident as a history of the student movement fighting for social justice and democracy 
by peaceful means but suppressed by violence from the Thai state. For example, an 
installation of more than a hundred pieces of art was arranged under the theme ‘Spirit of 
6th October’ with a statement by National Artist Alliance of Thailand (MR 1996; 
Penchan 2003). Moreover, it emphasised how the progressive lesson of 6th October 
contributed to Thai politics. A series of seminars integrated all kinds of topics including 
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state violence, political hatred in Thai society, mob and state, green politics, Buddhism 
and political crises, and political violence in Thai society, which were either relevant or 
irrelevant to 6th October and socialism. 
 
At the individual level, the example of Thongchai’s angry testimony of his firsthand 
experience of violence on the football field at Thammasat University and the loss of 
many lives in front of his own eyes was powerful and inspiring (MR 2000a; NS 2001; 
Thongchai 1996a; Thongchai 1996b). Subsequently, many other 6th Octobrists lined up 
to write memoirs of their untold stories as victims of state violence in the form of books, 
newspaper articles and personal online memoirs (Pichit 2009; Sarakadee 1996, 161-
163; Sucheera 2003). For instance, the students involved in the play which was claimed 
to be an act of lèse majesté and was a trigger for 6th October 1976, marched out to relate 
their own story to the public (Sukhum 1996a).  
 
There were four major consequences of this success. Firstly, in the historical context, 
the leftist image of the 6th Octobrists was diminished. Its historical status was treated as 
other ‘idealist’ people’s movements. By the 1990s, more and more intellectuals started 
referring to 6th October as equivalent to the 1932 transition to constitutional monarchy 
and the 14th October movement (Prachatai 2008). Above all, the 6th Octobrists became 
known and remembered by younger generations to the same degree as the 14th 
Octobrists. In a survey conducted by Thamrongsak Petchlert-anan and his team among 
136 students and people in three universities, Thammasat, Silapakorn and Rangsit, on 
their perception of 14th October 1973, 6th October 1976, and May 1992 (Thamrongsak 
2010), it was clear that the democratic historical version of 14th October was rooted 
among the public. Nearly 80 percent were aware of its history and nearly 100 percent 
viewed it either as a democratic movement or an anti-authoritarian movement. At the 
same time, the process of repositioning and giving prominence to the democratic 
version of 6th October had made some progress. Even though less than half of 
participants knew about the historical background of 6th October, nearly 95 percent of 
those who were confident to talk about its history described it as a continuation of 14th 
October, calling for democracy from an authoritarian regime and opposing violence 
against innocent students who were accused by an authoritarian government of 
communism. Only 7 persons referred to communist elements among these students.  
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Table 3.1: Survey on awareness of the histories of 14th and 6th October  
Incidents 
Aware of the histories  
(out of 136) 
Identifying the incident as a 
democratic movement (among 
those aware) 
Number % Number % 
14th October 
1973 
108 79.5 % 107  99 % 
6th October 1976 57 41.5 % 50  87.7% 
Source: Modified from survey results of Thamrongsak Petchlert-anan on ‘Future of 6th 
October’ 2008 
 
Secondly, the transformation of the image of 6th Octobrists from the painful experience 
of extreme leftists to being viewed as defenders of democracy was welcomed more and 
more by 6th Octobrists themselves, especially those who had earlier refused to join any 
commemoration (20th anniversary 6th of October preparation committee 1996; Boonlert 
1996; MR 1996). Many felt that they no longer needed to hide their own backgrounds as 
part of the history of 6th October. In Thongchai Winichakul’s speech for the celebration 
of 25th anniversary of 6th October, he argued that the success of the 20th anniversary 
helped to eliminate the uncomfortable context that haunted his generation for years and 
years. All preparations and activities before and during the celebrations allowed space 
for Octobrists to tell their own stories (NS 2001).  
 
Thirdly, this success also welcomed new non-6th Octobrists into the celebrations and the 
historical repositioning process. For example, the chair of the Coordinating Committee 
of the 20th Anniversary of 6th October was Gothom Ariya, a non-6th Octobrist liberal 
and human rights advocate. The fund-raising dinner talks for the 6th October 
celebrations were organised on the broad topic of ‘collective action for new politics’. 
The key speakers were Anand Panyarachun, Prawes Wasi and Thirayuth Boonmee. And 
the event was broadcast through various national and cable TV channels including 
Channel 9, Thai Sky TV, and ITV. In the same vein, at the 30th and 31st anniversary 
celebrations, more and more non-6th Octobrist public figures were invited including 
Saneh Jamarik, Apirak Kosayothin (Bangkok Governor from the Democrat Party), and 
other luminaries.  
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Lastly, many tangibly successful landmark projects were also conceived. With the 
support and collaboration of all parties, the 6th Octobrists successfully convinced 
Thammasat University to construct a 6th October monument at its auditorium, as well as 
the ‘Martyrs’ Monument’ at Chulalongkorn University (NS 2000; Vipa n.d.). A 
commission to reinvestigate the victims of the 6th October incident was set up and 
launched an independent report to contest the official history. The ‘6th October Martyr 
Fund’ was also set up as well as campaigns appealing for compensation from the 
government for the families of those who had lost their lives (Penchan 2003; LWN 
2003a).  
 
Normalising the 1970s extreme leftist ideas and identity 
 
Besides reframing the 14th and 6th October histories in ‘democratic’ and ‘moralistic’ 
terms, the former activists also successfully normalised their leftist histories and leftist 
ideological legacy, cultural objects and icons. In doing so they made a legend of their 
lives as communists in the jungle and realigned their 1970s leftist ideas with other 
liberal ideas and figures.  
 
 
Normalising leftist backgrounds and life with the CPT  
From the 1990s onward, countless interviews, books, films, plays and articles about the 
stories and experiences of the Octobrists both before and during their time with the CPT 
in the jungle were made public. Nevertheless, instead of revising and focusing on their 
leftist socialisation and ideological debates, nearly all historical records contained four 
major messages which all apparently supported the process of normalising their leftist 
ideas and identity from their 1970s and 1980s histories.  
 
First of all, the story about cell units for leftist socialisation and CPT domination among 
radical students between 1973 and 1976 was replaced by a claim to be self-organised 
and independent from the CPT, with their radicalism influenced by the vibrant political 
situation before and after the 14th October victory of democracy. The explanation for the 
causes and processes of joining the CPT was overwhelmed by stories of bright students 
who were forced by state violence and injustice to join the armed struggle with the CPT 
after 6th October 1976. However, these messages concealed the reality of many 
113 
 
connections they had had with the CPT long before 6th October as well as stories of 
students who had yearned to join the CPT for some time (Warasan Phleng Lae Dontri 
2002; Prasarn 2003, 60).  
 
Secondly, their history as militant communists and guerrilla fighters as perceived by the 
public during the 1980s was romanticised and portrayed as the lives of innocent and 
dedicated students working for underprivileged people and democracy. Countless 
interviews, books, articles, documentaries, films, websites and plays about their 
romantic life and daily struggles were produced and re-produced. For example, Bandit 
Jansrikham actively promoted many new columns written by former comrades in the 
Nation Sutsapda (Nation Weekend) about their lives in the jungle. He himself also wrote 
many articles about the history of that period. Furthermore, the mushrooming annual 
celebrations in the revolutionary bases, the skeleton-collecting activities, and the 
construction of monuments commemorating the dead, mainly focused on cultural 
activities and made heroes of those who died in the jungle during the armed struggle. In 
attracting more former comrades in the cities to join these commemoration events, the 
trips and events were full of nostalgic activities including the retelling of romantic 
memories, celebrations and the construction of monuments to the dead, charitable 
activities for poor comrades, revolutionary song concerts, and adventure trips back to 
remote revolutionary bases.  
 
Thirdly, stories of disappointment with and antipathy toward the CPT were highlighted. 
The CPT was depicted as Chinese-dominated, authoritarian and orthodox Maoists 
(Caravan 2000, 32–33). Students were portrayed as innocent patriots who fought for 
social justice and democracy, but were forced to join the CPT for lack of another choice 
and were disappointed with the corrupt and undemocratic culture of the CPT. Kasian 
Tejapira’s writings showed his great frustration with Chinese domination over the party 
which alienated him from the core structure of the CPT in spite of his respect toward 
many of its members (Kasian 2001b). Surachai Jantimatorn, a prominent 14th student 
activist singer, showed his respect for tribal comrades in their long rebellious history 
against the Thai even before joining the CPT but argued against the CPT’s claim of 
success in radicalising these people (1985a, 19).  The success in retelling these stories 
concealed the dedication of many CPT members, the sympathy that other former 
student activists had for the CPT even after leaving the jungle, and above all the 
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problems created by students for the CPT which later partly caused the decline of the 
CPT.  
  
Lastly, many celebrations embraced the non-leftist status of Octobrists and non-leftist 
figures in order to tone down and legitimise their leftist and militant histories. Many 
former Octobrist politicians were invited to act as chairpersons in many ceremonies at 
the revolutionary base sites. Adisorn Piengket, Deputy Minister of Science and 
Technology, was the chairperson at a merit-making ritual for those who lost their lives 
during battles at Phusang revolutionary base in 1997 (NS 1997a). In 2006 and 2007, 
General Surayud Chulanont, a member of the Privy Council and later Prime Minister 
(2006-2008), whose father, Comrade Khamtan, was a 1950s communist soldier, was 
invited to chair the opening ceremony of the ‘People’s History’ building, ‘Mong-Lauo’ 
tribal museum, and Solidarity Monument at the former revolutionary base at Phu Payak, 
Nan Province. The speech given by Surayud about his father, a great Thai soldier, who 
was forced to join the CPT because of his disagreement with the authoritarian Phibun 
Songkhram regime, helped to legitimise the militant background of these students (NS 
2006a). 
 
 
Deradicalising the 1970s radical reputation and cultural objects  
Besides romanticising their communist history, the Octobrists also successfully 
normalised their leftist image and cultural legacy. In doing so, they selectively dropped 
leftist elements and then linked their former leftist reputations with other non-leftist 
ideas and figures. Subsequently, they favourably turned them into merely progressive 
and radical liberal ones.  
 
Firstly, in term of ideas, in retelling their leftist socialisation, most prominent former 
student activists claimed that the initial ideological source of their activism was not 
socialist and they were only later forced to convert to leftist approaches. They also 
argued that they had already abandoned leftist ideas and turned to liberal and other 
moderate approaches. For example, Pirun Chatwanitchakul, a leading leftist mentor 
among radical students who joined the CPT at a very early stage, retold his story, saying 
that his political activism had been leavened by liberal and democratic ideas. However, 
he was berated for being a communist (Pirun, interview by author, 2 February 2007, 
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Bangkok). Similarly, Thirayuth Boonmee argued that three ideological streams 
influenced his initial political activities including western progressive ideas, social 
volunteerism and self-searching during his time at the university. Although he admitted 
that he was committed to Marxism and other leftist ideas before 6th October and during 
his time with the CPT, he claimed that he abandoned the extreme views and turned back 
to his original roots of rational Buddhism which he learnt when he was young (Siam 
Post 1993).  
 
Secondly, the Octobrists succeeded in converting their earlier leftist cultural objects 
including leftist and revolutionary songs and literature, into ‘songs and literature for 
life’. They publicly organised countless revolutionary music concerts. However, these 
events were treated as cultural and historical commemorations rather than potential 
cultural tools for revitalising radicalism. The concerts and music performances were 
frozen in a historical time capsule. For instance, patterns of performance were 
apparently kept in the original, singers marched out in red star military uniforms and 
everything was decorated with red flags and yellow stars.  
 
In diminishing the leftist image of their earlier literature in the public eye, they either 
mixed it with other non-left material or reproduced it in the name of the 14th or 6th 
Octobrists. Moreover, they successfully re-identified leftist literature during the 1960s 
and 1970s as a part of the development of the progressive Thai literature movement 
which had begun in the 1950s including the ‘peace revolution’, and the progressive 
journalists’ campaign against the authoritarianism of Phibun Songkhram (Editorial team 
1998). Furthermore, in legitimising their history, several publishing houses run by 
Octobrists, including the Khosit (Proclaim) and Saithan (Stream) publishing houses, 
reproduced countless pieces of radical literature, especially those on the list of the 100 
books banned during the 1970s. In doing so, they further argued that banning leftist 
literature during the 1970s was damaging to Thai wisdom and the intellectual 
environment (Monsikul 1997). The 14th Octobrist generation established the ‘14th 
October Academic Institute’ to revive the literature which influenced their generation, a 
set of the 30 most influential works. By the mid 1990s, they were relatively successful 
in mainstreaming these readings into Thai society. The major landmark is that many 
influential 1970s books were included in an official and popular list of the 100 ‘must 
read’ books for Thais. This was the result of many prominent Octobrist academics and 
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writers being members of the selection committee. Moreover, their new status helped to 
erase their leftist reputation. The image of Seksan Prasertkul, Thirayuth Boonmee, etc., 
as leftist writers gradually faded away after they were named as National Artists in 
Literature (MS 1993a).   
 
Thirdly, in diluting their leftist elements, they infused and integrated their leftist icons 
with liberal thinkers and ideas. On the one hand, they highlighted liberal royalist and 
liberalist thinkers as their influential icons during the 1970s. Sulak Sivarak and Puey 
Ungpakorn were prominent examples. As a result of their support for radical students at 
the peak of right wing government, when they were eventually alleged to be communist 
and forced to leave the country for political exile right after the 6th October incident, 
students started embracing these figures in their 1970s history and celebrations of 14th 
and 6th October as major influential and supportive figures for student activists. At the 
20th anniversary of 14th October, Thirayuth Boonmee argued he was inspired by western 
progressive ideas through Sulak and social volunteerism ideas through Puey (Siam Post 
1993).  
 
On the other hand, the Thai leftist thinkers of the 1950s replaced the earlier dominant 
picture of the CPT. However, the process was far from straightforward.  Many leftists of 
the 1950s intelligentsia were dropped and transformed into merely progressive 
intellectuals. Even though the 14th and 6th Octobrists were influenced by many other 
radical ideas, such as western liberals and leftists, and Maoists, the significance of 
Marxism and Maoism among Octobrists was toned down and the role of Thai leftists 
was promoted. From the early 1980s onward, the biography, songs and literature of Jit 
Phumisak were again reproduced. But this time, Jit was distanced from the CPT. His 
participation and connection with the CPT was defused. The focus was more on his 
rebellious behaviour during his life as a student at Chulalongkorn University and his 
intellectual contribution as a Thai thinker and political hero in Thai politics and 
literature for life (Athit 1978a). Countless events celebrating the life of Jit Phumisak 
were organised and supported by both former activists and other non-left and liberal 
intellectuals. Chanwit Kasetsiri played a vital role in establishing the Jit Phumisak Trust 
as a means to popularise Jit literature and songs with little mention of his relationship 
with the CPT (MS 2009). Similarly, the political contribution of Pridi Banomyong 
toward Thai democratisation and radicalism was emphasised. In 2000, Sulak Sivarak 
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and many Octobrists acted as main sponsors of the 100th anniversary of Pridi 
Banomyong. Rather than promoting socialist elements in his political work and the 
connections between Pridi and the CPT and CCP, his biography highlighted mainly his 
role in the 1932 democratic transition, the Free Thai movement (seri thai or khana thai 
isara) during World War II, and the establishment of Thammasat University. Sawanee 
Liminon mentioned Pridi Banomyong as the leader of the Free Thai movement rather 
than for his leftist thought (MR 2000b), in a book published by the 14th October 
foundation for the 11th Children’s Art Exhibition of ‘democracy is the heart of peace’ 
(The 14th October Foundation 2003).  
 
Institutionalising ‘Octobrist: democratic warrior’ 
 
In spite of efforts to ‘democratise’ and ‘normalise’ the 1970s leftist history of the 
Octobrists, genuine success in reviving and regaining their new political status was the 
result of institutionalising themselves with the new identity of ‘Octobrist’. There were 
three parallel processes in institutionalising this term.   
 
Firstly, it was used in embracing both the 14th and 6th October generations into the 
‘1970s generation’. The earlier differences and conflicting ideologies were reduced and 
blurred both among themselves and in the public eye. Both the 14th and 6th Octobrists 
started calling themselves and being called merely ‘Octobrists’ rather than being treated 
differently and separately. Many activities, institutes, websites, monuments etc., were 
constituted in the name of the ‘Octobrists’ rather than specifying which October was 
concerned. The outdoor art installation which had been originally intended as a 
monument for the 6th October incident was instead named the ‘October wall’. Much 
1970s leftist literature and music for life was reproduced and renamed as ‘October 
literature and songs’ rather than their specific relevance.  
 
Secondly, Octobrists used the term ‘Octobrist’ in distinguishing themselves from other 
generations. On the one hand, in publicising the existence of their generation, they 
involved other politically active generations including those in the ‘Free Thai’, in May 
1992, etc., in their celebrations. On the other hand, in distinguishing and emphasising 
the unique and outstanding attributes of the 1970s student activists, they persistently 
blamed younger students for being politically inactive and ignorant in comparison with 
118 
 
the ‘Octobrists’. However, they hardly mentioned that they actually were a minority 
among their own generation and the political conditions which stimulated their political 
radicalism changed (KT 1999b). Among them, Thirayuth Boonmee and Seksan 
Prasertkul were the two most prominent figures who persistently mentioned their 
disappointment with the younger generation with little political interest and social 
concern and their addiction to consumerism (Prida and Thongtem 2003, 66; Kamol et 
al. 2003 p. 31; Seksan 1994).   
 
Lastly and most importantly, the term of ‘Octobrist’ successfully enhanced and 
supported the process of democratising their leftist background and history. The concept 
of ‘Octobrist’ helped to enhance the harmonious picture of the 14th and 6th October 
incidents as a continuing effort of the people to protect democracy from the return of 
authoritarian regimes. In brief, the broad term ‘Octobrist’ helped to integrate 6th October 
into the successful democratic history of 14th October. Countless stories related the 14th 
October movement as a successful movement against authoritarianism and the 6th 
October incident as a landmark in the continuing fight against ongoing inequality and a 
corrupt political structure (Testimony of many Octobrists in Sarakadee 1996, 133-174; 
Seksan 2009). Seksan Prasertkul called their generation ‘October warriors’ in the battle 
for democracy who kindled hope for the entire nation, as well as rescuing national pride 
and dignity in his public talk on the 27th anniversary commemorating 14th October in 
2001 (Seksan 2001)  
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, throughout the 1990s, the Octobrists successfully recovered their 
political identity and regained acceptance from the public as well as reunifying through 
three parallel processes. Firstly, their efforts in democratising and moralising the history 
of 14th and 6th October were successful. Secondly, they succeeded in normalising their 
leftist background both before and during their time with the CPT. Lastly, the 
construction and institutionalisation of the term of ‘Octobrist: democratic fighter’ 
prevailed as their new identity.  
 
Under the grim conditions of the ‘Second Cold War’ and continuing military influence 
in 1980s Thai politics, most student activists discontinued their political activities with 
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leftist movements after their return from the armed struggle with the CPT. At the same 
time, because of the legacy of loose structural networks which caused obstacles to 
reuniting after the collapse of the CPT; and the internal ideological conflicts among 
student activist themselves which led them to an uncompromising situation, those who 
still wished to carry on their unfinished radical missions could not persuade others or 
reconcile the ideological disagreements among themselves. Most remaining connections 
and activities were rather divisive and apolitical. The gatherings mainly functioned as 
alumni reunions rather than as political meetings with a concrete political agenda.  
 
From the early 1990s, when the Cold War came to an end and political liberalisation 
began, these Octobrists eventually succeeded in reunifying their Octobrist networks and 
regained their prize of the history of the 1970s. However, this time, they revived 
themselves neither as radical activists nor revolutionary warriors, but instead with the 
new identity of ‘Octobrist: 1970s democratic fighter’. In doing so, they democratised 
the history of 14th and 6th October in parallel with normalising their 1970s leftist 
historical background, ideological legacy, cultural objects and hero idols.  They 
highlighted democratic and other liberal elements in their 1970s history, and diffused 
the leftist component with these non-leftist ideological elements. Concurrently, their 
efforts to integrate different and conflicting groups of Octobrists into a loose unity 
under the term ‘Octobrist’, and institutionalising the new identity of ‘Octobrist’ or 
1970s fighters for democracy for their whole generation triumphed. By the mid 1990s, 
these processes were concretised. The 14th Octobrists utilised the political asset of the 
success of 14th October people’s movement in blurring their leftist elements, while the 
6th Octobrists recovered from being a lost generation by turning into democratic fighters 
working side by side with the 14th Octobrist generation. The public no longer viewed 
the 14th and 6th October histories as leftist but rather as the path to democracy of 
contemporary Thai history. More and more non-leftists joined the celebrations and 
utilised this history in promoting democracy and liberal ideas.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Revival of the Octobrists in Parliamentary Politics in the 1990s 
 
 
In the mid-1980s, it was hard to imagine that in less than a decade after the decline of 
the Communist Party of Thailand (phak communist haeng prathet thai – CPT) and the 
leftist student movements, many of these former radical students, who had been 
perceived and indeed perceived themselves as failures, would manage to re-emerge as 
powerful politicians and spin doctors. While some quickly gained prominent political 
positions in various governments, others became key political consultants and campaign 
organisers for political parties. Furthermore, by the late 1990s, many of them also 
appeared as elected senators and were appointed as members of the National Human 
Rights Commission. 
 
In explaining these developments, this chapter focuses on the question of how these 
Octobrists managed to achieve and maintain roles as successful politicians, political 
lobbyists and political consultants. What this chapter examines firstly is the supportive 
political environment. Political liberalisation, which started in the late 1980s and 
developed even further after the 1992 May people’s uprising against the revival of the 
military in parliamentary politics, offered many Octobrists hope and the possibility of 
beginning to assume roles in party politics. The functions and expansion of coalition 
and machine politics increased the demand for more diverse personalities to serve in 
electoral politics. Furthermore, the political reforms of the late 1990s opened up new 
windows of opportunity for Octobrists to access parliamentary politics. Secondly, 
political resources, including the political skills and networks these Octobrists had 
obtained since the 1970s, were crucial for enabling these people to enter political parties 
and cliques in the first place. However, their new found ability to adjust and compete 
under new political rules of coalition politics was also a crucial factor for Octobrists in 
surviving and maintaining their power in the long run. Thirdly, the newly developed 
reputation of youthful and professional Octobrist politicians was a significant trademark 
for Octobrist politicians in differentiating themselves from conventional politicians. 
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Lastly, and most importantly, the ability to adjust to and compete in the new political 
context of coalition politics was also a crucial factor for Octobrists to survive and 
maintain power in electoral politics 
 
4.1 Octobrists in the political liberalisation of the late 1980s 
 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Thai politics was dominated by a semi-democratic or 
quasi-democratic system. It was a period when Thai parliamentary politics was still 
mainly dominated the military and top level bureaucrats in spite of constitutionally 
legitimated political institutions. Although general elections were in place and there was 
an increasing number of pressure groups, including business organisations, that tried to 
influence policy making, under Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), the 
constitution allowed non-elected prime ministers, who could come from within 
government service. The prime minister was elected by a coalition of parties, and major 
ministries were given to retired military figures, famous politicians, or high-level 
bureaucrats. The appointed upper house of the Parliament was overwhelmingly military, 
and several of the major political parties were military dominated (Connors 2003, 95; 
Neher 1988). On the other hand, it was the consequence of the crisis of open democracy 
in 1973-1976 which left the elite with no agreement on the form of leadership or 
regime, and on the continuing contested space between liberal and statist forces 
(Connors 2003, 91). By the late 1980s, this competition brought about political 
liberalisation. All political forces moved in one common direction toward electoral 
politics. Elected politicians and the newly emerging business community put much 
effort into widening their political power within parliamentary politics against military-
led democracy. They tried to change parts of the constitution which contained 
preferential conditions for non-elected military officers and businesspeople to maintain 
their position in the parliamentary system. At the same time, earlier dominant forces 
like the military, conservative capitalists and newly-emerging business groups also 
shifted and adjusted to electoral politics in tandem with retaining their power (Connors 
2003, 95-96). Many leading military officers resigned to establish themselves in party 
politics. Conservative businessmen, who tried to maintain their connections and 
exchanges with the military in acquiring power in parliamentary politics through the 
Senate, cabinet and governmental advisory committees, gradually expanded their 
political activities to support political parties and to participate directly in electoral and 
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party politics as electoral candidates (Likhit 1992, 211; Piyaporn 1994, (2)). The newly 
emerging businessmen at the local and national levels shifted their political strategy 
from acting as pressure groups to influence state policies toward direct participation in 
electoral politics (Sombat 2000). Collaborating with and taking control of political 
parties through financial support, as well as running for election as MPs became 
common practices among newly successful businessmen (Anek 1988: 452; Anek 1992; 
Piyaporn 1994, 5-6). As a result, after the end of the Prem Tinsulanonda administration, 
the Chatichai Choonhavan government (1988-1991), led by the first elected Prime 
Minister since the 1980s, saw the new face of Thai political liberalisation. New 
politicians and political parties proliferated. The electoral political environment and new 
politics became the sole battlefield for all political forces. This created a new set of 
political opportunities for Octobrists who would like to enter electoral politics.  
 
Under political liberalisation, machine and coalition politics which originated in the mid 
1970s became the predominant political rule. This opened up new opportunities for the 
Octobrists to access electoral politics and state power. Before the late 1970s, there had 
been neither genuine nor continuing political competition among political parties in 
Thai politics owing to the domination of military-backed parties and the use of state 
mechanisms to support their candidates and to suppress opposition parties. The changes 
started between 1969 and 1975, when more competitive elections were allowed. 
Political machines consisting of the hua khanaen (canvasser) system and vote-buying 
were created as tools for new individuals and groups to overcome stronger and older 
patron-client networks. In the 1980s during the latter stages of the Prem Tinsulanonda 
regime when electoral politics was fully functioning, new politicians, particularly those 
who transferred from the business, bureaucratic and military sectors, required more and 
more numbers, types and levels of intermediaries to bridge the gap between Bangkok 
and the banks of votes scattered around up-country villages and towns in the rest of the 
country (Ockey 2004, 24-25; Surin and McCargo 1997). By the mid-1990s, moreover, 
when the public became more interested in differences of party policy, all parties were 
forced to generate some type of eye-catching policy statement (Surin and McCargo 
1997, 142-143). Subsequently, they began to take an interest in recruiting new 
personnel in the form of spin doctors, strategic campaigners, and so forth. This new 
arrangement offered new reasons and new roles for Octobrists to yearn for party and 
electoral politics.  
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Moreover, coalition governance opened up possibilities for Octobrists to challenge 
stronger parties and candidates to ascend to ministerial positions. From the 1970s 
onwards, Thai political parties were built up from factions and based on personalities 
rather than policy platforms. After the disappearance of authoritarian government in 
1973, no party was able to monopolise resources within the government in electoral 
politics. Individual bureaucrats could be recruited into the hua khanaen structure of 
various candidates. Different parties used more complex campaign methods (Ockey 
2004; Surin and McCargo 1997). These helped newer parties to win more seats than 
ever before. Above all, no party won a majority on its own. Subsequently, coalition 
governance became the norm for Thai politics. Since 1975, the Seni Pramoj and Kukrit 
Pramoj governments comprised sixteen and twelve parties respectively, with fewer than 
ten seats for each party. Under these conditions the ‘cabinet quota’ system was 
institutionalised. Cabinet positions were allocated based on the number of MPs a 
minister or his group could control, regardless of background, ideology, seniority or 
experience. In negotiating for cabinet positions, many MPs were willing to change 
factions and even split parties and realign with opposition parties (Ockey 2004, 25-26 
and 38-40). Even though this made Thai governments short-lived and unstable, it 
allowed Octobrist politicians affiliated even to small parties and cliques to obtain 
leading positions in the parties and cabinets. 
 
1970s political skills and networks 
 
Although these Octobrists returned home as political failures, they were not without 
resources. Since the 1970s they had possessed skills in political campaigning and 
networking that suited them well for the needs of new MP candidates and for supporting 
functions in the more sophisticated political campaign system for politicians and newly 
emerging political parties. They acquired a profound practical knowledge of electoral 
politics, grassroots movements and elite political culture, and the ability to liaise among 
varying classes and interest groups. These assets laid a solid basis for their careers in 
parliamentary politics.   
 
First, involvement in electoral politics both at the university and national level since the 
1970s provided the Octobrists with the skills and instincts to analyse the political 
124 
 
situation, plan electoral campaigns and strategies, and so forth.  From the early 1970s 
when elections at the university level were allowed, the Octobrists played leading roles 
in inaugurating and campaigning for many radical parties at their universities. After the 
triumph of the student movement against the military regime in 1973, they developed 
more successful political campaigns through which socialist-oriented parties dominated 
the student councils in nearly all major universities (Kanungnit 1987; Padungsak 2006, 
196; Sila 2003). For example, Chaturon Chaisang, one of the most successful Octobrist 
politicians, has mentioned that skills in ‘analysing political situations’ during political 
crises, learnt from his radical colleague, Kriwut Sirinupong, have been useful for his 
political work until today (Chaturon 2006, 61). Many of them also progressed into 
national elections by joining socialist-oriented parties after graduating between 1973 
and 1976. Many prominent Octobrists who graduated after 1976 like Chamni Sakdiset 
and Jaran Dhitthapichai, worked with the Socialist Party of Thailand (sangkhomniyom 
haeng prathet thai) (Jaran, interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok; Thikan 
2005, 84; Su Anakhot 1979, 12). In going through these experiences, they developed 
political skills in respect to their functions within political parties. As MP candidates 
they developed their skills in leadership and public speaking. As support staff they 
acquired expertise in organising political campaigns.  
 
Second, their experience working with both grassroots movements and the elite gave 
them the qualifications to link extra-parliamentary and parliamentary politics. On the 
one hand, involvement in farmer, labour and ethnic minority movements during the 
1970s equipped these Octobrists with profound knowledge, networks and skills in 
working with extra-parliamentary forces. On the other hand, as university political 
activists negotiating with governments and promoting problem issues of grassroots 
people at the national level during the 1970s, the Octobrists had opportunities to 
connect with many elite and middle class networks. Through these they acquired the 
ability to promote grassroots problems in the language of the elite and the middle class 
(further details in Chapter 2).   
 
Beside political skills, the political networks also developed during the 1970s were also 
crucial political assets which the Octobrists mobilised to move into contemporary 
parliamentary politics. During their work with leftist student movements, the CPT, the 
anti-dictatorship campaign and socialist-oriented political parties, these Octobrists 
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developed profound connections with both leftist and non-leftist groups, including non-
left progressive politicians, military officers, elite classmates, and socialist-oriented 
politicians36
 
. Upon their return, three major linkages and relationships provided 
significant access to parliamentary politics. 
The first was the relationship with progressive and liberal politicians during the anti-
military government campaign. This relationship became the first point of contact for 
many Octobrists who wanted to join electoral politics after their return from the armed 
struggle with the CPT. Under the authoritarian regime in the early 1970s, the Octobrists 
and non-left liberal politicians, particularly those from the Democrat Party 
(Prachathipat), including Chuan Leekpai, Uthai Pimjaichon and Veera Musikapong, 
worked together in putting pressure on the military government to promote electoral 
politics. Many informal and formal gatherings between these young liberal politicians 
and leading student activists became a crucial force behind the success of the 1973 
people’s uprising. Many student activists, who later joined the leftist movement and the 
CPT had even been initially inspired by these liberal politicians. They were impressed 
by their anti-military rhetoric. Jaran Dhitthapichai and Sutham Saengprathum have 
mentioned how they appreciated and were inspired by the public speeches of Surin 
Pitsuwan, Chuan Leekpai and Damrong Lattapitpath from the Democrat Party (Jaran, 
interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok; Sutham 2001, 72-74).  
 
The second was the connection with progressive elements in the military during the 
ideological clashes between the Octobrists and leading members of the CPT, and the 
decline of the CPT. Because of the progressive image of the ‘Democratic Soldiers’ in 
pushing forward Prime Ministerial Order 66/23, the anti-communist insurgency policy 
which granted an amnesty for students who had fled to join the armed struggle with the 
CPT, and their close relationship with former military officers who used to work with 
and then left the CPT, many students who disagreed with the militant political strategies 
of the CPT gradually developed relationships and worked with these military officers. 
                                               
36 The network with 1970s socialist politicians is less important than others, because upon their return 
from the CPT the former socialist politicians themselves were less successful in recovering in the 1980s 
electoral politics (Wat 2000, 213-352). Only at the beginning did a small number of them play a role in 
encouraging several Octobrists to join political parties. As they found it hard to regain prominent roles in 
any party, their role quickly faded away and they became marginalised.  
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There were several meetings and consultations among the Democratic Soldiers, political 
parties and some former leftist student activists who earlier joined the CPT, including 
Sompong Sakravee, Yuk Sri-Ariya (Tienchai Wongchaisuwan), and Therdpoom 
Chaidee. Through connections with and support from the Democratic Soldiers, 
Sompong Sakravee worked on the progressive military magazine called ‘Tawan Mai 
(New Sun)’ (Chai-anan 1982). Another outstanding case was the relationship between 
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, one of the leading members of the Democratic 
Soldiers, and the Octobrists. As the leading figure in promoting 66/23 and in charge of 
North-eastern Thailand during the peak of the CPT, Chavalit was one of the key persons 
negotiating and working with CPT members in settling problems in conflict areas. 
Thanks to Chavalit’s profound understanding of the problems, many Octobrists had 
good impressions of his work with the local people.   
 
The third was the network among Octobrists themselves. While the communist 
insurgency ambience was still present, Octobrists selected specific networks among 
former comrades which would be helpful in the return to electoral politics. There was 
no evidence of a systematic effort to mobilise mass-base support from their former rural 
CPT comrades in their electoral campaigns. On the one hand, such an effort would not 
be good for new Octobrist MP candidates who wanted to leave their leftist reputation 
and background behind. On the other hand, moving around different revolutionary 
bases, their former rural CPT networks were scattered throughout the country and 
sometimes irrelevant to the location of their main constituencies. Subsequently, 
networks among former radical student activists who they were close to in various 
leftist political clubs, study groups, support functions, and military bases were more 
crucial (further details in Chapter 2). As we shall see below, when some Octobrist 
politicians started building up their support teams and recruiting potential new political 
candidates, they approached their former comrades. At the same time, many Octobrists 
who wished to pursue a career in electoral politics also exploited connections with their 
Octobrist friends who had become successful politicians at an early stage. The success 
of Octobrist politicians also came from the moral support of Octobrists in other sectors 
especially those in the media.  
 
In summary, 1970s political activism provided a solid political foundation for the 
Octobrists in electoral politics. Their first-hand experience with party politics and 
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mobilising works with grassroots and the elite turned these people into potential 
politicians and campaigners. The networks developed with liberal politicians, the 
military and among themselves offered them a first point of entry into electoral politics 
amidst the political liberalisation of the late 1980s.  
 
The first wave of Octobrists in electoral politics 
 
By the 1988 general election, there was the phenomenon of the first wave of Octobrists 
quietly joining several parties as candidates as well as spin doctors.  Chamni Sakdiset, 
Pinit Jarusombat, Chaturon Chaisang and Adisorn Piengket were outstanding and 
successful examples. And what these successful Octobrists had in common was direct 
connections with prominent politicians and elite inner circles of electoral politics. These 
people were able to connect with these networks both through their political activities 
with liberal MPs since the 1970s as well as through the family support of those who 
came from families with a background in the political elite.  
 
Chamni Sakdiset’s parents were teachers from Nakhon Si Thammarat Province in 
Southern Thailand. He was a student at the Faculty of Law, Ramkhamhaeng University, 
where he started his political activities. At Ramkhamhaeng University, he was active in 
establishing the Eternal Truth Party (Satjatham). He was a student leader and was one of 
the nine Ramkhamhaeng University students who were expelled because of their 
campaign against the military government. This incident later led to the mass student 
mobilisation which later developed into the people’s movement on 14th October 1973. 
After the 14th October incident, he became chairperson of the Democracy Propagation 
Programme (khrongkan phoeiphrae prachathipatai) in the Southern Region. After 
graduation in 1975, he joined the Socialist Party of Thailand (sangkhomniyom haeng 
prathet thai) led by former General Somkhit Srisongkhom, as MP candidate in Nakhon 
Si Thammarat Province, his hometown. He became the secretary of the party in 1976 
(Thikan 2005, 84). In 1977, he joined the armed struggle with the CPT in the name of 
the Socialist Party of Thailand. However, he left the CPT due to three major 
disagreements: undemocratic rule within the CPT; the CPT’s reliance on the CCP; and 
the domination of the CPT over the Socialist Party of Thailand. In 1985, he returned to 
electoral politics at the invitation of Uthai Pimjaichon, the Progressive Party (Kao Na) 
leader, a progressive politician who Chamni had known since the 1970s. In 1986, he 
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won in the general election and became MP for his hometown of Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Province. He also played a role in recruiting new Southern MP candidates for the party 
(MS 1986a).  
 
Pinit Jarusombat was another student leader from Ramkhamhaeng University. He was 
the secretary of the Eternal Truth Party (Satjatham) and eventually became a chairman 
of the Ramkhamhaeng University Student Council. Like Chamni Sakdiset, he was one 
of the nine students from Ramkhamhaeng University who was expelled before the 14th 
October incident. In 1975, he became a Deputy General Secretary of the National 
Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai - NSCT) and 
played an active role in promoting protests against state policy and violence. After 6th 
October 1976, he joined the CPT in the armed struggle. With a background in the local 
family business as the major alcohol and cigarette distributor and owner of several rice 
mills in Chachoengsao Province, Pinit quickly started his own business and later 
became one of the biggest shrimp export brokers. His wealth became a major asset for 
him in entering electoral politics. During the economic boom of 1990–1991, he 
expanded his business into real estate and became one of the most successful and 
wealthiest businessmen in the province. Through his connections with Uthai Pimjaichon 
and Arthit Urairat, liberal politicians who split from the Democrat Party (prachathipat) 
and started their own party, the Progressive Party (kao na), he started his political career 
as an MP candidate in 1986 but failed. In parallel with his successful business career, he 
finally won election in 1992.   
 
Chaturon Chaisang, a medical student, was the leader of the Dharma Party (Pracha 
Tham), the leftist student party in Chiang Mai University. After the party won the 
university election in 1976, he became president of the Chiang Mai University student 
council. He joined the CPT after the 6th October incident. During his time in the jungle, 
he was editor of ‘Athipat (Sovereign)’, the major student magazine in the battle zone 
(Padungsak 2008). Upon his return, he fled to the US with the support of his father, 
Anan Chaisang, a prominent liberal politician who fought against authoritarian regimes 
and promoted elections during the 1970s. In 1985, he received an urgent call from his 
father to come back to run as a candidate in the 1986 election again with the support of 
his father’s connections with political and military networks. At that time, he did not 
present himself as former leftist student activist. Instead he successfully reshaped his 
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new identity as a US-educated, new generation politician and the son of a former 
politician, Anan Chaisang (MS 1986b). He not only had his father’s connections, but he 
was also welcomed by his Octobrist friends in journalism. For example, when he started 
his political career, Kriwut Sirinupong, who was a veteran Octobrist in a newspaper at 
that time, helped to introduce Chaturon to many of his journalist friends and to develop 
sympathetic relations with various media outlets (Chaturon 2006, 61).  
 
Adisorn Piengket was the elder son of Thongpak Piengket, a socialist politician in the 
United Socialist Front of Thailand Party (naew ruam sangkhomniyom haeng prathet 
thai). He graduated from the Law Faculty, Thammasat University. After graduation in 
1973, Adisorn briefly worked as a lawyer in Khon Kaen, his hometown, and later 
started his political career in the United Socialist Front of Thailand Party. After the 6th 
October massacre, the whole Piengket family joined and became important allies of the 
CPT in the armed struggle. His family was located at the A30 military base in Lao 
where the CPT put socialist politicians and student leaders. Nevertheless, they later had 
conflicts with the CPT and left the CPT due to its domination over their allies. After the 
decline of the CPT, he returned and continued to work as a lawyer. As the Piengket 
family quickly recovered its political position in electoral politics, Adisorn also became 
a successful politician ahead of his former comrades. He ran as a candidate in the Mass 
Party (Muan Chon) through his father’s connections in 1983 and 1986 but failed both 
times.  
 
Beside these Octobrist MPs, other Octobrists also entered politics as political brokers 
and spin doctors providing support for politicians and political parties. Kriengkamol 
Laohapairoj is one of the most important Octobrist leading figures in the 1970s. Despite 
the fact that he was born in a nationalist Chinese family, he was later provoked by the 
anti-seniority and anti-military movements in his early years at the Law Faculty, 
Chulalongkorn University. He was one of the founding members of the leftist student 
party, Chula Dharma People Party (Chula Pracha Dharma). In 1975, he was elected as 
the General Secretary of the NSCT. After the massacre in 1976, he ran to the CPT in the 
armed struggle. As a prominent student leader, he was treated as a privileged ally of the 
CPT. He was sent to Laos and China. On these journeys, he started questioning and 
ended up disappointed with the CPT. Upon his return he faced many economic 
difficulties. Nevertheless, he carried on his political activities with many Octobrists and 
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other progressive politicians with whom he used to work in the 1970s. Around 1986, 
Kriengkamol and other leading 1970s Octobrist friends, Tanya Chunchanatarn and 
Phumtham Wechayachai, started helping Veera Musikapong, Chuan Leekpai and 
Banyat Banthattan, former liberal politicians in the Democrat Party (prachathipat), in 
their political campaigns from time to time (Kriengkamol, interview by author, 13 
March 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Anun Hanpanichpan was another interesting case. He was a student activist at the 
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University. Unlike others, Anun mainly focused his student 
activities on the arts and literature during the 1970s. He contributed many writings to 
progressive and leftist magazines to support the leftist student party at Thammasat 
University. Also he was one of the key persons in the revolutionary Thai musical band 
at Thammasat University. Through these activities, he developed a wide network of 
radical artists and activists and planned to join the armed struggle even before 1976. 
During his time with the CPT in the jungle, he started realising the problems and 
weaknesses of the CPT. He moved to several military bases in the hope that the 
situation would be better. He left the CPT at the last stage of its crisis around 1983. 
Upon his return, Anun quickly completed his university studies and carried on working 
in journalism. Through his academic and journalistic skills and political network, he 
was connected to Arthit Urairat by Chatcharin Chaiwat, a radical journalist who was 
once jailed on a charge of communism. Realising that he did not want to go into the 
private sector, he decided to work as a junior academic staff providing academic and 
political support for Arthit when Arthit was the secretary of the National Democratic 
Party (Chat Prachathipatai), the non-progressive party supporting General Kriangsak 
Chomanan to be Prime Minister. Gradually, he became a political and policy advisor to 
Arthit (Anun, interview by author, 17 May 2007, Bangkok).  
 
The second wave of Octobrists in electoral politics 
 
The second wave of the struggle to enter parliamentary and electoral politics mostly 
focused on connections with and support from former Octobrist friends who had already 
successfully established themselves in party politics. Either due to lack of opportunities, 
interests or direct connections with leading politicians in political parties, these 
Octobrists had not pursued political careers immediately after their return from the 
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armed struggle. However, from approximately the early 1990s, many new faces from 
among the Octobrists entered parliamentary politics via the support and networks of the 
first wave of Octobrist politicians who had earlier based themselves in varying political 
parties. Moreover, the increase in demand for new human resources in the expansion of 
political parties at the peak of political liberalisation and democratic transition during 
the Chatichai Choonhavan government and the 1992 movement against the military 
government expanded opportunities in party politics. The loose informal networks 
among Octobrists were important links between ordinary Octobrists and Octobrist 
politicians. Informal annual gatherings of the 14th and 6th October student activists, such 
as Friendship, Sisterhood and Brotherhood group (pheuan phong nong phi), became 
connecting points between Octobrists who needed political support or access to political 
parties and Octobrist politicians. Likewise, these were effective channels for Octobrist 
politicians to mobilise political support from their ex-comrades.  
 
Chamni Sakdiset started inviting more of his former comrades, including Sutham 
Saengprathum and Wittaya Kaew-Paradise, into the Progressive Party (Kao Na). These 
three Octobrist politicians set up a stronghold of the Progressive Party in southern 
Thailand. Sutham Saengprathum was a student at Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn 
University and was elected as the General Secretary of the National Student Council of 
Thailand in 1976. He was born in Nakhon Si Thammarat, the same province as Chamni. 
With a middle class background in a family of teachers, he had been socialised through 
liberal reading and had had a political ambition to play a role in electoral politics before 
joining the leftist movement at university. His political transformation began through 
his frustration with the military regimes in the early 1970s. After the coup and 
cancellation of the election in 1971, during his high school education, he started his 
political activism at the provincial level. In the 1973 student movement, as an ordinary 
participant, he was arrested by the police and briefly jailed, causing enormous 
frustration and provoking his political activism. After 1973, he became an active 
participant in all kinds of political activities including the Democracy Propagation 
Programme and public hearings for constitutional drafting. He was arrested during the 
6th October incident and jailed for nearly 3 years. During his time as a political prisoner, 
he joined a new political network including military officers who tried to stage a coup, 
including Major General Sanan Kajornprasat who later became a prominent politician in 
the Democrat Party (Prachathipat).. After defeating a court accusation of being a 
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communist, he spent 3 years in the US. In 1987, after returning from the US, he started 
discussing with many politicians his intention to step into electoral politics. Eventually, 
he was contacted by Chamni and encouraged by his activist wife to run for parliament.  
 
Wittaya Kaew-Paradise was another activist student at Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn 
University. He did not join the armed struggle because he was shot in both legs on 6th 
October. However, he was still in contact with many of his Octobrist friends in the CPT. 
After recovering from his injuries, he worked as a lawyer helping people who were 
charged with communism in southern Thailand. He started his political career at the 
invitation of Chamni Sakdiset who was in the Progressive Party (Kao Na) in the early 
1990s.  
  
Certainly, the initial entry of Octobrists into parliamentary politics relied upon their 
skills and connections acquired since the 1970s. However, surviving and maintaining a 
prominent role in the long term in coalition and machine politics required more than 
such skills and linkages. The ability to mobilise voters effectively, to maintain strong 
political networks and negotiating power in the cabinet quota system were essential 
requirements of political success in the fragmented parliamentary politics of the 1990s. 
Candidates could not hope to win without an effective hua khanaen (canvasser) 
structure. And MPs could not attain prominent positions in party and cabinet without a 
faction and strong financial support (Ockey 2004, 24-25; Surin and McCargo 1997). 
Thereafter, Octobrists who were successful in their political careers were those who 
successfully adjusted and competed in conventional coalition politics, and also 
maintained their 1970s progressive reputation. Some may have been able to avoid direct 
involvement in money politics. However, they still had to be able to extract political 
resources from the mechanisms of machine politics. At the same time, they were aware 
of what was off limits to them in promoting a progressive agenda and being involved in 
networks that were too radical. Those who wished to maintain complete independence 
from these systems which they assumed to be corrupt and non-idealistic or who failed to 
compete within the systems could neither survive nor achieve prosperous political 
careers. 
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Some failed, while others succeeded   
 
Initially, most Octobrists started their political careers with networks they had had since 
the 1970s as well as parties with progressive images. The Democrat Party (Prachathipat) 
with a lot of 1970s liberal politicians, and the Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp) and the 
Progressive Party (Kao Na) which belonged to Uthai Pimjaichon and Arthit Urairat, 
former liberal politicians who split from the Democrat Party, were the most popular 
parties among Octobrists. Moreover, other parties with the image of angels in the public 
eye due to their anti-military role during the 1992 May incident founded by progressive 
military officers including the Moral Force Party (Palang Dharma) of Chamlong 
Srimuang and the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai) of Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh were also attractive to many Octobrists. However, in the context of 
political competition, and to strengthen the possibility of joining a government, these 
seemingly progressive parties had to recruit many non-progressive politicians and 
cliques and align themselves and work with corrupt parties. At the same time, they had 
to rely on financial support from business politicians in exchange for policies which 
favoured their businesses.  
 
After acknowledging these realities, different Octobrists chose to pursue different 
directions. Some started to inaugurate an independent radical political party. In mid 
1991, under the vibrant political milieu of the Chatichai Choonhavan government, many 
new political parties sprang up. Kriengkamol Laohapairoj organised a meeting aimed at 
establishing a new political party with the name of ‘14 October’ or ‘Kita Party 
(Prachatham)’ (MR 1992; MS 1991). In responding to the 1991 coup, the party took 
public political action in denouncing the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) 
during the movement against the coup government. However, there was a lack of 
mutual agreement among Octobrists themselves regarding the political direction of the 
party. The ideological crisis from back in the 1970s left scars and disagreements among 
Octobrists, who were able to unite among themselves. Furthermore, with an insufficient 
political base, financial support and public understanding, establishing a new political 
party was nearly impossible. Owing to these failures, potential MP candidates on the 
party list declined to be involved. Instead they moved to support other parties. For 
example, Sombat Thamrongthanyawong and Sompong Sakravee joined the New 
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Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai). The party did not field any candidates in the 22nd 
March 1992 general election (Jaran, interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Aside from the failure to form their own political party, many other Octobrists also 
faced failure in electoral politics with other parties. Many Octobrists tried to distance 
themselves from money politics and strategic electoral support from corrupt political 
networks. Despite limited financial resources, they tried to avoid vote-buying strategies 
and they did not approach corrupt political networks for financial support. Nevertheless, 
in fierce political competitions which were dominated by corrupt politicians, they could 
hardly succeed (Wat 2000, 353-357). Eventually, many who were unable to mobilise 
political and financial support gave up electoral politics.  
 
For instance, Jaran Dhitthapichai was one of the most prominent Octobrist figures 
during the 1970s. His reputation as a leftist was established even before the CPT started 
working with student movements in urban areas. He was one of the founders of the 
Thammasat University Dome Assembly (Sapha Na Dome), an influential independent 
political club in Thammasat University. It later became a major hub for leftist student 
activists. After graduation, he carried on working as a mentor for Octobrists in many 
universities. After 1976, he fled to join the CPT in the Northern military bases and 
obtained a high rank in the CPT. When the CPT declined, he escaped Thailand and 
continued his studies in France and continued participating with the Socialist Party 
(Parti Socialiste) in France. Owing to his extreme leftist reputation, Jaran faced several 
difficulties in getting a satisfactory job after returning from France before being 
accepted on the academic staff at Rangsit University through a network of former 
comrades who worked with Arthit Urairat, the university’s owner and a liberal 
politician who was familiar with these Octobrists. During his time at Rangsit 
University, he resumed his political activities. Initially, he started expressing his 
political views and comments through articles in newspapers and political magazines. 
Frustrated with corrupt party politics, he gradually moved toward direct participation in 
electoral politics. He joined other Octobrists in the preparations for the establishment of 
the Pprachatham-Octobrist Party. The party failed, although he had connections with 
nearly all parties, especially the Democrat Party (Prachathipat) and the Moral Force 
Party (Palang Dharma) . Due to limited openings for candidates in the South which was 
his stronghold, he could hardly get into those parties. He then decided to join the 
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Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp) as MP candidate in a network with Uthai Pimjaichon, 
former liberal Democrat Party MP during the 1970s. However, he was not elected and 
eventually returned to work at Rangsit University. Consequently, he concluded that, 
given the realities of money politics, an idealist politician like him could barely succeed 
(Jaran, interview by author, 15 February 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Those who were unwilling to adjust to the norms of money and coalition politics, or 
who had been unable to work out how to play the conventional game, failed to survive 
in electoral politics and eventually were forced to leave in search of new channels to 
continue their political activities. With fewer resources and less capability to fight in 
conventional coalition and machine politics, these Octobrist politicians moved out of 
parliamentary politics and sought new venues in the 1997 constitution for continuing 
their political career.  
 
Maleerat Kaewka and Sompong Sakravee are good examples. Maleerat was a leading 
student activist from Khon Kaen University and member of the National Student Centre 
of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai) committee before joining the 
CPT in their armed struggle. She started her political career in the National 
Development Party (Chart Pattana) in 1995. She was promoted to a middle ranking 
position, assistant to the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. Frustrated 
within the party and failing to get elected in 1996, she switched to run as a Senate 
candidate.  
 
Unlike Maleerat Kaewka, Sompong Sakravee never succeeded at a general election 
despite several attempts and wide political networks. Sompong was president of the 
Ramkhamhaeng University Student Council and a leading member of the New 
Generation (khon run mai) Club at Ramkhamhaeng University. He was one of the nine 
students dismissed by the University for publishing a book against the authoritarian 
government and worked actively with the group appealing for a democratic constitution 
prior to the 14 October incident. He joined the CPT in the armed struggle after the 1976 
massacre. Upon his return, he pursued a business career in printing. Sompong ran in his 
first election with the Progressive Party (Kao Na), and then shifted to the Moral Force 
Party (Palang Dharma), the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai) and the Liberal 
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Integrity Party (Seritham), and again returned to the New Aspiration Party in 1996, but 
never won once.  
 
The Octobrist politicians who were able to maintain their political power were those 
who were keen to deploy sophisticated political calculation in coalition politics as well 
as their reputations as progressive and professional politicians in ascending to top 
cabinet positions. On the one hand, in comparison with the failed Octobrists, these 
Octobrist politicians dared and managed to ally with non-progressive forces and 
mobilise all sorts of support from conventional corrupt politicians. On the other hand, 
they successfully differentiated themselves from conventional politicians. Even though 
in reality, they were close to and benefitted from support from and connections with 
these politicians and their machine-based political strategies, successful Octobrist 
politicians managed to develop and maintain their positive reputation as young-blood 
professional politicians as a selling point in negotiating for positions in parties and 
cabinet. Or at least they were able convince the public that they were less directly 
involved in money politics or presumably more honest than their counterparts (Table 
4.1: Movements of Octobrist politicians in party politics).  
 
For example, Chaturon Chaisang in 1985 joined and ran for parliament under the 
Democrat Party (Prachathipat) through connections with Harn Leelanon, the 
Democratic Soldier who was close to his father. In 1983, Chaturon’s father and Harn 
worked with a group of politicians and former Democratic Soldiers in establishing the 
Reformist Party, but failed. During his first term, Chaturon quickly obtained the 
position of assistant secretary to the Deputy Minister of Finance during 1986-1989. 
With Harn, he left the Democrat Party to establish the People’s Party (Prachachon). But 
by late 1989, after the Progressive Party (Kao Na) merged with three other parties and 
turned into the Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp), he shifted to the Thai Nation Party (Chart 
Thai) through his connection with Kraisak Choonhavan, a former leftist student activist 
and the son of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Under the Chatichai government, 
Chaturon was appointed as secretary to the Minister of Commerce. In 1992, Chaturon 
shifted from the Thai Nation Party (chart thai) to the New Aspiration Party (Khwam 
Wang Mai) with a better offer from and close relationship with General Chavalit.  
 
137 
 
After moving around several parties, he successfully established himself in the New 
Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai). In the New Aspiration Party, Chaturon Chaisang 
was a rising star. With his well-educated background and youthful reputation, Chavalit 
hoped to use him to improve the party’s image. He was quickly promoted. Even after 
his failure in the general election, he was appointed party spokesperson. In 1996, when 
the New Aspiration Party was the leading party in government, he became the Deputy 
Minister of Finance. In 1997, during the decline of the New Aspiration Party, he was 
chosen to be the party’s Secretary-General, replacing Sanoh Tienthong, a corrupt 
politician with an image as a political dinosaur. Chaturon became a star MP in the 
House of Representatives during many parliamentary debates. However, as he was not a 
financial power-holder within the party, his role was only as image maker. When he 
came into conflict with other powerful politicians in the parties, he was suppressed. Due 
to his conflict with Chalerm Yoobamrung, a corrupt former police politician, Chaturon 
resigned as Secretary-General and moved down to take care of the economic policy 
team.  
 
Because of these conflicts within the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai), 
Chaturon Chaisang eventually decided to leave and intended to establish a new political 
party. Nevertheless, he learnt that under the 1997 Constitution there was limited space 
and little possibility for a small party to survive. He then decided to join the Thais Love 
Thais (Thai Rak Thai – TRT) at the last minute before the 2001 election. In the TRT, he 
was promoted to deputy leader and was 15th on the party list, which was considered to 
be a high ranking position in the party (further details in Chapter 6).  
 
Unlike Chaturon Chaisang, Pinit Jarusombat entered electoral politics as an Octobrist 
with a successful business background. Pinit started his political career through 
connections he had forged with Arthit Urairat and Uthai Pimjaichon, former progressive 
and liberal politicians from the Democrat Party (prachathipat). Unlike his comrades who 
moved to bigger parties, as a politician he stuck with small parties and successfully used 
them to negotiate with major political parties to gain government positions. In doing so, 
he became a major financial backer for these parties, including the Thai People’s Party 
(Prachachon Thai), the Progressive Party (Kao Na) and the Liberal Integrity Party 
(Seritham. Through coalition-building in parliament, his small parties were able to join 
nearly every government and gain a cabinet quota in exchange for supporting the 
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government coalition. He was one of the leading party figures who attained key 
positions in the cabinet. In 1993, under the Chuan Leekpai government, he gained the 
position of Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Minister of Transport and 
Communication, which was considered a grade ‘A’ ministry (in terms of opportunities 
for corruption as these ministries deliver a huge budget). In 1996, he became Liberal 
Integrity Party leader and was able to lead the party into government and earned the 
position of Deputy Minister of Interior for himself. Under the political changes in the 
context of the 1997 Constitution, which increased the power of big political parties, his 
small party started to face negotiating problems with the increasing power of the big 
parties. He started thinking about either shifting to the New Aspiration Party (Khwam 
Wang Mai) or merging with other smaller parties. However, he eventually joined the 
TRT Party, one of the promising major parties (further details in Chapter 6). 
 
Adisorn Piengket, another Octobrist, shifted around and managed to gain prominent 
positions in nearly every government. His failures with the Social Democratic Party in 
1983 and 1986 taught Adisorn a lesson in how to adjust to coalition politics. In his third 
attempt to become an MP, he moved to the Mass Party (Muanchon Party). Nevertheless, 
amidst the decline of the pro-military image of the Mass Party, he lost the election of 
1992. He swiftly shifted to the Moral Force Party (Phalang Dharma) which helped him 
to gain victory in the election later that year. With his stronghold in North-eastern 
Thailand, he became a significant MP and constituency controller for the Moral Force 
Party. He thus obtained a cabinet quota as the Deputy Minister of Education from 1992 
to 1995. The conflict within the Moral Force Party between the ‘temple’ and ‘politician’ 
factions forced Adisorn to move to the newly established Leading Thailand Party (Nam 
Thai) in 1995 and act as its Deputy Secretary General. However, the Leading Thailand 
Party was immediately disbanded after its failure in the general election. Adisorn then 
chose to go to the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai) as the party rose to power. 
After the 1995 election, the New Aspiration Party gained enough MPs (125 seats out of 
393) to form the government. During this term, Adisorn successfully gained several 
leading positions in both the cabinet and the party. He was Deputy Minister of Science 
and Deputy Party Leader. In 2001, amidst the decline of the New Aspiration Party, he 
moved out with Chaturon Chaisang to form a new party but did not succeed. Eventually 
he moved to the TRT just as it was being formed.  
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Chamni Sakdiset, Sutham Saengprathum and Wittaya Kaew-Paradise, three southern 
Octobrist politicians, struggled to build their southern stronghold with small parties with 
which they had connections. To overcome the inadequate support of small parties, they 
all moved to bigger and more promising parties like the Moral Force Party (Phalang 
Dharma). After all had built up their constituencies and reputations, they searched for 
their own routes to furthering their political space and promotion. Initially, Chamni, 
Sutham and Wittaya tried to stick with parties with a progressive image which had links 
to them since the 1970s. Chamni joined the Progressive Party (Kao Na) through a direct 
connection with Uthai Pimjaichon, the party leader. Later he invited both Sutham and 
Wittaya to join him in the hopes of building up a stronghold in the southern 
constituencies. By the end of 1988, under the Chatichai Choonhavan government, the 
four parties, including the People’s (Prachachon), Progressive (Kao Na), United Thais 
(Ruam Thai) and Community Action (Kitprachakhom) parties merged into the 
Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp). In doing so, the Solidarity Party finally joined the 
government and that helped Chamni to gain a position as deputy government 
spokesperson. Nevertheless, remaining with the Solidarity Party because of their 
profound link with Uthai taught Sutham and Wittaya an important political lesson. They 
both failed in the March 1992 election, before deciding to move to a bigger and more 
popular party like the Moral Force Party (Phalang Dharma).  
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Table 4.1: Movements of Octobrist politicians in party politics 
 
Political Transition Movements of Octobrist politicians in party politics of coalition governance 
 
1988 Coalition government 
comprising the Thai Nation 
Party(Chart Thai), Social Action 
Party (Kit Sangkhom), Democrat 
Party (Prachathipat), and United 
Thais Party (Ruam Thai). Most 
Octobrist politicians are in the 
opposition parties.  
 
The Progressive (Kao Na), the Thai 
People’s (Prachachon Thai), 
Community Action 
(Kitprachakhom), and United Thais 
(Ruam Thai) parties merge into the 
Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp). The 
Solidarity Party joins the 
government.   
 
1991 coup and the May 1992 
people’s uprising  
 
Post-May 1992: Chuan Leekpai 
Govt.  
Octobrist politicians started gaining 
higher cabinet positions  
 
Banharn Silpa-archa Govt.  
(July 1995 – November 1996) 
 
 Moral Force 
Party  
   Thinnawat 
Marukapitak
 
  
Mass Party  
    Adisorn 
Piengket 
 
Progressive 
Party  
  Chamni Sakdiset 
Sutham Saengprathum  
    People Party   
Chaturon Chaisang  
Harn Leelanon  
 
 
Liberal Integrity Party  
   Pinit Jarusombat (f.)*   
 
Moral Force 
Party  
Thinnawat and  
Prasarn (f.)* M.  
 
 
      Solidarity Party  
 Chamni S., Sutham S. and 
Wittaya Kaew-Paradise (f.)* 
Chaturon C. briefly 
moves to Liberal 
Integrity Party 
and then New 
Aspiration Party 
 
 
Harn L. 
moves to 
Democrat 
Party  
 
Moral Force Party  
Thinnawat M. – DM – Public Health  
Prasarn M. (f.)* 
Adisorn – DM – Education  
Chamni S. – DM – Interior  
Sutham S.  
Wittaya K.  
 
 
 
 
 
New Aspiration Party  
Chaturon C. – Govt. 
Spokesperson  
Terdphoom Jaidee  
Sompong Sakravee (f.)* 
Liberal Integrity Party 
Pinit J. – DM – Interior 
and Transportation and 
Communication  
Democrat 
Party 
Wittaya K. 
Chamni S.  
 
 
Moral Force Party  
Thinnawat M.  
Sutham S.  
Charus  Puachuay  
 
 
Leading Thailand                  
Party 
Adisorn  
Terdphoom J. (f.)*  
 
 
National 
Development 
Party  
Maleerat Keawka  
   
 
 
New 
Aspiration 
Party 
Chaturon C. 
 
 
Liberal Integrity 
Party 
Pinit J. 
Sompong S. (f.)* 
Somsak Khungarn 
Sithing Rattanavichai  
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Political Transition Movements of Octobrist politicians in party politics of coalition governance 
 
 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Govt.  
(November 1996-November 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
Chuan Leekpai Govt.  
(November 1997-February 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra Govt. (1) 
(February 2001-March 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democrat 
Party 
Wittaya K. 
Chamni S.  
 
 
Moral Force Party  
 Sutham S. (f.)*  
 
 
 
National 
Development Party 
Maleerat Keawka (f.)* 
Sunai Jullapongsatorn  
 
 
New Aspiration 
Party  
Chaturon C. (f.)* 
Sompong S. (f.)* 
 
 
 Liberal 
Integrity  Party 
 Pinit J. – Party  
                Leader  
 
 
Democrat 
Party 
Wittaya K. 
Chamni S.  
 
 
Thais Love Thais Party (Thai Rak 
Thai) 
Sutham S.   
Chaturon C.  
Sompong S. 
Pinit J. 
 
 
Liberal Integrity 
Party 
Pinit J. – Party Leader 
and Deputy Minister 
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Because of the rise of the Moral Force Party (Phalang Dharma) after the 1992 May 
incident, the ‘three musketeers’ moved to the Moral Force Party at the invitation of 
Boonchoo Rotjanasatien, previously the major financial supporter of the Progressive 
Party (Kao Na) and the Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp). Owing to the weakness of the 
Moral Force Party in southern constituencies, the three were really welcome and 
became leading figures in promoting the political campaign for the party. Chamni 
Sakdiset was promoted as Director of the Southern Election Centre of the Moral Force 
Party, and attained the position of the Deputy Minister of Interior, while Sutham 
Saengprathum became the party’s spokesperson.  
 
The three moved further politically and separated when they had already established 
themselves in electoral politics. Because of conflicts within the party, Chamni, Sutham 
and Wittaya lost their positions as Moral Force Party (Phalang Dharma) committee 
members during a committee meeting. With their established reputations and 
constituencies, Chamni and Wittaya managed to move to a bigger party in the form of 
the Democrat Party (Prachathipat) through their connections with Major General Sanan 
Kajornprasat, a former military officer with close links with several Octobrists since his 
time in jail in the early 1980s and a powerful Secretary-General and fundraiser for the 
Democrat Party. With close connections with the leading figures in the Democrat Party 
and the rooted political support in their constituencies, they were quickly promoted in 
the Democrat Party. In the 1997 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and 1998 Chuan Leekpai 
governments, Chamni twice gained the position of Deputy Minister of Interior. Sutham 
decided to remain with the Moral Force Party as he did not want to remain under the 
shadow of Chamni. Nevertheless, staying with a declining party like the Moral Force 
Party led to failure for Sutham in the November 1996 election. He therefore moved to 
the TRT as he once worked closely with Thaksin Shinawatra when Thaksin was in the 
Moral Force Party. With his long experience and strong constituency in Southern 
Thailand, he was promoted as chair of the strategic political campaign for the Thais 
Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai – TRT) in the South. He was also appointed Minister of 
University Affairs, deputy party leader, and chief government whip.  
 
In addition to these Octobrists who became MPs, Kriengkamol Laohapairoj and Anun 
Hanpanichpan managed to carry on their political activities as political consultants and 
campaigners. Kriengkamol once did campaigning support work for the Democrat Party 
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and the Moral Force Party (Phalang Dharma). At the same time, he provided political 
support for Chaturon Chaisang, with whom he was close during their time in the CPT 
armed struggle. He admired Chaturon as a smart, wise and idealist politician. During the 
rise of the TRT Party, he was one of the first Octobrists whom Thaksin contacted to 
support the party. Kriengkamol always worked behind the scenes.  
 
Anun started by working with Arthit Urairat in the National Democratic Party (Chart 
Prachatipatai). He was assigned to conduct policy research, as well as to take care of 
political campaigns. At the same time, he carried on his journalistic work. He still wrote 
political articles and poems for several radical political magazines including Matuphum 
(Motherland) and Athit (Sun). After the party was disbanded, Arthit became the 
chairman of the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA) board of directors. Anun 
continued working for Arthit in drafting policy and dealing with the MWA labour 
union. At the same time, he helped Arthit to establish Rangsit University and took care 
of student affairs. Through his connection with Arthit, he helped many Octobrists to get 
work as lecturers at Rangsit University.  
 
Furthermore, in promoting a progressive agenda and enhancing their former radical 
networks, these successful Octobrist politicians did not push their efforts due to the 
limitations of electoral and coalition conditions. Although these Octobrists pursued the 
rules of coalition politics in surviving and maintaining their political positions, they put 
effort into promoting a progressive agenda and enhanced their former radical networks 
in five major areas: their role in promoting the 1992 anti-military movement as 
progressive politicians; participating in reform; providing support for their former 
comrades in rural areas; pushing forward a progressive agenda favouring the rise of 
social movements; and suspending the anti-communist law. Nevertheless, due to the 
limitations of electoral and party politics, many of their initiatives failed or did not last 
long.   
 
In May 1992, nearly all of the Octobrist politicians and political campaigners came out 
to support the movement against the revival of the military in parliamentary politics. 
Chaturon Chaisang played a crucial role in building alliances among politicians in 
campaigning against the revival of military dictatorship and fighting for democracy and 
political reform. At the same time, Chamni Sakdiset moved in support of the 
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organisation of the Democratic Federation (klum samaphan prachathipatai) in changing 
the constitution earlier drafted by military, as well as developing alliances among 1970s 
politicians and an anti-military party coalition among the Democrat Party 
(Prachathipat), Solidarity Party (Ekkaparp) and New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang 
Mai). Nevertheless, their role in the anti-military movement was questioned for using 
the people’s movement and claiming their 1970s history as democratic fighters merely 
to support their own political legitimacy. Since the revival of the military was a threat to 
elected politicians, fighting against the military was partly to protect their political 
realm from non-elected elite and military taking over parliamentary power.   
 
Chaturon and Chamni started to promote political reform immediately after May 1992. 
Although Chaturon failed to win in the 1992 election, he took the role of New 
Aspiration Party representative on the special committee for constitutional reform. In 
addition, he organised the ‘club of politicians outside parliament’ to work on the 
political reform process. In parallel, Chamni advocated political decentralisation. In this, 
he started working with Octobrist academics like Anek Laothamatas and Tanet 
Charoenmuang from the Political Science Faculties at Thammasat University and 
Chiang Mai University. However, these initial efforts met with the disapproval of 
several senior members in the party, and politicians with local business interests, like 
Sanoh Tienthong.  
 
Furthermore, many Octobrist politicians still maintained their connections with and 
support for their former comrades upcountry. Chaturon Chaisang annually visited the 
people with whom he used to live during his political mission with the CPT in Nan 
Province. He allocated budget and promoted development policies for the villages, 
including new roads and mini-hydroelectric generating plants. Nonetheless, all of these 
schemes were minor compared to the real socio-economic difficulties that these ex-
comrades were facing. His activities were interpreted by the public and his political 
rivals as a process of making use of these people in promoting his political career.  
 
More importantly, these Octobrist politicians and spin doctors worked to shift the 
direction of the government in dealing with the rise of social movements. Due to their 
skills and interests, most of them were assigned by their parties and governments to take 
care of negotiations with the social movements in different areas. During the successful 
145 
 
period for many Octobrist politicians in the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government, many 
of them gained cabinet positions and through these channels, they pushed forward many 
new policy initiatives and strategies in dealing with the problems of people’s 
movements. However, nearly all of these either failed or were ignored by other 
powerful politicians.  
 
As Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, Adisorn Piengket pushed forward 
environmental research projects, compensation for people who were affected by the 
Rasi Salai dam, proposals for changing the environment laws in favour of the people, 
and progressive strategies in dealing with demonstrations. However, in doing so, he was 
attacked and asked to leave the party by Sanoh Tienthong, the Secretary-General of his 
own party. In addition, he was later accused by the incoming Chuan Leekpai 
government of corruption in the compensation allocation process. At the same time, 
Chaturon Chaisang was assigned to take care of the compensation fund for the people 
who were affected by the Pak Mun dam project. Pinit Jarusombat promised groups 
opposing the Bor Nok and Hin Krud power plants that the projects would be suspended. 
Nonetheless, his proposal was obstructed by several MPs in parliament. Because of 
these failures, he was publicly condemned by the movements. In 1998, as Deputy 
Minister of Interior, Chamni Sakdiset had to deal with several pressure groups, such as 
a group opposing a garbage dump in Chiang Mai and a protest by golf caddies. 
Furthermore, in 1999, Anun Hanpanichpan was assigned to deal with the anti-Rasi Salai 
dam protest when Arthit Urairat became the Minister of Science and Technology. 
Despite a profound understanding of the problem, he did not have the power to 
convince conservative technocrats in the Ministry of Science and Technology. The 
Octobrist politicians all repeated the same lesson, good will and intentions at the outset, 
but under the internal constraints of corrupt coalition party politics, most of their efforts 
were suspended. Most eventually ended up following the government’s direction. At the 
same time, they ended up being condemned as traitors by the people’s movements.  
 
Not all of their efforts failed. Chamni Sakdiset and Pinit Jarusombat succeeded in 
suspending the anti-communist law. In 1997, while they were both Deputy Ministers of 
Interior, with the support of Sanan Kajornprasat, the Minister of Interior who was from 
the military and who did understand the problem with the law, they successfully pushed 
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forward a new security law to replace the 1952 Anti-Communist Act. They argued that 
an up-to-date law was required to deal with new emerging threats to national security. 
 
 
4.2 Octobrists in the late 1990s political reform  
 
Alongside the opportunities created by the rise of parliamentary politics with its 
coalitions and money politics, there were subsequent opportunities arising from the 
1990s political reform process as well as the new networks and reputation they had 
recently developed. The campaign to reform Thai politics and the constitution started 
right after the events of May 1992. The process was supported by a tactical alliance 
among liberal, progressive and conservative forces. The purpose of the reform was to 
check the power of corrupt elected politicians who were perceived as the cause of the 
ineffectiveness of Thailand’s representative structures, electoral and structural 
corruption, the plague of factionalism, and political instability (McCargo 2002; Surin 
and McCargo 1997). In addition, it was designed to limit the power of the mass of rural 
voters who elected vote-buying and corrupt politicians (Connors 2002; Somchai 2002; 
Streckfuss and Templeton 2002). Although the drafting process for the 1997 reform 
constitution was heralded as producing a ‘people’s constitution’ due to the presence of 
provincial representatives who had been chosen by a complicated nomination process 
and the public consultation and debates, including a series of ‘public hearings’ across 
the country, the drafting process was an elite-led affair, and politicians had the final say 
concerning the selection of the committee. Overall, popular participation was very 
limited (Connors 2002; McCargo 2002). The reform process concentrated on three 
broad areas: reform of the electoral system; establishment of new bodies charged with 
providing checks and balance against abuse of the political process; and promoting and 
protecting popular rights (McCargo 2002, 9-12).  
 
The 1997 constitution not only brought about institutional changes for Thai politics; it 
also had two immediate outcomes which created new roles and opportunities for 
Octobrists. The replacement of an appointed Senate with an elected Senate and the 
establishment of new bodies to monitor and reform the political order (the expansion of 
opportunity from the part-list system will be discussed in Chapter 6) opened new spaces 
for Octobrist politicians to compete to enter parliamentary politics, both for those who 
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had failed to win seats in earlier MP elections and for those who had been active in 
extra-parliamentary politics.  
 
Prior to 1997, the Thai parliament had a long history as a bicameral system. While the 
lower house or House of Representatives was directly elected by local constituencies, 
the upper house or Senate had only once been elected, by the House of Representatives 
at its inauguration, and had long been viewed as ‘the house of bureaucrats’ because its 
members had been appointed by panels including judges and ultimately all 
appointments were countersigned by the King. The Senators consisted almost 
exclusively of royalists, the military and conservative businesspeople (Naruemon 2002, 
197). To counter the corrupt politicians and coalition politics in the lower house, the 
constitution was designed to enable the Senate to be ‘non-partisan’ and free of day-to-
day politics.  Its power was also increased to balance the lower house.  The 1997 reform 
and its constitution prohibited Senate candidates from being members of or representing 
political parties and from conducting election campaigns and provided the Senate with 
more power than appointed Senates under previous constitutions, in order to check and 
balance the House of Representatives (McCargo 2002, 9–12; Sombat 2002, 204, 207-
208). The new 200 elected Senate seats from 76 provinces increased the political 
opportunities and space for Octobrists who wished to pursue careers in electoral politics 
and gain direct access to state power. The requirements for Senate candidates to be 
independent from political parties and not to conduct election campaigns enabled many 
Octobrists who had already built their public popularity either as politicians or social 
activists.  
 
Aside from positions as elected senators, new windows of opportunity came along with 
many non-elected independent bodies established by the 1997 constitution to monitor 
the government. It was hoped that these new bodies, including the Election Commission 
(EC), the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC), the Constitutional Court, 
the Administrative Courts, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the 
State Audit Commission would curtail abuses of power by both elected politicians and 
government officials (McCargo 2002, 9-12). Many Octobrists who had developed 
expertise and carried on their political and social activities in the political and public 
realms on issues related to these new bodies, were recruited into these independent state 
bodies. Some of them gained positions in the NHRC, which was created to promote 
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civil, political, economic, social and cultural liberty (Streckfuss and Templeton 2002, 
84-86).    
 
Even though many Octobrists succeeded in winning election to the Senate and attaining 
positions in the NHRC immediately after the new constitution was implemented, 
structural constraints obstructed their push for a progressive agenda. The elected Senate 
was in fact still dominated and manipulated by party politics (Sombat 2002, 207-210). 
Elected Octobrist senators who were independent from party politics became a minority 
in the upper house. As a result, all they could do was to advocate a progressive agenda 
while finding it almost impossible to achieve concrete results. In the same vein, in spite 
of its independence from the elected government, the NHRC lacked any law 
enforcement function. Consequently, its efforts to halt human rights violations were 
limited.  
 
Elected Senate Octobrists 
 
In the elected Senate, Nirun Phitakwatchara, Sompong Sakravee, Maleerat Kaewka, 
Karun Saingarm and Pichit Pantachot were successful examples of Octobrists who won 
seats. The elected Senate also opened new opportunities for other Octobrists who had 
earlier failed in electoral politics. Sompong, Maleerat, Karun and Pichit, who had been 
less fortunate in party politics, managed to succeed in the 2000 Senate elections. 
Alongside veteran Octobrist politicians like Maleerat and Sompong, a newcomer like 
Nirun also found an opportunity in the Senate elections. Nirun was an activist medical 
student. He was a leader of a successful leftist student party at Mahidol University, the 
Mahidol Alliance Party (phak naew ruam mahidon). In 1973-1976, he worked in 
support of election campaigns as well as other activities of leftist student movements. 
After the 1976 massacre, he did not join the armed struggle with the CPT, choosing 
instead to work in a rural hospital in Ubon Ratchathani Province, North-eastern 
Thailand, but still continuing to provide indirect support for local CPT staff (Nirun, 
interview by author, 27 March 2007, Ubon Ratchathani).  
 
After the decline of the CPT, he continued his social and political activities. Through 
his medical network, he worked with the Rural Doctors Foundation (munlanithi mo 
chonabot) which linked him with the progressive medical movement as well as 
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politically active royalist and reformist elite doctors like Prawes Wasi. At the same 
time, he worked with middle class, rural people and NGO networks in Ubon 
Ratchathani Province in environmental conservation activities. He later became the 
chairperson of the NATURE CARE Foundation (munlanithi phithak thammachat phuea 
chiwit). These networks connected him to further political activities in the anti-military 
movement in May 1992, the political reform process, and direct participation in the 
Senate elections. In May 1992, in Ubon Ratchathani, he was one of the major figures 
mobilising the middle class, NGOs, rural people and many of his former leftist 
comrades in supporting the national campaign against the revival of the military in 
parliamentary politics. Immediately thereafter, at the invitation and with the support of 
Prawes Wasi, he became chairperson of the independent organisation monitoring the 
general election or P-Net (ongkon klang) in Ubon Ratchathani Province. During the 
political reform and constitutional drafting process in 1997, he joined the Democratic 
Development Committee (khana kamakan phathana prachathipatai) and became the key 
person in charge of public hearings on the 1997 constitution in North-eastern Thailand.  
 
Nirun Phitakwatchara decided to run for the elected Senate in 2000. His triumph in the 
Senate election was the result of his prominent reputation as a politically active medical 
doctor as well as the constituencies he had built up with both middle class and rural 
networks during his political and social activities. His decision to enter parliamentary 
politics was based on his desire to link his work in what he called ‘people politics’ with 
the formal political process. Distrustful of Thai political parties, he found that the 
structural transformation of the Senate elections offered him a chance to enter politics 
without being dependent on political parties and corrupt political networks (Nirun, 
interview by author, 27 March 2007, Upon Ratchathani).  
 
Compared with those in party politics, the Octobrist elected senators were more 
progressive and radical in pushing forward their political and social agenda. The two 
main underlying conditions for their progressive role were their intention to be 
independent from party politics, and the loose network successfully built among the 
minority of progressive senators. Despite the fact that in reality the upper house was still 
dominated by elected senators who were connected with and influenced by political 
parties, the Octobrist senators who entered the upper house independent of political 
parties benefitted from this situation. They had more political freedom in their political 
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decisions and actions. Besides, independent Senate elections encouraged and allowed 
people outside party politics to enter parliamentary politics. These small groups of 
progressive people became good resources for the Octobrist senators in building 
supportive alliances in the upper house.  
 
At the individual level, Nirun Phitakwatchara, Maleerat Kaewka and Sompong 
Sakravee became senators who worked at the forefront of efforts to initiate and support 
progressive programmes in the upper house. At the same time, their efforts in 
developing a loose network among formerly non-leftist progressive senators became 
one of the success stories of parliamentary politics. During his six-year term in the 
upper house, Nirun played an outstanding role in proposing and obstructing laws, 
policies and government projects. As Chair of the Senate Committee on Social 
Development and Human Security and as Secretary of the Committee on the 
Environment, he was one of the leading senators who supported the community forest 
charter proposed by social movements and NGOs, and special medical treatment for the 
poor in the government health scheme (MR 2001d). He opposed many mega projects of 
the government, for instance, the Thai-Malaysia gas pipeline project (KT 2000b), and 
the Pak Mun dam project. Moreover, he played an active role in monitoring 
administrative power including forming a special commission to monitor corruption in 
the Ministry of Public Health (KT 2000a), in the construction of Suvarnabhumi Airport, 
and in the Khlong Dan waste water treatment project (SR 2001).  
 
Maleerat Kaewka was an outstanding figure promoting women’s issues during her term 
as elected Senator from Sakon Nakhon Province. She was elected Chair of the Senate 
Committee on Women, Children and the Elderly. She pushed for an increased budget 
for social development work, a progressive law on abortion, outreach anti-drug policies, 
etc. Moreover she actively worked on mainstreaming women in parliamentary politics 
at both national and local levels (KS 2001d; MR 2001b; MD 2000b). 
 
Besides their individual efforts, these Octobrist Senators also promoted a progressive 
network in the upper house as well as alliances outside parliament in pushing forward 
progressive political issues and activities. Inside the Senate, there were efforts to 
promote a loose network among progressive senators. A group of around 40 senators 
with Octobrist and other non-left progressive backgrounds was gradually developed and 
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called itself the Independent Senator group, or what was known as the NGO-friendly 
Senate group (Post Today 2004). Despite the fact that this network was very loose and 
each member had his/her own political agenda and varying level of progressiveness 
(Nirun, interview by author, 27 March 2007, Upon Ratchathani), it was effectively used 
in mobilising support among these Senators for a progressive agenda and political 
action from time to time. Nirun Phitakwatchara effectively mobilised this network in 
conducting fact finding in support of opposition to the Pak Mun dam and the Southern 
gas pipeline projects. Moreover, this Senate group also played an aggressive role in 
initiating a no confidence vote against the government on different problem issues 
including bureaucratic centralisation, militant measures dealing with the violence in 
Southern Thailand, etc. (PCT 2000).  
 
At the same time, in dealing with these problem issues, many Octobrist Senators linked 
with and supported other progressive networks outside parliament. In the case of the 
Pak Mun dam and gas pipeline projects, the Octobrist senators collaborated with former 
comrades who were leading NGO figures working with the social movements. In the 
same vein, Maleerat Kaewka maintained strong connections and worked closely with 
former Octobrist activists in civil society in promoting an alternative women’s group 
called ‘We Move – the women’s movement promoting political reform’ including 
Sunee Chaiyaros at the National Human Rights Commission, Rosana Tositrakul from 
an independent anti-corruption campaign, and Thicha Na Nakhorn, a leader in the 
Women and the Constitution network, in promoting a progressive agenda against other 
conservative women groups and MPs who were organised by the government (TS 
2006b).  
 
Because of restrictions under the reformist structures, most initiatives and activities of 
Octobrists and other progressive senators brought about hardly any radical changes. The 
direct and indirect interventions of political parties and politicians in the lower house 
still dominated and influenced the majority of the elected Senators in upper house 
voting. Direct vote buying was also widespread in blocking votes in the upper house on 
laws and other political matters, especially the selection of members of independent 
bodies such as the Election Commission and the National Counter-Corruption 
Commission, etc. (TN 2006a). Moreover, as relatives of MPs, many senators could 
hardly deny being indirectly influenced by politicians and political parties in the lower 
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house. As a result the majority of elected senators supported proposals from the lower 
house and opposed the agenda of independent Senators. The upper house was clearly 
divided into three major groups. A bloc of around 100 were government supporters, 40 
former NGOs and academics comprised a progressive bloc, and around 60 shifted 
between these two sides (PT 2004). Under these conditions, progressive Senators could 
hardly succeed in pushing their agenda in the upper house. The failure to pass the 
progressive Community Forest charter drafted by the people’s movement and to halt 
several governmental mega projects was an outstanding example.  
 
The Octobrist National Human Rights Commissioners  
 
Alongside opportunities in the elected Senate, several Octobrists also benefitted from 
the creation of independent bodies like the National Human Rights Commission (khana 
kamakan sithi manut - NHRC). Jaran Dhitthapichai and Sunee Chaiyaros are prominent 
Octobrists who managed to attain positions as National Human Rights Commissioners. 
After failing in electoral politics, Jaran shifted his interest to human rights issues, which 
became a major asset for his entry into politics through the NHRC in the late 1990s. 
During the 1990s, Jaran became a prominent human rights activist and advocate. He 
became chairperson of the Union for Civil Liberty (samakhom sitthi seriphap khong 
prachachon), the long standing Thai-based civil rights NGO, and a member of the 
committees of many human rights and democracy advocacy NGOs. He provided serious 
support to the Free Burma campaign, for which he was arrested in 1998. Although he 
was not very optimistic about the political reform process as a major force for change 
for Thai politics, he benefitted from the 1997 constitution. With his reputation and 
experience in human rights advocacy work, he applied for and was selected as a 
National Human Rights Commissioner.  
 
Sunee Chaiyaros, another Octobrist who managed to obtain a position as a National 
Human Rights Commissioner, was from the 14 October generation. She graduated from 
the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, in 1973, and was a leading figure in 
the leftist movement working with women’s and labour groups. After graduation, she 
decided to experience life as a worker and organised a labour union in a garment 
factory. She was arrested and jailed in 1974 as a communist for her work mobilising 
worker protests. She joined the CPT after outbursts of violence in 1976 and remained in 
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the jungle for 6 years. Upon her return, she was again prosecuted by the Thai 
government and jailed for several years. She even gave birth to her child in prison. After 
being released, she worked as editor of ‘Green World (Lok See Khiao)’, an 
environmental magazine supported by a network of former comrades. In 1984, she 
decided to run for a seat on the Nong Bua Lamphu Provincial Council with the support 
of the Democrat Party (Prachathipat). Her drive to promote women’s, environmental 
and development projects at the local level made her a well-known activist and devoted 
local woman politician. Nonetheless, she failed when she moved to the national level. 
Because the constituency was large, a newcomer without financial support could hardly 
manage to compete with the incumbent MP. After this failure, she carried on working as 
the Chair of the Provincial Cultural Council in her province. She was also elected as the 
provincial member of the 1997 Constitutional Drafting Committee. She was given an 
award as a ‘successful woman in politics’. She then decided to join the Thais Love 
Thais (Thai Rak Thai - TRT) Party, as a prospective MP candidate and campaign 
strategist on women’s issues. She initially found TRT an opportunity. She worked on 
the Executive Committee of the TRT for more than 2 years while the party was being 
formed. However, she was later disappointed by the TRT, which replaced her as a 
candidate with her former rival who had recently entered the TRT and put her far down 
the party list. She therefore publicly denounced the TRT and finally resigned from the 
party. Shortly thereafter she decided to apply for and was successfully nominated to, the 
NHRC (Sunee 2004; Sunee, interview by author, 12 February 2007, Bangkok).   
 
Under the newly-created structures in the 1997 constitution designed to deal with the 
earlier problems of electoral politics, the Octobrists were able to play a progressive role 
in pushing forward their issues of concern. The NHRC and the elected Senate were 
expected to perform new functions in monitoring and providing checks and balances 
against executive and parliamentary power, as well as to promote social and political 
agendas which governmental bodies were not capable of doing. With these conditions 
and expectations, Octobrists were allowed to push forward a radical political agenda 
and counter state power from within. Designed to deal with human rights issues under 
the guidance of Saneh Jamarik, a prominent former political scientist from Thammasat 
University and a member of the liberal elite, and comprising commissioners with 
progressive elite and leftist backgrounds, the NHRC became an NGO-like human rights 
advocacy organisation. This provided an opening for Octobrists like Sunee Chaiyaros 
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and Jaran Dhitthapichai to play a radical role in pushing forward a human rights agenda 
(Sunee, interview by author, 12 February 2007, Bangkok).   
 
During their terms as National Human Rights commissioners, both Sunee and Jaran 
dedicated themselves to pushing forward radical issues and political activities. Their 
role in the NHRC included fact finding, publicising problem issues and pushing issues 
of concern into the parliamentary arena. Jaran focused his work on two main areas: 
protecting the rights of ethnic minorities; and opposing state political violence. 
Consequently, he became the key person in the NHRC in pushing forward the rights of 
ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees along the border. He also pushed forward a 
series of public denouncements of the TRT government for violence in the anti-drug 
campaign and anti-terrorism operations in Southern Thailand and made interventions to 
promote and defend media freedom (TP 2001b).  
 
Sunee’s work focused more on promoting and protecting the rights of grassroots people 
to participate in political and policy processes. She was involved in many cases where 
the rights of people affected by governmental development projects and policies were 
violated. She paid a great deal of attention to local communities affected by gas 
pipelines (KT 2002b; MR 2003e), dams, power plant construction, and state housing 
projects (TN 2005b). She also helped small scale fishermen affected by an irrigation 
project of the Royal Irrigation Department (KS 2003a).  
 
Although they were surrounded by rather progressive colleagues, the Octobrists in the 
NHRC were ultimately powerless to take political action. Their role was limited to 
provoking public concern and denouncing the government rather than stopping the 
government from violating human rights. Many reports of human rights violations were 
produced and publicised by the NHRC. In their six-year terms, both Sunee and Jaran 
conducted hundreds of investigations. But few of them led to serious prosecutions 
against human right violators.  
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4.3 Conclusion  
 
The political liberalisation of the mid-1980s created new political conditions.  These 
conditions permitted the first wave of Octobrists who either had political family 
backgrounds or direct connections with progressive politicians or military personnel to 
enter electoral politics. Soon thereafter, the second wave followed. Octobrists who had 
been skilful in political campaigns and were eager to join electoral politics but did not 
have direct access made contact with their former comrades, who had already 
established themselves as politicians, as a bridge to political parties.  
 
However, to survive and succeed in electoral politics dominated by coalition and 
machine politics, these Octobrists needed more than the progressive image of being 
Octobrists, out-of-date political networks and political skills developed in the 1970s. 
Those who were able to survive in competitive electoral politics had to be skilful and 
capable of adapting to mobilise support from new non-progressive political cliques and 
capable of cleverly playing the political game of coalition and factional politics to 
negotiate cabinet quota positions alongside their efforts to be more progressive than 
corrupt politicians. Most of those who still preferred to keep a distance from dirty 
political norms and were not capable of playing the game were eventually alienated 
from politics.  
 
In the late 1990s, new opportunities opened up for those who either failed or were not 
willing to become involved in coalition, machine and money politics. Many new 
political channels and positions in the elected Senate and other independent bodies, 
especially the NHRC, became available. Many former Octobrist politicians were 
disappointed with fierce political elections and Octobrist social activists eventually won 
seats places in parliament. However, there was no easy road in performing these new 
political functions. The Octobrists still faced many structural obstacles in pushing their 
political agenda to success. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Revival of the Octobrists in Extra-parliamentary Politics in the 1990s  
 
 
Upon their return from the armed struggle with the Communist Party of Thailand (phak 
communist haeng prathet thai – CPT), the majority of Octobrists started new lives in 
non-state sectors including private companies, NGOs, academia, the media, and the 
entertainment industry. In terms of careers, many became successful businesspersons, 
prominent NGO workers, influential popular intellectuals, critical journalists, and 
famous singers and writers. From the early 1990s onwards, many of them also 
successfully revived their political roles in extra-parliamentary politics. Countless 
Octobrists reappeared on the streets both as protest leaders and active participants in the 
May 1992 people’s uprising. Also, many Octobrist NGO workers, academics, 
journalists and businesspeople played leading and supporting roles in promoting and 
advocating the rise of social movements throughout the 1990s. Significant numbers of 
Octobrist political activists and active members of the middle class also participated in 
the late 1990s in the successful movement for political reform and called for the 1997 
people’s constitution. 
  
In examining these trends, this chapter identifies four major interrelated conditions 
which explain why these Octobrists managed to survive a changing socio-economic 
context and revive their political roles. Firstly, as members of the large urban middle 
class of educated Thais, Octobrists benefitted from the new supportive structure of 
political opportunity enhancing the formation and active political participation of the 
Thai urban middle class of the 1990s. The double-digit economic growth and influx of 
foreign investment and funds to Thailand from the late 1980s onwards provided new 
career opportunities for Octobrists in all sectors including the business, academic, 
entertainment, journalism and development sectors. In addition, the increased role of the 
middle class in the May 1992 people’s uprising against the revival of military in 
parliamentary politics, the proliferation of social movements throughout the 1990s, and 
the political reforms in the late 1990s opened up new windows of opportunity for 
Octobrists to participate in extra-parliamentary politics. Secondly, their prestige 
education, skills and contacts through their activism in the 1970s and into the early 
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1980s offered Octobrists a vital basis for ascendancy in their occupations and recent 
political activities. Thirdly, the successful construction of a new ‘Octobrist’ identity 
worked to legitimise their new political roles. Fourth and finally, after persisting to a 
certain degree in their earlier ‘revolutionary’ aspirations for social change in the 1970s, 
many Octobrists eventually shifted toward ‘reformist/liberal’ goals and actions. This 
slippage gave rise to new and more compatible ideological tools for Octobrists to use in 
non-leftist political activities and movements.  
 
 
5.1 Revival of Octobrists as successful members of the middle class  
  
Octobrists started to build their new lives by the mid-1980s when new opportunities in 
the private sector expanded. The percentage of workers in the urban industrial-service-
professional sectors as opposed to agriculture and fishing increased from 17%, 24% and 
31% in 1960, 1971 and 1980 respectively to nearly 36% in 1990. This change reflects 
the expansion of opportunity for a growing middle class (Hewison 1996, 143). 
 
Table 5.1: Category of work of the economically active population in Thailand 1960 
and 1990 in % 
Category  1960 1971 1980 1990 
Professional and technical  1.3 1.57 2.48 3.3 
Administrative, executive and 
managerial  
 
0.2 0.65 1.31 
 
1.5 
Clerical 1.1 1.28 1.74 2.8 
Sales 5.3 7.96 8.34 8.7 
Service industries 2.00 1.73 2.66 6.3 
Agriculture and fishing  82.3 76.91 70.86 64.0 
Production and related workers 7.1 9.85 12.61 13.2 
Other 0.7 1.57 2.48 0.1 
   Source: ILO, Employment - 2C Total employment, by occupation, Thailand  
 
The Octobrists were a part of this new rising middle class who benefitted from these 
new career opportunities. The Octobrists had acquired an education and many other 
unique qualifications which made them competent human resources for the growing 
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private and professional sectors. As a by-product of Sarit Thanarat’s US-backed policy 
of expanding higher education, the Octobrists were part of the first generation of mass 
university graduates (Anderson 1977). Their university education prepared them to 
enter and share the expansion of wealth in the private and professional sectors which 
required more highly skilled labour. Moreover, their professionalism, unique 
interpersonal and management skills, extensive contacts ranging from the elite to rural 
grassroots movements, and critical thinking, which had been developed through their 
activism in the 1970s and into the early 1980s, were crucial assets in accessing and 
promoting work in organisations requiring unique skills and experience, such as the 
public relations departments in private companies, rural development NGOs, academic 
institutions, newspapers, music bands, and publishing houses. However, to become 
successful in these new careers, education, networks and social skills from the 1970s 
were not enough. To reach the top positions in these new organisations, the Octobrists 
needed to abandon a certain degree of their earlier radicalism and to adapt and 
incorporate their earlier ideas and language to promote more liberal and reformist goals 
and actions. 
 
Octobrists in the business world  
 
By the mid-1980s when the Octobrists returned home, a decade of Thai economic 
stagnation had come to an end. The biggest Thai economic boom took off before 
reaching its peak in the early 1990s. After the 1973 global oil shock, the Thai economy 
suffered from long-term low growth. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth in the mid-
1970s dropped to 4.4 and remained at merely 4.6 in 1980. Dramatic changes took place 
by the mid-1980s. Thai economic growth rose sharply by 1986 and reached double 
digits in 1987 (Figure 5.1: GDP growth).  
159 
 
 
Figure 5.1: GDP growth 
 
Source: World Bank, NESDB (National Economic and Social Development)  
2009 
 
This growth was a result of the devaluation of the Thai baht in 1984 which increased its 
export capacity, as well as the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the resulting appreciation of 
the Japanese yen in relation to the US dollar which encouraged foreign direct 
investment and the relocation of Japanese manufacturing to Thailand. This new growth 
was driven by the expansion of the industrial-service-professional sectors. The share of 
GDP of the formerly predominant agricultural sector dropped from 34% and 27 in 1966 
and 1976 to 16% and 10% in 1886 and 1996, while that of industry and the service 
sector shifted from 22% and 28 in 1966 and 1976 to 33% and 41% in 1886 and 1996 
(Figure 5.2: GDP by sector). Subsequently, demand for and employment of skilled and 
educated labour in the private sector increased.  
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Figure 5.2: GDP by sector 
 
 Source: Source: World Bank, NESDB (2010) 
 
Against the backdrop of expanding opportunities in the private sector, many former 
student activists successfully utilised their 1970s connections and activist skills in 
accessing new careers in the private sector and business opportunities. Many managed 
to reach top positions in various companies or succeeded in their own businesses. For 
example, Prasarn Maruekpitak, a leading student activist during 14th October 1973, 
started a career in public speaking training and personality improvement in a company 
founded by his brother, who had also joined the CPT, in the 1970s after five years in the 
jungle. With public speaking and unique interpersonal skills, he quickly became a 
successful trainer. Furthermore, using new non-left networks and making his work more 
business-oriented, by the early 1990s he quickly became a successful businessman in 
public speaking and business training. He later became a prominent instructor for many 
companies, including Siam TV and Communication (a company under Royal 
Patronage). At the same time, he had his own company producing TV programmes, 
books and cassettes on how to succeed in business (Manager Magazine 1995).    
 
Not only leading activists but also many rank-and-file student activists had very 
successful careers in the private sector. Vipa Daomanee is an interesting example of an 
Octobrist who turned the skills learnt during her time as a student activist and with the 
CPT into an asset in pursuing work in the marketing and advertising business. Vipa was 
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an ordinary rank-and-file leftist activist from the Faculty of Science, Chulalongkorn 
University, in the public relations Unit of the ‘People’s Chula (Chula Prachachon)’, a 
leftist student political party at Chulalongkorn University. At that time, she actively 
organised many exhibitions against the military government, and worked as head of the 
Entertainment Unit in Tanaosri CPT military base after 6th October 1976. Upon her 
return, she went back to finish her undergraduate studies. After graduation, instead of 
pursuing a job in science, she instead started her career as a copy writer, event organiser 
and news analyst. Later on she successfully became a well-paid marketing and 
advertising manager in many different advertising companies during the economic 
boom of the mid 1990s. For instance, before the economic collapse in 1997, she earned 
around 120,000 Baht (4,800 US$) per month as senior executive member for Siam TV. 
Vipa admitted that she owed all her success in marketing to the experience and skills 
developed during her time in the jungle. As head of an Entertainment Unit, she had to 
organise and work out all the details for welcoming and farewell ceremonies, weddings, 
funerals, plays and other entertainments, involving everything from the writing of news, 
poems and play scripts, to arranging costumes and preparing food. As a result, even 
though she was not formally trained in marketing, she found that her time with the CPT 
equipped her for a marketing career. For her, producing books, organising company 
events, and inventing sales campaigns were ‘a piece of cake’ (Vipa, interview by author, 
28 January 2007, Bangkok). 
 
Many other successful examples included Pridi Boonsue, a former leading figure at the 
Thammasat University Dome Assembly (Sapha Na Dome) and critic of the CPT upon 
his return, who currently acts as Vice President, Alliance & Loyalty Management 
Department, Thai Airways International plc; Prasarn Trairatvorakul, formerly a 
politically active engineering student from Chulalongkorn University during the 14th 
October 1973 incident, who was Director and President of Kasikorn Bank plc and was 
recently offered a position as Governor of the Bank of Thailand; Sathien Setthasit, a 
former rank-and-file Thammasat University economics leftist student activist during 6th 
October 1976 who became a very successful businessman with a hundred-million-baht 
‘German Tawandeng’ brewery and ‘Red Buffalo (Carabao Daeng)’ energy drink 
businesses in collaboration with Aed Carabao (Yoonyong Opakul) – a famous Octobrist 
singer – who spent time with him in the Southern Isan revolutionary base.  
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Although not all Octobrists achieved leading positions and wealth, these new 
opportunities and their assets at least allowed them to survive after their failed political 
struggle in the 1970s and to maintain in most cases a middle class living standard. 
Suthisak Pavarathisan successfully exploited earlier leftist connections and skills in 
achieving middle class status. During his time with the CPT, with his background as a 
first year university student at the Faculty of Associated Medical Sciences, Chiang Mai 
University, Suthisak was sent by the CPT to study Chinese medicine in China. With 
fluent Chinese communication skills and an inside understanding of China, Suthisak, 
after his return to Thailand, was invited by his former comrades to work for a politically 
connected company to expand trade between Thailand and Southern China. This Thai-
Chinese trading company hired more than thirty to forty of his former comrades. 
Furthermore, his Chinese medical skills eventually enabled the success of his Chinese 
medical clinic in his hometown of Chiang Mai. He was one of the few practitioners of 
Chinese medicine when the market for alternative medicine started booming in 
Thailand. (Suthisak, interview by author, 13 December 2006, Chiang Mai).  
 
As with Suthisak, the majority of Octobrists were able to find decent jobs and maintain 
their middle class status. Tanit Vijitsukhon and Veerasak Kukantin, former singers in 
the leftist Kammachon (Labourer) band, both became owners of small businesses 
including bookshops, restaurants, and music studios. Varis Mongkholsri, an active 
pioneer member of the ‘Siam Youth’ group, now owns a medium sized construction 
company. Prachoom Sirithamwat, an active Thammasat University student and 
founding member of the ‘Dharma Party (Phalang Tham)’, a leftist student political party 
at Thammasat University, was initially successful with a real estate business before 
going bankrupt. Jariya Suanpan, who joined the CPT when she was a high school 
student, now makes a living as the manager of a laundromat in Bangkok. Lert Edison 
(pseudonym), a former leftist Chiang Mai University science student and an important 
inventor at Nan revolutionary base, became a successful insurance representative after 
several agro-business failures.  
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Octobrists in the newspaper business  
  
Since the first Thai newspaper was founded in 1844 until the mid 1980s, the Thai press 
has struggled through ebbs and flows of development, in spite of sporadic periods of 
political press freedom such as during the premiership of Pridi Banomyong (March-
August 1946) and the post-14th October period between 1973 and 1976. For most of the 
time, the press was suppressed by the state, especially during the dictatorship of Prime 
Minister Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) and the period after 6th October 1976 (Boonrak 
1982; McCargo 2002a, 9-16). However, by the mid 1980s, the Thai newspaper business 
boomed dramatically before being hit by the 1997 economic crisis. From the mid-1980s 
to 1997, journalism became a prestige career with a well-paid salary, as well as social 
and political status. There were three main factors explaining this phenomenon. The 
first was the gradual expansion of press freedom under the more moderate governments 
of Kriangsak Chomanan, Prem Tinsulanonda and Chatichai Choonhavan. Even though 
Kriangsak and Prem did not take any steps to abolish legislation which undermined 
press freedom and still used arbitrary power to punish publications from time to time, a 
new progressive press was allowed to grow. And under Chatichai, the first elected 
government since 1976, and later during the 1992 May incident, freedom of the press in 
Thailand flourished (McCargo 2002b, 15-25). The second was the 1980s-1990s 
economic boom. While the Thai stock market rose sharply during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the share value of newspaper groups increased at a phenomenal rate. At the 
same time, the growth in profits came from increased income from advertising and 
sales. Subsequently, many newspaper owners became multi-millionaires. Journalists 
and reporters received better salaries and benefits, sometimes in the form of shares. The 
third was an increase in financial support from politicians to newspapers which caused 
an expansion in printed media. Countless politicians had a direct financial stake in 
particular newspapers (McCargo 2002b, 30-33; Ockey 1992, 325-327).  
 
Against this backdrop, journalism was the first career choice offered to many Octobrists 
upon their return, which many of them took. Strong experience in various printed media 
and skills in political analysis developed during the 1970s made these people uniquely 
qualified to work at newspapers and magazines. At the same time, extensive 
connections with both leftist and non-leftist networks helped these Octobrists to win 
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jobs and provided access to inside stories for their newspapers which no other groups of 
people in their generation enjoyed. Also, adjusting to more commercial and liberal 
media widened the career opportunities for these people.   
 
The success of Pirun Chatwanitchakul in the media sector is an interesting example. 
Pirun was one of the most influential mentors among leftist students. Amidst the 
conflict within and decline of the CPT, Pirun still worked actively to reunify and revive 
the CPT upon his return to Bangkok. Nevertheless, he ended up being arrested and 
detained in prison for several years on charges of communism. After his release from 
jail, he started a new life working with countless newspapers, political magazines and 
radio programmes through connections with liberal journalists and his former close 
friends in the business sector. He won a job as special reporter for Khao Phiset (Special 
News), a radical political magazine of Chatcharin Chaiwat, a well-known liberal 
journalist who was charged by the government as a leftist. Nevertheless, he later 
collaborated with other non-left connections particularly his non-left close friend during 
his time at Chulalongkorn University, Paiboon Wattanasiritham, the media tycoon of 
GMM Grammy plc. As a result he was offered jobs in various newspapers and media 
including the Khu Khaeng (Competitor) newspaper, Thai Time News, and Open Radio 
programmes, etc. In building up the Thai Time news centre, he recruited many former 
leftist friends including Kamol Kamoltrakul and Wichai Bamrungrit (now having 
changed his name to Nattapat Bamrungrit), to work with him. Furthermore, through his 
extensive connections, he was easily able to find prominent political figures to be 
interviewed for his newspaper and radio programmes. In adjusting to the media 
business, he shifted to a softer tone vis-à-vis the capitalist world. For example, when he 
started working with a business newspaper like the Khu Khaeng, he argued that as a 
result of media liberalisation it was unnecessary to work only in radical media to 
promote progressive issues as the mainstream media was now also more free and able to 
present progressive news. He also appreciated working with Paiboon as he was a 
progressive businessman. He even claimed that his influence during the 1970s made 
Paiboon progressive. He further argued that there were several good elements in the 
capitalist world, as they allowed former leftists like him to pursue their dream job (NS 
2005; Pirun, interview by author, 2 February 2007, Bangkok).  
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Dozens of other Octobrists took this career line. Nithinand Yorsaengrat, a member of 
the Thammasat University student council in 1974 and an active member of the radical 
Thammasat University Ton Kla (Seedling) band, did not join the armed struggle but 
remained in town to provide support for friends in the jungle. Throughout her career, 
she went back and forth between The Nation and Matichon (Public Opinion) 
newspapers. Recently, she became senior editor of the Nation Broadcasting Corporation 
Plc (Nithinand, interview by author, 2 March 2007, Bangkok). Bandit Chansrikham 
started working as a writer and journalist after returning from the jungle. He is currently 
an executive editor of Nation Sutsapda (Nation Weekend) political magazine under the 
Nation group. He was also widely known for his columns in the Nation Sutsapda under 
the pseudonym of Khaen Sarika, which were full of insider political analysis and news 
about Octobrists. Through him, the Nation Sutsapda was full of columns contributed by 
former leftist activists. Kamnoon Sidhisamarn, Secretary General of the National 
Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai) in 1975, was 
a member of the leftist anti-CPT group and follower of Pin Buo-on, who split from the 
CPT. He actively worked behind the scenes to support Thai Nikorn (Thai group), an 
important anti-CPT magazine. He later worked for many other political magazines 
including Su Anakhot (Toward the Future) and Chaturat (Square). In 1990, he moved to 
work for the Phuchatkan (Manager) group. Recently, he became a senior editor and had 
his own column and radio and television programmes under the Manager group 
(Somsak 2007a; Thailand Political Base 2011). Kasian Tejapira, currently a political 
scientist professor at Thammasat University, was a journalist in his first job before 
moving on. During his studies at Thammasat University, he worked part-time as a 
journalist at Setthakit Kanmueang (Politics and Economics). Tanet Charoenmuang, a 
political scientist lecturer at Chiang Mai University, also got a job as a journalist at 
Matuphum Thurakit (Motherland Business) newspaper though the connections of 
friends. 
 
Octobrist singers and writers  
Economic growth from the mid-1980s to 1997 increased the consumer power and 
culture of an expanding middle class. One interesting phenomenon was an expansion in 
entertainment and leisure-related businesses, especially music, books and films. Many 
small and big record companies, publishing houses and bookstores sprang up. Market 
demand for more diverse music and literature increased (Business Review 1986).  
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With this expansion of music and literature businesses, many Octobrists reappeared as 
famous singers, song writers and musicians, in both the mainstream music business and 
the alternative stream of ‘music/literature for life’37, prominent writers, and owners of 
several new publishing houses and bookstores. For example in the music industry, the 
fourth album of the Carabao band38
 
, ‘Made in Thailand’ surpassed the one-million sales 
record of the ‘Impossible’, the most popular 1980s ‘bubble-gum’ band. This meant that 
‘songs for life’ were no longer radical and illegal but had become popular music 
(Sutthasinee 1990, 8-12 and 97). Seksan Prasertkul and Surachai Jantimatorn were 
recognised as national artists in 2009 and 2010, a conservative and conventional award 
granted by the Ministry of Culture. Seksan’s wife, Jiranan Pitpreecha and Winai 
Boonchoay received popular writing awards like the S.E.A Write Awards (Southeast 
Asian Writers Award) in 1989 and 1993. 
In exploiting these opening opportunities, the Octobrists used their professional skills, 
critical perceptions, reputations and connections developed since the 1970s. Nearly all 
the Octobrists who are currently in the music and literature businesses were 
professionally trained and formerly worked as writers, singers and musicians to support 
the cultural activities of either the Leftist student movements or the CPT. These skilful 
artists and writers could easily compete with others in the mainstream entertainment 
industry. However, the really successful ones were those who knew how to adjust to 
more popular music and literature. 
 
One good example is Visa Khanthap, a very well-known poet, songwriter and student 
activist during the 1970s. After returning from the jungle, he composed many popular 
songs for several advertising companies, plays and films, as well as less radical songs 
for a younger generation of ‘songs for life’ singers. Sek Saksit and Thirasak 
                                               
37‘Songs/literature for life’ reflect economic, political and social problems. The genre actually emerged 
during the 1950s, but was suppressed by authoritarian regimes. Only after the declaration of the new 
constitution in 1968 and throughout the 1970s political struggle was it revived, becoming very popular 
among radical student activists, labourers and farmers. During that time, it was influenced by the songs 
and literature of the 1950s leftists like Art for Life, Art for People (sinlapa phuea chiwit sinlapa phuea 
prachachon) of Jit Phumisak, anti-war songs and literature, and revolutionary songs. After the 14th 
October victory, it turned more leftist and its content focussed more on class struggle and revolution  
(Sutthasinee 1990, 3-7, 54-67 and 67-88; Myers-Moro 1986) 
38 The word carabao is Tagalog meaning "buffalo".  
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Atchimanon, former members of the ‘Khuruchon (Teacher)’ and ‘Khrong-Lo (Wheel)’ 
bands, composed many popular songs and acted as producers for many younger ‘music 
for life’ bands after returning from the jungle. Suwat Sichuea (now Thoranong 
Sichuea), a critical writer during the 1970s, became a successful film director. By 1980, 
the ‘War Animal (sat songkram)’, a film directed by Suwat, received the Thai award for 
Best Script of the Year. Both his action and erotic films were commercially successful 
(Jan-Aksarapijan 2011). Kritsanapong Nak-tana, a former member of the Tawan 
Phloeng (Blazing Sun) drama group from Ramkhamhaeng University, based on the 
good reputation he earned from producing the critical film ‘Weeping Kula Plain (Thung 
Kula Ronghai)’, was recruited and worked as the right-hand man for Bandit Rittikol, 
one of the most famous film directors producing many popular films (PR 2009; Sukhum 
1996b).  
 
Their reputation as high-profile radical figures built up since the 1970s were also crucial 
assets for these Octobrists to return to the stage immediately after returning from the 
jungle. On the one hand, younger activists made efforts to revive the ‘literature for life’ 
(Veera 1981). On the other hand, Octobrists attempted to mainstream leftist literature 
and continuing social critiques. Many radical and leftist poems and songs were 
reproduced and repeatedly echoed in public (Vanich 1997, 70-71). In one individual 
case, Jiranan Pitpreecha, a leading female activist from Chulalongkorn University, 
produced countless writings, poems and translations to support the anti-military and 
leftist movements during the 1970s. Many of her works included golden phrases which 
many Octobrists learned by heart. After conflicting with and abandoning the CPT, she 
became a successful writer, poet and film subtitle translator. Most of the works for 
which she became famous soon after her return from jungle were those drawing on her 
time with leftist movements. For example, she obtained many writing awards, including 
the S.E.A. Write Award in 1989 for Lost Leaves (bai mai thi hai pai), a compilation of 
poems reflecting her political disappointment and struggle during the 1970s (Thanon 
Nangsue 1986, 58-59). Another example is Winai Boonchuay, known by his 
pseudonym Sila Khomchai, a former Ramkhamhaeng University student, writer, lead 
singer and founder of the Khom Chai (Shining Lamp) band, a Ramkhamhaeng 
University leftist music band. During his time with the CPT in the jungle, he was sent 
for special training in music and composing at Jinghong, Xīshuāngbǎnnà, China. Also, 
during his 6 years with the CPT, he wrote many short stories for radio programmes of 
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the Voice of the People of Thailand which were printed in the Athipat Nai Satanakarn 
Surop (Sovereign at the War Zone) newsletter. After several years of struggling to 
adjust to life in city, he eventually recovered as a successful writer and poet for many 
weekly newspapers and produced countless books and articles of social criticism. In 
1993 and 1997, Winai was also awarded the S.E.A. Write Award and an honourable 
mention from the Ministry of Education and the Sri Burapha Award. His books were 
repeatedly reprinted and some even turned into famous films (Sutjaphoom 1993, 39-40). 
 
Singers such as Yoonyong Opakul, Surachai Jantimatorn, Mongkol Utok, Virasak 
Soontornsri, Thongkran Tana, and Phongthep Kradonchamnan, of the Carabao band, 
and the Caravan band, came back as singers in the music for life business. As with 
writers, many singers and bands had already been widely recognised since the mid 
1970s. Caravan became a famous band and was on the cultural front line of the leftist 
student movement. Their music made money and a nation-wide concert tour started in 
the mid 1970s (Caravan 2000, 32-33). On their return, on the strength of their earlier 
reputation, many of their members were invited by radical singers and students in Japan 
to organise a concert tour and in 1982 the whole band was asked to join the 1st UNICEF 
concert. Even though it was just a part of the whole concert which comprised many 
other famous singers, the success of the concert was overwhelmed by the news of their 
return to the stage. Their revival in the music industry began at that time (Sri Burapha 
2006, 16-40).  
 
Aside from their skills, reputations and experiences, social connections with leftists and 
non-leftist colleagues in the music and literature circles offered Octobrists easy and 
quick access to writing and musical careers. During the 1970s, both leftist and radical 
non-leftist artists worked very closely to promote political activities. For example, the 
United Artists Front of Thailand (naew ruam sinlapin haeng prathet thai), established in 
the late 1960s among liberal, progressive and radical artists, writers, poets and 
musicians to support the anti-authoritarian movement (Nai Krawek 1996, 216-184; 
Wongmai 1994), was useful to Octobrists. Many non-left and liberal senior writers and 
artists from this network, including Nawarat Pongpaibul, Suchit Wongthet, Khanchai 
Boonpan and, Satien Jantimatorn, who had already achieved a high profile, were 
sympathetic and supported the Octobrists on their return. Suchit Wongthet was a major 
shareholder and Satien Jantimatorn was an important figure at the Matichon (Public 
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Opinion) publishing house, which was the first place for many Octobrist writers to get 
their work published after their return. For example, after returning from the jungle, 
Winai Boonchuay got his first publication printed at Matichon through a connection 
with Satien. Later on, he was offered a job at Krungthep Thurakit (Bangkok Biznews) 
and Khu Khaeng (Competitor) newspapers founded by senior Octobrists. He currently 
has his own weekly columns at several weekly newspapers like Matichon Sutsapda 
(Public Opinion Weekend) (Sutjaphoom 1993, 39-40).  
 
Eventually, the efforts to reduce their radicalism and integrate more popular ideas, as 
well as more professional marketing strategies allowed the works of these Octobrists to 
reach a wider audience. During the 1970s, the content of their songs and writings was a 
cultural weapon to fight against the Thai authoritarian state, capitalism, class 
exploitation and imperialism, as well as to promote social and political revolution. 
However, from the mid-1980s onwards, the works of these Octobrists were confined to 
calls for liberal democracy and Thai nationalism, peace and volunteerism, and above all 
criticising specific social problems like poverty, drugs, family issues, prostitution, 
consumerism, etc (Sutthasinee 1990, 117-269). The meaning of their works was limited 
to a symbol of rebellious culture at the individual level rather than promoting a mass 
movement as it once did. On the one hand, this was a response to earlier lessons that too 
radical content would either be censored by the Board of Censorship or accepted only 
with great difficulty by music companies. Many Octobrists thus initially avoided 
content which would threaten the political regime. On the other hand, this was a 
reaction to a changing political and social context with no leftist movement. The 
Octobrists learned that in the post-leftist era, people still searched for political criticism 
but were not ready for leftist or militant revolutionary mobilisation. Therefore, they 
produced more ‘mainstream’ work in response to the demands of the market. Many 
Octobrists viewed this change in themselves as a process of adjusting to a changing 
world and preparing to become again a source of inspiration and possibly an engine of 
change (Parithatsan 1982; Thanon Nangsue 1985a; thanon Nangsue 1985b).  
 
Carabao’s first few albums were entitled ‘Lung Khi Mao (drunken old man)’ and ‘Pae 
Khai Khuat (old bottle collector)’. Their content reflected only the lives of ordinary 
poor people and underprivileged groups but not structural problems (Sutthasinee 1990, 
108 and 182-183). The most popular album of Phongthep Kradonchamnan, another 
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prominent Octobrist singer appeared in 1990 and was called ‘Khon Jon Run Mai (new 
generation of the poor)’, also far from being revolutionary songs. The most successful 
songs which Sek Saksit composed for a younger generation of songs-for-life bands, 
were ‘Dek Pump (Gas Station Boy)’, ‘Sao Ramwong (Dancer Girl)’, ‘Racha Sam Cha 
(King of Cha-cha-cha)’, and ‘Tam Du Phu Thaen (Follow up Member of Parliament)’, 
and touched on minor social issues. The book which won Winai the S.E.A Write and 
other awards was ‘Khrobkhrua Khang Thanon (Family by the Side of the Road)’, a book 
which reflected the problems of the contemporary urban middle class.  
 
In addition to changes in content, Octobrists learnt that to survive and succeed in the 
music business, they needed more professional production and marketing plans to 
improve their record sales. After several failures with their first few albums which they 
launched themselves, many Octobrists eventually decided to work with and accepted 
assistance from music companies. Starting from production, the Carabao band was 
assisted in its third album, ‘Wanipok Phanejon (Wandering Beggar)’, by a professional 
composer to incorporate the earlier generation of ‘songs for life’ which had been 
dominated by western anti-war, folk, local folk and revolutionary marches and waltzes 
with ‘cha-cha-cha’ and country and western themes. This meant that the album was 
more successful and reached wider audiences than the first two. Its songs were used as 
dance music in discos and clubs. Furthermore, they followed the distribution, promotion 
and advertising plans of the music individually. For example, they had to put on 
commercial tour concerts in pubs, big hotels, private parties, discos, etc., according to a 
schedule set by the companies (Suttasinee 1990, 98-109 and 111-116).  In the book 
business, the Octobrist publishing houses which initially tried to reproduce their 1970s 
radical literature and new works by Octobrists also had to publish other conventional 
books for wider targets in order to survive in a competitive market. Successful examples 
include Phosop (Ceres, goddess of grain), Thanon Nangsue (book road) and Suan 
Akson (garden of letters) magazines, Dok Ya (grass flower), Chonniyom (populism), 
Ming Mit (close friend), Winyuchon (wise man), and Sai Than (stream).  
 
Octobrists in NGOs and Civil Society Organisations  
 
Before the late 1960s, Thai NGOs were predominantly philanthropic in nature. Nearly 
all of them were under the control either of the royal family, western missionaries, 
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Chinese businesses, or political groups. The history of more liberal and progressive 
NGOs started only four decades ago. By the late 1960s, liberal intellectuals led by Puey 
Ungpakorn initiated several projects and organisations promoting rural development 
including the Thai Rural Reconstruction Movement Foundation (munlanithi burana 
chonabot haeng prathet thai), the Graduate Volunteer Centre (samnak bandit asasamak), 
and the Meklong Integrated Rural Development Project (khrongkan phatana lumnam 
mae klong). In response to the 14th October incident, several academics, lawyers and 
activists also founded the Union for Civil Liberty (samakhom sitthi seriphap khong 
prachachon) (Benjamas and Surapol 2003, 13-27; Sanguan and Surapol 2001, 41-89; 
TDRI 2001, 4-6).  
 
After the 6th October 1976 massacre, while radicals ran into the jungle, liberal NGO 
workers and activists remained in Bangkok and proliferated especially in the early and 
mid 1980s. By the end of the 1970s, both the Thai and western governments shifted 
away from purely military strategies to rural development and poverty eradication 
approaches in dealing with the earlier spread of Communist movements. From 1975 on, 
Thailand also started receiving refugees from Indochina. As a result, huge amounts of 
financial and technical assistance from foreign governments and international NGOs 
flowed into Thailand (Simpkins 2003, 256-259; TDRI 2001, 5-6). Flow of money from 
foreign NGOs to Thailand rose sharply from around US$10 million during the 4th 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) Plan (1977-1981) to 
US$40-80 million in the 5th (1982-1986), 6th (1987-1991) and 7th (1992-1996) plans 
(Table 5.2: Financial aid received from foreign NGOs to Thailand between the 2nd and 
8th NESDB plans). In addition, in responding to new social and political issues, more 
diverse categories of NGOs addressing environmental issues, homosexuality, alternative 
energy and agriculture mushroomed. From the mid-1980s onward, the number of new 
local and international NGOs and their staff proliferated. During the mid 1970s, there 
were less than twenty NGOs. But the number rose to around 50 in 1980, 200 in 1997 
and 1,557 in 2001 (Simpkins 2003, 258-259 and 282). 
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Table 5.2: Financial aid from foreign NGOs to Thailand between the 2nd and 8th NESDB 
plan (US$) 
NESDB Plan Total Amount (US$) 
2 (1967-1971) 6,953,200 
3 (1972-1976) 11,157,600 
4 (1977-1981) 10,144,300 
5 (1982-1986) 44,282,000 
6 (1987-1991) 80,167,000 
7 (1992-1996) 81,737,300 
8 (1997-2001) 23,583,400 
Source: The Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation    
 
This expansion of the NGO sector became a refuge or retreat for many distressed 
Octobrists who had difficulty adjusting to either the private or public sectors upon their 
return from their failed revolutionary missions. From the mid-1980s onward, countless 
Octobrists were recruited into various NGOs. And many of them became prominent 
figures in those organisations.  
 
For example, Vanida Tantiwittayapitak and Watchari Paoluangthong, two former leftist 
student activists from Thammasat University, took jobs at the Foundation for Ecological 
Recovery (munlanithi fuenfu chiwit lae thammachat) after a long struggle in the private 
sector upon their return from the jungle. By the mid 1990s, both of them had become 
persistent NGO campaigners against mega development projects which exploited the 
environment and local people’s livelihoods. While Vanida worked with the Mun River 
Conservation Project as a locally based NGO to support villagers’ organisations, 
Watchari initiated Nuclear Watch – Alternative Energy Project for Sustainability (klum 
sueksa phalang ngan thanglueak phuea anakhot). Suwit Watnoo, a student leader of 
Bangsaen College of Education (now known as Burapha University), later became one 
of the most respected figures among NGO workers on slum issues. Somchai Homla-or, 
a law student from Thammasat University and one of the founding members of 
Thammasat University Dome (sapha na dome) indirectly organised by the CPT from the 
very beginning, turned into a leading human rights advocate after the collapse of the 
CPT. Usa Lertsrisanthat, a former leftist student, became the Director of the Foundation 
for Women, an organisation working on the issue of violence against women. Supa 
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Yaimuang, another Thammasat University student, became a leading figure 
campaigning for alternative agriculture and supporting the struggles of small farmers for 
community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems. Supa became currently a 
committee member of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (Thailand) and General 
Secretary of the Sustainable Agriculture Institute. 
 
The return of these Octobrists to the NGO sector was based largely on their 1970s assets 
of political commitment, knowledge and skills in working with grassroots and poor 
people in the 1970s, as well as their ability to adjust to non-leftist organisations. Most 
Octobrists who later pursued a career in the NGO sector shared a common background 
of having worked closely with grassroots people during the 1970s. And this training 
made them the few members of the middle class who had firsthand experience in 
working with grassroots marginalised people as well as conveying their problem issues 
and agendas to the public and the policy-making process. However, the decline of the 
CPT forced them to abandon grassroots movements. Thereafter, these Octobrists found 
that work with NGOs was more relevant to their activist nature and skills compared to 
the dissatisfaction of working in the private and public sectors. During the 1970s, there 
were ideological debates and fights between these NGOs and leftist activists. While 
radical activists perceived NGOs as reactionary, dominated by the US as an anti-
communist insurgency mechanism through its financial support, liberal NGOs and 
activists looked at these radicals as extremists (Benjamas and Surapol 2003, 13-27; 
Sanguan and Surapol 2001, 41-89; TDRI 2001, 4-6). Upon their return, the NGO sector 
offered them the only career with the financial resources, technical support and new 
social status to continue their unfulfilled missions.  
 
During the 1970s, Vanida Tantiwittayapitak actively worked with the HARA labour 
group in garment factories as an advisor during the negotiating process which led to the 
five-month long protest and successful seizure of the plant. After the 6th October 
incident, she fled to join the CPT in the jungle with her HARA worker friends in 
Songkhla Province. Even though the CPT declined, Vanida was not discouraged but 
still wanted to fight for disadvantaged people. Upon her return, after struggling in many 
low-paid jobs like tour guide, insurance salesperson and street vendor to sustain her 
studies and solve the debt problem of her family, she joined the Foundation for 
Ecological Recovery in 1990 as an environmental campaigner focusing on two local 
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communities threatened by large dams, Kaeng Suea Ten in Northern Thailand and Pak 
Mun in the Northeast (Vanida, interview by author, 12 January 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Suwit Watnoo played a leading role in mobilising more than a thousand students from 
his university to support the anti-military dictatorship movement in 1973, and was one 
of the major speakers on protest stages during the 14th October incident. Later, he 
worked especially closely with the Farmers Federation of Thailand and supported leftist 
student activities at the Phraram-hok Technology School where he was a lecturer. 
During the armed struggle with the CPT in Southern Thailand, he volunteered for 
frontline military duty and remained in the jungle until 1985. As he did not report to the 
government upon his return, it was hard to find a proper job. After nearly a decade in 
the jungle with rural people, adjusting to normal private life was very difficult. After 
trying several jobs including journalist, restaurant proprietor, and gardener, he decided 
to join a slum NGO where he continued to work until his death in March 2007. With the 
slum NGOs, Suwit had the chance to utilise his skills, knowledge and networks 
developed since the 1970s both in negotiation between slum networks and state and 
private sectors for structural change and advocating slum issues in the national agenda, 
as well as promoting slum movements and networks (Nitirat 2007). Somchai Homla-
or’s 1970s experience in providing support for leftist activists and victims of political 
violence laid the foundation for his return as a human rights advocate. After 14th 
October, he worked as lawyer for the Union for Civil Liberty and also helped the 
Socialist Party of Thailand (sangkhomniyom haeng prathet thai) in mobilising rural 
constituencies. During his time with the CPT, his main tasks were taking care of the 
families of those who joined the CPT in the jungle, and mobilising resources and 
expanding alliances in the city to support those in the jungle even until the very last 
minute of the party in 1985. In doing so, his cover was working as a lawyer at the Union 
for Civil Liberty while hiding his real underground work for the CPT. In addition, he 
was trained in human rights issues during a two-year period seeking refuge abroad, 
especially in the US, from political conflict with Prasong Sunsiri, a leading figure in the 
government, because of his public revelations of corruption by the Thai government 
with respect to Cambodian refugees. Upon his return, he actively advocated human 
rights issues through his work at the Union for Civil Liberty, and later the Law Society 
of Thailand and the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-
ASIA). This also helped him in economic terms. Alongside his activism, he and his 
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Octobrist friends also opened a law firm providing business and law consultation for 
many foreign companies who appreciated Somchai’s reputation as human rights lawyer 
(Somchai H., interview by author, 5 February 2007, Bangkok) 
 
Furthermore, networks of both 1970s non-left activists and other Octobrist friends who 
had earlier entered non-government organisations offered pivotal points of access for 
these Octobrists into the NGO sphere. For example, the very first few jobs in NGOs for 
Vanida Tantiwittayapitak came through her younger sister who had been a human rights 
activist against the CPT during the 1970s, in the Socially Engaged Religion Group 
(klum sasana phuea sangkhom) campaigning for peace and human rights, and another 
sister who worked at the Human Settlement Foundation, a slum-based NGO (Vanida, 
interview by author, 12 January 2007, Bangkok). Returning from the jungle, Suwit 
Watnoo was invited by Prateep Ungsongtham, a pioneer slum NGO worker who had 
always supported leftist student activists even before the 6th October incident, to work at 
the Duang Prateep Foundation, a slum NGO in Klong Toey, Bangkok and a hub for 
many Octobrists (Nitirat 2007). Watchari Paoluangthong took several part-time research 
jobs though her Octobrist connections: a health care research job from a leftist medical 
doctor who formerly helped her leftist activist boyfriend, a job at the advertising 
company of her leftist sister; and helping Vanida sell shirts to tourists in Phuket. In 
1990, she immediately accepted an invitation from Vanida to work as office manager at 
the Foundation for Ecological Recovery. Even in establishing Nuclear Watch - 
Alternative Energy Project for Sustainability, she gained advice and support from the 
monk Paisarn Wisalo, a former 1970s peace and non-violence student activist 
(Watchari, interview by author, 18 January 2007, Bangkok).  
 
In working with these organisations, which were less radical than earlier leftist 
organisations and the CPT, some Octobrists quickly accepted the new norms and 
adjusted accordingly. Others who tried to insist on a certain degree of radicalism had to 
go with the flow from time to time in sustaining their organisation. Ideologically, many 
Octobrists tried to challenge the predominance of localism and communitarianism39
                                               
39 Further details and debates of localism and communitarianism in Hewison 1999.  
 
over development NGOs. At the same time, they advocated a political economy 
approach as an alternative. Nevertheless, they did not succeed but ended up applying 
localism as an ideological instrument in pushing forward grassroots single-issue 
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movements (Vi, interview by author, 8 December 2006, Chiang Mai). In practice, both 
Vanida and Watchari disagreed with the position of the Foundation for Ecological 
Recovery (munlanithi fuenfu chiwit lae thammachat) in acting only in a supportive 
capacity without becoming too directly involved with the movement. They eventually 
left the Foundation for Ecological Recovery and set up the Mun River Conservation 
Project as a locally-based NGO to support villagers’ organisations (Missingham 2003, 
102-105). Suwit was also dissatisfied with the charitable approach and relief work of 
the Duangprathep Foundation. He thus moved to work with the Human Settlement 
Foundation Thailand, which was a more movement-based organisation. To convey the 
demands of the poor people with whom he worked to the policy level, he had to develop 
networks with elite and even royalist groups. For example, although he always insisted 
on not engaging with politicians and the elite, in order to obtain permission from the 
Crown Property Bureau Foundation to rent their land to slum dwellers, he had to 
develop connections with Anand Panyarachun to gain access to Chirayu Isarangkun Na 
Ayuthaya, Chairman of the Crown Property Bureau Foundation (Thai Post Editorial 
Team 2007).  
 
Octobrist intellectuals and academics  
 
Octobrists returned home from the armed struggle at the initial stage of the boom in 
graduate education. From 1916 until 1981, Thailand created only eleven registered 
universities. However, in response to the increase in demand for skilled labour from 
both the private sector and the new middle class, within only a decade more than 
thirteen new universities were established, and there were twenty-two more in the 
decade to 2001 and seventy-three in the decade to 2011. Moreover, the earlier 
generation universities extended their range of courses. By the early 1990s, Thammasat 
University started adding new faculties of science, technology and health science to 
those in the social sciences and humanities. By 2011, the Thammasat University had 
around 21 faculties and colleges. In parallel, Mahidol University, which originated as a 
health science university, gradually expanded. By the mid-1980s, it added several social 
science and humanities faculties. Subsequently, this raised the demand for intellectuals 
to work at these new universities. 
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Table 5.3: Number of public and private universities in Thailand in 1961, 1971, 1981, 
1991, 2001 and 2011   
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 
Total number of registered 
universities 
6 9 11 24 46 119 
Number of new Universities  6 3 2 13 22 73 
Source: Anderson 1977, 16-17; Hewison 1996, 144-145; Wikipedia/List of Higher 
Education Institutions in Thailand 2011 
 
Aside from the increase in their number, university lecturers became more influential 
and prominent. Independent research centres and think-tank NGOs remained very few. 
Investment in research and development in the private sector was limited. But the 
private sector’s need for research and technical support grew. Requests for policy and 
organisational consultation from the government and bureaucracy increased. Above all, 
the demand for critical political analysis and alternative political directions among the 
media and public expanded amidst political liberalisation. A huge number of research 
projects were offered to university lecturers. Academic opinion pieces and 
commentaries on political, social and economic issues were attractive to all media.  
 
Against this backdrop, many Octobrists reappeared both in universities and research 
institutes. In addition to dedicating themselves to teaching and research in their specific 
fields, many became influential popular intellectuals advocating political critiques and 
proposing alternative political directions to the public. However, by this time, they were 
no longer homogenous. Instead, they focused and campaigned on different specific 
issues and more divergent political stances and ideologies. Thirayuth Boonmee, one of 
the 14th October student activist icons, became an influential intellectual promoting 
reformist and conservative liberalist political reform during the last two decades. Jaran 
Dhitthapichai, one of the first few students to present himself in public as a leftist even 
before the 14th October incident, later became a prominent popular intellectual 
advocating human rights issues. Tanet Charoenmuang is another important example of 
an Octobrist who is now a well-known popular intellectual campaigning for political 
decentralisation and empowerment of local governance. Kasian Tejapira, a leftist 
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student activist during the 6th October incident was one of the most prominent popular 
intellectuals campaigning against political corruption and supporting the rise of Thai 
social movements in the 1990s. Anek Laothamatas, a former radical medical student 
activist and President of the Thammasat University Student Council in 1976 was Dean 
of the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University (1999-2000) and later at the 
Public Administration Institute at Rangsit University. Sangsidh Piriyarangsan, a leftist 
Thammasat University economics student activist, became a lecturer at the Faculty of 
Economics, Chulalongkorn University and Director of the Political Economy Centre. 
He was an important academic who conducted research on and persistently advocated 
campaigns against corruption, local mafias and black business. Somsak Jeamteerasakul, 
a radical 6th Octobrist known as ‘Big Head’ and one of nineteen students who was jailed 
after the 6th October incident, has been a lecturer at the Department of History, 
Thammasat University, and one of the most radical Thai historians especially on critical 
histories of the Thai left, and the monarchy. Somkiet Pongpaibul, a former activist from 
Srinakharinwirot University (formally Prasarnmit Teachers College), who worked 
closely with the Farmers Federation of Thailand during the 1970s both in town and in 
the jungle, became a lecturer at Nakhon Ratchasima Rajabhat University (formerly 
Nakhon Ratchasima Teachers College) and also an outspoken intellectual activist 
writing and campaigning in support of small-scale farmers and social movements 
throughout the 1990s. Thongchai Winichakul, first secretary general of the Student 
Centre of Thailand in 1974, is currently a world-class scholar and Professor of History 
at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. From the early 1990s until now he has long 
advocated intellectual campaigns to promote multi-culturalism and deconstruct Thai 
state-centric nationalism. Cholthicha Sutthinirandkul, a critical Chulalongkorn 
University lecturer who joined the armed struggle with the CPT at an early stage, is now 
a linguistics professor at Rangsit University. Tanet Apornsuwan, a former leading 
member of the Thammasat University Dome Assembly (Sapha Na Dome), was Dean of 
the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University. He has been an activist historian 
focusing on human rights issues and continued writing political articles for several 
political weekly newspapers in criticising governments and commenting on the political 
situation. Somchai Phatharathananunth, a former rank-and-file leftist student activist 
from Ramkhamhaeng University, was Dean at the College of Politics and Governance, 
Mahasarakham University and consistently produced research works on rural social 
movements and local politics. Sucheela Thanchainan was a leading Thammasat 
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University political scientist student activist in the socialist women’s movement before 
being jailed for several years after the 6th October massacre. After being released from 
jail she continued her life as an intellectual. She was once a lecturer at Thammasat 
University and is currently teaching at the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, 
Mahidol University. At the same time, she carried on working on women’s issues with 
several organisations including the Friends of Women Foundation, and the Asian Forum 
for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) (Sucheera 2003). 
 
The recruitment of a large number of Octobrists into the academic sector and as popular 
intellectuals was a result of their bright intellectual backgrounds, and political advocacy 
skills developed during their 1970s activism, and their desire to continue their 
intellectual journey. Very many Octobrists were bright young students in the 1970s. 
Upon their return, they were still the cream of the crop, and competed successfully with 
others in the same generation. Those who wished to continue their career in academia, 
were either quickly offered scholarships to continue their higher education abroad or 
successfully acquired university lectureships. 
 
Thirayuth Boonmee, Thongchai Winichakul and Somsak Jeamteerasakul had been 
rising stars since they were at Suankularb high school. Even Tanet Charoenmuang and 
Seksan Prasertkul, who had had upcountry backgrounds, were able to get American 
Field Service (AFS) scholarships for one-year exchange programmes to the USA. Most 
succeeded in entering the most competitive undergraduate programmes in prestige 
universities. In spite of a poor family background, Thirayuth Boonmee received national 
recognition in 1968 by getting the highest score in the science exam to enter the Faculty 
of Engineering at Chulalongkorn University (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 143). 
Thongchai and Somsak were outstanding history students at Thammasat University. 
Despite upcountry backgrounds, Anek, Tanet and Seksan competed in the university 
entrance exam to get places in the faculties of medicine and political science, 
Chulalongkorn University.  
 
180 
 
Furthermore, owing to their distinguished university academic performance, several 
were offered either lectureships or scholarships to continue graduate study right after 
graduation. For example, in early 1976, shortly after graduation, Tanet Charoenmuang 
was offered a lecturer position at Chiang Mai University and later a Thai government 
scholarship to continue to his PhD in Russian Studies at Georgetown University. After 
returning to Bangkok, Kasian Tejapira continued his studies at Thammasat University. 
Soon after graduation, he obtained a teaching job at Thammasat University and a 
scholarship to pursue his PhD at Cornell University. Tanet Apornsuwan obtained 
scholarships to continue his studies in history. And after obtaining his PhD from 
Binghamton University, USA, he returned to be a lecturer at Thammasat University. 
After that Sucheela continued her academic work at the International Institute of Social 
Studies, the Netherlands, and completed a PhD at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), UK. As for Cholthira Sattayawattana, despite being arrested shortly 
after returning to Bangkok and remaining in jail for several years owing to her leading 
position in the CPT, she soon was awarded a scholarship to continue her PhD in 
Anthropology at the Australian National University. She was also offered a lectureship 
at Rangsit University even before completing her PhD.  
 
The political skills developed during their 1970s political activism in advocating radical 
ideas and the demands of grassroots movements made these Octobrists unique as 
popular intellectuals. Thirayuth Boonmee is an outstanding case. His activities as the 4th 
secretary general of the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa 
haeng prathet thai) and a key person in many political campaigns since the 1970s 
including those against Japanese imports that had left Thailand with a heavy trade 
deficit, against the seniority system and corruption within Chulalongkorn University, 
for a democratic constitution and elections, made Thirayuth a skilful popular intellectual 
since the 1970s (Sri Burapha 2003, 30-35). After returning to Thailand in 1987, through 
his new position as researcher and lecturer at the Social Research Institute, 
Chulalongkorn University, and later at the Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Thammasat University, he actively conducted regular social and political polls, and 
arranged many public presentations of his political commentaries and proposals for 
government and society. These became a phenomenon, being famously called 
‘Thirayuth’s polls’ and ‘Thirayuth’s points’ and were always covered on the front page 
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of nearly every leading newspaper. Whatever he proposed was regularly claimed as a 
guideline for society. He himself was called a ‘social engineer’ by many media. Even 
though his academic freedom was regularly threatened by the government, by the mid 
1990s, he became one of the most prominent popular intellectuals (MS 1993b). 
 
In the same vein, during the 1970s, Kasian Tejapira spent most of his time at 
Thammasat University participating in political activities particularly with the 
Thammasat University Student Union. During his time with the CPT at revolutionary 
bases in Southern Isan, he wrote many articles and poems for the Thongchai (Victory 
Flag) newsletter. Upon his return, he went back to study at Thammasat University and 
worked part-time as journalist at the Setthakit Kanmueang (Politics and Economics) 
newspaper. With the hope of reviving people power and the radical movement, he 
started his popular intellectual project. Throughout the 1990s, he was one of the 
champions of ‘people’s democracy’ and a campaigner against corrupt elected 
politicians. In popularising these ideas, he produced countless newspaper articles and 
talks with the support of 1970s leftist and other non-leftist progressive journalists who 
still shared his political interests. Suchit Wongthet and Khanchai Boonpan, former 
radical journalists and the major shareholders in Matichon (Public Opinion) and 
Sinlapawattanatham (Culture and Art); Kamnoon Sidhisamarn, a former student 
activist who later became a leading member of the Phuchatkan (Manager), and other 
Octobrists in the editorial team of the Siam Post were all close to Kasian Tejapira since 
the 1970s. They respected Kasian’s critical works and always offered him space in their 
publications. Leading conventional publishing houses like Dok Ya, which belongs to an 
Octobrist, published collections of Kasian’s newspaper articles.  
 
Due to their disappointment with the decline of the CPT and its rigid Maoist 
approaches, many Octobrists were eager to search for alternative ideologies and 
political directions. Academic university positions offered them chances to explore new 
western and Thai leftist ideas, as well as earlier non-leftist roots including liberal, 
conservative and other ideological beliefs. Many Octobrists, even those with 
educational backgrounds in science, shifted into the social sciences. On these new 
intellectual journeys, they explored, redeveloped and advocated a wide range of new 
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ideas from the socialist end of the ideological spectrum to other non-leftist ideas 
including liberalism, and reformism.  
 
Kasian Tejapira’s case is interesting. He returned home from his revolutionary base in 
1983 profoundly disappointed and in conflict with leading CPT members. For him, the 
CPT dehumanised and de-intellectualised the Octobrist intellectuals, lacked internal 
democracy and any system of checks and balances, and emphasised only Maoism and 
Leninism. During the late 1980s, Kasian devoted his time to exploring and advocating 
other streams of Marxism and trying to go beyond the dominant liberal reformism 
(Kasian 1984a; Kasian 1984b). He was inspired by several non-left popular 
intellectuals. In his ‘Peace and Non-Violence’ class at Thammasat University, Kasian 
Tejapira said that Chaiwat Sata-anan was the person who helped him out of the vicious 
cycle of ‘class-historical materialism-violent revolution’ and introduced him to a 
‘humanism-subjectivism-non-violence’ strategy which was relevant to his disagreement 
with the CPT. He viewed these people as those who opened his eyes and guided him 
beyond leftist ideas. In several books in the 1990s, he always paid tribute to these 
people. He wrote, ‘for teacher Ben [Anderson], Chanwit [Kasetsiri], Chaiwat [Sata-
anan] and Nithi [Eawsriwong]: who changed my world view’ (Kasian 1994a, 228; 
Kasian 1999, 177-180).  
 
Similar to Kasian Tejapira, Thongchai explored diverse aspects of Marxism during his 
academic sojourn at University of Sydney (Thongchai 1983a, 82-85; Thongchai 1983b, 
54-60). Under the supervision o f Prof. Craig J. Reynolds, he was inspired to explore a 
wider range of ideas and literature beyond Marxism. Furthermore, through the PhD 
process, he became more interested in the politics of nationalism. His PhD thesis, later 
published as a book, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, was a 
breakthrough in Thai studies on the development of the Thai state and its nationalist 
project. Since then he has become a figurehead of the academic anti-nationalism 
campaign calling for political freedom and multi-culturalism.  
 
By contrast, to overcome his disappointment with the collapse of the CPT, Tanet 
Charoenmuang went back to his upcountry roots. By the end of the CPT, he still had not 
given up on it. While waiting for the revival of a Thai revolutionary party, he went to 
the US to complete his PhD at the University of Northern Illinois. However, after 
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returning to a lectureship at Chiang Mai University in his hometown, he turned his 
political interests into local governance and empowerment. He started conducting 
research and campaigns for political decentralisation including direct elections at the 
local authority level. Furthermore, he actively participated in and organised a local 
movement to campaign for environmental and historical protection in Chiang Mai 
Province. He argued that after twenty years outside of his hometown, he had just 
realised that the reason why people in peripheral areas were suppressed was political 
centralisation. Due to the lack of local intellectuals, he thought it was his duty to go 
back to advocate localism in strengthening local power and liberate these people from 
national structural suppression (Tanet, interview by author, 14 December 2006, Chiang 
Mai).  
 
In conclusion, by the end of the 1980s, the Octobrists had successfully exploited 
opportunities which gave rise to the new middle class. To do this, they utilised the 
privileged higher education, social and political skills, and extensive connections both 
within and across sectors which they had obtained and developed in the 1970s. And to 
reach the top of their careers, they readjusted to the new norms of these new social and 
economic institutions. They selectively dropped radical elements of their thinking and 
took in a wider range of non-leftist ideas and popular language. Nonetheless, they did 
not confine their success to their careers. These Octobrists revitalised and developed 
their political roles and participation in different political transitions throughout the 
1990s in parallel with the new middle class.  
 
 
5.2 Political participation of the Octobrist middle class in extra-parliamentary 
politics 
 
Over the past three decades, the newly established middle class among whom Octobrists 
loomed large grew not only in numbers and economic power but also in their political 
role and importance. After the earlier predominance of the bureaucratic and 
conservative elites in Thai politics, by the early 1990s, the middle class in various 
groups and sectors developed into a major political power, especially in extra-
parliamentary politics.  
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The public witnessed the first emergence of the middle class in the mass movement 
against the return of the military into parliamentary politics in 1992. After more than a 
decade of semi-democratic government, in 1988 Thailand had an elected government 
under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991). Nonetheless, in 1991, it was 
overthrown by a coup led by the National Peace Keeping Council, a group of senior 
military personnel making accusations of corruption and an attempt to destroy the 
military and monarchy institution. At the beginning, the middle class did not entirely 
oppose the coup. However, by the end of 1991, the National Peace Keeping Council 
revealed its intention to remain in power by pushing forward a constitution which 
allowed a non-elected Prime Minister. A mass democratic campaign then began. In May 
1992, the protest developed into a mass movement and ended as the biggest 
confrontation between the people and the authorities since 1976. Eventually on 20th 
May 1992, General Suchinda Kraprayoon (April-May 1992), a non-elected Prime 
Minister, announced his resignation.  
 
Even though there was some evidence that the middle class was neither the majority nor 
a genuine democratic force in the May 1992 movement (Connors 2002, 41; Giles 
2003a, 18; Somsak 1993; Yoshifumi 2004, 28; Ockey 1999, 244), various academics, 
including modernists and pluralists (Anek 1992; Anek 1996; Prudhisan 1992; Suchit 
1996), those in international relations (Chai-anan 1993: 42 -57) and even Marxists 
(Hewison 1997, 5–10; Hewison 2003; Giles 2003a, 19) came out to explain the reasons 
and impulses behind this rise of the middle class according to their approaches. The 
1992 protest was called a ‘middle-class’ revolt with the image of Bangkok and 
provincial middle-class protesters, with the Volvo or Mercedes Benz parked nearby and 
mobile phone in hand, challenging armed troops (Anek 1992; Girling 1996, 20; 
Sangsidh and Pasuk 1993). The roles of media and provincial business people were 
emphasised (LoGerfo 2000; Thitinan 1997). The opinion of the middle class was 
reported by the media as ‘legitimate opinion’ and ‘public opinion’ (Yoshifumi 2004, 2-4 
and 34).  
 
The political role of this new middle class did not end in the May 1992 democratic 
movement. Many members also played an active role in facilitating and supporting the 
rise of many social movements throughout the 1990s. From the mid-1990s onwards, 
there was a proliferation of vibrant radical social movements of marginal people in 
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Thailand in response to the negative impact of economic development on grassroots 
people (Bell 2003; Chantana 2004: 235; Hirsch 1997, 190-192 and 180; Praphat 1998, 
38-41; Sayamol, Atchara and Kritsada 2002, 263), the failures of the Thai state in 
dealing with new problems and articulating the people’s interests (Connors 2002: 214; 
Kanokrat 2003), the new capitalist crisis (Bell 2003) and above all political 
liberalisation and relaxation of political control (Chantana 2004, 234–235; Connors 
2002, 214). Initially, there was a rise of single-issue movements promoting 
environmental conservation, labour, the urban poor, small-scale farmers and fishermen, 
sustainable development, and opposition to state development projects (Hirsch 1997; 
Praphat and Anusorn 2002). Later, to enhance their negotiating power and mobilise 
resources, many of these issue-based movements developed into social movement 
networks. Some allied with similar movements, such as the regional and national 
networks of slum people and small-scale farmers. Others pulled themselves into a 
powerful ‘cross-sector network movements’ under the name of Assembly of the Poor 
(samacha khon chon - AOP) advocating the interests of the poor and underprivileged 
(Baker 2000; Missingham 2003; Praphat 1998; Rungrawee 2004).  
 
Against this backdrop, various middle class groups, especially NGO workers, 
intellectuals and journalists, provided support for these social movements from the very 
initial stage of their formation. They helped to organise, mobilise resources, lobby and 
network both within the movements themselves and with the middle class, intellectuals, 
media, and politicians. In the anti-Pak Mun dam movement, NGOs worked to provide 
sources of information and acted as a ‘secretariat of the movement’ in stimulating and 
strengthening the movement’s structure, network and agenda. Academics and the media 
conducted academic work to legitimise the demands of the movement and negotiate 
with government. They also advocated concepts of the ‘New Social Movement’ and 
other democratic ideas in promoting social movements including cross-class 
networking, identity/cultural politics, grassroots empowerment, participatory 
democracy, and alternative development discourse (Baker 2000; Kanokrat 2003; 
Missingham 2003; Nalinee, Sulaiporn and Siriporn 2002, 188; Naruemon 2002, 468; 
Pasuk 2002; Praphat 998; Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997; Rungrawee 2004; Sayamol, 
Atchara and Kritsada 2002). 
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In addition, many members of the middle class played prominent roles in the political 
reform process of the 1990s. Right after the 1991 coup and the 1992 democratic 
transition, there was certain degree of common agreement, at least among the liberal 
reformist elite and middle class, to push forward institutional reform to prevent any 
future return of undemocratic forces and to sustain Thai democratic development. In 
1994, public pressures successfully forced the Chuan Leekpai government to establish 
the ‘Democratic Development Committee (khanakamakan phathana prachathipatai)’. 
Furthermore, the constitution drafting process was designed to be and look deliberative. 
The 1997 Constitution was the first constitution to be drafted by a popularly-elected 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (sapha rang rathathamanun). It comprised seventy-six 
directly elected representatives from each of the provinces out of ninety-nine members. 
In addition, a nation-wide process of public consultations took place. On top of this, the 
mass ‘green flag’ campaign, led by a group of 1997 Constitutional drafters and the 
middle class in Bangkok, successfully pressured parliament to pass the 1997 
Constitution. Hence it was popularly heralded as a "People's Constitution". 
 
On the one hand, the reform was perceived as one of the most outstanding democratic 
efforts in Thai political history, as a response to the problems of money politics in the 
electoral system, the lack of ideological political parties and policy platforms, and the 
instability of coalition governments (McVey 2000, 4-12; Nakharin 1991; Ockey 2000, 
80-83; Ockey 2004, 22-55 and 80-100; Pasuk and Baker 2002, 31-50; Sombat 2000; 
Suchit 1996; Surin and McCargo 1997). On the other hand, many intellectuals argued 
that the so-called ‘People’s Constitution’ was the result of negotiation between the 
progressive/reformist, liberal and conservative elites, and the neo-liberal private 
(constitutionalist) bourgeoisie, sharing the common ground of opposing a strong state 
controlled by elected local politicians (Connors 1999; Connors 2002; Somchai 2002; 
Kanokrat 2003; Ockey 2004, 166-170; McCargo 1998, 5-9 and 26; McCargo 2002a, 4-5 
and 9-12). The majority of the middle class went along with this. Only a minority of the 
middle class supported a more radical agenda. Nonetheless, the non-elite power alliance 
eventually functioned only as the instrumental supporter of the elite reformist project 
without any real influential power (Connors 2002: 38-52; Streckfuss and Templeton 
2002).  
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In parallel with the rise of the middle class in extra-parliamentary politics, many 
Octobrists successfully revitalised their political role in these political transitions. There 
are four common points explaining why these Octobrists managed to return to politics 
and maintain their political significance in these new political movements. Firstly, the 
effort of the middle class in promoting different political movements opened up new 
windows of political opportunity for those who wished to advance their political role 
and encouraged those who still hid themselves from politics to return to political 
activism. Secondly, connections with leftist and non-leftist friends from the 1970s 
brought them back to politics. Their skills and experience developed since the 1970s 
also made them skilful political mobilisers and popular intellectuals for the movements. 
Thirdly, Octobrists successfully constructed and utilised the Octobrist identities. They 
rewrote the roles and the history of the 1970s from extreme leftist activists to consistent 
fighters for democracy. Their new identity as Octobrists also helped to legitimise their 
role in new movements. Finally, they made a decision to compromise with non-leftist 
ideas and interests in promoting and sustaining movements of the classic liberal 
bourgeoisie calling for the restoration of democracy (and constitutional reform) and the 
mass mobilisation of the rural and urban poor. 
 
Octobrists in the May 1992 people’s uprising  
 
Literature on the democratic transition during 1991-1992 acknowledge the activists of 
the 1970s as a crucial element in the people’s uprising in the 1992 mass protests (Anek 
1992; Bamber 1997, 240-242; Chantana 2004, 242-244; LoGerfo 2000, 221-252; 
Mukdawan 1992; Nuannoi 2002; Ockey 2004, 151-171; Pasuk 1997, 32-35; Thitinan 
1997, 216-232). While many leading Octobrists played prominent roles in the inner 
circle of organisers and their allies in strategising, facilitating and mobilising the 
movement, countless other Octobrists participated in the movement as ordinary 
protesters and supporters.  
 
Many Octobrists played crucial roles in both the Campaign for Popular Democracy 
(khana kamakan ronarong phuea prachathipatai - CPD) and the Confederation for 
Democracy (samaphan phuea prachathipatai – CFD), the two major mobilising 
organisations behind the May 1992 people’s movement (Callahan 1993, 114; Suthy 
1995, 121-122). Several joined the CPD at the initial stage in advocating democratic 
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issues and campaigning against the constitution and political parties supported by the 
National Peace Keeping Council (Callahan 1993, 103). Somchai Homla-or acted as 
General Secretary of the CPD . Vanida Tantiwittayapitak and Pairoj Polpetch were 
committee members representing their NGOs; Foundation for Ecological Recovery and 
Union for Civil Liberty. Amorn Amornratananon, former General Secretary of the 
Student Centre of Thailand in 1976 also joined the CPD. For the CFD, Weng 
Tojirakarn, a leftist medical student activist from Mahidol University, was one of its 
founding committee members and worked on the front lines of the movement (The 
Confederation for Democracy 1992, 48).  
 
Many other individual Octobrists supported the protest in the name of their new 
affiliations. Suwit Watnoo and Somkiet Pongpaibul mobilised hundreds of members 
from the ‘Slum Organisation for Democracy (ongkon slum phuea prachathipatai)’ and 
the ‘Teachers for Democracy Co-coordinating Committee (khana kamakan prasan ngan 
khru phuea prachathipatai)’. At the same time, many Octobrists who worked in the 
private sector established the ‘Democratic Businesspeople (chomrom nak thurakit phuea 
prachathipatai)’, a politically active business network in the 1992 May incident. Prasarn 
Maruekpitak acted as its chairperson. Pichien Amnatworapraserkul and Thida 
Tavornseth (Weng’s wife) were active Octobrist members in the network. Furthermore, 
Thirayuth Boonmee and Seksan Prasertkul were among many intellectuals who 
regularly provided consultation and ideas to the movement (Krittiya and Suporn 1997, 
38; Seksan 1993, 118). Thirayuth Boonmee, Tanet Apornsuwan, Apichai Puntasen were 
among 42 academics who submitted a petition to the King opposing all political parties 
changing the constitution in support of a non-elected Prime Minister.  
 
In addition, research and interviews show countless ordinary Octobrists joined the May 
movement. Yoshifumi (2004, 25-26) argued in his research that ‘the well-educated 
people who had engaged in social activities earnestly since the 14th October incident in 
1973’ were one of the major groups of people in the middle class movement in May 
1992.  According to statistics, 59% of participants in the May incident were above 30 
years old and 69% held a BA or higher. These attributes matched the qualifications of 
Octobrists. An eyewitness, Kriengkamol Laohapairoj, met more than 60-70 of those 
who once fought in the jungle and were part of the 14th October generation (TP 2003f).  
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In explaining this phenomenon, first of all, it is important to note the emerging role of 
the middle class encouraged many Octobrists, especially those in private sector, to 
return to politics. For instance, in her workplace, Vipa Daomanee generally hid her 
earlier leftist political background. At the beginning of May 1992, Vipa kept her eyes 
and ears on the political situation and gave moral support to the protesters. She did not 
dare to be the first to be active in politics. However, she became active and regularly 
participated in the protests with the encouragement of her middle class colleagues and 
the politically active ambience in her business on Silom Road, the centre of middle-
class protesters. At the peak of the protests, her liberal foreign boss gave the green light 
for all staff to join the demonstrations. From her office, Vipa disseminated a political 
fax shaming and denouncing the power of the government. However, the degree of 
participation still varied. Ped (pseudonym), who had just recovered from his financial 
difficulties and started a bakery, found that he was not ready to appear in the protests. 
Nevertheless, he regularly followed news from his former comrades who actively 
participated in the movement, and sent bakery products to support the movement. In the 
same vein, Vi (pseudonym) did not openly participate in the protests but helped in back 
stage support in producing posters and other political campaign materials in Chiang 
Mai. To a lesser extent, Porn-narong Pattanaboonpaiboon admitted that he did not want 
to risk his job as a doctor in a private hospital by participating in the May protests, even 
though he kept his eye on the political situation at all times and always sent moral 
support to the protesters. At that time, he thought that it would take him some time to 
collect money and when he was ready, he would return to politics (Ped, Porn-narong 
and Vipa, interview by author, 25 November 2006, 7 March 2007 and 28 January 2007, 
Bangkok; Vi, interview by author, 8 December 2006, Chiang Mai). 
 
In addition to this new political impulse, the 1970s networks, skills and social 
embeddedness provided a political foundation encouraging Octobrists to promote their 
political role. Social connections among Octobrist friends were important. Jariya 
Suanpan was encouraged by her Octobrist friends, particularly those from the same 
revolutionary base, to participate in the protests. Jariya said that there was a common 
agreement and organised network among her close 1970s friends to collect money and 
other supplies to support the movement (Jariya, interview by author, 24 February 2007, 
Bangkok). Pan luckily regularly joined the May protests with Octobrist colleagues from 
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her workplace, PLAN company, which was owned by a group of Octobrists (Pan, 
interview by author, 12 March 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Octobrists also used their 1970s skills and social embeddedness to support the 1992 
democratic movement. For instance, owing to his well-known role on protest stages 
since the 1970s, Suwit Watnoo knew how to mobilise people, take mass control and 
avoid violence and was thus asked to be the Master of Ceremonies and speaker on the 
stage in May (Nitirat 2007, 17-18 and 39-40; Salai 2003, 101). Kriengkamol 
Laohapairoj was another person invited to be a major speaker on the protest stage and 
strategist in mobilising mass support and protests (TP 2003f). In addition, a branch of 
Octobrist singers and artists formed the ‘Artists Confederationfor Democracy 
(samaphan sinlapin phuea prachathipatai)’ as a means to fight authoritarian government. 
Countless Octobrist writers and singers also produced new songs and writings to 
support the movement and condemning the violence used by the military (MS 1992). By 
the 15th of May, songs of four artists, including 2 Octobrists (Surachai Jantimatorn and 
Aed Carabao or Yoonyong Opakul), were banned from government radio stations. 
 
In parallel with their participation in the protests, Octobrists democratised their 1970s 
history and normalised their ‘Octobrist’ identity. At the same time, they turned this 
identity into an asset to revive their networks and political collaboration. They started to 
integrate the history of 14th and 6th October into May 1992 as part of a democratisation 
process. Tanet Apornsuwan, Octobrist historian at Thammasat University, is an 
example of those who spelled out these ideas.  
 
‘The origin and process of this [May 1992] incident and 14 October are partly 
similar. At the beginning, it seemed like a victory of the people and of the 
students. The government was changed according to the demand of the people. 
But on 14th October, the people’s movement perhaps did not maintain political 
power. Eventually, the power was taken back [by the state] ending in the 6th 
October bloodshed. … I think the demands of people during May 1992 were 
clearer than on 14th and 6th October. … people with the highest power must 
come from elections. … the recent uprising [the May 1992] was a continuation 
of the political will and proved that during the last 19 years Thai democracy 
has never been suspended’ 
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(Tanet 1992, 37) 
 
Jaran Dhitthapichai spoke at the October anniversary about the connection and 
similarity between 14th October and May 1992 (Jaran 1992, 6-9). Also in celebrating 
and commemorating the three incidents, Somchai Homla-or, the Secretary-General of 
the Campaign for Popular Democracy (khana kamakan ronarong phuea prachathipatai - 
CPD), in 1998, organised a political art exhibition and auction in memory of the three 
incidents. The exhibition by both Octobrists and other professional artists at a luxury 
hotel was called ‘Ratchadamnoen Memory’ as all the incidents took place on 
Ratchadamnoen Avenue (Callahan 1998, 146). Many buyers were former 1970s 
students who were then corporate executives and middle level government officials. 
Under the new Octobrist brand as 1970s democratic fighters, more and more Octobrists 
started to join the new political campaigns under the new common banner of Octobrists. 
The victory of May 1992 was the turning point which made the Octobrists start talking 
to each other. The military base and university network among Octobrists like the 
Southern Isan and the ‘Chula friends club (chomrom phuean chula)’ networks were 
reconnected shortly after May 1992 (Jariya and Pha, interview by author, 24 February 
2007 and 3 March 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Moreover, participating in the May incident, Octobrists came with competing and 
contradictory political stances and interests. In 1991, many Octobrists were part of 
business groups which initially welcomed and supported the military coup in 1991 
against the elected Chatichai Choonhavan government out of concern about its 
corruption. Only when they thought that for the military to remain in power would ruin 
economic prosperity, did they shift to support the anti-military movement (Ockey 2004, 
151-171). Their views on movement mobilising strategies were divided by the clash 
between the Campaign for Popular Democracy (khana kamakan ronarong phuea 
prachathipatai - CPD) and the Confederation for Democracy (samaphan phuea 
prachathipatai – CFD),over the leadership within the May movement (Callahan 1998, 
121-122; Krittiya and Suporn 1997, 29-31). Leading Octobrist figures in the CPD and 
other individuals like Kriengkamol Laohapairoj argued that the establishment of the 
CFD hijacked the protests away from the CPD, which had earlier been the leading 
organisations supporting the movement, and to the Chamlong Srimuang faction (TP 
2003f). Many gradually faded away from the movement due to disagreements over the 
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confrontational strategies led by Chamlong. Many Octobrist academics like Seksan 
Prasertkul and Thirayuth Boonmee argued from their 1970s experience that the 
movement should not continue overnight protests. The tension between exhausted and 
frustrated protesters and the authorities would lead to fierce confrontation (Krittiya and 
Suporn 1997, 38; Seksan 1993, 118). Kriengkamol disagreed with Chamlong’s hunger 
strike and persisted in temporarily suspending the protests during confrontations (TP 
2003f). By contrast, Weng Tojirakarn, one of the committee members in the CFD, 
persistently supported permanent protests by arguing that they did not think the 
authority would use guns on the protesters (The Confederation for Democracy 1992, 48; 
Krittiya and Suporn 1997, 39).  
  
Octobrists in the rise of social movement in the 1990s  
 
In analysing the proliferation of the 1990s Thai social movements, many writers have 
taken account of the role of Octobrists and their 1970s legacy (Hewison 2003, 144-145; 
Missingham 2003, 30; Phumtham 1986, 24-25; Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997, 199-201; 
Simpkins 2003, 255; Suthy 1995, 121-122; Giles 2003c, 291). Many works identified 
Octobrist journalists, senators, academics, and businesspeople who helped in mobilising 
support for the Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP)  (Hirsch and 
Lohmann 1989; Kanokrat 2003; Missingham 2003, 50-51, 91, 105, 131, 135, 148-152, 
162-165; Praphat 1998; Rungrawee 2004, 552; Somchai 2006, 60-63).  
 
After initial failing to promote a radical agenda in their own organisations, many 
Octobrist NGO workers shifted to work directly with people and communities directly 
affected by development problems. They taught grassroots people to link their problems 
to political and economic structures. And in responding to these problems, they asserted 
the idea of both dealing with problems at the policy level and mobilising power in 
collective action in communicating with the public and putting pressure on the state 
authorities. For instance, after leaving a philanthropic slum organisation, Suwit Watnoo 
expanded the work on slums to other urban poor groups and became the key person 
promoting the Four Region Slum Network (khrueakhai slum si phak). Furthermore, he 
turned the slum networks into major supporters of the AOP. Beside the slum movement, 
Suwit played a crucial role as NGO adviser in many other movements including the 
Khor Jor Kor protests, small scale farmer movements, and many other movements 
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against state development projects (Nitirat 2007, 15 and 37-39). Vanida 
Tantiwittayapitak also left the Foundation for Ecological Recovery in 1988 as it had 
refused to support her political mobilisation work. Since then, Vanida devoted her life 
to work with the anti-Pak Mun dam movement. She not only turned this movement into 
one of the strongest and most persistent anti-dam movements in Thailand, but she also 
worked with other anti-dam groups and promoted an anti-dam network which later 
became a core network in the formation of the AOP (Vanida and Watchari, interview by 
author, 12 January 2007 and 18 January 2007, Bangkok).  
 
Also, many Octobrist intellectuals helped social movements especially during the peak 
of the AOP in strategising their political actions, legitimising their moves through their 
academic works and petitions, as well as connecting the movement with other non-left 
progressive academics. Seksan Prasertkul, Kasian Tejapira, Thongchai Winichakul, 
Nuannoi Treerat, and Sucheera Thanchaina, came out to sign petitions to support 
various campaigns initiated by the AOP and their Octobrist NGO friends including 
campaigns against the Thai-Malay gas pipeline, and the Bo Nok and Hin Krut power 
plant projects. In Thirayuth’s public talk ‘The Fight of the Poor: Guiding Values for 
Thai Society’, he argued that the 18-month protest of the AOP set up new strategies for 
movements of the poor in Thailand (MR 27 August 2001, 2). Somkiet Pongpaibul wrote 
countless articles in support of the AOP and small scale farmer movements. At the same 
time, some, like Sangsidh Piriyarangsan (1998) tried to mainstream progressive 
development work in Thai state mechanisms like the Ministry of Interior on local 
community projects. Moreover, many Octobrist artists, singers and journalists helped to 
popularise and communicate the issues of the social movement with the public and 
government. Phongthep Kradonchamnan organised concerts in connection with 
environmental and anti-deforestation issues. Owing to a long-term friendship with 
Vanida, Tue, Ti Kammachon and many other Octobrist singers in the ‘Kamlangjai 
(Enthusiasm)’ band composed many songs and an album called ‘Fish Ladder (bandai 
pla jon)’ dedicated to the anti-Pak Mun dam movement. Many Octobrists in the 
business sector also tried to support and legitimise the AOP. The Social Venture 
Network, which was led by many Octobrist businessmen like Prasarn Maruekpitak, 
gave awards for people working for society and the environment. In 1999, three out of 
four awardees were their former Octobrist friends: Vanida Tantiwittayapitak, Jaran 
Dhitthapichai, and Khamron Kunadilok. 
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In addition, the Octobrists’ promotion of social movements was grounded in their 1970s 
networks. Much of their work was to help their former urban poor, farmer and ethnic 
minority comrades. They were alienated from both local communities and the Thai state 
as former communists. Many became landless and powerless farmers and poor people. 
Others were affected by government development policies and projects. Various 
networks of Octobrists and 1970s non-left progressive people in NGOs, politicians, and 
academic activists were significant both in publicly campaigning for them as well as in 
penetrating government policy-making processes. These networks became a part of the 
new loose network structure and cross-sector alliances, especially in the case of the 
AOP.  
 
In addition to the 1970s legacy and new status, the newly constructed ‘Octobrist: 
democratic fighter’ frame helped to legitimise their role and the activities of their 
movements. They cleverly combined the Octobrist identity and the rise of the AOP in 
re-writing the history of people politics in Thailand. Thirayuth Boonmee pointed out 
that the rise of movements of the poor and the alliances with NGOs and other 
progressive civil society organisations s were a later stage of democratic development 
after 14th October, 6th October and May 1992. Thirayuth and a network of 30 
democratic organisations also compared the Chuan Leekpai government with the 
corrupt military dictatorships of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Jarusathien during the 
1970s. This was because of its suppression of social movements which promoted 
democracy initiated by the 14th Octobrists (BP 1993; KT 1999c; MR 1993b; MR 2001c). 
Many other media echoed the same message. Matichon Raiwan  (Public Opinion Daily) 
compared the role of Sulak Sivarak in obstructing construction of the Thai-Burma gas 
pipeline with that of Thirayuth Boonmee before 14th October 1976 when he called for 
elections and a democratic constitution as both were illegal civil actions fighting against 
injustice and state power (MR 1998). In return, Octobrists highlighted the issues of new 
social movements, and people’s democracy in the 14th and 6th October commemoration 
ceremonies. On the 30th anniversary of 6th October, a whole series of commemorative 
seminars and events were overshadowed by talks about ‘people’s political reform’, and 
‘non-violent conflict resolution in Thai society’. Furthermore, the 6th October Relatives 
Fund committee presented the ‘Rangwan Khom Tula (Sharp October Prize)’ award to 
Charoen Wat-aksorn, leader of the protests against the Bo Nok and Hin Krut power 
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plant projects, who had been recently assassinated. They explained that the award was 
to show the gratitude of the Octobrists toward those who shared the same values as 
people who fought for social justice during the 1970s.  
 
In terms of ideology, the Octobrist NGO workers, intellectuals and social activists did 
not advocate radical and leftist ideas in mobilising movements. They no longer 
highlighted the ideas of a class-based movement, communist network or Leftist 
movement. Instead, in legitimising the movement and mobilising support both within 
and outside the movement, they moved to four other major non-left political concepts: 
notions of ‘direct’, ‘participatory’ and ‘grassroots’ democracy to legitimise non-state 
actors in the political process (Naruemon and Jaran 2002, 495); a ‘New Social 
Movement’ and its element of cross-class networking strategies, identity/cultural 
politics, and single-issue campaigns (Baker 2000; Missingham 2003; Nalinee, Sulaiporn 
and Siriporn 2002, 188; Naruemon 2002, 468; Pasuk 2002, 25; Praphat 1998; Prudhisan 
and Maneerat 1997; Rungrawee 2004; Sayamol, Atchara and Kritsada 2002); a new 
approach of seizing ‘the state’ without revolution but through reformation (McCargo 
2002a, 4-5); and liberal concepts including neo-liberalism, nationalist localism, 
communitarianism, moderate civil society and the humanist left, post-modernism, 
anarchism and autonomism (Connors 2002, 231-233; Hewison 2002, 144–145).  
 
Octobrists in the 1990s political reform 
 
As the political reform movement grew, many Octobrist academics, NGO workers and 
businesspeople came out to press for government ratification and public acceptance of 
the 1997 constitution drafted by the Constitution Drafting Assembly. Countless leading 
Octobrist popular intellectuals became pioneers in mobilising political resources and 
asserting new political ideas in the process of reform. From the middle of 1994 
Thirayuth Boonmee was a pioneer in urging cross-sector collaboration and organising 
petitions among academics in support of political reform (Connors 2002; Thirayuth 
2007, 87-92). Many other ordinary Octobrists spent much time and energy on street 
campaigns and advocacy at the grassroots level. Ped said that he helped to distribute 
pro-1997 constitution banners at Chatuchak, the biggest weekend market in Bangkok 
(Ped, interview by author, 25 November 2006, Bangkok). Vi also worked with many 
Octobrist campaign leaders in Chiang Mai and campaigned for the 1997 constitution in 
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rural areas of Chiang Mai (Vi, interview by author, 8 December 2006, Chiang Mai). At 
the same time, several other Octobrists applied to be members of the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly. Even though many of them knew that they may not have any 
chance to win election, they were there to vote for candidates they supported. Those in 
civil society organisations like the Women’s Constitution Network (khrueakhai phuying 
rathathamanun), the Campaign for Popular Democracy (khana kamakan ronarong phuea 
prachathipatai  - CPD), the Anti-Corruption Network, the Rural Doctors Association 
and 30 NGOs working on health issues and business groups worked together in 
promoting the Independent Mechanisms in the constitution (Naruemon and Jaran 2002, 
492). In social movements, many leading Octobrist NGO workers played leading roles 
in facilitating Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) participation in 
constitution drafting and consultation through organised ‘Political Schools’ 
(Missingham 2003, 159-162). In parallel, many also worked to advocate the agendas 
and demands of the organisations they were affiliated with. For example, Ticha Na 
Nakorn, Anjana Suvarnanonda and Octobrists working on feminist issues worked hard 
in advocating equal rights in the draft constitution for men and women as well as the 
rights of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered (Sirilak 2007).  
 
In participating in the reform movement, success in exploiting their new Octobrist 
identity and adopting new non-leftist ideas in promoting their work were crucial factors 
for the success of Octobrists in the movement. They successfully connected their 1970s 
history and political reform as a path of democratisation. By this time, the term 
‘Octobrist’ became established among the Thai public. In participating in the 
movement, these former activists always referred to themselves as ‘Octobrist’. For 
instance, Thirayuth Boonmee always mentioned his 14th October success in promoting 
political reforms. In his writing to promote political reform, he portrayed the 
development of Thai democracy through comparative studies of democratisation after 
1932, 14th October, May 1992 and the 1997 political reform (Table 5.4: the three phases 
of democracy).  
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Table 5.4: the three phases of democracy 
Phases of 
democracy 
Problem and goal Change agent Method 
 
1. 1932 
 
To change political 
regime from absolute 
monarchy to 
democracy 
 
 
Civil servants and 
military 
 
Coup d’état 
 
2. 14 October 
1973 
 
To overthrow 
military authoritarian 
regime and establish 
democracy, 
parliament and 
elections  
 
 
Student activists, 
intellectuals and 
grassroots mass 
 
Protest 
 
3. Political 
reform: May 
1992 until 
present 
 
To reform and 
modernise political 
system, eradicate 
corruption, money 
politics, and enhance 
discipline and ethics 
among politicians  
 
Intellectuals, 
students, middle 
class, military and 
senate 
 
1.Revision of 
constitution based on 
constitutionalism  
2. Promoting new 
political ideas in a 
cognitivist approach 
3.Empowering civic 
movements or 
populism  
 
   Source:  Thirayuth 1996a 
 
 
Many Octobrists played an active role in advocating new political ideas. Nevertheless, 
their opinions on reform and process were divided. The most dominant and powerful 
Octobrists in the reform process were those intellectuals who actively advocated an 
‘elitist perspective – ideal of electoral democracy’ and collaborated with the liberal 
reformist elite in pushing forward reform nationalism. Others perceived the reform 
process as a means of asserting radical ideas for the benefit of the lower class. 
 
At the onset of the reform, Anek Laothamatas, Octobrist Thammasat University 
lecturer, set out his analysis and reform proposals through his powerful article, ‘A Tale 
of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand’ 
(1993 and 1996). From his observations of Thai electoral politics until May 1992, he 
argued that Thai society and politics were divided into two. The majority of uneducated 
rural constituencies dominated power in choosing and forming governments. They 
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tended to choose corrupt politicians who responded to their short term benefits. 
Meanwhile, an educated urban middle-class minority played a crucial role in 
overthrowing corrupt governments chosen by the majority rural class. They were more 
concerned with transparent and effective government. As a result, reform was required 
in replacing representative and electoral politics with participatory democracy which 
offered new access and power for the educated middle-class minority, as well as 
encouraging the uneducated rural poor to be more concerned with long-term policy 
(Anek 1993a; Anek 1995; Anek 1996). His analysis met a quick response from 
reformist academic and liberal elitists on how to reduce the power of the majority poor 
and to increase the power of the educated middle class. 
 
At a later stage of reform, Thirayuth Boonmee supported Anek’s argument. He pointed 
out that Thai politics was dominated by the major capitalist groups and their vote-
buying and patron-client relationships with their rural constituencies (MR 1997c). These 
capitalist politicians promoted liberal economic policies which caused difficulties at all 
economic levels and were inefficient in solving the economic crisis in 1997 (TR 1 
August 1997, 1, 17 and 23). In responding to these problems, Thirayuth was the first 
person to incorporate the term ‘good governance’ in political reform which earlier had 
been used in the private sector in achieving economic reform (MR 1997b; Thirayuth 
2002). He insisted that Thai society needed a ‘democracy of checks and balances’ to 
monitor corrupt representative democracy as well as promote social movements to 
establish the minimal state in society (Thirayuth 1997a; Thirayuth 1997b). To be more 
concrete, he urged the public to support the 1997 constitution as the most democratic to 
date due to its deliberative drafting process (KS 1997; MR 1997a). Above all, it 
contained the new electoral system of one-MP-per-constituency and a party list system 
by which the educated people in urban areas could choose politicians who have the least 
corruption problem and offered a way for technocrats and educated people who did not 
want to run in elections to win cabinet seats (Thirayuth 1996a; Thirayuth 1996b). 
 
Other Octobrist NGO workers and academics proposed more radical demands. 
Nonetheless, they were sidelined. Their efforts helped to support a liberal reformist 
agenda rather than radical change. They were sceptical of the 1997 liberal elitist and 
reformist constitution from the beginning. However, they expected to use this 
opportunity to insert the issues on their agenda such as promoting progressive 
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capitalism, sharing and limiting state power at the structural level, and creating a 
concrete bridge between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary politics through a 
reformist constitution. They thus pushed their organisations and networks to participate 
in the consultation process in the drafting of the constitution, to support the campaign to 
pass the constitution and later to follow up its implementation. For example, Vanida 
Tantiwittayapitak argued that the 1997 constitution was a liberal capitalist constitution 
which was humanist and at least functioned as a political tool for those who were 
powerless to fight for their rights and balance the power of the state (Vanida 2004). 
Nevertheless, in the process, they had to compromise with liberal reformists. In spite of 
their efforts to assert their agenda, the whole drafting process ended up dominated by a 
handful of reformists, constitutionalists and liberal royalists (Connors 2002, 46). Many 
of their proposals were turned down (Connors 2002, 336-337; Naruemon 1998). 
Although they were not satisfied with the overall process and the outcome of the 
constitution, they continued to follow up implementation of the reformist constitution, 
because several articles and mechanisms within the constitution looked promising for 
their future work. After the passing of the 1997 constitution, Octobrist NGOs and their 
movements paid more attention to implementing the new constitution in the activities of 
their movements. However, they faced many difficulties in making use of this 
constitution as a means of promoting political participation for social movements. The 
Octobrist NGOs also indirectly supported people in the movement as candidates in new 
mechanisms created by new constitution, in the parliamentary system and in local 
politics. They tried to lobby for and support people from their side to run for election as 
senators, commissioners in the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and 
members of several governmental special advisory committees. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
With the rise of the middle class and their increasing economic and political power, 
many Octobrists recovered. Initially, they developed as successful educated white-collar 
businesspeople and professionals in various sectors. Later, these Octobrists went 
beyond their careers. They became politically active in various key developments in 
Thai democracy outside the realm of parliamentary politics, most notably the 1991-92 
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mobilisation for the restoration of democracy, the new social movements and protests of 
the decade, and constitutional reform in 1997. 
 
There were several assets, advantages, opportunities and impulses which forced the 
Octobrist middle-class who had hidden themselves from politics after their failure with 
the CPT. Firstly, changes in demography and career made the educated 1970s activists 
part of the 1990s middle class. Subsequently, the economic boom of the late 1980s, 
which helped the rise of the middle class, also benefitted the Octobrists. The expansion 
of the private sector offered the Octobrists prosperity in business, entertainment, media, 
and academic careers. The increase in funding for social and rural development projects 
provided many Octobrists promising positions in various NGOs. Above all, the 
participation of more and more members of the middle class in extra-parliamentary 
politics including the 1992 May people’s uprising, the rise of social movements and the 
drafting of the 1997 people’s constitution, encouraged the Octobrist to revitalise their 
political activism.  
 
Secondly, the set of skills and experience obtained during their political activities in the 
1970s made these Octobrists uniquely qualified for various competitive careers. 
Contacts and linkages developed since the 1970s with both leftist and non-leftist groups 
were valuable for the Octobrists, especially at the initial stage of entering new jobs and 
organisations. Thirdly, participating in various democratic and grassroots movements 
helped in building up their new identity and rewriting the history of their 1970s leftist 
activities as Octobrist democratic warriors. Also, when the Octobrist identity was 
established, it later helped in legitimising the role of the Octobrists in new political 
activities and movements.  
 
Lastly, in promoting and mobilising resources for the movement, many Octobrists opted 
for liberal reformist and other non-leftist ideas including new social movements and 
localism. Although, initially, many of them insisted on advocating radicalism in their 
works, in order to sustain and obtain legitimacy or their political activities, they had to 
integrate more compromising positions. In this process, different Octobrists pursued 
different directions and ideas according to their new affiliations. Therefore, in spite of 
wrapping themselves in the loose identity of ‘Octobrists’, they were highly diverse and 
pulled in different directions. These differences would only deepen in the years to come.   
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Chapter 6 
 
The Octobrists and the Rise of the TRT government 
 
  
By the end of the 1990s, the Octobrists had already recovered from the failures of the 
1970s and established themselves as successful members of the middle class. They 
occupied prominent roles in both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. These 
people were no longer perceived as extreme leftists. Instead, their radical reputation was 
normalised as that of ‘Octobrists’ - innocent student activists fighting for democracy 
and social justice during the historic episode of 14th October 1973 and 6th October 1976. 
Their political participation during the democratic transition throughout the 1990s was 
viewed as the return of the democratic fighters of the 1970s. On top of this, many 
Octobrists reached the peak of their political power during the rise of the Thaksin 
Shinawatra government during the first half of the 2000s. In mobilising all kinds of 
political strategies and human resources in constructing the Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak 
Thai – TRT), formulating policies and winning the election, Thaksin recruited countless 
Octobrist politicians, campaigners, NGO workers and other professionals alongside 
other non-progressive forces. The victory of the TRT Party in January 2001 owed much 
to the contribution of Octobrists from various sectors. Youthful Octobrist politicians 
were placed in the party to build up its progressive image and to balance the old-style 
‘mafia’ politicians. Veteran Octobrist NGO workers and intellectuals played prominent 
roles in formulating pro-poor policies. Octobrist political campaigners and spin doctors 
were trusted to deal with election strategies and communications in connecting the party 
with different classes and groups of voters. During the first term of the TRT 
government, many Octobrists reached the peaks of their political careers. Many were 
granted top positions in the party, the government and the cabinet. ‘People-oriented’ 
policies influenced by many Octobrists were implemented. Furthermore, Octobrist 
outsiders were sympathetic to the TRT, owing to their trust in the party’s leadership and 
their friendship with Octobrist insiders. Therefore, many worked in support of the TRT. 
Nevertheless, the Octobrists were a loose faction in the TRT. They joined the TRT with 
different expectations, proposals and points of entry. Some became permanent 
protectors of Thaksin. Others appeared to become increasingly marginalised as 
Thaksin’s rule continued. 
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The rise to prominence and power of the Octobrists under the TRT government was the 
result of their success in exploiting the new opportunities accompanying the rise of the 
TRT government and its initially inclusive form of politics and policy. In building up a 
modern policy platform party and a professional political campaign, as well as 
successfully exercising conventional coalition and machine politics, Thaksin demanded 
a wide range of potential politicians, spin doctors, and campaigners. Their recently 
developed reputations as youthful politicians and professional campaigners made them 
attractive for Thaksin and the TRT. The direct connection with Thaksin and their friends 
in the party gave Octobrists close and easy access to the TRT. Above all, in reaching 
and maintaining their top positions in the government, they followed a moderate line 
rather than pushing in too radical a direction.  
 
 
6.1 The rise of the TRT Party and the Thaksin government 
 
The landslide victory of the TRT Party and Prime Minister Thaksin in January 2001 
changed the Thai political landscape. Aside from winning an almost absolute majority 
of seats in the House of Representatives, the government aggressively centralised state 
power in many respects. It was able to control and balance power among different 
political cliques and parties, as well as reform state structures and functions according to 
the demands of the party. In addition, it managed to reduce the power of political 
brokers by linking grassroots constituencies directly to the party through its populist 
policy platforms. Subsequently, it was the first elected government which was able to 
maintain power until the end of its 4-year term. And above all, in spite of dissatisfaction 
among various elite, middle-class and civil society groups, the TRT Party still 
overwhelmingly won the election in early 2005 and went into a second term (McCargo 
and Ukrist 2005, 7-10; Pasuk and Baker 2004).  
 
The first condition which set the stage for the rise of Thaksin and the TRT Party in a 
way which no earlier political parties or politicians had ever achieved was a result of the 
1997 constitutional reform. While throughout the 1990s, Thai politics had been 
governed by unstable governments with fractious coalitions of several small parties 
(Connors 1999; Hicken 2001; Klein 1998; McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 215; Pasuk and 
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Baker 2004, 94; Rangsan 2003), the 1997 constitution aimed to create more stable 
government and enabled the TRT to control its politicians and coalition partners. On the 
one hand, it gave an unprecedented boost to the power of the executive branch and 
made parliament very much subordinated to the executive power of the Prime 
Minister’s office. For instance, no-confidence motions were made more difficult with 
the requirement of two-fifths of the lower house to demand a no-confidence vote on the 
Prime Minister and twenty percent for other ministers (Office of the Council of State 
1997; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 94-95). The constitution was also designed to make the 
position of political cliques and small parties virtually untenable with political power 
concentrated among a limited number of larger parties. For example, the election law 
which required MPs to switch parties at least 90 days before an election and constrained 
party swapping during the term of a government made most MPs vulnerable to conflict 
with party leaders. Otherwise, they could be frozen out of an election. Only those 
parties securing more than five percent of the popular vote were entitled to any party 
lists seats. Therefore, senior figures running on the party list of small parties found 
themselves without seats. Small and medium-sized parties became ‘subsidiaries’ of the 
TRT. Eventually, the party absorbed the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai) and 
by March 2002 Thaksin presided over a grand coalition with Thai Nation Party (Chart 
Thai) and National Development Party (Chart Pattana), opposed only by the Democrat 
Party (Prachathipat) (Baker 2005; McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 1-18, 80 and 215).  
 
Secondly, Thaksin was a new choice for both the middle class and the poor in the 
context of disillusionment and boredom with earlier politicians (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 
66). This was a result of his reputation as a new generation politician with a successful 
but humble business background. Despite his wealthy family background in Chiang Mai 
Province, Thaksin successfully and deliberately constructed his life story as a legend of 
an ordinary man from a modest family who experienced the hardship of rural poverty. 
His recent success as an ordinary Chinese member of the middle class who climbed up 
the social and business ladder also made him an idol of the newly emerging middle 
class (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 25-26 and 34). Moreover, his wealth convinced people 
that he would not be involved in petty corruption like other politicians. His claim that it 
was time for a rich person like him to pay back to the country became a favourable 
image. Above all, his reputation as the embodiment of a new generation of businessman 
in the modern world convinced the public that he would run Thailand according to 
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business principles or in a CEO (Chief Executive Officer) style. He would be quicker, 
more decisive and more effective than the bureaucratic and corrupt administrations of 
earlier governments (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 5, 17, 108-110 and 219).  
 
The third factor lay in Thaksin’s outstanding public policies, a professional election 
campaign, and a modern political marketing strategy, or what Pasuk and Baker term the 
‘New Politics’ (2004, 83-84). The TRT Party and Thaksin were seen as the first serious 
‘electoral professional party’ and a Thai politician committed to manifesto-based 
politics. The campaigning and marketing team successfully branded the party as a 
‘policy-based party’ with the slogan of ‘think new, act new’ during the 2001 election. 
And in responding to the interests and problems of various constituencies, which the 
previous government had failed or refused to do, research and public policy units were 
vigorously constructed. The party integrated a wide range of people into the policy 
formulation process, including grassroots movement leaders, progressive academics, 
and NGO activists, with ideas ranging from left to right wing, and liberal to anti-neo-
liberal. Subsequently, on the one hand, the TRT Party actively promoted pro-poor 
rhetoric, policies and projects including the 30-baht medical services scheme, SME 
(Small and Medium Enterprise) funds, a one million baht loan fund for each village, the 
‘one tambon (sub-district), one product’ (OTOP) project, and a ‘people’s bank’. On the 
other hand, it also covertly promoted many other elitist economic and political policies 
to win big business support. It gave the green light to economic monopolisation, and 
political centralisation (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 18, 78, 91-92, 100-102, 184-188 and 
217-218; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 69-82; Pasuk and Baker 2008, 64 and 66-70). The 
nationalist protectionist rhetoric of the TRT won the hearts of leading big businessmen 
(Glassman 2004, 40). Through these policy platforms, the TRT managed to build direct 
connections with grassroots and other extra-parliamentary forces. Unlike earlier parties 
which employed only individual MPs and old-style canvasser networks, its policies 
functioned as a shortcut to the constituencies, bypassing traditional patronage politics. 
(Nelson 2002, 290-291). Furthermore, both public and private media were successfully 
used in communicating with the population at large (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 64-65).  
 
The fourth factor was a complex mixture of old and new politics. The TRT employed 
old-fashioned coalition and money politics in parallel with a new-style political strategy 
(Pasuk and Baker 2004, 82-83 and 88; Somchai 2008). In entering politics, Thaksin 
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followed in the footsteps of other businesspeople. He began by providing financial 
support to leading political parties in exchange for benefits related to his 
telecommunications business. Through extensive bureaucratic and political connections, 
Thaksin was one of the very few businessmen to survive the 1997 economic crisis while 
many other tycoons lost. In joining electoral politics, Thaksin decided to go to the 
Moral Force Party (Palang Dharma) owing to its reputation as free from corruption. 
However, he quickly abandoned the party owing to its failure in the election, and a 
series of internal conflicts and constraints on small and medium parties as a result of 
political reform (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 30-63; Worrawoot 2005). In inaugurating 
his own party, the TRT Party, Thaksin wisely used his financial wealth and cabinet 
quota to attack and control other political cliques, smaller political parties and political 
canvassers (BP 2000; Somchai 2008, 108). Subsequently, the TRT was criticised as the 
‘sucking’ and ‘vacuuming’ party (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 80-83; Pasuk and Baker 
2004, 95 and 192). In spite of its initial plan to field 75 percent ‘new face’ politicians, in 
practice, the younger generation MPs came from close patronage or family relationships 
with old-style corrupt politicians. In sustaining its power, the TRT developed a grand 
coalition strategy and controlled over 300 seats of small political factions through 
‘divide and rule’ tactics (Ockey 2003, 663-680). Crucial positions in the cabinet were 
concentrated among old politicians. In parallel with its professional marketing and 
political campaign, the TRT Party continued traditional methods of electioneering, 
including vote-buying, electoral manipulation in connection with government officials, 
mobilisation of traditional patronage networks and straightforward violence and 
intimidation (Kengkij 2006, 95-96; McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 81 and 99-100). Through 
these conventional means, in 2005, the TRT managed to win re-election and form the 
first elected single-party government.  
 
The fifth factor was the TRT’s success in centralising state power and enhancing the 
efficiency of the state apparatus. The TRT Party was aware of the inefficiency of the 
bureaucratic system as an obstacle to effective policy implementation. In tackling this 
problem, the party chose strong measures of structural change. It promoted bureaucratic 
reform by reducing the power of previous bureaucratic functions and enhancing the 
power of those directly controlled by the government. In October 2002, the party re-
organised governmental departments and divisions in setting up more effective and 
short-cut state mechanisms on implementation of its populist policies. For instance, 
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Thaksin expanded the scale of the national lottery to increase revenue to support its 
increased spending. He also managed to consolidate a remarkable and extensive 
network of power among the military and police force through his kinship, marriage and 
class network (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 121-157 and 213-233; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 
176-188). 
 
The sixth reason why the TRT gained the momentum of victory was the failure of Thai 
civil society and social movements in party politics. In fighting against the state and 
asserting their demands, most civil society organisations and social movements 
persisted with protest and lobbying strategies instead of shifting to promote an 
alternative political party. Without a membership-based or party-based system to attain 
state power, these people saw the TRT as a potential option especially during their 
protracted conflict with the Chuan Leekpai government. Prawes Wasi, social activist 
and a leading architect of the political reform movement, publicly announced his 
support for Thaksin and the establishment of the TRT. He even argued that Thaksin was 
one of only a few politicians who understood the country’s problems and was suited to 
serve as Prime Minister (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 81 and 87; Worrawoot 2005, 90-95). 
Unlike earlier party leaders, Thaksin was sympathetic towards NGOs and rural protest 
groups. He adopted some of their ideas and vocabulary. In formulating its policy, the 
TRT also welcomed ideas and suggestions from many activists and progressive 
academics. On the day after the election victory, Thaksin even visited and had lunch 
with Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) members on the pavement at 
their protest camp outside Government House. Thaksin also ordered a temporary 
opening of the Pak Mun dam sluice gates and commissioned research to evaluate the 
dam’s project on the local environment and fisheries as a temporary solution (Pasuk and 
Baker 2004, 144).  
 
Against the backdrop of this success, a great number of Octobrists played crucial roles 
in promoting the rise of the TRT from the beginning. Soon thereafter, they became 
prominent spin-doctors, policy formulators, political campaigners and politicians in the 
party. The pages below illustrate how the Octobrists managed to access the TRT Party, 
influence its policy formulation process, and maintain their power in the TRT 
government.  
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6.2 Octobrists inside the TRT Party  
 
From day one of the TRT Party, many politicians, political activists, NGO workers, 
academics and media people with Octobrist backgrounds were recruited into the party 
alongside other groups of politicians and canvassers. With a mixture of reasons and 
incentives ranging from the chance of survival in parliamentary politics to new 
opportunities to fulfil their unfinished radical missions from the 1970s, Octobrists 
joined the TRT through three major channels including the conventional path of party 
politics, direct recruitment by Thaksin, and connections with other Octobrists already 
established in the TRT Party.  
 
For already successful Octobrist politicians, the progressive reputation of the TRT Party 
was one reason for joining the party. But more importantly, shifting to the TRT was a 
calculated strategy for success and survival. The constraints of the 1997 reform of 
electoral law and the abundant financial support of the TRT Party forced Octobrist 
politicians from other smaller parties to opt for the TRT Party by mid 1998 (PR 1998). 
Chaturon Chaisang and Pinit Jarusombat were outstanding examples. During the 1970s, 
Chaturon was a leader of the leftist student political party at Chiang Mai University and 
a former President of the Chiang Mai University Student Council in 1976. In the jungle, 
he was part of the editorial team of the Athipat Nai Satanakarnsoorop (Sovereign at the 
War Zone) magazine and worked closely with many other leading Octobrists who later 
played leading roles in the TRT like Kriengkamol Laohapairoj. By the late 1990s, he 
was a rising young blood politician in the New Aspiration Party (Khwam Wang Mai) 
(KT 1999a). After a long battle to seize the general secretary position in the party 
against old-style politicians with reputations for corruption, he eventually resigned and 
attempted to build up his own party with other progressive and Octobrist politicians (BP 
27 June 2000, 10; KT 1998a). Nevertheless, the party failed to take off as several key 
members declined and moved to the Democrat Party (Prachathipat). He finally joined 
the TRT in August 2000 as 15th in the party list, which was considered a very high 
position.  
 
Pinit Jarusombat was a Ramkhamhaeng University student leader during 14th October 
who had later worked to support the leftist movement and joined the armed struggle 
with the Communist Party of Thailand (phak communist haeng prathet thai – CPT). 
Like Chaturon, by the late 1990s, he was a successful politician and a long-term leader 
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of the Liberal Integrity Party (Seritham). Between 1995 and 2001, he was consistently 
successful in using his small party to negotiate for a good position in coalition 
governments. At the beginning, Pinit Jarusombat and his Liberal Integrity Party were 
not willing to merge with the TRT Party. Nonetheless, because of the 1997 constitution 
bias toward big parties, his small party experienced a big failure in the 2001 general 
election. By February 2001, Pinit eventually joined the TRT.  
 
In addition to these two, many other Octobrist politicians joined the party including 
Sutham Saengprathum, Chamni Sakdiset, and Adisorn Piengket. Those who did not join 
the TRT, to survive in the changing context had to be offered reasonable deals from 
other medium-size parties. Chamni Sakdiset and Wittaya Keaw-Paradise, veteran 
Octobrist politicians from the Moral Force Party (Palang Dharma), were able to join the 
Democrat Party through Sutham Saengprathum, their Octobrist comrade.  
 
Those who instead tried to fight the TRT by shifting to other small parties could hardly 
survive. Anek Laothamathas, President of the Chulalongkorn University Student 
Council in 1976 and a well-known academic at Thammasat University, lately became a 
politician with the Democrat Party. Prior to the 2001 election, he left the Democrat 
Party and built up a new small party, the ‘Mass Party (Mahachon)’. In spite of a strong 
policy on a welfare state and pro-poor policies, his party could hardly get any seats in 
parliament.  
 
Apart from party politics, many Octobrists decided to join the TRT Party either directly 
through Thaksin or through their former comrades inside the party. For these non-
politician Octobrists and unsuccessful Octobrist politicians, the rise of the TRT was a 
new opportunity to access state power and to recover and establish a role in 
parliamentary politics. At the same time, because of the initial progressive intentions of 
the TRT, they perceived it as a potential channel to promote progressive policies, as 
well as to revive their 1970s radical ideas and identity. Pirun Chatwanitchakul, one of 
the most senior leftist mentors during the 1970s who did not join the TRT affirmed that 
many of his former comrades generally worked not merely for money but for 
ideological and political support (TP 2001c).  
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In joining the TRT, some were directly recruited by Thaksin. When he first drafted his 
campaign team and policy think-tank, he enlisted all sorts of people from earlier 
connections and also consulted leading figures in various sectors to recommend policy 
proposals and potential personnel. Through this process, many Octobrists were taken 
into the party. For Thaksin, these people were not merely democratic activists from the 
1970s, but, more importantly, veteran and skilful political campaigners and strategists, 
because they managed to formulate sophisticated policy proposals and connected the 
party with their extensive network of grassroots, middle-class and elite constituencies 
(Pasuk and Baker 2008, 64).  
 
Prommin Lertsuridej, a former medical student activist from the Mahidol Medical 
School, was a good example of those who were brought into Thaksin’s business empire 
and political activities. During the 1970s, Prommin graduated from the prestigious 
Suankularb high school. Although he was not a well-known medical student activist, he 
was an active ‘leftist underground mobiliser’ in the Mahidol Alliance Party (phak naew 
ruam mahidon), the successful leftist student party at Mahidol Medical School. He was 
a theorist behind the medical doctor student movement and one of the key supporters of 
the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai - 
NSCT) (NS 2003a). During his four years with the CPT in the Southern Isan-Phanom 
Dongrak revolutionary base, he developed a wide range of networks with both CPT 
leaders and local members. After his return from the jungle in 1980, Prommin spent 
several years as a rural doctor before returning Bangkok to work as an official in the 
Policy and Planning Division at the Ministry of Public Health. Because of his long 
experience in public policy management and his extensive social networks, in 1993 he 
was recruited directly by Pojaman Shinawatra, Thaksin’s wife, into the Shinawatra 
Company as a senior executive in charge of new stations for Shin Satellite in Cambodia 
and Laos. Within less than eight years, he had become Managing Director of CS 
Communication Co. By this time, Thaksin had joined the Moral Force Party (Phalang 
Dharma) but did not have a trusted person to help him with political campaigning. He 
therefore asked Prommin to be his personal advisor for his first MP candidacy for the 
Moral Force Party. During the formulation of the TRT, he was once again called to help 
from time to time on party administration and also in political campaigning (Pasuk and 
Baker 2004, 68-69).  
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Kriengkamol Laohapairoj and Phumtham Wechayachai had known Thaksin since 1975. 
At that time, while Thaksin was a ministerial aide, Kriengkamol was General Secretary 
of the NSCT and Phumtham was a leading activist from the Chula Pracha Dharma 
Party, the leftist student political party at Chulalongkorn University. Also, these two 
shared the same revolutionary base in Southern Isan. They were among the first few 
Octobrists who Thaksin asked for political advice (PCT 2006b). Apart from their 
reputation as leading 1970s activists with extensive political networks, what Thaksin 
recognised in these two was their long experience as spin doctors working for the 
people’s movement and many politicians (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 64). Before joining 
the TRT, Phumtham established himself as a prominent NGO worker as the first 
Director of the Thai Volunteer Service, as well as a political campaigner for several 
young politicians in the Democrat Party (Prachathipat) and many other parties (NS 
2006b). Thaksin asked Kriengkamol to be his political consultant even before accepting 
the position of leader of the Moral Force Party  (TP 2001c). Phumtham was hired into 
the Shinawatra Company in 1996. For both of them, joining the TRT was the 
overcoming of their long-standing failures in party politics. After failing to push their 
proposals with other parties, including even the Democrat Party through connections 
with youthful politicians, and to establish their own political party for lack of political 
and financial support (NS 2006b), the TRT was the best option. At the very beginning of 
the government, Kriengkamol frequently emphasised the initial optimistic impression 
he had of Thaksin and the TRT in pushing forward progressive policies.  
 
‘No one knows how this government is going to turn out. But at least 
Thaksin himself is a capable person. He was ready to accept new ideas and 
push forward change. He was really different from earlier politicians and 
Prime Ministers. For instance, the 30 baht free medical scheme was 
actually proposed by academics in the Ministry of Public Health. But no 
previous ministers listened to this. When TRT, Prommin and Surapong 
proposed it, Thaksin immediately accepted the ideas.  I do not mean that 
Thaksin is a good person who sympathises with poor people. But at least he 
accepted all of these ideas… But whenever he [Thaksin] stops accepting 
our good proposals, we will no longer stay with him’  
(TP 2001c) 
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In addition, Praphat Panyachatrak, a heroic icon of the 14th October incident, became a 
crucial figure in formulating pro-poor policies for the TRT Party (Pasuk and Baker 
2008, 64). On 14th October 1973, Praphat, a rank-and-file student activist from 
Kasetsart University, faced down soldiers in full battle gear armed with a wooden stick 
and shouted ‘I am ready to die for democracy!’ The next morning, the picture of Praphat 
– with bullet wounds in his waist, left thigh and leg and grasping a stick - were splashed 
across the front pages of several national newspapers with the caption ‘Walking Tall’. 
After his return from the jungle in the early 1980s, he started investing in a contract 
forest and logging business in North-Eastern Thailand and Myanmar. Later he moved 
on to farming organic orchards in Lampang Province. This involved him again with 
farmers’ problems (Supradit 1996). In 1999, after hearing of Thaksin’s intention to 
formulate new policies, he directly faxed Thaksin his policy statement. It was welcomed 
and became part of the TRT programme. He later was rewarded with the post of Deputy 
Agriculture Minister (2001) when the party took office (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 68-69).   
 
In addition to direct connections with Thaksin, many other Octobrists joined the party 
through connections with Octobrist first comers and successful politicians in the TRT. 
For example, Amorn Amornratananon was General Secretary of the NSCT in 1976 
before spending three years with the CPT in the Southern Thailand. After returning 
home in 1980, he carried on his political activism in parallel with his interior design and 
decorating business. He actively participated in the protests of May 1992. Four years 
later, as general secretary, he brought an ‘October network’ to support the 1997 political 
reform as well as to monitor corrupt politicians. In spite of not joining the TRT at its 
founding, he was sympathetic to the party. When in 2000, he attacked the Democrat 
Party in his anti-corruption campaign, he was denounced as Thaksin’s defender in the 
scandal of concealing share holdings in Shin Corporation (NS 2007a). Even after the 
landslide victory of the TRT in 2001, he still planned to prepare an ‘October network’ 
political party for the next election in four years. Nonetheless, in December 2001, he 
formally accepted an offer to work with the TRT Party as a Deputy General Secretary of 
the Debt Rehabilitation Fund for Farmers. He won this position through connections 
with Phumtham Wechayachai as well as Saman Lertwongrat, an Octobrist who acted as 
its General Secretary. 
 
After joining the TRT through different routes and for various reasons, the Octobrists 
212 
 
became one node or loose political network and support team behind the success and 
power of Thaksin (McCargo and Ukrist 2005; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 67-68). More 
specifically, they served as: 
 
 
Political advisors and spin-doctors: Many Octobrists worked as personal advisors for 
Thaksin in both political and business issues. Those who were trusted would even be 
offered high ranking positions in the TRT Party and cabinet positions under Thaksin’s 
ministerial quotas in order to work side by side with him.  
 
Policy strategists and implementers: Octobrists performed crucial work in both 
formulating and implementing pro-poor policies for the TRT Party (Glassman 2004, 50-
51; Kasian 2004; Giles 2001). Because of their comprehensive understanding of both 
urban and rural problems, their pro-poor policy proposals matched Thaksin’s ideas for 
formulating policies responding to all groups in society. At the same time, they worked 
as key persons in connecting the TRT with leading intellectuals, NGOs and civil society 
organisations in progressive and radical movements in the process of policy 
consultation and formulation. They successfully incorporated their 1970s political assets 
into the policy and political network formation of the TRT Party.  
 
Political campaigners: Because of their direct experiences and extensive networks with 
a wide range of people, many Octobrists were assigned to work as political brokers 
connecting the party with the media, and middle-class and above all grassroots 
constituencies. Moreover, many of them helped to articulate the TRT’s social agenda 
and gave Thaksin a tinge of legitimacy with journalists and activists from the same 
generation (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 69). 
 
Conflict mediators and public relations: Octobrists became key mediators in handling 
conflicts and problems between the government and social movements and civil society 
organisations, particularly those led by their former comrades. The media criticised 
Thaksin for transferring all work with mass protests to Octobrists (KS 2002b; KS 
2002c). 
 
Successful politicians: Octobrist politicians were brought into the party as part of a 
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process of building the progressive reputation of the party and the extensive political 
connections of veteran politicians. At the initial stage, they obtained several top 
positions in the TRT Party and many ministerial posts.  
 
To illustrate these roles in the TRT, examples of individual active and successful 
Octobrists merit special mention.  
 
Prommin Lertsuridej – Thaksin’s ‘super secretary’: Although he himself always kept a 
low profile in the media, Prommin was publicly known as Thaksin’s ‘super secretary’, 
as he was not only able to read Thaksin’s mind and articulate his ideas, but also to know 
how to take on the bureaucracy, which was seen as the main stumbling block for the 
Thaksin government (TN 2005a). In 2001, when Thaksin first became Prime Minister, 
Prommin was appointed as the Prime Minister’s general secretary. He coordinated all 
state mechanisms in pushing forward policies. Also, Prommin was among the core 
initiators of the village fund, debt moratorium and 30-baht healthcare scheme. 
Furthermore, he was in charge of conducting surveys to gauge TRT’s popularity (TN 
2001a).  In October 2002, he assumed the role of deputy premier overseeing economic 
affairs. And in mediating conflict, he was appointed as secretary of the Special 
Committee to Solve the Problems of Protest Appeals of the People. Even during his 
tenure as Energy Minister in early 2003, Prommin continued to act much like a 
secretary to the Prime Minister. He coordinated relief operations after the tsunami 
disaster and played a key role in plotting TRT’s strategy in the upcoming election (TN 
2005a).  
 
Phumtham Wechayachai – versatile spin-doctor: Phumtham was able to work in 
different areas including public relations, policy implementation, conflict management 
and national electoral campaigns. In 1999, his very first job was to draft a biography of 
Thaksin and party publicity (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 68). Through his connection with 
NGOs and Octobrists in social movements, he was trusted and promoted as a secretary 
to the Interior Minister to build a good relationship between government and protesters 
and to resolve conflicts between them. 
 
‘Formerly an activist and a NGO worker, he managed to persuade the 
protesters to return home shortly before the Songkran festival last month. 
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He also arranged for Thaksin to join a ‘farewell party’ with the villagers at 
their protest site, giving a boost to the Prime Minister’s image…Thaksin 
has also assigned Phumtham to deal with certain issues that are viewed as 
hot potatoes: a project to build two power plants in Prachuap Khiri Khan, a 
planned waste-water treatment plant in Samut Prakan, and the Thai-
Malaysian gas-pipeline project in Songkhla. 
(TN  2001a) 
 
In policy implementation, Phumtham was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 2003 and 
played a major role in putting pro-poor policies into effect. For instance, in the ‘One 
Tambon One Product’ policy, he was a key man in establishing the National Office of 
the General Secretary of the One Tambon One Product project with its main function of 
enforcing the policy on old-style bureaucrats. His role as electoral campaigner was also 
prominent. In 2002, he was head of the secretary-general’s office, a position which 
party insiders describe as similar to director of the election campaign. He dedicated 
himself to preparing for the 2005 election with political marketing research and 
comprehensive surveys of the political allegiance of key civil servants and community 
leaders across the nation. Success in the 2005 election, where TRT won 355 seats, made 
Phumtham an even more important person in the TRT (MR 2005; TN 2002b).  
 
Kriengkamol Laohapairoj – behind-the-scenes personal advisor and lobbyist:  
Although Kriengkamol did not hold any position in either the party or the government, 
he was another powerful person in the inner circle of the TRT. He regularly appeared at 
Government House beside Thaksin. The media even called him Thaksin’s bodyguard. 
Especially during the court hearings on Thaksin’s concealed shareholdings, he always 
stayed by Thaksin’s side (PCT 2006b). He also helped Thaksin solve problems in policy 
implementation and was a key contact person between the government and activist 
groups (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 68-69; TP 2001c).  
 
Praphat Panyachatrak – pro-poor policy formulator and implementer: Praphat was one 
of the key persons in formulating successful pro-poor policies for the TRT. In 1999, the 
policy team was still focused on urban issues and had as yet no substantive rural 
programme. But when rural protests reached their peak, the team began to consult rural 
leaders and NGO workers. It took up Praphat’s three-page policy. Thereafter, Praphat 
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started participating in the policy process. After the victory of the TRT in 2001, he was 
appointed Deputy Agriculture Minister in 2001 and later Minister of Natural Resources 
and the Environment (2002-2004) with responsibility for implementing rural pro-poor 
policies (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 68-69).  
 
Amorn Amornratananon – bit player in pro-poor policy enforcement: Even though he 
argued that he joined the TRT not only to work for the government but to push forward 
progressive policies, in reality, he was recruited into the party to promote the Debt 
Rehabilitation Fund and to mobilise support from networks he had earlier developed. 
For instance, he mobilised people from his former military base area, Chokchang 
revolutionary bases in Surat Thani Province, to support the TRT.  
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Table 6.1: Political path of Octobrists in TRT governments  
 
Political period Name and Position 
2001 
Thaksin 1: Feb 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
Thaksin 2: Mar 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thaksin 3: Oct 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chaturon C. 
Prime 
Minister’s 
Office 
Minister 
Praphat P. 
Minister 
of 
National 
Resources 
and the 
Environm
ent  
Sutham S. 
Minister of 
University 
Affairs 
Phumtham W. 
Secretary to 
Interior 
Minister 
Adisorn P. 
Deputy 
Government 
Whip 
Prommin L.  
Secretary to 
Prime Minister 
Pinit J. 
Deputy 
TRT party 
leader the  
 
Chaturon C. 
Minister of 
Justice 
Sutham 
Advisor to 
Prime 
Minister 
Prommin L.  
Secretary to 
Prime Minister 
Chaturon 
C. 
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Phumtham W. 
TRT election 
campaign 
manager, or 
Secretary-
General’s Office 
of TRT 
Prommin  
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Surapong S. 
Minister of 
Technology and 
Communications  
Pinit J. 
Minister of 
Science and 
Technology  
Chaturon 
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Phumtham W. 
Secretary to 
Interior 
Minister 
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Political period Name and Position 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
2004  
 
 
 
 
2005 
February 2005  
Ranking of Octobrists 
in the Thaksin II party 
list  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 cabinet  
 
 
 
Chaturon C. 
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Phumtham W. 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Prommin L.   
Minister of 
Energy 
 
Pinit J. 
Minister of 
Industry  
Sutham S. 
Deputy 
Minister of 
Education 
Chaturon C.  
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Pinit J. 
Deputy 
Prime 
Minister 
Sutham S. 
Deputy 
Minister of 
Interior 
Chaturon C.  
Minister of 
Education 
Adisorn P.  
Deputy 
Minister of 
Agriculture  
Phumtham W.  
Deputy Minister of 
Transport and 
Communication  
 
Chaturon C. 
4th 
 
Pinit J.  
6th 
Surapong S. 
14th 
 
Sutham S. 
20th 
Thinnawat 
Maruekapitak 
85th 
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Chaturon Chaisang – tamed progressive politician: In spite of providing neither strong 
financial support nor a large number of MPs in his clique, Chaturon was offered a good 
position in every cabinet under TRT governments due to his credentials as a progressive 
and effective politician. In every position, he almost always promoted progressive 
policies and provided support for his former comrades. Nonetheless, most of his actions 
violated the interests of the authorities and capitalists. Many times, Thaksin intervened 
and eventually moved him away. Several media commented that Thaksin was scared of 
Chaturon usurping his leadership (MR 2003a). However, instead of going against 
orders, Chaturon turned to silence and went with the flow.  
 
At the beginning of the TRT government, Chaturon was given the position of Minister 
in the Prime Minister’s Office with responsibility for the political decentralisation 
process, bureaucratic reform and the Energy Policy Committee. In pushing forward 
decentralisation of local revenue collection and direct elections of local leaders, he 
encountered many conservative forces in the Ministry of Interior on the one hand (KT 
2001b), and on the other hand disagreement with several members inside the TRT and 
Thaksin who promoted centralised CEO mayors (MD 2002). On energy policy, he 
fought with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) in promoting new 
consumer-friendly electricity fee calculations as well as progressive policies on the 
demands of social movements and NGOs to cancel several power plants and dams (KS 
2001c; KT 2001a). He revealed to the public EGAT’s mistake in initiating power plants 
which eventually forced the government to pay compensation to private companies (KS 
2001b). Faced with confrontation, he was forced to step back. The decision-making 
authority was transferred back to the Director-General of the National Energy 
Department (TN 2001b). And eventually he was moved to become Minister of Justice. 
At the beginning, he was rather frustrated with Thaksin’s interventions. He even gave a 
sarcastic interview saying that Thaksin broke his promise of more opportunities to deal 
with these problems (KS 2002a; TR 2002). But soon after that he went silent and 
accepted the change  
 
In the Ministry of Justice, Chaturon found himself in a powerless position in 
comparison to the dominant powerful judiciary and prosecution service. In response to 
this, he set up the Department of Special Investigation as special unit to balance against 
the power of the judiciary, prosecution service and police. Even though he received a 
219 
 
positive response from a public frustrated with these authorities, he faced a 
counterattack from powerful bureaucratic forces (SR 2002). To end this conflict, 
Thaksin again removed him from his position. In October 2002, he was placed in a 
genuine non-job as Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for social affairs. He was 
assigned non-political jobs, for instance promoting a campaign to reduce alcohol 
consumption, controlling on-line computer games, problems with the university 
admission examinations, and children’s television time. Even in this position, Chaturon 
still proposed a progressive law banning alcohol advertisements on television during 
prime time, and time and zone controls on the sale of alcohol. However, in this he had 
to fight the business sector. Amidst the political crisis and violence in Southern 
Thailand, he also proposed a reconciliation and ceasefire plan formulated from public 
consultations and admired by local partners in the conflict area, for instance, appealing 
for an amnesty for Muslim separatists, a reduction in police numbers and the lifting of 
martial law. Nonetheless, his proposal was immediately rejected. (TN 2004a; TN 
2004b). As could be guessed, his proposal was rejected by Thaksin and his security 
team. After the failure of his peace plan, Chaturon was removed to the Ministry of 
Education. Although he again tried to promote innovative policies including Education 
Funds and reform of the law and structure of the Ministry of Education, he ended up in 
conflict with conservative forces within the Ministry (TP 2005). 
 
Pinit Jarusombat – successful conventional TRT guardian: Despite not being an MP, 
Pinit still gained prominent positions both in cabinet and the TRT Party under the new 
system of the 1997 constitution. Furthermore, he succeeded in using his small Liberal 
Integrity Party (Seritham), which had only 10 MPs, and an accumulation of other 
North-eastern region MPs to build a medium-sized power clique called the ‘Phaya Naga 
group’ comprised of more than 40 MPs. Furthermore, due to his extensive networks and 
political experience in managing competing interests, Pinit managed to maintain 
leadership of his clique despite not being an MP. Pinit was called a ‘ten-dimension 
political coordinator’ not only among government coalition parties, but also linking the 
TRT with opposition parties like the Democrat Party (Prachathipat) and other old-style 
politicians. Thaksin appointed him as the party’s candidate to the Election Commission 
selection committee to replace Adisorn Piengket, a prominent Octobrist politician in the 
TRT, who had been known for his frequent clashes and poor relations with the 
Democrat Party. In addition, Pinit was close to local mafia-style politicians like Sanoh 
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Tientong.  
 
In spite of his success in conventional party politics, unlike Chaturon Chaisang, Pinit 
Jarusombat never put himself in conflict situations in pushing forward progressive 
policies. Instead, he compromised in dealing with conflicts of interest between the party 
and public. He sometimes tried to push forward progressive policies but only those 
which did not attack the interests of any major group inside the TRT Party. If that 
happened, he always supported those major powers rather than insisting on his 
progressive ideas. In the case of the Tobacco Act prohibiting retail outlets from 
displaying cigarettes to the public, he immediately stepped back when the policy 
disturbed the interests of a powerful company running a chain of convenience stores, 
CP 7-Eleven Co (TN 2005c). He also helped his former comrades in small matters but 
did not deal with structural problems. Vanida Tantiwittayapitak, advisor of the 
Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP), said that ‘Pinit [Jarusombat] is a 
nice former comrade. You can ask him for rice and food to support the movement, but 
don’t expect him to seriously help you to put forward the policy you want’ (Vanida, 
interview by author, 12 January 2007, Bangkok). 
 
In conclusion, the rise of the TRT Party opened up a new window of opportunity for 
Octobrists both to survive through changing political conditions and access to state 
power. Through direct networks either with Thaksin or their Octobrist friends in the 
TRT, countless Octobrists joined the party. And because of their unique political skills 
and connections, they were trusted by Thaksin not only to act crucially for the TRT in 
formulating, promoting and implementing innovative policies, but also significantly in 
political campaigning and connecting the party with wider constituencies. At the 
beginning some put efforts into pushing radical changes. But to sustain their position in 
the government, many of them dropped several initial attempts and opted for more 
compromising policies and status quo political stances. 
 
6.3 Octobrists outside the TRT Party 
 
Besides those inside the TRT Party, many other Octobrists outside the party also played 
a significant supporting role for the party. The initial sympathy which Thaksin had had 
for civil society organisations and radical movements made the TRT an ally after the 
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discontent and distress they faced with the earlier more conservative Chuan 
government. The introduction of a participatory approach in developing pro-poor 
policies motivated these Octobrists to support the party. Many ideas and proposals from 
Octobrists outside the party were taken into account in policy formulation. But this also 
meant that they had high expectations of their friends in the TRT. Although many 
Octobrist friends had previously been involved in parliamentary politics, this was the 
first time that a significant number of Octobrists managed to reach the very top 
positions in politics as well as steering the TRT in a progressive direction. Participation 
in the policy-making process of the TRT through connections with their former 
comrades was a supreme opportunity for Octobrists outside TRT. This meant that they 
would be able to access state power without relying on old-style corrupt politicians and 
parties as they had previously had to do.  
 
From the very beginning, many expressed their hopes and sympathetic perceptions of 
the TRT and their former comrades inside the party. For example, Pipob Thongchai, a 
senior Octobrist NGO worker, gave his support to several policies, including the 30-
baht healthcare scheme, village funds, and the debt moratorium. He also wanted the 
Octobrists inside the government to deal with conflicts between earlier governments and 
the movement, such as electricity power plant projects, the Pak Mun dam, political 
decentralisation and media reform (TP 2001c). Chaiwat Surawichai, the former Vice 
President of the Chulalongkorn University Student Union and then a veteran political 
activist in the 1970s, publicly stated:   
 
‘Chaturon, Surapong and Praphat are still good examples; they still carry on 
their good intentions. But they did not have much chance. I am still proud of 
Ming [Prommin], Phumtham and Saman. At least, I do know that they will 
not be corrupt like old-style politicians. Although we sometimes have 
different attitudes about work, we have a sense of brotherhood. They will link 
to the people’s movement. They listened to and tried to understand the 
people. My suggestion to them is that they have to maintain their connection 
with those Octobrists who still pursue our good intentions and ideology’  
(TP 2003c) 
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Somchai Homla-or, a former leading Octobrist, was then a human rights lawyer and 
chair of the Union for Civil Liberty. After a long failed struggle to negotiate with the 
Chuan Leekpai government on compensation for workers affected by the Cobalt-60 
incident, Somchai became enthusiastic about the good response from Pinit Jarusombat 
when he became Minister of Science and Technology (MR 2002a).  
 
As a result, many Octobrists did not hesitate to collaborate with the TRT. Some were 
contacted by Octobrists inside the TRT to help in formulating and promoting new 
progressive policies, while others approached their old Octobrist friends in the TRT to 
help them either to include their proposals in the party’s policies or to sort out problems 
which their organisations had faced with state agencies and previous governments. 
Kriengkamol Laohapairoj invited Sucheera Thanchainan, a former radical feminist 
activist from Thammasat University, one of the nineteen prisoners during the 6th 
October 1976 incident and then a university lecturer, to revise and push forward 
changes in Village Fund regulations for women (TP 2001c). In organising policy 
workshops, like that on ‘Establishing Village Funds through Community Organisation’ 
at Government House in 2001 where Thaksin wanted to push money into villages, 
Phumtham and Prommin brought in several grassroots leaders and progressive NGO 
workers from their networks during Phumtham’s time as coordinator of the Thai 
Volunteer Service, and Prommin’s as a medical doctor activist in community 
development work (KS 2001a). Chaturon invariably brought in his former student 
comrades to act as his political assistants. For instance, in formulating progressive 
policies in education during his term as Minister of Education, Chaturon invited Tanet 
Charoenmuang, a former Chulalongkorn University activist and later prominent 
academic at Chiang Mai University, who had been close to him both in the jungle and 
later during his studies in the US as his academic advisor (Tanet, interview by author, 
14 December 2006, Chiang Mai).  
 
Furthermore, from time to time, Octobrists both inside and outside the party 
collaborated in mobilising the resources of the TRT government to enhance the 
legitimacy of their Octobrist identity. Octobrists inside the TRT helped in allocating a 
government budget of nearly US$2.5 million to organise the 30th anniversary of the 14th 
October incident. It became one of the biggest nation-wide 14th October cerebrations 
ever (MR 2003b). Kanya Panyachatrak, wife of Praphat Panyachatrak, acted as 
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chairperson of the committee providing funds for relatives of those who lost their lives 
in both the 14th and 6th October incidents. Furthermore, with the support of Octobrist 
politicians, they succeeded in including the history of 14th October in the national 
school curriculum as well as declaring 14th October as ‘14th October Democratic Day’ 
(Prajak 2005, 6 and 10-12).  
 
In contrast, many Octobrists were sceptical about the TRT government and the power of 
their Octobrists friends as a result of painful experience they had with earlier 
governments and the consequent distrust (TP 2003c). Nevertheless, they did not attack 
them directly from the beginning. They still perceived the TRT and their comrades as 
strategic allies whom they could use to mobilise support for the political goals of their 
organisations and movements. Many turned a blind eye to controversial issues and 
inconsistencies in the pro-poor ideas and programmes of the TRT in the belief that they 
would be able pressure the government and their comrades if the policies were 
misguided (further details in Chapter 7). 
 
In summary, the initial outreach approach and policies of the TRT government as well 
as the connections with their former comrades in the TRT offered new chances for 
many non-TRT Octobrists to take part in the policy process and to push forward their 
long-term unfulfilled demands ignored by earlier governments. Nevertheless, several 
other Octobrists were sceptical about the intentions of the TRT and Thaksin. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
During the rise of the strong TRT government, Octobrists were one of the major groups 
who played a significant role in constructing the Thaksin government. In establishing 
the party, the TRT demanded all potential resource people to support its policy think-
tank and political campaign. It mobilised people able to formulate and implement 
innovative policies which the former bureaucratic system was incapable of doing. It also 
called for political intermediaries or brokers who would help in expanding their 
constituency by connecting them with both majority rural grassroots groups and 
minority urban middle class people. Against this backdrop, Octobrists seemed to have 
the qualifications to respond to these demands. Nearly two decades after returning from 
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the armed struggle with the CPT, several Octobrists had already established themselves 
as rising star politicians and campaigners in many political factions, as well as 
prominent social movement activists. Their 1970s political experience and assets, and 
their continuing political activities gave these Octobrists a profound knowledge of 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. Their networks and skills in connecting 
and communicating with varying political groups and constituencies, including the elite, 
the middle class, academics, the media, radical social movements and grassroots people, 
perfectly matched the demands of Thaksin in establishing his party policy platform and 
reaching a wider constituency. Therefore, from day one of the TRT Party, large 
numbers of Octobrists were recruited into the party through direct connections with 
both Thaksin and the Octobrist networks.  
 
However, the emergence of Octobrists in the TRT was not as a unified force to 
revitalise the radical movement. They joined the party at different times and through 
different channels according to their new status. Above all, in spite of the fact that they 
all perceived the TRT as an effective political vehicle, they joined the party with 
different interests and ideas. While the main objective of Octobrist politicians was to 
survive under the new constitutional reforms and conditions, other Octobrist spin-
doctors and campaigners joined the TRT either to push forward progressive public 
policies or to achieve their political ambitions. At the same time, those in social 
movements and other civil society organisations worked hard to advocate the demands 
of their movements and organisations in this new strong government. And from time to 
time, their interests conflicted. For their survival and the maintenance of their status, 
Octobrists politicians and TRT staff did not go against Thaksin and his cronies but went 
with the flow in several non-progressive directions. These went against the expectations 
of their friends outside the party. Nonetheless, at this stage, these people were still 
bound by a loose old-boy networks and ‘Octobrist’ identity from the 1970s. The values 
they shared were broadly progressive and democratic ideas and discourse, not their 
1970s radicalism. However, reconnecting with friends from the 1970s was more a path 
to legitimise their current roles and interests as well as their newly constructed 
‘Octobrist’ identity than to revive the leftist movement as a whole.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Octobrists amidst the rise of the Yellow and Red Shirt conflicts 
 
  
From the mid 2000s onward, Thai politics was dominated by the complicated and 
intense colour-coded conflict between the ‘Yellow Shirts’ (People’s Alliance for 
Democracy - phanthamit – PAD) opposing the exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his alleged ‘nominee’ governments, and the pro-Thaksin and anti-coup 
‘Red Shirts’ (United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship – no pho cho - UDD). In 
participating in these contradicting and contesting movements, Octobrists not only 
battled to promote and defend their movements, but they also fought against each other. 
This brought about a conflict among these 1970s former radical activists that could not 
be concealed; their earlier loose and compromised ‘Octobrist network’ no longer 
functioned effectively or harmoniously. While some worked to defend the Thais Love 
Thais (Thai Rak Thai - TRT) Party and were supportive of the rise of the radical red 
shirt movement, many others participated in the more conservative Yellow Shirt 
movement. However, when the anti-TRT campaign shifted too far toward the right wing 
and eventually supported the 2006 coup d’état, many Octobrists who had earlier 
supported the Yellow camp left. Some opted for the ‘Two-No: No Thaksin and No 
Coup’ campaign. Others switched to supporting the Red Shirts and fighting against the 
Yellow Shirts.  
 
Why did these former 1970s student activists who had once risked their lives in defence 
of radicalism turn out to be so bitterly divided? In answering this question, this thesis 
argues that there were three parallel causal conditions. Firstly, the differences in their 
ideas and interests had recently developed into something more deeply rooted. Even 
though the diverse 1970s embeddedness affected their early political path as shown in 
chapters two, four and five, what really made their ideas and interests more contested 
developed after they returned from the ‘jungle’. When the Communist Party of Thailand 
(phak communist haeng prathet thai – CPT) declined, they diverged into new different 
affiliations and explored more diverse ideas. Amid the Yellow-Red Shirts conflict, 
Octobrists were received by and became affiliated with all sides. In promoting different 
and mostly contradictory interests and pursuing ideological strategies, the gaps among 
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these Octobrists turned to be uncompromising conflicts. Secondly, the dramatic political 
trajectory of the Thai political landscape set the stage for the explosion of differences 
among the Octobrists. Under coalition governance, the Octobrists inside weak elected 
governments had to negotiate with those in the extra-parliamentary forces in exchange 
for their support. However, with the strong Thaksin government, they no longer found 
any need to compromise with the interests of their Octobrist friends on opposing sides. 
Therefore the earlier differences turned out to be conflicting interests. Lastly, the broad 
term and identity of Octobrist could no longer function as an effective means of 
unifying them and concealing their growing differences. Worse still, the mantle of 
‘Octobrist’ was used as a frame to fight against each other. All competed in utilising the 
‘Octobrist’ frame to legitimize themselves and delegitimise Octobrists in the opposite 
camp. This exacerbated the conflict and their comradeship deteriorated. 
 
To illustrate these arguments, this chapter starts with a brief overview of the 
complicated colour-coded conflict among the Yellow Shirts, Red Shirts and others, as 
well as its significance for the battles among Octobrists. It then follows the development 
of Octobrists on different sides of these political divides and shows how their 
participation and roles worsened their conflicts.  
 
 
7.1 Octobrists during the rise of the anti-TRT movement and the Yellow Shirts  
 
After its landslide victory in 2001, the rise in popularity of the TRT among the majority 
grassroots people and its dominance over parliamentary and party politics threatened 
non-elected and traditional elite groups. The systematic corruption and negative 
consequences of implementing the policies of the TRT and its coalition partners caused 
disappointment among the urban middle class, civil society organisations, and radical 
social movements (Askew 2010a, 1-3; Connors 2008a; Kasian 2006a; Pasuk and Baker 
2008). Gradually, these dissatisfied forces turned into a loose anti-TRT grouping and 
later the strong Yellow Shirt movement.   
 
The success of TRT’s pro-poor and welfare policies hijacked grassroots supporters from 
the royalist elite and started the development of a new relationship between the 
government and the people. The TRT managed to convince people that the party and 
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government were genuine political institutions which could provide them with concrete 
support and solutions (Askew 2010a, 2; Hewison 2008, 205-207; Hewison and Kengkij 
2010; 192-198; Pasuk and Baker 2008, 78). The bureaucrats were discontented with its 
bureaucratic reform and restructuring package in increasing the efficiency of policy 
implementation and centralising power to the government (Yoshifumi 2008, 247-248). 
They argued that the TRT, Thaksin and coalition parties used the reform to centralise 
administrative power solely for the benefit of members of the clique supporting the TRT 
and corrupt politicians. The bureaucratic restructuring was to reward those who had a 
close relationship with the government and to punish its opponents (Pasuk and Baker, 
2004, 172 and 185-188; McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 215-233). Furthermore, older 
business powers were threatened by the rise of the TRT. While most of them were 
strongly hit by the 1997 economic crisis, Thaksin’s business empire survived and 
expanded enormously thereafter (Hewison 2001, 92; Hewison 2008, 200-201; McCargo 
and Ukrist 2005, 35-36, 42, 47-48, 50-63 and 215; Pasuk and Baker 2000, 58-59). The 
greatest concern of business was the use of state power by Thaksin and political cliques 
within the government to promote their business empires and distance others from the 
business opportunities related to state concessions (Ukrist 2008, 133-136).  
 
In addition, different political cliques and coalition parties were also frustrated by the 
TRT government’s quasi-absolute control over parliament. The financial and political 
resources of Thaksin and the conditions of the 1997 constitution reform meant that 
small and medium sized parties could hardly survive. Nearly all either had to merge 
with TRT or remain with little negotiating power for cabinet quotas (Baker 2005). 
.Furthermore, the success of pro-poor policies hijacked grassroots constituencies from 
earlier successful politicians (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 189-191).  
 
Outside state power, the initial sympathy for Thaksin and the TRT among the middle 
class, civil society organisations and social movements turned sour. They found that the 
TRT actually followed the same path as earlier corrupt politicians or on an even bigger 
scale. Many academics and social critics started to condemn Thaksin and the TRT Party 
for its corruption (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 149 and 153-155). The success of the TRT in 
securing majority support among the poor through pro-poor policies threatened the 
legitimacy and power of the minority middle class in the political process (Kasian 
2006a; Connors 2008b, 483). The middle class, who had earlier played a crucial role in 
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removing unsatisfactory governments, found that it was nearly impossible in the case of 
the strong TRT government, owing to its quasi-absolute control over nearly all 
government sectors, the media and the majority of the electorate (Askew 2010a, 7; 
Pittaya 2007, 20-30; Anek 2006, 122-124; Pasuk and Baker 2008, 78; Pasuk and Baker 
2009, 353-354). 
 
Civil society organisations and social movements concluded that the TRT used pro-poor 
projects and ideas merely as rhetoric and as a means to hijack grassroots people from 
the anti-neo-liberalist NGOs (Put 2005, 100-101). After their political triumph in 2001, 
Thaksin and the TRT learned that its grassroots constituencies were actually based on 
conventional money politics and pro-poor policies rather than the support of radical 
actors, and progressive agendas and demands seemed to be contrary to their interests. 
Subsequently, the earlier promises were dropped (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 144-156). 
Furthermore, they suffered from stronger laws and violent measures by the government 
in controlling and delegitimising demonstrations (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 147–148). The 
TRT Party condemned NGO workers who disagreed with its policies as ‘brokers of the 
poor’. It claimed that the TRT Party had already replaced these ‘third hand’ agencies 
and created a short cut between the people and government funding (TP 2001a). 
Forceful action in removing the Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) 
protest camp in late 2002 caused exasperation among the grassroots and progressive 
movements. The most crucial cases of human rights violations were the series of the 
executions in dealing the domestic terrorist and people’s uprising in Southern Thailand, 
including Tak Bai and Krue Se. The TRT government intervened in both public and 
private media. For instance, any TV or radio programmes that criticised the government 
were either taken off the air, closed down, or subjected to censorship (Han 2010, 211; 
Montesano 2009, 2-3).  
 
By the mid-2000s, when control over political power, corruption scandals, and the use 
of violence by the TRT government dramatically increased, initial dissatisfaction turned 
into polarised conflict between the TRT government and a well-organised anti-TRT 
movement.  
 
In fighting against the strong authority of the TRT government, the earlier loose and 
diverse anti-TRT forces reformulated themselves into a more unified and stronger 
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movement. Around February 2006, all anti-TRT groups coalesced under the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (phanthamit – PAD). The PAD was an amalgamation of a wide 
range of anti-Thaksin political and social forces. The first group was widely described 
as the Bangkok middle class and the urban middle class in other provinces (Connors 
2008b, 488).  The second was the personal leadership of Sondhi Limthongkul, bankrupt 
multi-millionaire owner of the Phuchatkan (Manager) Media Group and former crony of 
Thaksin’s, turned militant oppositionist (Kasian 2006a; Pye and Schaffer 2008, 40-42; 
Ukrist 2008, 130-131). The third was the urban elite or conservative forces including 
royalist civil servants, aristocrats and members of the military who were being 
marginalised by the TRT, and businessmen who were not part of Thaksin’s patronage 
system (Pye and Schaffer 2008: 40-41; Connors 2008b, 488-489). The last was a wide 
range of civil society organisations, social movements and NGOs with grassroots bases, 
such as workers, farmers, university lecturers, state enterprise trade unionists, and 
teacher and student activists (Pye and Schaffer 2008, 40-41). 
 
By 2005, the Yellow Shirt movement and its organisation, the PAD, became a well-
organised protest movement. With support from various social and political forces and 
the strong leadership of Sondhi Limthongkul, it was equipped with professional 
communications tools including ASTV, a satellite television station, and Phuchatkan 
(Manager) newspaper, as well as strategic groups. The loose constellation of anti-TRT 
force started unifying in early 2006 when Sondhi took his weekly programme Muang 
Thai Raisapda, which was banned by the Thaksin government, to Thammasat 
University, and then to an open-air setting in Lumpini Park in Bangkok. It then 
expanded and gained crucial momentum when Thaksin faced the scandal of his tax 
avoidance in connection with the sale of his Shin Corporation to the Singaporean state 
investment company Temasek Holdings. In early 2006, the PAD reached its first peak. 
It was able to mobilise more than 300,000 protesters in Bangkok and other provinces to 
oust Thaksin as Prime Minister. By the end of February, under strong pressure from the 
opposition, Thaksin dissolved Parliament and quickly called for new elections. 
Nonetheless, the anti-TRT forces and the three major political parties – the Democrat 
(Prachathipat), Thai Nation (Chart Thai) and Mass (Mahachon) – declined to participate 
in the general election. They knew that Thaksin would win the new election owing to 
his continuing mass support. To relieve social pressures, Thaksin promised not to 
become Prime Minister in the new parliament. However, after another landslide victory 
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in the April 2006 election, Thaksin returned to act as interim Prime Minister with the 
excuse of taking care of the King’s sixtieth jubilee celebrations. On his return, he 
quickly faced efforts to oust him, both on the streets of Bangkok and on the part of 
powerful members of the Thai establishment. The tension between the protesters and 
the government intensified. This confrontation temporarily ended with a military coup 
d’état on 19th September 2006 which successfully overthrew the Thaksin government 
and forced Thaksin to flee Thailand for exile abroad (Montesano 2009, 3-9).  
 
The victory of the Yellow Shirts did not last long. Although the coup-installed 
government of retired General Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) oversaw the judicially-
ordered dissolution the TRT Party, the freezing of Thaksin’s assets, and the drafting of a 
new constitution which was expected to diminish support for Thaksin’s rule (Chairat 
2009, 55-68), it could neither reduce the popularity of Thaksin among his mass 
supporters nor uproot his political influence. In the December 2007 elections, in spite of 
strong efforts by the military and bureaucracy to dampen the influence of vote 
canvassers in former TRT strongholds, the People Power’s Party (phalang prachachon), 
successor to Thaksin’s TRT Party, won again. Furthermore, although Thaksin was 
officially judged guilty (in absentia) of conflict of interest involving his then wife 
Pojaman in a land deal while he was in office, the Thai authorities were unable to 
apprehend him. Subsequently, the Yellow Shirt movement resumed its fight. In May 
2008, the PAD began its campaign to topple the government in what was proclaimed as 
a ‘final war’. In June, they seized Government House to put pressure on the People 
Power’s Party leader and Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej (January-September 2008), 
a veteran right wing-politician with royalist credentials. In September, Samak was sued 
and forced to resign over his violation of Article 267 of the Constitution on conflict of 
interest by hosting two television cooking programmes during his term of office. 
Nonetheless, a majority of votes in the lower house replaced Samak with Somchai 
Wongsawat (September-December 2008), Thaksin’s brother-in-law. In the eyes of the 
PAD and anti-Thaksin groups, Somchai was a ‘nominee’ of the exiled Thaksin. A 
violent clash between the PAD and the government in October 2008 aggravated the 
conflict. At the end of 2008, the PAD Yellow Shirts occupied Bangkok’s Don Muang 
and Suvarnabhumi International Airports to demand the resignation of the government. 
Only a few days after the airport was occupied, the People Power’s Party was dissolved 
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by the Constitutional Court40
 
. Nonetheless, instead of a general election, as the For 
Thais Party (Pheu Thai) (successor to the People Power’s Party) demanded, six parties 
pulled together and formed a coalition government headed by the Democrat Party 
(Prachathipat), the second biggest party strongly supported by a Friends of Newin 
group, a defector from the People Power’s Party backed by the military (Askew 2010b, 
36-42; McCargo 2009, 7; Nostitz 2009, 33-38).  
In spite of its victory, under the rule of Abhisit Vejjajiva (2005-2008), the Yellow Shirt 
movement soon encountered fragmentation and decline. The major issues were the 
effort to establish a Yellow Shirt political party and the position with regard to the 
Abhisit government. Whilst the PAD leadership intended to form the New Politics Party 
and persistently criticised the Democrat Party government for its corruption and 
policies, the majority of Yellow Shirts were Democrat Party supporters (Nelson 2010). 
As the Abhisit government stayed on in power, huge numbers of Democrat Party 
Yellow Shirts distanced themselves from the movement.  
 
In terms of ideology and discourse, the PAD at the beginning mainly focused on a 
liberal campaign and styled itself as a democratic watchdog. The PAD campaigned 
against the inefficiency of populist policies, and the corrupt, authoritarian and hyper-
capitalist nature of the TRT government (Kasian 2006a; Connors 2008b, 483; 
Montesano 2009, 2-3). As the conflict developed, the movement’s strategies were 
gradually framed around more controversial concepts including royalism, nationalism 
and anti-democratic ideas. The PAD integrated royalist ideological strategies (Askew 
2010, 3-4; Thongchai 2008b, 30-33). From the beginning of 2006, the PAD used 
Yellow Shirts to symbolise its members as protectors of the King (yellow represents the 
colour of the day of the week on which the King was born). Later, the PAD campaigned 
for a premier directly appointed by the King, based on the putative applicability of 
Article 7 of the 1997 constitution, as well as enforcement of a lèse-majesté suit as a 
tactic against Thaksin. Eventually the PAD and its liberal-conservative elite allies 
labelled Thaksin and his mass supporters among the poor as a threat to the royal 
institution and alleged that Thaksin was an anti-monarchist motivated by the intention 
                                               
40 ‘Critics noted a number of irregularities in the court proceedings, which suggested that judges had 
made up their minds on the dissolution before the final defending statements of the People Power Party 
(Phalang Prachachon)’ (Askew 2010b, 40-41).  
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to establish a republic (Connors 2008a; Connors 2008b; Han 2010, 211-212; McCargo 
2009, 14-16; Ukrist 2008, 131-132; Montesano 2009, 5-6 and 10). 
 
In the same vein, the PAD promoted ultra-nationalist sentiments among its supporters. 
The selling of Thaksin’s Shin Corp shareholders to Temasek, a Singaporean company, 
and his tax evasion were highlighted, and it was alleged that Thaksin was a national 
traitor selling national interests to a foreign company. The PAD mobilised xenophobic 
paranoia to challenge the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the 
ownership of Preah Vihear. With the support of the Democrat Party (Prachathipat), they 
argued that Thaksin intended to accept that this UNESCO heritage site belong to the 
Cambodia in exchange for business concessions in Cambodia (Askew 2010b, 34-35; 
Connor 2008b, 489; Pavin 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the PAD supported non-democratic politics in fighting against the TRT 
government. Initially, it campaigned to legitimise a revival of the non-elected elite. In 
mid-2006, the PAD leaders promoted the role of Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, Privy 
Councillor, as an ‘extra-constitutional figure’ as a plot against Thaksin (Montesano 
2009; Connors 2008b, 483). Moreover, its militant demonstrations provided a pretext 
for the military to intervene against the TRT government (Ukrist 2008, 125). After the 
19th September coup d’état, PAD leaders worked to legitimise the military by arguing 
that the military was a new instrument in uprooting the ‘Thaksin regime’ and stood 
side-by-side with the non-elected Surayud Chulanont government (NS 2007c). In 
subsequent proposals for the 2007 constitution and later in 2008 in campaigns against 
the Samak government, the PAD aggressively fostered the ideas of a ‘New Politics’ – 
occupational/sectoral representation in parliament, and reducing directly-elected 
representatives to just 30 per cent of parliamentary seats (later modified to 50 per cent). 
This move expressed pent-up frustration with the opportunities offered by conventional 
electoral democracy for corrupt politicians to maintain power and for the majority rural 
and urban poor to dominate Thai parliamentary politics through majoritarian rule.  
(McCargo 2009, 18; Connor 2008b, 490: Nelson 2010; Askew 2010a, 8-9).  
 
Even though some of the PAD leaders argued that they did not agree with or believe in 
these regressive ideas, but used them only as symbolic strategies to block the powerful 
corrupt regime of Thaksin (McCargo 2009, 19), by late 2007, the anti-TRT movement 
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was identified by several academics as a liberalist-conservative force with ideologies 
connected to the palace, military, bureaucracy, and the liberal elite against the politics of 
new capital and its democratic mass supporters (Connor 2008b, 490-491).  
 
As the power of Thaksin and the Octobrists inside the TRT Party grew, they no longer 
compromised with any opposition forces or the Octobrists on the opposing side. In 
fighting against the TRT government and their Octobrist friends inside the party, 
countless Octobrists joined the PAD and pursued its right wing ideological tactics in 
mobilising legitimacy and support to attack the strong TRT regime and their former 
comrades inside the party. At the same time, they utilised the term ‘Octobrist’ to 
legitimise themselves and delegitimise their former comrades among the ‘Red Shirts’. 
In response to these pressures, some Octobrists inside the TRT started abandoning the 
party, while many others remained with the TRT and persisted in protecting both 
Thaksin and the party, and using the same non-progressive tactics against their former 
comrades in the Yellow camp.  
 
Octobrists in the anti-TRT movement  
 
As the conflict began, Octobrists who had been negatively affected by and disagreed 
with the TRT government started to perceive the TRT Party as a political threat to them. 
However, owing to their diverse interests and affiliations, they initially participated in 
different anti-TRT groups rather than form a unified movement. Those with authority 
like Nirun Pitakwatchara, Karun Saignarm (Octobrist senators) and Jaran Dhitthapichai 
(National Human Rights Commission member) mobilised to attack Thaksin and the 
TRT, whilst independent Octobrist social activists like Weng Tojirakarn worked 
wholeheartedly to fight against the corruption of Thaksin in the name of the People’s 
Network Against Corruption (khrueakhai prachachon tan khorapchan) and the 
Democratic Federation (klum samaphan prachathipatai). Successful Octobrist 
businesspersons like Prasarn Maruekpitak joined hands with other politically active 
businessmen to criticise Thaksin through the ‘Democratic Business Club (chomrom nak 
thurakit phuea prachathipatai)’. Octobrist academics like Somkiet Pongpaibul, Kasian 
Tejapira, and Thirayuth Boonmee, came out with petitions against the government and 
other campaigns and protest actions. And countless other Octobrist NGO workers 
promoted their campaign criticising its development policies, such as Vanida 
234 
 
Tantiwittayapitak (Assembly of the Poor - samacha khon chon), Pittaya Wongkul and 
Pipob Thongchai (Campaign for Popular Democracy – khana kamakan ronarong phuea 
prachathipatai), and Suwit Watnoo (Four Regions Slum Network - khrueakhai slum si 
phak).  
 
In the formation of the PAD, Octobrists in the loose anti-TRT networks gradually 
joined in. Some were active core leaders and organisers. Others acted as major 
supporters and participants. Among the nine formal leaders of the PAD41, six of them 
shared a common background as Octobrists: Pipob Thongchai, Somkiet Pongpaibul, 
Somsak Kosaisuk, Chaiwat Sinsuwong, Amorn Amornratananon and Terdphoom 
Jaidee. In spite of their numbers, in reality, they did not have as much power as other 
more conservative leaders like Sondhi Limthongkul and Maj-Gen Chamlong Srimuang. 
This was partly because of two major reasons. Firstly, in comparison with Sondhi, with 
elite and middle class support, and Chamlong, with his Dharma army from the Santi 
Asok Buddhist sect42
                                               
41 There were six leaders at the beginning of the movement. Three more were later appointed in August 
2008 when the first group of leaders was charged with an attempt to seize Government House.  
, they, rather than the real followers or financial supporters, were 
chosen to shore up the good reputation of the Yellow Shirts (Ukrist 2008, 132-133). 
Secondly, their different affiliations were fragmented. For example, Somkiet 
Pongpaibul had been prominent in the PAD rallies as an MP of the Democrat Party 
(Prachathipat) (Askew 2010b, 44). In terms of unity, most of them did not trust Amorn. 
This was because before joining the PAD, he had long worked with the TRT and many 
other corrupt politicians.  He turned 180 degrees against the TRT only in mid 2006 (KT 
2006d). Kamnoon Sidhisamarn, who was the real right-hand of Sondhi, was distrusted 
by several Octobrists in the movement. Kamnoon broke with other radical students in 
the 1970s. He was a former Thammasat law student activist and General Secretary of 
42 Chamlong Srimuang has long successfully mobilized support both for his political parties and other 
political campaigns from members of Santi Asoke, a Buddhist sect established by Samana Phothirak. 
Both during the formation of the Moral Force Party (Palang Dharma) in 1988 and Chamlong’s political 
involvement in the May 1992 people’s uprising, members of the Santi Asoke sect worked as the backbone 
for all political activities under his leadership. Although from time to time, there were fights between 
Santi Asoke members like Chamlong who intransigently insisted on their principles and rejected 
compromise (the so-called "temple" faction) and its pragmatic faction of secular politicians with in the 
party, these members consistently stood on the side of Chamlong (Mackenzie, Rory 2007, 128-130; 
McCargo 1997). Even when Chamlong moved to the TRT party and eventually the PAD, Santi Asoke 
members wholeheartedly supported his political campaigns and guidance.  
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the National Student Centre of Thailand (sun klang nisit naksueksa haeng prathet thai) 
in 1975. Above all, as a liberal student he went against the leadership of the CPT and 
supported Pin Buo-on, a prominent socialist activist who left the CPT after an 
ideological conflict. Since then he had become a black sheep among Octobrists. His 
later close relationship with Sondhi rather than with his generation in the social 
movement distanced him from others (Kan, interview by author, 2 February 2006, 
Bangkok).  
 
Besides those leading figures, a large number of Octobrists supported the PAD. At the 
beginning of the movement in 2006, around 70–80 percent of Octobrists supported the 
movement (TP 2006a). Many leading Octobrist figures either joined the PAD protest or 
publicly announced their support of the PAD (PT 2006; BP 2006a). Moreover, several 
Octobrists encouraged their heirs to organise student political groups in the name of the 
‘Democratic Student Group (klum nakrian phuea prachathipatai)’ and ‘Thinking Force – 
Democratic Seed (klum raeng khit ton kla prachathipatai)’ to support the PAD on its 
protest stage (KT 2006b). 
 
In terms of ideas and activities, many leading popular intellectual Octobrists started 
their anti-TRT campaign with liberal ideas monitoring the corruption in the government 
and its inefficient populist policies. Kasian Tejapira and Anek Laothamatas were 
leading figures. From the early stage of the government, Kasian (2001b; 2001c) and 
Anek (2006) used the term prachaniyom (populism) to illustrate the irresponsibility of 
the government in using huge funds for non-sustainable development policies in 
exchange for the support of the mass poor (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 65). And later on 
when the anti-TRT movement sparked up, Kasian successfully coined the powerful 
term of rabob Thaksin (Thaksin regime), a frightening image of a quasi-absolutist 
regime, which was later used repeatedly by all anti-TRT forces (Kasian 2006b). 
Countless Octobrist academics and NGO workers also produced works and campaigns 
in line with these ideas.  
 
However, when the PAD started to integrate royalist, nationalist and anti-democratic 
ideological strategies, most of the Octobrists inside the PAD followed suit. Thirayuth 
Boonmee, who had never publicly announced his support for the PAD, made a public 
statement that paralleled the PAD nationalist, royalist and non-democratic campaign. 
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Also, many echoed the nationalist attack on Thaksin for selling his Shin Corp shares to 
the Singaporean Temasek Co. Weng Tojirakarn gave a speech on the PAD stage to 
protest that ‘Thaksin no longer has the legitimacy to rule this country. Today he 
[Thaksin] sold off national autonomy, lied to all the Thai people, and behaved as the 
authoritarian owner of Shin Corp. It is enough. We have to get Thaksin out’ (NN 2006). 
 
Furthermore, the royalist ideological strategy was accepted by majority of Octobrists in 
the PAD (TP 2006a). Many prominent Octobrists signed a petition calling for the 
King’s intervention in politics by royally nominating a Prime Minister, and petitioned 
the Crown about the problem of Thaksin43
 
. Popular intellectual Pittaya Wongkul used 
his weekly articles to reveal his moral support for implementation of Article 7 of the 
Constitution (Pittaya 2004, 4). Thirayuth Boonmee was really scared that the PAD 
might fail to dislodge Thaksin. Therefore, he publicly expressed his support for the 
controversial appeal for royal intervention to appoint a new Prime Minister under 
Article 7 (MR 2006b):  
‘According to Thai tradition people can seek help from His Majesty. I have 
no objection to that and I don’t think those calling [for it] are 
regressive…theoretically speaking, [critics of royal intervention] should step 
beyond the Western frame of thinking. His Majesty the King can provide the 
final resolution or conclusion to the conflict when all system of checks and 
balances have become dysfunctional or the country faces grave crises like 
the uprisings of October 1973 or May 1992’  
(TN 2006b)  
 
Furthermore, they supported enforcement of the lèse-majesté law in attacking the pro-
TRT movement. Kamnoon Sidhisamarn wrote many articles supporting and 
legitimising the role of the monarchy to intervene in political crises. He argued that 
                                               
43 Kahmnoon Sidhisamarn (journalist), Thirayuth Boonmee (lecturer at Thammasat University), Prasarn 
Maruekapitak (businessman and politician), Pipob Thongchai (NGO activist), Wasan Sittiket (Artist), 
Viroj Tangwanij (businessman), Somsak Kosaisuk (labour unionist), Sarachai Jantimatorn (singer), 
Pichien Amnatworapraserkul (activist) are examples of Octobrists who signed the petition appealing for 
the King’s intervention. Furthermore, Sangsidh Piriyarangsan (lecturer at Chulalongkorn University), 
Nirun Pitakwatchara (senator), Maleerat Keawkah (senator) and others signed a petition to the Crown 
about corruption and abuse of power by Thaksin on 5th March 2006. 
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while governments and cabinets changed, the monarchy continued as an institution and 
it had long experience in taking care of the country (KT 2006c).  As a member of the 
National Legislative Assembly (NLA) of the Surayud government, equivalent to an MP 
in an elected parliament, Kamnoon argued in support of new measures to use the lèse-
majesté law in handling illegal protests and preventing violations of the lèse-majesté 
law. 
 
Not only did Octobrists in the PAD promote strategic right wing issues, they also 
pursued its anti-democratic ideas and supported undemocratic and non-elected forces. In 
fighting against the TRT government, many of them publicly stood up to support the 
military coup d’état, something they fought against during the 1970s. While Pichian 
Amnartworaprasert and Cholthira Sattayawattana spoke at the of 30th anniversary 
celebration of 6th October, about their sympathy for and pride in the coup, others like 
Thirayuth Boonmee did not stand up against it. Instead, they carried on criticising the 
TRT government and said that they would give the nominated government and military 
time to solve the political crisis (LWN 2006a). Somchai Homla-or criticised the impact 
of retaining the emergency decree as the law violated human rights. However he did not 
condemn the coup (TP 2006b). 
 
These Octobrists collaborated with the non-elected government appointed by the King 
and backed by the military. Instead of strong criticism, like that against the Thaksin 
administration and earlier governments, Thirayuth Boonmee coined a sympathetic name 
for the government as the ‘OT’ government, which he said could stand for either the 
‘Old Technocrat’ or ‘Over Time’ government which devoted its retirement years to 
solving the crisis for the country (MS 2006; NS 2007b). Sangsidh Piriyarangsan and 
Kamnoon Sidhisamarn accepted positions as members of the National Legislative 
Assembly, and under the 2007 constitution, Kamnoon was appointed as senator under 
the PAD quota. These Octobrists urged the Surayud government to take retaliatory 
measures to uproot the TRT regime and its cronies. Thirayuth Boonmee, Prasarn 
Maruekpitak, Chaiwat Sinsuwong, Anek Laothamatas, Tienchai Wongchaisuwan, 
Somkiet Pongpaibul and Sangsidh Piriyarangsan echoed this message regularly in the 
media (NS 2007b; NS 2007c).  
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At the same time, these Octobrists actively advocated ‘New Politics’ and political 
intervention by extra-constitutional powers. Octobrists in the PAD strongly supported 
the idea of having 70 percent of MPs nominated (by a method that was never made clear 
by the PAD) and 30 percent elected. At the same time those on the constitutional 
drafting committee and in the National Legislative Assembly proposed and supported 
non-electoral political ideas like changing the selection method for senators from 
election to nomination. Also, popular Octobrist intellectual Thirayuth Boonmee became 
a major advocate of the ‘judicialisation’ of politics under the neologism ‘tulakarn 
piwat’ (judicialisation) (MR 2006c). This was the effort to use judicial power to counter 
the power of the TRT and the support of their ‘16 million votes’. In the end the 
Constitutional Tribunal successfully dissolved the TRT. In supporting this process, 
Thirayuth suggested that the judiciary should play a role in reforming the country’s 
political system amid a prolonged deadlock. He referred to the King’s April 25 speech 
in which judges of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court were 
urged to step in to resolve the months-old political deadlock (BP 2006b; TN 2006d; TN 
2006e). This idea later became very popular among the anti-TRT movement.  
 
In pursuing these non-progressive ideological strategies, most Octobrists interviewed 
argued that they did not believe in these conservative ideas. They agreed with them only 
as strategies for the movement to attack their antagonists. As the Thaksin regime was 
powerful, there were few political forces which could fight against TRT. Although they 
disagreed with Article 7 and the coup, they could hardly deny that these actors could 
bring them political victory in fighting a corrupt government like the TRT. Similarly, 
they did not wholeheartedly trust Sondhi, the PAD leader. They perceived those in the 
PAD as potential allies and stepping stones to getting rid of Thaksin. For example, 
Amorn Amornratananon argued that he wrote many newspaper articles on his 
disagreement with the coup and Surayud government (NS 2007a).  
 
In addition to their dissatisfaction and battle with the TRT Party, Octobrists in the anti-
TRT movement also fought against their former friends from the 1970s. Their initial 
strategy was to call Octobrists in the TRT naïve, misguided and traitorous, attacking 
their former comrades for their poor work performance and abuse of power. Initially, 
some criticised their friends in the party with the soft arguments that they were naïve 
former leftists with good intentions (KH 2002). Suwit Watnoo commented that 
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Octobrists were just in the outer circles of the party and were daydreamers. He warned 
these people to stop thinking that they would be able to make use of Thaksin. In reality, 
they were being used by Thaksin. Thaksin was a cunning executive and manipulator 
who had known how to exploit both left and right wings (TP 2003e). Some like Vanida 
Tantiwittayapitak, prominent Octobrist Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - 
AOP) advisor, also tried to warn her friends about the excessive use of force in dealing 
with AOP protesters by reminding them about the mistakes of the government during 
the 6th October incident of discrediting the people’s movement and creating a culture of 
hatred (MR 2002b).  
 
Even though they knew that in reality, their friends did not have the authority or 
opportunity to respond to their demands (KH 2002), when the problem of mishandling 
protesters appeared, Octobrists who worked closely with this social movement were 
immediately condemned. Phumtham Wechayachai, secretary to the Interior Minister, 
was publicly attacked and accused of acting behind the government use of the Anti-
Money Laundering law against NGOs and journalists (TN 2002a; KCL 2003). When the 
protest camps of the AOP in front of Government House were destroyed by unknown 
people and were forced to move away by the Bangkok governor, Vanida 
Tantiwittayapitak called on Octobrists in the government to take responsibility (MD 
2002b). Chaturon Chaisang and Phumtham Wechayachai clarified that they were 
neither aware of nor involved in these actions (KS 2003b). In the campaign against the 
privatisation of state enterprises and the construction of new electric plants, Weng 
Tojirakarn, who actively supported many organisations on consumer rights issues, gave 
a sarcastic interview about the changing behaviour of Prommin Lertsuridej, his senior 
friend since the Mahidol Medical School who had been appointed as Minister of 
Energy.  
 
‘After the demonstration of state enterprise workers, he (Prommin) called 
me. So I told him (Than) as a ‘Phu Yai [important person]’ of this country he 
should be generous and open-minded to listen to the ‘Phu Noi’ ordinary 
citizens like us. He should look at us with a friendly attitude, not as an 
enemy. … I also suggested a referendum on this matter. But he refused and 
argued that it was too late. But I think nothing is too late for improving any 
law regarding public affairs’. 
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(Thai Post Tabloid 2003) 
 
After learning that their former comrades insisted on remaining in and supporting the 
TRT, stronger criticisms linked with their 1970s political background escalated. 
Countless comments in the newspapers called these people ‘leftist traitors’ who had 
already sold their souls to capitalism and corrupt politics. The core argument was that 
these former socialists turned away from radical and democratic ideas in exchange for 
their own political and financial interests (TP 2003b; LWN 2003b). Some pointed out 
that these Octobrists obtained their political positions and interests by trading on their 
‘Octobrist’ status, networks and skills developed during the 1970s (TP 2001c). Amorn 
Amornratananon, who had also earlier worked for the TRT, revealed in his open letter 
to their friends in TRT about how these people used money to buy the support of former 
CPT comrades in rural areas for the TRT (KT 2006d). Pittaya Wongkul, a freelance 
academic and social critic, assaulted these Octobrists as servants of authoritarianism.  
 
‘Some volunteered to be servants of an authoritarian CEO for the benefit of 
power. They are no different from someone who paddles the boat for a 
pirate. They claimed to be working for society in the name of democracy and 
the Octobrist soul. They only know how to construct and manipulate the 
Octobrist image. And now they try to use the October anniversary as a ritual 
to legitimise their role. … Thus, we have to be careful about inviting any of 
these politicians to give a talk or opening remarks at the October 
anniversary. Don’t offer opportunities for these supporters of 
authoritarianism.’  
(Pittaya 2004, 4) 
 
Many revealed their disappointment with the Octobrists who were in power. Suwit 
Watnoo, veteran slum NGO worker complained that the situation and the relationship 
among Octobrists inside and outside government under TRT was worse than during the 
Chuan Leekpai government. He argued that at least the Octobrists in the Chuan 
government did not act against the Octobrists in social movements. Meanwhile his 
trusted former comrades in the Thaksin government took severe action against him in 
defence of the government. Similarly, Jaran Dhitthapichai, the National Human Rights 
Commissioner, was disappointed with his friends in the TRT. He said that during the 
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first two years, most people in the government were always willing to help those in 
social movements and civil society, but no longer in the third year. Many stopped being 
involved with their friends and issues related to social movements. They carried on 
working in their positions (TP 2003e).  
 
Several individuals were severely attacked in corruption scandals. Phumtham 
Wechayachai was denounced over the rapid increase in his assets due to his connections 
with corrupt politicians. For example, Phuchatkan Raiwan (Manager Daily)  newspaper 
revealed that thorough his connections within the TRT Party, he owned a restaurant in a 
National Park in Chiang Mai Province, and one of his relatives, Sunisa Wechayachai, 
owned more than three companies connected with the Thaksin family (PCT 2006a; MD 
2006). They were also alleged to be promoting old style money and coalition politics. 
For example, as a head of the TRT Secretary-General’s office, Phumtham was described 
by party insiders as election campaign manager. He was at the centre of a controversy 
when it was reported that the TRT was undertaking a comprehensive survey of the 
political allegiance of key civil servants and community leaders across the nation. 
Although the party denied that it was behind such a survey, nobody provided assurances 
that it was not taking place (TN 2002b). 
 
Many of them were also called ‘loyal guard dogs of Thaksin’ or ‘flunkeys of a tyrant’, 
because of their protective actions in defence of the TRT and their loyalty to Thaksin 
(MD 2005). Phumtham, as Deputy Minister of Transport, was sued by Veera 
Somkwamkit, an Octobrist anti-corruption campaigner, over his protection of Thaksin 
and TRT’s business cronies (PCT 2006c). For instance, Phumtham pushed the 
privatisation of state enterprises like the Thai Maritime Navigation Co. Ltd. which were 
bought by companies with which he had connections. He also dissolved the Express 
Transportation Organisation of Thailand which offered new opportunities for private 
companies (KT 2005; PCT 2006a). He was also accused of providing support for Thai 
Air Asia which later had a majority share-holding by the Shin Corporation owned by 
the Shinawatra family (TS 2006a). Surapong Suebwonglee, a former medical student 
activist who was then Minister of Communication, was also denounced for providing 
support to Asia Info Services, Thaksin’s company (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 27).  
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There were campaigns calling for Octobrists in the TRT to resign and suspend their 
support for Thaksin and the party. For instance, after the Tak Bai incident and many 
other cases of state violence, many gathered in the name of Dome United (Dome Ruam 
Jai) and (former) ‘Thammasat University student’ groups called on their Octobrist 
friends to resign from the Thaksin government. Dr. Prayong Temchawala, former 
President of Mahidol University Student Union, called on his 1970s activist friends to 
stand up against the government (KT 2006b).  
 
In parallel with the term ‘Octobrist’, Octobrists in the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(phanthamit – PAD) used royalist, nationalist and non-democratic language and 
arguments to assault their former comrades in the TRT. Some were surprisingly similar 
to those used by 1970s ultra-right wing movements to attack radical movements. They 
labelled their friends as extreme leftists who intended to overthrow the monarchy, 
revive the CPT, and make Thailand a republic. In mid 2006 when the PAD had its 
broadest base of support, several Octobrists and activists in the PAD released 
information about a ‘Finland Declaration’. They claimed that in 1999, Thaksin was 
inspired by anti-monarchy Octobrists during their trip to Finland to overthrow the 
monarchy. This initial idea was later termed the ‘Finland Declaration (patinya Finland)’. 
Kamnoon Sidhisamarn, Sophong Supapong and Pramoj Nakornthap, took turns to 
allege that under this plot the TRT and former radical student activists attempted to 
disempower the monarchy (Han 2010, 211-212). They also claimed that they pushed 
forward many anti-royalty policies including changing the national anthem, eliminating 
the Garuda (symbol of state and royal approval) from national ID cards, defending the 
book ‘The King Never Smiles’ which criticises the role of the current King, and acting 
in a contemptuous manner toward His Majesty the King by asking him to sign an illegal 
declaration. Through this initiative, Octobrists outside the TRT sent a strong message 
that Thaksin’s Octobrist political advisors were leftists joining hands with new 
capitalists to overthrow the monarchy. Amorn Amornratananon and Pittaya Wongkul 
were among those who aggressively advocated this issue. Amorn used to work with the 
TRT and then turned his support to the PAD. He claimed to guarantee that the Finland 
Declaration was real as he used to work in the TRT (Thanapol 2007, 309-10). Through 
his popular weekly articles, Pittaya confirmed the Finland Declaration. He argued that 
the Octobrists in the TRT were radicals who applied out-of-date leftist ideology in 
promoting a capitalist revolution and overthrowing ‘Sakdina-Thai feudalism’ or the 
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institution of the monarchy to legitimise and support their authoritarian capitalist CEO 
regime (Pittaya 2006, 4).  
 
In addition to allegations about the Finland Declaration, Yellow Shirt Octobrists also 
attacked individual Octobrists for plotting against the monarchy. Kamnoon Sidhisamarn 
alleged that Somsak Jeamteerasakul was used to sustain Thaksin in power and his 
proposal for reforming the monarchy was an attempt to push Thailand to becoming a 
democratic country without the King (Kamnoon 2007b). He claimed that there were 
movements attempting to oppose the monarchy comprising ‘aggressive capitalists’ and 
‘broken-hearted communists’. He explained that the second group was those who tried 
to fight the monarchy during the 1970s. But he argued that not all former communists 
now thought the same (Kamnoon 2007b). On the other hand, Kamnoon claimed that 
Pichit Likitjitsomboom, a critical Octobrist academic at Thammasat University, who 
later on was labelled as a pro-TRT popular academic, had worked to advocate 
‘democracy of the people’ as opposed to a democratic system of government with the 
King as Head of State. There were also several open letters from Octobrists in the PAD 
against Thongchai Winichakul for his critiques of the royalist and nationalist ideas of 
the PAD. They claimed that his ideas were a result of his painful personal experiences 
during the 6th October incident without reconsidering the changing political context. 
They also rejected his argument that they had all turned into right wing supporters. 
Instead, they said that Thongchai was the one who forgot what Thaksin did to Thai 
society which was even worse than the 6th October incident (KT 2006g; MR 2006h). 
 
Beside the anti-monarchy issue, Octobrists in the TRT were also alleged to have the 
intention of reviving the CPT through their work with the TRT. Through his famous 
political column in Phuchatkan (Manager) newspaper, Kamnoon Sidhisamarn was a 
major advocate. He released evidence of their efforts to mobilise support from leading 
figures in the TRT and former comrades in the rural areas by advocating the idea that 
they had to support a capitalist party to achieve a capitalist revolution and overthrow the 
monarchy before establishing a capitalist and later a socialist state (Kamnoon 2007a).  
 
Although the Finland Declaration has never been verified, these allegations were 
powerful enough to become one of the major political accusations of the PAD. It was 
proclaimed as a momentous affirmation of a linkage between the influential role of 
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Octobrists and Thaksin’s alleged intention to erode the constitutional monarchy and 
establish a republic. This kind of message reshaped public perception about the 
ideological legacy of the Octobrists. It forcefully guided the public to believe that the 
Octobrists were following a mission to destroy the monarchy and capitalism.  
 
Reaction from Octobrists inside the TRT – leave the party or fight to defend their 
stronghold 
 
Under severe attack from the anti-TRT movement and with the temporary downturn of 
the TRT after the coup, some Octobrists inside the party persistently and combatively 
defended Thaksin and the TRT Party against the anti-TRT campaigns. However, many 
others dropped out and switched to work with other political cliques.  
 
Those who remained with the party argued that the TRT was still the party with an 
alternative policy platform and was democratically supported by the majority in 
comparison with other parties and non-state actors. Both Prommin Lertsuridej and 
Kriengkamol Laohapairoj repeatedly proclaimed the success of TRT’s pro-poor policies 
and defended the party against negative comments about their failure in policy 
implementation (TP 2003f). They claimed that the unprecedented popular mass vote for 
the TRT reflected the popularity of the pro-poor policies with the public (TR 2006a). 
They also sent out the message that Thaksin was still the only capable and legitimate 
choice for Prime Minister. Against public critiques of Thaksin’s authoritative CEO 
working style and corruption scandals, Phumtham Wechayachai and Kriengkamol 
Laohapairoj argued that Thaksin Shinawatra was sincere, wise, creative and decisive 
(TP 2003d). They claimed that they were close to Thaksin and understood how difficult 
his job was and how much effort he put into promoting progressive policies (MR 
2002b).  Although they admitted that he was sometimes outspoken, Thaksin was still 
the most capable person to be Prime Minister compared to other choices (TP 2003g). 
Furthermore, they persistently worked to defend Thaksin and fought against the coup 
and the PAD. During the last minutes of the government before the coup when Thaksin 
was in New York attending the UNGA conference, Prommin was still coordinating with 
all television stations to broadcast Thaksin’s statement. Even after he left the party, he 
still worked for Thaksin but kept a low profile. After Thaksin suspended his political 
role after the coup, Chaturon Chaisang accepted an offer to act as interim TRT Party 
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leader. By protecting the elected political party, he fought strongly against the anti-TRT 
groups (SR 2006). Adisorn Piengket and Saman Lertwongrat were among the few who 
stood side by side with Chaturon and promoted him as a ‘democratic hero’. Adisorn 
remained a committee member of the TRT, while Saman acted as party registrar (NS 
2007b). 
 
At the same time, they fought back against direct insults from their friends and the rise 
of anti-TRT campaigns. Initially, most Octobrists inside the TRT called for an 
understanding that working in real politics was tough and insisted that they would still 
actively work to promote a progressive agenda. Phumtham was one of those who 
emphasised his standpoint of developing a better relationship between state and society. 
He asked his friends to understand the limitations of dealing with all demands and 
expectations. He was condemned for not joining a meeting with his Octobrist friends in 
the anti-Rasi Salai dam movement when he had to be in another meeting dealing with 
the problem of the Assembly of the Poor (samacha khon chon - AOP) (TP 2002). 
Similarly, Kriengkamol tried to argue that he did not work with the TRT for money 
(PCT 2006b), and would remain with the TRT only if it allowed him to pursue what he 
would like to do. In the case of the Pak Mun dam, he claimed that he understood both 
the demands of the movement and the limitations of the government. He asked 
Octobrist NGO activists, like Vanida Tantiwittayapitak, to be more patient (TP 2003f). 
 
However, after being attacked by their Octobrist friends, many of them started fighting 
back on two major grounds. First of all, they competed to appropriate and monopolise 
the meaning of Octobrist. They began in soft tones by criticising their opponents for 
being too naïve, romantic and stubborn, stuck on polarised ideas of left/right and 
state/people without understanding the reality of parliamentary politics. They also 
complained that their friends did not respect the middle path and put too much pressure 
on the government with militant strategies. Phumtham was really upset and turned his 
back on his friends in the AOP after being shamed by the AOP, when they put a mask 
of his face on a monitor lizard (which is a term of abuse in Thai). He blamed Octobrists 
in the AOP for being behind this even though they denied it (TP 2002). Kriengkamol 
Laohapairoj reckoned his former leftist friends would be wiser to seize the political 
opportunities offered by the TRT. He reckoned that they should shift toward more 
academic and policy-oriented work rather than movement activities (TP 2002; TP 
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2003f). He condemned the mistake of NGO workers in provoking confrontations 
between inexperienced protesters and the police in the case of the movement against the 
Thai-Malaysia gas pipeline, which, he claimed, later caused a violent night-time clash in 
the middle of business district of Hat Yai (TP 2003f). 
 
Furthermore, when the Octobrists’ friends in the PAD turned more conservative, they 
also shifted to denounce them as ‘traitors to the left’. They argued that these people had 
reverted to conservative and right wing ideas and joined hands with the conservative 
elite. Phumtham Wechayachai was one of the first persons in the TRT to start a 
movement against the call for the King’s political intervention in the crisis. He argued 
that it was a symbolic war which Sondhi Limthongkul was trying to manipulate by 
linking royalist ideas with former Octobrists to delegitimise the TRT.  He distributed 
parts of an article, ‘Discourse on the King’s power or short-sighted democracy’ written 
by Thongchai Winichakul, a prominent Octobrist academic activist who strongly 
opposed the use of Article 7, presenting only those parts about the danger of any 
intervention by the King. However, he ignored the parts in which Thongchai criticised 
the Thaksin government (NS 2006b).  
 
Furthermore, they condemned their Octobrist friends and the PAD as anarchists and 
anti-democratic forces. They argued that their friends helped the PAD to promote 
militant protests and support extra-constitutional power in overthrowing a 
democratically elected government which was supported by the majority poor. 
Moreover, they saw the ‘New Politics’ as an anti-liberal democracy and a pro-
aristocratic state campaign (KT 2006e). From the beginning of the PAD until the coup, 
Phumtham Wechayachai condemned the rise of the PAD and the efforts of the former 
elite in promoting the coup as an attempt to topple the government (TN 2005d; TN 
2006f). Aside from attacking the PAD, these Octobrists argued that they were 
‘guardians of democracy’. They worked wholeheartedly to protect an elected political 
regime against anti-democratic movements and non-elected elites. Especially after the 
coup, the leading Octobrists in TRT like Prommin Lertsuridej and Chaturon Chaisang 
condemned the coup for destroying democracy by violating the 1997 constitution, the 
so-called ‘people’s constitution’ (TN 2006g; TN 2006h; TR 2006c). Chaturon also 
refused to send a representative from the TRT to join the National Legislative Assembly 
or work with any organisation of the non-elected government (BP 2006d).  
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Second, they used conservative discourse and measures to delegitimise their comrades 
in NGOs, civil society organisations and academia as obstacles to development. Like 
the government, they intentionally condemned Octobrist NGO development workers as 
‘brokers of the poor’ (KT 2003). They also assailed Octobrist political activists for 
being dominated by foreign agendas and threatening national security because they 
obtained funding from international agencies. They even proposed that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs disclose the budget of targeted NGOs and called on international 
agencies to stop supporting these agencies (KCL 2002; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 144-148; 
MD 2003). In addition, they criticised the role of Octobrist activist academics who 
monitored the TRT as unproductive. For instance, in response to the research about 
corruption under the Thaksin government by Sangsidh Piriyarangsan, a student activist 
during the 1970s and recently a veteran academic focusing on corruption issues, 
Phumtham argued that it was easy for academia to criticise. But their government had to 
get things done and understand the whole system. He also complained about academics’ 
exaggeration of ‘policy corruption’ in their attacks on the TRT (TP 2003a). 
 
To counter accusations of being anti-royalist, they defended their royalist credentials 
and condemned their friends in the PAD for disturbing the King. To survive in a 
conservative political context, most of them repeatedly added that they were and had 
been loyal to the Thai royal institution and the current King and his family even during 
their time as student activists (TN 2005e). In presenting their concerns about the 
monarchy, they denounced the PAD for calling for application of Article 7 as 
inappropriate behaviour disturbing the King. To seize political space through the same 
strategies as the PAD, Phumtham wrote an article interpreting the King’s speech, saying 
that he would like society to be united and not in conflict. He further claimed that the 
PAD’s mobilisation of the anti-TRT movement went against the King’s intention (MR 
2006e). To prove this, he sued Sondhi Limthongkul for writing an article in Phuchatkan 
Raiwan (Manager Daily) that he was a key player in the Finland Declaration. The court 
ruled that the Finland Declaration had no involvement in an overthrow of the monarchy 
(Han 2010, 211). 
 
Nonetheless, not all Octobrists remained as protectors of the TRT. In an atmosphere of 
crisis, several Octobrists who had been disappointed with Thaksin and the TRT 
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withdrew their support from it. For instance, Sunee Chaiyaros left the TRT because of 
her disappointment with the party’s electoral strategies. Sunee was a radical Thammasat 
University feminist activist during the 1970s. Upon her return and before joining the 
TRT, she became a successful local politician, but could not succeed at the national 
level. With a promise from the TRT to support her to run for an MP seat, Sunee spent 
nearly two years formulating women’s policies for the party. However, as a newcomer 
in national elections, she was eventually replaced by her earlier opponent, the former 
successful MP who shifted to the TRT. In compensation for her disappointment, the 
party offered her a low ranking position in the party list which was almost certainly not 
going to win a seat. Eventually, she resigned from the TRT (NN 2000; MD 2000a). 
Meanwhile, other Octobrists were disappointed with the party for distorting radical and 
progressive policies after the electoral victory. In 2003, Praphat Panyachatrak, a non-
politician Octobrist who had been promoted as Minister of National Resources and the 
Environment, was dismissed from his position after several efforts to promote 
progressive programmes which threatened the interests of business groups within the 
party. The TRT and Thaksin also recognised that he could not stop conflicts between 
the party and social movements. 
 
Soon after the coup, the TRT Party was dissolved on charges of violating electoral law 
and corruption in 2007, and the 111 executive members of the party were banned from 
politics for five years. With the decline of the TRT Party, many Octobrist quietly left 
the party and continued their political career with other political parties and cliques. 
With their established reputation as veteran Octobrist politicians and spin doctors, they 
were welcomed by many new parties. Octobrist politicians, spin doctors and 
campaigners like Phumtham Wechayachai, Prommin Lertsuridej and Kriengkamol 
Laohapairoj were contacted by the proposed Sovereignty of Righteousness Party 
(dharma thippatai), led by Somkid Jatusipitak as political coordinator for the party with 
civil society organisations and other former TRT MPs from the northeast (MW 2007). 
Prominent politician Pinit Jarusombat quickly abandoned his image as a TRT supporter 
to become a neutral politician. He announced that his Phaya Naga faction would support 
the role of the Council for National Security (CNS) in solving the political crisis. He 
rallied with other political groups even including earlier opposition parties in 
establishing a ‘Political Reconciliation Alliance’. He quickly developed a new close 
relationship with the Council for National Security and the newly appointed 
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government. Through this he became the only former TRT member who was selected as 
a member of the National Legislative Assembly. Nonetheless, after the dissolution of 
the TRT Party, Pinit and the 110 other members of the TRT were banned from politics 
for five years by the Constitution Tribunal and Pinit finally resigned from the National 
Legislative Assembly. There was a rumour that Pinit planned to support the 
establishment of an ad hoc political party to allow the leader of the Council for National 
Security to step into electoral politics in exchange for an amnesty for the 111 banned 
TRT members. But because of social pressure, the Council for National Security could 
not push forward an amnesty. Phumtham also promptly resigned from the TRT in 
October 2006 immediately after the coup. He carried on his political advisory work with 
new political groups. Praphat Panyachatrak instead was offered the position of deputy 
leader by the Thai Nation Party (Chart Thai) to work on poverty eradication for Thai 
farmers (Pan Bang Keaw 2006, 10-11).  
 
In conclusion, with the proliferation and development of the liberal royalist Yellow 
Shirt movement, Octobrists who had been threatened by the rise of the TRT government 
joined the campaign. As the movement developed, they shifted toward more 
conservative and non-democratic approaches and strategies in attacking both their 
opponents and their Octobrist friends on the opposite side. Nonetheless, those who 
remained with the TRT were little different. In responding to attacks from the Yellow 
Shirts and their friends on the opposite side, they acted as defenders of Thaksin and 
used similar conformist and conservative rhetoric, while those who left the TRT 
continued their political careers in the mode of ‘politics as usual’.  
 
 
7.2 Octobrists and the rise of the Red Shirts  
 
With the rapid growth of the anti-Thaksin forces in 2005-2006, the Red Shirt movement 
started and expanded. Although the Red Shirts were stereotyped as tools of the exiled 
Thaksin, their components and ideologies are diverse and from time to time 
contradictory (Askew 2010a, 3). Initially, the majority of the Red Shirts were from TRT 
constituencies under the loose formation of the National United Front of Democracy 
against Dictatorship (no pho cho - UDD) and joined the movement simply with the 
strong and limited intention of protecting Thaksin, the TRT and its populist policies. 
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Nonetheless, later on when the Yellow Shirt movement shifted in a more conservative 
direction, using nationalist, royalist and anti-democratic ideas, the Red Shirts expanded 
their political agenda to include liberal democracy and more radical elements (Askew 
2010a, 4-5; Surachart 2009).  
 
The initial turning point was the 2006 coup. This incident pushed the Red Shirts beyond 
pro-Thaksin sentiment and made them pay more attention to the significance of 
electoral democracy (Askew 2010a, 8). The coup took away Thaksin and the 
Constitutional Tribunal, set up by the coup group, eventually used the coup declaration 
as law to dissolve the TRT Party, removed the elected leader and government, and 
replaced it with the non-elected Surayud Chulanont government. Therefore, to protect 
the government they had voted for, they had to fight for the return of free elections.  
 
Further radicalisation among the Red Shirts was provoked during their campaign for 
liberal democracy against the ‘double standards’ of the ‘ammat’ (aristocratic 
bureaucrats) and middle class by law enforcement and judicial decisions which went 
against the Red Shirts but supported the Yellow Shirts. While there was no attempt by 
the military and other authorities to intervene in the occupation of Government House 
and Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang international airports by the PAD 
Yellow Shirts, demonstrations of the Red Shirts against the Abhisit Vejjajiva 
government were condemned, and their networks were either eliminated or restricted by 
backlash measures of the conservative elite during ‘Bloody Songkran’ in April 2009. 
While the two parties (the TRT and the People Power’s Party - Palang Prachachon), and 
three Prime Ministers (Thaksin Shinawatra, Samak Sundaravej and Somchai 
Wongsawat) which the majority Red Shirts had elected were dissolved and ousted by 
extra-constitutional and bureaucratic forces, the second biggest party, the Democrat 
Party (Prachathipat) was allowed to form a government and kept out the People Power’s 
Party, the new version of the TRT Party. They strongly denounced the new coalition 
government led by the Democrat Party as a ‘silent coup’ engineered by the military and 
the courts (Askew 2010b, 47-53). 
 
Furthermore, they adopted an agenda of class struggle and equality before the law. 
During the mass mobilisation in 2010, red shirt orators provided a new frame for the 
movement’s cause, identity and enemies: the language of class. They cast the movement 
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as an uprising of phrai - the term for bonded commoner in the pre-modern Thai social 
system - against the conservative ammat. They also embraced Thaksin as an honorary 
phrai (Askew 2010c, 304-305). Furthermore, they identified their movement as an ‘eye-
opening (ta sawang)’ phenomenon. The influence and support of the royalists for the 
Yellow Shirt movement, and the use of Article 112, the lèse-majesté law, to victimise 
Red Shirt leaders, made the Red Shirts prioritise the royal institution as one of the most 
important threats and major forces behind the strength of the Yellow Shirts. Especially 
after the bloodshed in May 2010 when the Abhisit government used a full military 
crackdown on the Red Shirt protest camp at Ratchaprasong, one of the busiest and most 
prestigious shopping districts in Bangkok, after a three-month protest calling for a new 
general election, the Red Shirts turned more and more radical against the royal family in 
the belief that this institution was the real cause of the problem and the violence against 
them (Hewison and Kengkij 2010).  
 
Aside from the Red Shirts from the TRT constituency, many of Thailand’s academics, 
intelligentsia and columnists, many of whom had formerly been Yellow Shirts, started 
turning against the conservative direction of the PAD and criticising the 2006 coup and 
the constitutional/judicial rearrangement that followed it. Several eventually went 
further to support the Red Shirts (Askew 2010a, 9-11). This started when the PAD 
appealed for royal and military intervention. Especially when PAD leaders called for 
implementation of Article 7 of the constitution, many potential allies started distancing 
themselves from the PAD and announcing their disagreement with the PAD’s ideas on 
royal intervention (Pye and Schaffer 2008, 42). They campaigned against the PAD for 
its anti-democratic and pro-bureaucratic bias, its moves to align with the conservative 
elite, and above all its militant campaign in setting up the pretext for the coup and the 
revival of the military in politics (Askew 2010a, 6 and 9-10). Immediately after the 19 
September 2006 coup, they formed a loose network of anti-coup groups acting 
collectively under the name of the ‘19th September network against the coup’. In 
parallel with the Red Shirt movement, they actively campaigned against the non-elected 
government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, the supporting coup group, and 
Prem Tinsulanonda as the person behind the coup, and also against the drafting of the 
2007 constitution and judicialisation of politics as regressive ideas which could lead to 
the domination of the political process by an elite minority (Connor 2008b, 487; MR 
2006d; MD 2007).  
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By mid 2007, the 19 September network split into two. While one part joined hands 
with the Red Shirts, the other launched its new campaign of the ‘Two-No: No Thaksin – 
No coup’.  The first group, led by radical academics and activists like Giles Ungpakorn, 
and Sombat Boon-ngam-anong, viewed the TRT’s supporters as a potential progressive 
and radical mass in fighting against the Yellow Shirt movement and the conservative 
elite. In pushing these people beyond being merely Thaksin’s supporters, they argued 
that it was essential to mainstream the more progressive and democratic agenda in the 
Red Shirts movement. The second group was led by a number of scholars and writers, 
for example those in the Midnight University and Same Sky Magazine (Fa Diao Kan), 
still reluctant to join hands with the pro-TRT movement and unsure if it was an 
organised movement for the political benefit of Thaksin. They therefore insisted on 
campaigning against both the coup and the TRT government. Nonetheless, as the Red 
Shirt movement evolved to become a more spontaneous and more radical movement, 
the latter eventually considered the Red Shirts as the progressive movement and 
switched back to fight either alongside or as a part of the Red Shirt movement. 
Furthermore, because of the increasing use of the lèse-majesté law and other ultra-right 
wing propaganda to silence political dissent, they perceived the non-elected elite and the 
PAD as a more dangerous threat than a corrupt elected Thaksin (Askew 2010a, 10-11) 
 
In this proliferation of the Red Shirts, countless Octobrists played active roles both as 
leading figures or supporters of the movement. In doing so, they not only fought against 
the PAD and supported the Red Shirts, but were in severe competition with their former 
comrades on the opposing side. Nonetheless, Octobrists among the Red Shirts were far 
from unified and sometimes very contentious. Different Octobrists pursued different 
routes to the movement with various ideas. While long-term Octobrists in the TRT 
Party immediately supported the Red Shirt movement, many others began with the anti-
PAD and anti-coup 19th September network, and later on with the ‘Two-No’ campaign. 
However, as the Red Shirts turned more radical and were criticised by their friends 
within the Red Shirt spectrum, they gradually shifted to be either supporters or 
sympathisers of the Red Shirts.  
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Octobrists in the TRT 
 
As mentioned earlier, many Octobrist politicians in the TRT immediately abandoned 
the party after the TRT was dissolved. Nonetheless, several of them were still 
determined to stand beside the party and support the Red Shirts. At the initial stage of 
the Red Shirt movement, there was an effort by Thaksin to promote Phumtham 
Wechayachai, Kriengkamol Laohapairoj, Prommin Lertsuridej and Chaturon Chaisang 
to be the leaders of the Red Shirts (KT 2009). Some of them like Chaturon were alleged 
by Panitan Wattanayakorn, spokesperson of the Abhisit government, to be the mentors 
behind the Red Shirt movement to promote an anti-monarchist approach (US Embassy 
Bangkok 2010). However, because of the diverse and decentralised nature of the 
movement, they became just a small faction within the Red Shirt leadership. Octobrist 
politicians and campaigners like Chaturon, Adisorn, and Kriengkamol, joined the Red 
Shirts on their protest stage, providing strategic assistance, and gave countless 
interviews to enhance and legitimise the movement (KT 2010). Chaturon gave a strong 
speech about his disagreement with the use of violence by Abhisit and the military to 
demolish the Red Shirt movement. He also tried to assert a democratic frame to the 
movement to maintain its reputation for independence from Thaksin. When the 
movement was dominated by a hard-core militant leadership, they tried to convince the 
movement to adopt a non-violent strategy by warning the Red Shirts not to repeat the 
same mistake of the Yellow Shirts (TP 2009). Unlike Chaturon, who kept a certain 
distance from the Red Shirt leadership, Adisorn performed as one of the National 
United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (no pho cho - UDD) leaders. He acted 
as chief executive of the Red Shirt People Channel satellite TV. After the May 2010 
clash, Adisorn faced terrorism charges over the uprising. After a year of hiding 
underground, he surrendered. He was arrested, imprisoned and released on bail in 
March 2011.  
 
Octobrists in the anti-PAD and anti-Coup movements 
 
When the People’s Alliance for Democracy (phanthamit – PAD) started calling for the 
implementation of Article 7, allying with former elite and bureaucratic powers in 
fighting against the TRT and calling for the judicialisation of politics, some Octobrists 
in the anti-TRT movement started moving away and turned to attack the PAD and their 
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former comrades in the PAD. For them these were dangerous ideological strategies 
which supported the revival of the royalist movement and bureaucrats in Thai politics. 
Many leading Octobrists individually came out to criticise the PAD and their former 
comrades in the PAD as ‘right wing lackeys’ who so hated Thaksin that they would 
even use regressive ideological strategies and ally themselves with the conservative 
elite. Somsak Jeamteerasakul, Thongchai Winichakul, Kasian Tejapira, Jaran 
Dhitthapichai and Weng Tojirakarn were prominent Octobrists who acted on the front 
lines against the royalist, nationalist and pro-bureaucratic elite of the anti-TRT 
movement.  
 
Even though Thongchai had earlier attacked the Thaksin government for using 
nationalism in dealing with the southern separatists and other opposition groups, by the 
end of 2005, he criticised the PAD and other former elites on their royalist strategies in 
fighting Thaksin and warned the public of the danger (KS 2006b; Thongchai 2007). He 
argued in his public talk on the 32nd anniversary of 14th October 1973 that the use of 
ultra-nationalist and royalist ideas among the PAD and Thai elite promoted the role of 
royalist forces (MS 2005). He disapproved of Thirayuth Boonmee, his senior, on the 
idea of the judicialisation of politics and many other elitist, royalist and anti-democratic 
views (MR 2006f; Thongchai 2008b, 30-33). He called Thirayuth’s view of the coup as 
a necessary step for democracy and the proposal for a selected (not elected) ‘council for 
moral security’, as ‘nakedly aristocratic,’ with the aristocrats (aphichon - literally the 
superior or higher people) flocking onto the upper level ‘above’ politics (Thongchai 
2006). Even though the former radical activists claimed they embraced a ‘good’ 
nationalism, Thongchai argued their ideas were drawn from conservative nationalism. 
He also criticised Anek Laothamatas’ appeal for elected politicians to learn from the 
aphichon and monarchy (Thongchai 2008b, 31-32).  
 
Although Kasian Tejapira continued to criticise Thaksin as a threat to Thai democracy 
due to his semi-fascist and soft-authoritarian actions, he joined other academics in 
condemning the call by the PAD for a royally appointed Prime Minister. For him, it was 
‘ad hoc absolutism’ which would create a huge dilemma for Thai democracy as well as 
the conditions for confrontation and violence (MR 2006a; TN 2006c; Kasian 2007).  
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Jaran Dhitthapichai, as a National Human Rights Commissioner, disagreed with the 
PAD campaign over the call for Article 7, the judicialisation of politics in dissolving 
TRT Party, and its condemnation of TRT supporters as a hired mob. He argued that 
what the PAD and its fellows in the anti-TRT movement were currently up to was 
undemocratic. He argued that political parties were supported by people. Thus, in 
dissolving the TRT Party, the political rights of more than 10 million people who voted 
for the TRT were violated (TP 2006a).  
 
In the case of Weng Tojirakarn, because of his close relationship with Chamlong 
Srimuang, his support for a nationalist ideology in attacking Thaksin and his prominent 
leading position in the PAD, his shift against the PAD and royalist ideas was a surprise 
among the PAD and the public (KT 2006b). Nevertheless, royalist ideas, especially the 
PAD proposal on the Article 7 issue made eventually caused Weng to announce the 
withdrawal of himself and the Democratic Federation (klum samaphan prachathipatai) 
under his leadership from the PAD in March 2006 (KT 2006a; TR 2006b). Furthermore, 
he disagreed with the PAD in promoting conditions for a coup and royal intervention by 
mobilising more and more people to put pressure on the government and creating 
confrontation between people on both sides (KS 2006a; DN 2006a). 
 
After the 2006 coup, these Octobrists went even further to organise and publicly 
campaign in support the ‘19 September’ or the ‘No Coup’ movements. They 
collaborated with the broad common political goals of opposing the coup, non-elected 
government and the anti-democratic ideas of the PAD and their friends inside these 
groups. Nevertheless, the participation of different individual Octobrists in these 
alliances was not unified.  
 
Right after the coup, Weng Tojirakarn and other Octobrist friends like Suthachai 
Yimprasert and Pichit Likitjitsomboom conveyed strong messages of disagreement with 
the coup in their talks at the 30th anniversary of 6th October at Thammasat University 
(MR 2006g). Later on, Jaran and Weng publicly announced their formal participation in 
the 19th September network (LWN 2006b; DN 2006b). Weng played an active role 
helping the group in daily street protests including giving speeches at the protest site 
and mobilising supporters. In March 2007, at the peak of the 19th September group, 
Weng led anti-coup groups to the house of Prem Tinsulanonda, Privy Council President, 
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to denounce the man they believed to be the mastermind behind the military takeover 
six months previously and to call on Prem to support democracy and get Surayud 
Chulanont out (MD 2007). They called for an immediate return to democracy and 
general elections. Weng further submitted a petition to the Constitution Drafting 
Assembly opposing a clause to be added to the new charter that granted an amnesty to 
the coup makers (BP 2007; TN 2007b). 
 
Thongchai Winichakul provocatively condemned the PAD intellectual advisors, many 
of whom were former leftist friends, as ‘pragmatists’. In his well-known and 
controversial article, ‘Pragmatism of Thai intellectuals and the 19 September 2006 
coup’, he angrily denounced pro-PAD academics, senators and activists, including 
many Octobrists, who either supported or were sympathetic to the coup. He argued that 
these people were merely pragmatists who would exploit any means for their success. 
He further claimed that they supported the coup and violence to get rid of Thaksin and 
the TRT without considering whether those means were undemocratic, conservative, 
royalist, nationalist, right wing, illegal or socially violent (Thongchai 2006). 
 
Unlike Thongchai Winichakul and Weng Tojirakarn who opposed the coup even before 
the coup itself happened, Kasian Tejapira did not immediately show his concerns about 
the coup. His weekly articles still perceived the coup as merely a normal phenomenon 
to get rid of the corrupt TRT government, and military and the nominated government 
had to leave soon (Kasian 2006d; Kasian 2006c). Also, Kasian criticised the coup for 
violating the political right to have political gatherings (Kasian 2006e). Furthermore, he 
argued that the PAD leaders had already planned their campaign as the path for the coup 
and intended to promote the non-democratic New Politics 30:70 idea to empower a non-
elected regime (Prachatai 2007). Nonetheless, he was still criticised by Somsak and 
Thongchai for his delayed action against the coup and his earlier works which called the 
Thaksin regime an ‘elected capitalist absolutism’ (Kasian 2004). For instance, 
Thongchai argued that his influential works helped to condemn and delegitimise 
democracy (Thongchai 2008b, 27).  
 
Following their campaigns against the coup, these Octobrists in the 19-September 
alliance went further to oppose the non-elected government. Several Octobrists who 
disagreed with the coup, acting in the name of 14th Octobrists, urged the interim 
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government to lift martial law and argued that it was against the fundamental rights that 
people fought and died for 33 years previously (BP 2006c). As a National Human 
Rights Commissioner, Jaran Dhitthapichai also claimed that the new government 
supported by the coup was no different from the TRT government as it violated the 
rights of protesters and continued promoting regressive policies like privatisation 
including the privatisation of universities (KT 2007). Furthermore, he took the symbolic 
action of returning his Thammasat University degree as the current administration had 
turned its support to the PAD and the interim government nominated by the coup (LWN 
2006b). In the same vein, Weng Tojirakarn started the revelation of a corruption scandal 
involving Prime Minister Surayud’s illegal occupation of land in a forest reserve in 
Northeast Thailand and asked him to step down (TN 2006i). 
 
The anti-coup Octobrists all united to act against the drafting of the 2007 constitution, 
referendum and political reform following the coup. They argued that not only was the 
process undemocratic, but it also revitalised the political role of the bureaucracy. In 
collaboration with Midnight University, the academic group who opposed the coup, 
Kasian Tejapira acted as spokesperson announcing their disagreement with the 2007 
constitutional referendum and calling for the return of the 1997 constitution (Prachatai 
2007). Jaran Dhitthapichai formed and acted as general secretary of the Friends of the 
1997 Constitution Group. He disagreed with the constitution drafting process 
particularly the exclusion of several groups of people, including the poor (TN 2007a). 
Weng Tojirakarn, besides condemning the National Legislative Assembly as tool to 
serve the Council for National Security (Weng 2006a), also argued that the 2007 
constitution was a political process to maintain the power of the coup group; the public 
was deceived by the superficial participatory process of drafting the constitution as there 
were only 2,000 members who were nominated and indirectly elected; and the 
referendum did not offer a thorough public debate as there should be for the people’s 
participation in the referendum process (Weng 2006b). Beside the issues of the 
constitution per se, Thongchai Winichakul argued against Thirayuth Boonmee’s 
proposal supporting the new constitution as a ‘constitution of Thai wisdom’ against one 
oriented to western electoral politics, and the role of charismatic persons and educated 
people in the new constitution and political reform. Thongchai argued that what 
Thirayuth was supporting was a problematic Thai culture where those with charisma are 
better than ordinary people and had higher moral standards than others. He further 
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argued that this contradicted democracy and made Thai society worship only privileged 
people including the King, aristocracy, technocracy, university lecturers, politicians, and 
senior citizens (KT 2006f). 
 
From the anti-Coup to the ‘Two-No’ and Red Shirt campaigns 
 
Amidst the fragmentation of the anti-coup groups, Octobrists in the ‘No Coup’ 
campaign group were also split into two. The first group switched to realign with the 
Red Shirts and their former comrades in the TRT in fighting against the Yellow Shirts 
and extra-constitutional elite. They argued that the National United Front of Democracy 
against Dictatorship (no pho cho – UDD) which later developed into the Red Shirt 
movement was the most potential political force countering the revival of conservative 
and non-democratic forces. They thought that a corrupt elected government like the 
Thaksin regime was better than a military and bureaucratic state supported by the 
royalist movement. At least there was still a checks-and-balances system and concern 
for lower class people. Furthermore, they criticised their friends in the ‘Two-No’ 
movement as naïve, as in reality, there was no neutral position in politics (DN 2006b). 
Jaran Dhitthapichai and Weng Tojirakarn were the most outstanding examples. Jaran 
started a political dialogue with Kriengkamol Laohapairoj and Chaturon Chaisang. With 
Kriengkamol, they made a ‘Soontari Declaration’ at the Soontari restaurant, 
Prachachoen district in Bangkok, to fight in support the Red Shirts and cut relationships 
with former leftist friends in the Yellow Shirt movement (NW 2007b). Jaran 
subsequently became one of the first generation of UDD leaders. In October 2007, the 
PAD accused him of political partiality for publicly participating in UDD activities and 
asked the court to remove him from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). 
During the peak of the Red Shirts in the May 2010 protests occupying Ratchadamnoen 
Ave., many of these Octobrists mainly affiliated with the moderate ‘dove’ faction (Sai 
Phirap) fought against the militant and extremist ‘eagle’ faction. While their group 
sought a middle ground solution for the movement to compromise with the government, 
its internal opponents insisted on their immediate goal and provoked the militant mass 
to fight the government. Weng and Jaran collaborated with other Octobrists from the 
TRT including Chaturon and Kriengkamol to campaign for a protracted movement for 
structural change. They were the core group in advocating the idea of phrai-ammat class 
war (KT 2010; KCL 2010). After the May 2010 clash, he was charged and had to seek 
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refuge in France. In the same vein, Weng provocatively acted as one of the five leaders 
of the ‘Red Shirts’ group in late 2008 and early 2009. Weng was charged and later 
arrested. In the 2011 election, when Yingluck Shinawatra – Thaksin’s sister – won and 
brought her For Thais Party (Pheu Thai) into power, Jaran returned home and Weng 
became a party-list MP (KCL 2010). 
 
The second group declared themselves the ‘Two-No’ group, insisting on opposing both 
the conservative Yellow Shirt movement as well as the TRT government. At the same 
time, they disagreed with their friends who joined the UDD and questioned how they 
could forget what Thaksin had done to Thailand. Nevertheless, as the Red Shirts grew 
in number and turned more radical, those with the Two-No campaign became more 
sympathetic to and supportive of them. Kasian Tejapira and Thongchai Winichakul 
were leading Octobrist figures in the campaign. Kasian explained both those supporting 
Thaksin and those supporting the coup by the term ‘double false consciousness’. On the 
one hand, the middle class and Octobrists hoped that the military and sakdina 
bureaucrats/technocrats would be able to deliver political and economic freedom against 
big monopoly capitalism and the governments of the TRT. On the other hand, that 
grassroots mass opted for big monopoly capitalism to deliver them justice and equality 
(MR 2006h). Furthermore, they criticised the switch of their friends to the Red Shirts as 
a short-sighted strategy. Kasian angrily criticised Jaran: 
 
‘Jaran Dhitthapichai gave an interview that if he had to choose between 
being a servant of Thaksin and of a dictator, he would choose Thaksin. He 
further said that Thaksin did not do very much wrong. He only wanted too 
much power. However, Jaran once gave an interview to the Bangkok Post. I 
still can remember the date. During the ‘War on Drugs’ when many people 
died, he said that Thaksin was creating ‘a Kingdom of Fear’. Jaran was a 
member of the sub-committee of the National Human Rights Commission 
investigating the Jana case. The report signed by Jaran himself clearly 
indicated that there was a violation of many articles of the constitution. How 
could he say that Thaksin did not do very much wrong?’ 
(prachatai 2007) 
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However, the ‘Two-No’ campaign did not last long. As the Yellow Shirts and extra-
constitution elite turned more ultra-right wing, and the Red Shirts become more radical, 
many leading Octobrists in the Two-No shifted to support to the Red Shirts. Their shift 
was partly the result of the increase in the degree of conservativeness in the PAD and 
royalist elite. The manipulation of the lèse-majesté law and backlash measures against 
the Red Shirts gradually convinced many Octobrists that the royalist elite was more 
dangerous than a corrupt elected government. Many Octobrists tried to promote public 
debate about reform and criticism of the royal institution along the same lines as the 
Red Shirts. Under the very restricted political situation and the rise of royalism, 
Thongchai Winichakul organised a panel on the monarchy at the 10th Thai Studies 
Conference in January 2008. This panel discussed many issues which were not earlier 
discussed within Thai society, including a review of the banned book ‘The King Never 
Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej’ by Paul M. Handley.  
 
Many of his writings throughout 2008 onward reflected his strong intention to oppose 
the monarchists (see, e.g., Thongchai 2008a; Thongchai 2008b; Thongchai 2008c). For 
instance, he argued that the 2006 coup was the latest effort of the monarchists to take 
control over the democratisation process.  
 
Furthermore, as several elements with the Red Shirts became more radical and 
independent of Thaksin, many Octobrists in the Two-No movement became more 
sympathetic to them and started to see them as a potential mass movement against the 
conservative and non-democratic elite. Many of them produced analyses and writings 
that legitimised the Red Shirts and delegitimised the Yellow Shirts. Kasian Tejapira 
explained the conflict between the TRT and anti-TRT as class politics between the 
rural/urban poor, and the capitalist/middle class and former elite. He argued that the 
PAD was a middle class movement which was threatened by the conjoined power of the 
majority poor and the corrupt elected government of Thaksin (Kasian 2008). He further 
argued that to get rid of these threats, they dared to join hands with former conservative 
forces of the royal institution, bureaucratic state and conservative capitalists which all 
had been threatened by the rise of new aggressive capitalists and also used non-
democratic political strategies like advocating ‘New Politics’, which diluted the power 
of representative democracy with appointed representatives in the 2007 constitution 
drafting (Kasian 2007). Somchai Phatharathananunth, a former Ramkhamhaeng 
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University activist who later became an active lecturer at Mahasarakham University, in 
legitimising the democratic element of the Red Shirt movement, pointed out that the 
Red Shirt movement signaled a real revolution in political consciousness and 
organisation in the countryside reflecting changes toward a post-peasant society (Askew 
2010a, 9; Ittipol 2009) 
 
In summary, as with the Yellow Shirt movement, countless Octobrists stood alongside 
the Red Shirts. However, they were heterogeneous and from time to time in 
disagreement. Some had long been associated with the Red Shirts. Others opted for that 
side as a result of disagreements with the Yellow Shirts and their sympathy for the 
radical prospects of the Red Shirts.  
 
 
7.3 Conclusion  
 
The 1990s was the golden age for Octobrists. They successfully constructed strong 
networks and transformed their 1970s political deficit into valuable assets in supporting 
their political activities and status (as shown in chapters three to six). Nonetheless, in 
the 2000s this temporary unification came to an end. In participating in the colour-
coded conflict between the Yellow and Red Shirt movements, they were spread among 
all parties. They fought against each in advancing their new movements and contesting 
ideas. Their earlier long-term friendships were torn apart. This development reflected 
the outbreak of their long developed contradictory interests and ideas under a new 
political constellation, and the failure of the earlier Octobrist identity in concealing their 
differences amidst the conflict.  
 
Differences among Octobrists accumulated since the 1970s and developed over 
successive decades. The frustrations among Octobrists regard their divergent degrees of 
radicalism and different views toward revolutionary strategies remained with them even 
after the collapse of the CPT. Upon their return, in affiliating with different sectors, 
ranging from big business, corrupt political parties, liberal reformist NGOs, and the 
bureaucracy, these Octobrists were exposed to new ideas and political stances. 
Nonetheless, during the 1990s, under coalition politics and weak governments, 
Octobrists with access to state power were more compromised than their outsider 
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friends, whilst from the 2000s onward under the changing political conditions of the 
strong Thaksin government, many Octobrists in the TRT no longer had to either ask for 
support or compromise with their friends in extra-parliamentary politics, they did not 
hesitate to clash with their former colleagues outside the state to protect their new 
political space and interests. Subsequently, many Octobrists were heartbroken with 
Octobrist friends inside the party. The earlier sanguine feeling was subdued and 
replaced with anger and hatred. Furthermore, in participating in the Yellow and Red 
Shirt movements, they all shifted to new sets of ideas and movements. While the 
Yellow Shirts attached themselves to the non-elected elite and conservative ideological 
norms, they followed suit. As the Red Shirts turned more and more radical, those 
Octobrists who disagreed with the right wing and non-democratic approaches of the 
Yellow Shirts helped the Red Shirts to radicalise their movement.  
 
In addition, the ‘Octobrist’ frame, which earlier had been used for covering up their 
differences and building up a loose Octobrist identity, instead became a tool for 
Octobrists to fight against each other. Amidst the conflict, Octobrists on all sides re-
defined the term Octobrist’ in legitimising their new interests and ideas as well as 
delegitimising their friends on the opposite side. At the same time, they attacked their 
friends in conservative terms proposed by the PAD. They all claimed to be genuine 
Octobrists while blaming their comrades as ‘leftist traitors’. Subsequently, the earlier 
loose alliance which had recently been built among former student activists from the 
1970s was under tension during the 1990s. The previous conflicting interests and ideas 
which had been concealed by the broad term of Octobrist exploded, devastating their 
long-term comradeship.  
 
By the end of the 2000s, no one would believe that these people were once radical 
student activists who stood side-by-side both in Bangkok and in the jungle against 
authoritarian regimes and promoted radicalism. They were now known as highly 
conflict-ridden school-boy networks.   
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
As detailed in the preceding chapters, this thesis has chronicled the rise of left wing 
student activists – ‘Octobrists’ – to positions of prominence and power in Thai society 
and politics over the past three decades. The Octobrists managed to survive repressive 
conditions in the late 1970s and to maintain their political activism and achieve 
positions of status and power in a wide range of political arenas over successive 
decades. After the decline of the Communist Party of Thailand (phak communist haeng 
prathet thai – CPT) by the mid 1980s, these activists returned home under a political 
amnesty granted by the Thai government. Amidst grim conditions upon their return, 
they scattered into different social and political sectors. Within less than a decade, many 
of them started to reclaim their political status as young active politicians and veteran 
political campaigners in nearly all political parties, ranging from the conservative to the 
more progressive. From the early 1990s onward, they quickly achieved prominent 
positions in various parties, cabinets and governments. Outside parliament, countless 
Octobrists re-appeared as successful young businesspeople, leading NGO workers, 
social activists, provocative journalists, prominent university intellectuals, popular 
artists and writers, and high-ranking government officials. At the same time, they 
successfully re-established themselves as ‘Octobrist-1970s democratic fighters’ and 
played a vital role in different political transitions including the successful campaign 
against the military-led government in 1992, the rise of radical social movements 
throughout the 1990s, the political reform movement in the late 1990s, the 
establishment of the Thaksin government, and the political conflict between the Yellow 
Shirt and Red Shirt movements in recent years. 
 
 
8.1 Why success?  
 
Drawing on the literature on social movements, this thesis has offered an explanation 
for the nature and extent of the Octobrists’ success in Thai society and politics over the 
past three decades. The thesis has shown that the trajectory of the Octobrists since the 
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mid-1970s has been profoundly shaped by dramatic shifts in political environment (or 
‘opportunity structure’) in Thailand, by the networks, mobilising structures, and 
resources developed among the Octobrists in the 1970s, and by the construction and 
modification of ‘collective frames’ around which their identities and activism has been 
organised over the past three decades. As detailed in Chapter 7, moreover, this thesis 
has also shown how shifts in the structure of political opportunities over the past decade 
led first to unprecedented power and prominence for Octobrists under the administration 
of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and then to bitter divisions and conflicts among 
Octobrists in the context of polarisation in Thai politics beginning with anti-Thaksin 
protests in 2005 and continuing through the military coup of 2006 and a succession of 
unstable governments. Thus the thesis provides a framework for understanding both the 
evolving roles and positions of the Octobrists in Thai society and politics, on the one 
hand, and the changing dynamics among the Octobrists themselves, on the other, over 
the course of the decades since their emergence as activists in the tumultuous politics of 
the 1970s. 
 
Political Opportunity Structure  
 
As detailed over successive chapters, this thesis has shown how shifts in the political 
environment in Thailand provided new opportunities for the Octobrists to re-emerge and 
re-engage with Thai society and politics, and to rise to positions of power and 
prominence in due course. Over the course of the 1980s, the power of ultra-right wing 
groups in Thai politics declined, and overt repression diminished, as a gradual process 
of liberalisation unfolded under the long tenure of General Prem Tinsulanonda as Prime 
Minister (1980-1988). The gradual reduction of the role of the military in Thai politics, 
and the expansion of parliamentary politics over the 1980s and 1990s, the emergence of 
a highly fragmented form of parliamentary rule, the proliferation of civic groups and 
non-governmental organisations, and the increasing importance of the media provided a 
wide range of opportunities for Octobrists to participate in Thai politics.  
 
In the 1980s, the Thai state abandoned its harshly repressive policies and shifted 
towards a more inclusive and tolerant stance vis-à-vis the former left wing student 
activists who had fled to the jungle and joined the CPT in the wake of the coup of 1976. 
They granted a political amnesty and returned student and citizenship status to those 
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who decided to abandon the CPT. This became the initial stage enabling student 
activists to return home without penalty and continue their lives at least as ordinary 
citizens.  
 
Democratisation from the late 1980s and political transitions during the whole 1990s 
brought about an opening of institutional access both in parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary politics. In parliamentary politics, the increase in demand for human 
resources in the form of youthful politicians, political brokers, facilitators and mediators 
between urban and rural constituencies amidst the expansion of electoral politics 
enlarged the political space for the Octobrists. With unique political assets developed 
since the 1970s, Octobrists were recruited by all parties. Furthermore, under the new 
system of coalition politics, each election, change of government and governmental 
reshuffle gave Octobrist politicians from small parties the chance to obtain positions in 
government and join government coalitions. Not only the Octobrists in parliamentary 
politics, but those in extra-parliamentary politics also benefitted from shifts among the 
elite. Because governments and political parties sought support from those in the public 
sphere, especially civil society organisations, social movements, the private sector, etc., 
during different political realignments, many Octobrist NGO workers, journalists and 
businesspeople gained opportunities to assert their political demands and to influence 
political decision making.  
 
In addition, during each of the political transitions throughout the 1990s, there were new 
political opportunities for access to potential alliances for these Octobrists to revitalise 
their role and power. Conflicts and fragmentation within/among the elite during this 
period encouraged Octobrists to revitalise their political activism and engage in 
contemporary politics.  
 
Initially, the democratic uprising of the middle class in May 1992 offered a supportive 
political context and opportunity for the Octobrists to participate in the anti-military 
government movement in the name of a politically active middle class, NGO workers 
and political activists. At the same time, the economic liberalisation since the 1980s 
turned the liberal and reformist elite into influential allies of the Octobrists in pushing 
forward the movement against the return of the military in politics. 
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The proliferation of various social movements throughout the 1990s provided political 
access for the Octobrists to extra-parliamentary politics. Octobrist NGO workers, 
academics and journalists had new spaces to promote radical social movements and 
work on problem issues they had advocated and been interested in since the 1970s. 
Octobrist NGO workers who upon their return had earlier worked with philanthropic 
organisations on development projects with the non-politicised rural and urban poor 
became key political consultants and facilitators for the Assembly of the Poor (samacha 
khon chon - AOP) and many other single-issue movements. Also, many Octobrist 
academics and journalists were offered opportunities to serve as popular intellectuals 
and progressive media for the social movements.  
 
The rise of the political reform movement of the late 1990s and its product, the 1997 
“People’s Constitution”, provided new points of access for the Octobrists. Although 
most of their radical demands were mitigated by reformist forces, the reform process 
opened up political channels for the Octobrists and activists to assert their political 
demands and concerns in the constitutional drafting process as well as to re-establish 
their ‘Octobrist’ status in national politics. New political positions created by the 1997 
constitution, like elected senators, and membership in various independent 
governmental bodies, became new sources of political position and power for the 
Octobrists who had earlier failed to access parliamentary politics.  
 
Furthermore, the formation of the TRT Party was one of the most promising 
opportunities for the Octobrists to access party politics. The landslide victory in the 
2001 election and the successful populist policy, gave Thaksin Shinawatra a position of 
unprecedented power in Thai politics. With abundant political resources and Thaksin’s 
strong desire to create a grandiose party policy platform, Octobrists with unique 
political skills were highly valued for their role in policy formation, and campaign 
promotion. Many Octobrist politicians were integrated into the party to balance against 
familiar corrupt politicians. Nonetheless, from 2005 onwards, the mobilisation of the 
anti-Thaksin movement set the stage for the coup and the end of the Thaksin 
government. In response to this, the pro-TRT movement grew and developed into the 
Red Shirt movement. The confrontation between these two movements triggered serious 
political violence and political polarisation within Thai society. And this new political 
environment created unprecedented divisions and conflicts among the Octobrists. 
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Mobilisation Structures  
 
As shown in the thesis, the rise to prominence and power by the Octobrists over the past 
three decades has been enabled not only be successive shifts in political environment 
and opportunities, but also by the mobilising structures and resources developed by the 
Octobrists from their emergence in Thai politics in the 1970s. Over the past three 
decades, Thai Octobrists have been successful in mobilising and integrating all kinds of 
resources including higher education, political activism and skills, and 
schoolboynetworks into their adult careers and political participation during distinctive 
political transitions. After the decline of radical ideologies, what the Octobrists were left 
with was different political embeddedness, activism, knowledge and skills.  These 
offered them unique and vital life-long assets and turned them into a unique human 
resource for the private and public labour markets as well as electoral politics.  
 
Immediately after their return, repressive political conditions and their limited legal 
status did not allow these Octobrists to reconnect formally and publicly. Their networks 
were loose and informal. Gatherings among Octobrists were irregular and informal as 
alumni groups and night-out parties and were limited to small groups of people from the 
same revolutionary bases, political clubs and duty assignments. However, their 
schoolboy networks gradually functioned as points of access to careers. For most, their 
first job came through networks of 1970s activists as well as non-left high school, 
university and politician friends who had already reached a mid-range executive level, 
and succeeded as well-off businesspersons during economic booms. Furthermore, these 
cross-sector connections helped Octobrists in government offices, political parties and 
the private sector to connect easily with friends who worked with grassroots and civil 
society organisations.  
 
In time, the initial informal mobilising structures of the Octobrists became more formal 
and professional and gained resources and support from the government, the elite and 
the wider public. Starting from the anniversaries of the 14th and 6th October incidents in 
later years, the Octobrists started organising themselves into various formal associations 
with more concrete political agendas and procedures. At the same time, they began to 
play active roles in both extra-parliamentary politics with other social movements, and 
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in parliamentary politics under various names of 1970s activist groups. Some even tried 
to organise their own political parties. 
 
In a broader sense, socialisation through radical movements marked them as political 
activists. Even after abandoning leftist movements, political activism or the instincts of 
a political animal remained with them. Nearly all of them eventually resumed political 
roles and participation in contemporary politics in one way or another. Furthermore, 
higher education from prestigious universities offered these people a social and 
economic competitive advantage. Upon their return from leftist movements, an 
economic boom awaited. Despite the background of political failure of the former 
leftists, they were a group of people with a university education which was required by 
both the private and public sectors. Trained as the elite in prestigious institutions like 
Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Triam Udom Suksa High School and 
Suankularb High School, the Octobrists were close to elite power and elite networks.  
 
More specifically, promoting their political activities in diverse and flexible functions 
and locations during the 1970s, the Octobrists were endowed with versatile skills, 
networks and bodies of knowledge. Firstly, through mobilising, managing, strategising 
and sustaining mass movements, many had become veteran public speakers, negotiators 
and alliance builders. Secondly, many developed skills useful in electoral politics as 
politicians, spin-doctors, deal-makers, and campaigners, through their work on election 
campaigns and policy formulation for socialist oriented parties. Lastly, in providing 
intellectual and academic work for the movement, many leading Octobrists developed 
writing, analytical and translating skills.  
 
Moreover, working in a wide range of political locations allowed Octobrists to develop 
unique interpersonal skills with different power groups. Negotiating and mobilising 
support from the state, officials and elite groups enabled these people to speak the 
language of the elite. Advocating their agenda in urban areas allow them to learn to 
modify their agenda in middle class language. Agitating on issues with the urban, rural 
and ethnic minjority poor, the Octobrists developed communication skills in simplifying 
their agenda in common language. In another words, the Octobrists were a unique 
middle class group who understood popular culture and knew how to speak both the 
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‘Nakleng/Phrai’ or rural poor language, and the ‘Phudi’ or urban elite/middle class 
language.  
 
Octobrists also successfully turned personal and informal networks both among 
themselves and with other grassroots and elite groups into collective vehicles for 
extracting political resources and legitimacy, as well as for sustaining their political 
activism. Octobrists developed strong personal networks and ties with each other 
through their activities in different networks based on high school, university, faculty, 
political club, political party, duty assignments, and various grassroots movements. At 
the same time, they developed profound personal connections and networks with other 
non-left groups including high schools, universities, non-left intellectuals, progressive 
politicians, and reformist and liberal elites. Also, during their time with the CPT, they 
developed other sets of networks according to the political location of and role of 
revolutionary bases. Owing to the loyalties developed during their education and their 
elite class socialisation, these personal networks continued even after the decline of 
student movements. Upon return, they succeeded in integrating these cross-sector 
connections with new networks cultivated in their new careers and political settings, and 
transformed them into concrete political alliances and channels for the revival of the 
Octobrist movement structure.  
 
Framing process 
 
The success of the Octobrists in Thai society and politics entailed the construction of a 
new inclusive identity of ‘Octobrist – democratic fighter’ in normalising their radical 
past and legitimising their current ideas and roles in politics. At the same time, they 
adjusted to new systems of political governance, and successfully incorporated other 
non-leftist language and ideas in promoting their political status and power. Although 
the Octobrists shifted toward various new ideologies, including regressive ones such as 
reformism, nationalism, anti-democracy, and monarchism, over the course of the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s, the identity they constructed as ‘Octobrists’ and as ‘democracy 
fighters’ successfully created a progressive image and language incorporating radical 
and non-radical ideological elements. Furthermore, this inclusive identity became a 
valuable asset in mobilising political resources, constructing their new collective 
270 
 
identity in temporarily unifying their earlier fragmentation, as well as building non-left 
alliances throughout the process of revival and during different political transitions.  
 
Framing skills obtained since the 1970s and newly cultivated political positions and 
authority laid the foundation for the framing process of the Octobrists. On the one hand, 
the framing process is nothing new for the Octobrists. They have been skilful frame 
specialists since the 1970s. For instance, during the 14th October incident, leading 
activists played crucial roles in combining liberal, socialist and royalist ideas in 
campaigning against the authoritarian regime. Between 1973 and 1976 and afterwards 
with the CPT, many Octobrists were both socialised through and advocated Maoist and 
nationalist ideas in pushing forward their revolutionary mission. On their return from 
the jungle, their skills in processing frames since the 1970s remained with them. On the 
other hand, their new political status enhanced their capacity in frame amplification and 
extension. Successful careers in both the public and private sectors, and achievements in 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics provided the Octobrists with the political 
tools and authority to mainstream their new frame among themselves, the elite and the 
public.  
 
The construction of the Octobrists’ identity was composed of two major efforts and 
interconnected framing processes in their struggle to revive their roles in contemporary 
politics. Firstly, upon their return, the Octobrists constructed a new meaning in 
explaining themselves through a rewritten history of their own. They selectively re-
crafted their 1970s history in the relevant new democratic context. Their image and 
historical background as extreme leftist failures were replaced by those of democratic 
heroes. Particular parts of their history were highlighted and emphasised in retelling 
their history to the public, especially the victory and role of student activists in leading a 
successful democratic movement and mass uprising against the authoritarian regime on 
14th October 1973. During every single anniversary commemorating 14th October, 
pictures and stories were promoted of brave and dedicated young activists hungry for 
democracy and progressive young intellectual networks. Democratic activities including 
election monitoring, calls for a democratic constitution, and anti-seniority campaigns 
were retold as the legend of the Octobrists. At the same time, they worked hard in de-
radicalising their own leftist history and extremist image. Pictures of innocent student 
activists fighting for democracy and social justice and suppressed by ultra-right wing 
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authorities replaced extremist, socialist and violent elements. The massacre at 
Thammasat University on the morning of 6th October 1976 was reproduced as a killing 
field of innocent students. While normalising and toning down their earlier extremist 
elements, they also successfully romanticised their leftist history with the leftist 
movements in the towns and the revolutionary mission with the CPT. Countless books, 
articles, seminars, concerts and commemorative ceremonies were organised in 
recounting the lives of these Octobrists during the time of their revolutionary mission 
with the CPT. Nonetheless, most of these emphasised cultural aspects and stories of 
authentic livelihood in the jungle. Stories of those who were loyal to Maoism and the 
CPT were downplayed by complaints from those who portrayed themselves as 
democratic student activists against the undemocratic and authoritative norms and 
practices of the CPT. The process of normalising their earlier leftist identity and re-
packaging themselves as democratic heroes was relevant to the whole idea and flow of 
liberal democracy and the context of a world without space for leftists or socialism. Its 
design as a broad progressive political idea allowed these frames to connect and absorb 
all sorts of reformism, liberalism, radicalism, nationalism and even monarchism.  
 
Secondly, while rewriting their 1970s history, Octobrists reinvented their political 
identity as ‘Octobrists’, democratic fighters since the 1970s. They not only constructed 
it, but also utilised it as means of securing political legitimacy, unification among 
themselves, and political support from non-left alliances. Even though during the 1970s, 
many incidents happened in many other months, and many actors were involved in 
these political processes, the official history of the 1970s was reduced to ‘October’ and 
student power. Against the backdrop of a successfully rewritten 1970s history, the 
Octobrists limited the whole of the 1970s to the success of student activists in 
promoting democracy and their sacrifices in protecting social justice during the two 
political incidents of 14th October 1973 and 6th October 1976. On the one hand, many of 
them started calling themselves Octobrist–1970s democratic fighters and innocent 
students fighting for social justice. By the mid-1990s, the term ‘Octobrist’ became 
recognised and accepted by the public and media as the name for this whole generation 
who were either directly or indirectly involved in these incidents. Furthermore, the 
framing of the Octobrists succeeded because it was relevant to the existing narrative of 
Thai cultural politics. While Thai politics was moralised, the Octobrists portrayed 
themselves through an ideal picture of former innocent students who had fought for 
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democracy and against an authoritarian regime. Subsequently, through this Octobrist 
identity, their return to politics was treated as a continuation from the former activists 
and their fight against social and political injustice, although their new political interests 
and ideas were different from their 1970s history.  
 
The concept of Octobrist helped to reunify their earlier fragmentations. The Octobrist 
identity and concept comprise a congruent and complementary set of individual 
interests, values, beliefs and collective activities which all different groups of Octobrists 
accepted and found compatible with their new status. First of all, the Octobrist identity 
linked all former activists with their past memory through the ‘community of memory 
and hope’. Through the concept of Octobrist, they came together at anniversaries and 
also brought other people in their new organisations into this Octobrist movement. 
‘Community of memory’ explains the common sentiment of activism based on their 
common repressive historical experience that they were unable to tell the public. One 
that does not forget its past, the community of memory ties them to the past (McCarthy 
1996; Woliver 1993, 2, 46-48). Against this backdrop, the Octobrists linked together 
former activists who shared painful and traumatic experiences during the 1970s but 
could not tell anyone. In parallel, the Octobrist concept bound and turned them toward 
the future as communities of hope. It included a meaning that allowed them to connect 
their personal aspirations. For former student activists, the concept of Octobrist offered 
the hope that when opportunities came and if they joined the Octobrist movement, they 
would be able to revive their role and resume the political dignity which they lost at the 
end of the 1970s.  
 
Second of all, the Octobrist concept was designed as an inclusive ideology and identity. 
It was broad enough to absorb and conceal both past and current ideological 
fragmentation and personal conflicts. It created a sense of ‘we-ness’. Without 
mentioning leftist ideological elements, but defined by broad ideas of progressiveness, 
democracy and social justice, it brought all conflicting elements during the 1970s under 
the umbrella of the Octobrist generation. The Octobrist concept was broad enough to 
create temporary unification among Octobrists who have spread into new political 
settings and used new ideas and interests because it was inclusive enough to assert their 
new ideas under the concept of Octobrist. For example, normalising 1970s leftist history 
into the success of the democratic movement and construction of a broad Octobrist 
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identity created a comfortable common ground of collaboration among all conflicting 
groups, including the more liberal socialist 14th and the more extreme Maoist 6th 
Octobrist generations. At the same time, all Octobrists in different sectors found the 
broad concept and identity of Octobrist beneficial for legitimising and advocating their 
ideas and interests.  
 
In addition, the ‘Octobrist’ frame helped to gain support from non-leftist alliances and 
attracted a more sympathetic perception of former activists in the eyes of the authorities 
and the public and created political opportunities to access new political spheres and 
positions. The earlier picture of extremists was replaced by Octobrists, former radical 
students who had already given up radicalism in favour of liberal and progressive 
approaches. They were no longer perceived as a threat to the Thai state. They were now 
perceived as a non-radical group ready to collaborate with any non-left progressive and 
liberal groups. With this new identity and alliances, the Octobrists were accepted by the 
public and gained stronger negotiating power with the state and their countermovement. 
Above all, they are valuable political assets for all sides. For instance, politicians who 
presented themselves or were known as Octobrist politicians were credited with being 
progressive. The Octobrists in the private sector were viewed as socially concerned 
businesspersons.  
 
In participating in different phases of political transitions between the 1990s and 2000s, 
the Octobrists extended the definition of Octobrist as continuing the democratic struggle 
as well as utilising the Octobrist concept in legitimising their new ideas and roles. They 
argued that the May 1992 incident, various social movements throughout the 1990s, the 
political reform of 1997, and the rise of the TRT Party and anti-TRT movement, were 
following stages of democratisation which followed what they initiated in 14th October 
1973. Furthermore, they combined the Octobrist identity with their new status. In 
participating in any political activities, they regularly called themselves Octobrist 
politicians, NGO workers, intellectuals, businesspeople, middle class, journalists or 
political campaigners, as a guarantee to the public that they were the continuation of the 
progressive Octobrist 1970s democratic fighters in the process of democratisation. 
 
Apart from constructing and utilising a new identity, the Octobrists succeeded in 
building their ideological frames in order to overcome the new political constraints and 
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adjust to new political governance. The collapse of the global leftist movement closed 
all windows of opportunity for the Octobrists to continue their radical collective actions 
and movements and forced them to seek alternative ideological stances. The withdrawal 
of financial and technical support from and changes of international policy of the 
Eastern world, especially from the CCP, affected the organisational decline of CPT, and 
the abandonment of radicalism among the Octobrists. Left in Thailand with no 
meaningful connection with any external leftist movement throughout the 1980s, they 
were susceptible to other local non-left progressive, liberal and reformist movements in 
recovering from the ideological crisis when the left Octobrists returned home in 
disappointment and exhaustion. Initially, isolation and regret in the aftermath of the 
1970s, life-course changes and a shift in the political context made these people turn 
away from politics and keep a low profile. Some even felt regret about the career 
opportunities lost in the 1970s. Whether they left the CPT with sympathy or empathy, 
nearly all the Octobrists expressed a certain degree of agreement in shifting away from 
earlier orthodox Maoist and extreme leftist approaches. The 14th October generation 
who had been socialised through more flexible ideas of liberalism, social democracy, 
nationalism, and royalism, and had initiated debates with the CPT about its rigid 
Maoist, non-democratic and authoritative political culture, shifted away from the left to 
other alternatives. They argued that orthodox Maoism and the CPT could hardly offer 
an ideology relevant to changing and developing Thai politics. In contrast, the 6th 
October generation, who had been radicalised through rigid Maoist-CPT thinking 
between 1973 and 1976, attempted to improve and solve ideological problems within 
that framework. Owing to limited exploration of and connection with Western leftist 
movements and other available leftist streams, when they recognised that the ideological 
and organisational crisis within the CPT was unsolvable, they abandoned the whole idea 
of leftism and revolution. They quickly opened up to new ideologies outside the radical 
spectrum. 
 
Furthermore, with the nature of the Thai state changing toward the ‘coalition’ rule of 
electoral politics, the Octobrists learnt to embrace liberal democracy and compromised 
with the Thai state and corrupt politicians in order to resume their activist role. By the 
end of the Cold War, the Thai elite and state had become fragmented and liberal in their 
eyes, but managed to maintain a stronghold on real political power and co-opted their 
challengers into formal channels. The Thai state was pressured by international forces to 
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shift toward more neo-liberalist economics and liberal democracy. The large role of the 
state was delegitimised. Therefore, the Thai state wrapped itself in liberal and 
progressive language and distorted democratic discourse to gain a new type of 
legitimacy.  It integrated new non-state actors into its political sphere as long as these 
new actors did not challenge their power. Nonetheless, royalist groups, the former elite 
and the bureaucrats remained strong and controlled hegemonic power over contesting 
elected politicians, reformist forces and other political structures and functions. Against 
this backdrop, the Octobrists shifted toward a moderate position in meeting and 
collaborating with the Thai state in the middle ground. In other words, they shifted from 
conflict against the Thai state to consensus with it, and eventually experienced 
consensus with and co-optation by the Thai state. Under the ‘rules of coalition politics’ 
in Thai party politics and the domination of ‘liberal reformism’ in extra-parliamentary 
politics, to gain strategic support to access cabinet positions and to promote social 
movements and political reform, the Octobrists who initially attempted to act as radical 
and progressive politicians and campaigners learned to reduce their radicalism and 
compromised with reformist/liberal or ex-conservative and business-oriented 
politicians.  
 
8.2 Why conflict?  
 
If the 1990s saw the Octobrists enjoy unprecedented power and prominence as well as a 
loose consensus among themselves, the first decade of the 21st century saw a growing 
legitimacy crisis and deepening internal conflict within their ranks. This thesis has 
suggested two explanations for this development. Firstly, the trajectory of political 
governance from the coalition politics of weak governments to the strong government 
of the TRT turned the earlier compromising relationship among Octobrists into 
confrontation. Secondly, the earlier successful Octobrist frame and identity failed to 
maintain unity but instead were utilised as a means of fighting against other Octobrists 
amidst the Red-Yellow Shirt conflict and their divergent ideas and interests.  
 
New political environment  
 
The turn of the twenty-first century saw a dramatic shift in the political environment 
which profoundly influenced the status of the Octobrists and relationships among them. 
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Up through the 1990s, under coalition governments, elected politicians were weak and 
required support from other non-elected elite and non-state actors as their strategic 
allies. Against this backdrop, Octobrists temporarily unified and cooperated in spite of 
different political settings and contradictory political interests. Whilst Octobrist 
politicians required support and collaboration from their NGO, intellectual and 
journalist friends to back up their legitimacy, Octobrists outside parliament needed the 
help and connections of their politician friends to support their demands in the 
parliamentary and political processes.  
 
Nonetheless, in the first years of the 21st century, the emergence and successful 
consolidation of power of Thaksin and his TRT government destroyed the earlier co-
existence under a balance of power among different groups of the elite, middle class and 
politicians. Quasi-absolute political power in parliament, overwhelming popular support 
and widespread corruption threatened the interests and popularity, and reduced the 
negotiating power, of the former elite and different groups of politicians, and the 
legitimacy of higher middle class. To this extent, the government and its supporters no 
longer needed to compromise with the elite and minority middle class in exchange for 
their support.  
 
In this context, the relationship between Octobrists who had then taken opposite 
positions turned sour. Octobrists who were in the TRT and supported its policies viewed 
the TRT as an effective tool either to promote progressive policies or protect their 
interests and worked wholeheartedly to defend the government. In addition, the strong 
political power of the government offered Octobrists in the TRT the authority to push 
forward their roles and interests without relying on support from elsewhere and made 
them ready to fight against their former comrades who did not agree with the party. In 
contrast, Octobrists who were threatened by the TRT government and its policies 
perceived the government and their friends who worked for the government as political 
threats. Therefore, in protecting their strongholds, they not only waged war against the 
government but also with their friends inside it.         
 
On top of this, the rise of the Red and Yellow Shirt movements turned the initial 
disagreements among Octobrists into a severe battle. The expansion of these counter 
movements offered strategic alliances and a new organisation for divided Octobrists. 
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Those who were frustrated and struggled with inferior negotiating power against the 
TRT government found the Yellow Shirt group the optimal option to form a powerful 
movement to fight back against the government and their friends in the TRT Party. At 
the same time, the emergence of the Red Shirt movement reacting against the coup that 
toppled Thaksin and the increase in power of the non-elected elite and middle class 
formed a new political constellation and empowered Octobrists who either had 
supported the TRT or disagreed with non-elected forces to fight back against their 
friends in the Yellow Shirt movement.    
 
Frame competition    
 
Aside from the changes in political environment which turned temporary cooperation 
among Octobrists into conflict, frame competition also forced them to confront and 
eventually encounter with a crisis of legitimacy in utilising the Octobrist frame. 
Actually, the competition in constructing and making use of frame was nothing new for 
these Octobrists. These people had long fought against each other to promote the 1970s 
student movement and recently to revitalise their role in contemporary politics. When 
competition to insert their different political stances and interests into a master frame 
was minimal during their participation in May 1992, the rise of social movements, and 
the political reform process, the concept was broad enough to legitimise their 
differences. However, when the gap was huge, frame competition became more and 
more severe. Their temporarily unified network exploded and they became adversaries. 
Under the polarised political conditions of the rise of the TRT and the anti-TRT 
movement, different Octobrists took positions on opposite sides. 
 
Initially, the unified appearance of the Octobrist frame could no longer conceal the 
contradictory ideas and interests of Octobrists in different parties in the conflict. The 
Octobrist identity was constructed through a loose and broad concept of 
progressiveness, democracy, and social justice. Thus, it built an image of harmony for 
Octobrists only when their differences were not too contradictory. While Octobrists 
used the concept to promote different roles and interests, it enhanced the unified look 
for former activists, at least in the public eye. However, when they took contradictory 
and uncompromising political stances and interests, the Octobrist frame could no longer 
help them to hide their differences.  
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Furthermore, not only did the Octobrist frame not help to veil their controversy, it also 
became a powerful weapon to wield against each other and devastate their long 
successful networks and identity. Different groups of Octobrists exploited the Octobrist 
frame as a means of legitimising their new interests and ideological stances, and of de-
legitimising their former comrades on the opposite side. Both TRT supporters and those 
who went against the government argued that they were the genuine Octobrists who 
continued to promote democracy and social justice. At the same time, they condemned 
their friends with different stances as betrayers of the Octobrist ideal. Those in the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (phanthamit – PAD) even used royalist strategies in 
arguing that their friends who acted as advisors to Thaksin were ex-communists who 
would like to promote a republic and overthrow constitutional monarchy. These right 
wing strategies caused deep conflict among those on both sides.  
 
In summary, over the past two decades, former leftist activists throughout the world 
have struggled to survive and return to politics. Some failed. Others partly succeeded. 
The Thai Octobrists – 1970s left-leaning activists – expanded their roles and influence 
in nearly all political arenas over the course of the past few decades. Unlike their 
counterparts in other countries, the Octobrists successfully managed to exploit new 
political opportunities and overcome structural constraints. They were able to mobilise 
all sorts of political assets including skills, networks and activism, both retained since 
the 1970s and recently cultivated, to promote and sustain their power. Above all, as 
successful frame specialists since the 1970s, they again constructed a new identity of 
‘Octobrists-democratic fighters’ in legitimising their new political activities, ideas and 
interests.  
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11 and 16. 
Phoomtham blames NGOs for obstructing the state in solving social problems [ภูมิ
ธรรม ซดัเอน็จีโอถ่วงรัฐแกส้งัคม]. 2003. Kkrungthep Thurakit , 19 August, 12. 
Sondhi reveals names of Octobrists against Thai Maritime Navigation [สนธิ เปิดช่ือคน
เดือนตุลาฯรุมท้ึงบทด]. 2005. Krungthep Thurakit , 17 December, 9 and 12. 
Former Bloody May leaders push Chamrong to lead the team to overthrow 
Thaksin [อดีตแกนนาํพฤษภาทมิฬดนั จาํลอง นาํทีมโค่นทกัษิณ]. 2006a. Krungthep Thurakit , 
24 January, 12. 
Chamrong announces today joining the movement to oust the PM [จาํลอง แถลงวนัน้ีร่วม
ขบวนไล่นายก]. 2006b. Krungthep Thurakit , 19 February, 1 and 9. 
Petition to the crown [ถวายฎีกา]. 2006c. Krungthep Thurakit , 9 May, 12. 
Open letter from Amorn, Octobrist, to Phrommin [จดหมายเปิดผนึก อมร-คนตุลา ถึง 
พรหมินทร์]. 2006d. Kkrungthep Thurakit , 24 August, 11. 
The bankruptcy of the Octobrists [ความลม้ละลายของคนเดือนตุลา]. 2006e. Krungthep 
Thurakit , 14 September, 12. 
Thongchai Winichakul debates with Thirayuth [ธงชยั วินิจจะกูล เปิดวิวาทะ ธีรยทุธ]. 2006f. 
Krungthep Thurakit , 13 November, 14. 
Letter to Dr. Thongchai Winichakul on the discourse of those who have no 
ideology [จดหมายถึงดร.ธงชยั วินิจจะกลู วา่เร่ืองวาทกรรมของพวกไร้หลกัาร]. 2006g. Krungthep 
Thurakit , 17 November, 15. 
The NHRC stops 5 decrees on the privatisation of universities [กรรมการสิทธิฯ เบรก พรบ. 
5 ฉบบัม.นอกระบบ]. 2007. Kkrungthep Thurakit , 21 February, 12. 
Thaksin brings Phoomtham-Chaturon-Dr. Ming to lead the Red Shirts [ทกัษิณดึงภูมิ
ธรรม-จาตุรนต-์หมอมิ้งนาํเส้ือแดง]. 2009. Krungthep Thurakit , 28 April. 
The leaders of 4 groups with different objectives: the reason is the Red movement 
is losing the mass [แกนนาํ 4 กลุ่มต่างเป้าหมาย ตน้เหตุ"แดง"เคล่ือนไหวเสียมวลชน]. 2010. 
Krungthep Thurakit , 29 April. 
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Lok Wanni (World Today - LWN)  
Appealing for a political court to revise the history of 6 October 76 [เรียกร้องจดัตั้งศาล
การเมืองชาํระประวติัศาสตร์ 6 ตุลา 19]. 2003a. Lok Wanni, 7 October 4. 
Life long activist - Dr. Weng [นกัเคล่ือนไหวตลอดกาล หมอเหวง]. 2003b. lok Wanni, 11 
October, 5. 
Wearing mourning for democracy, mourning the constitution [ไวทุ้กขใ์ห้ประชาธิปไตยไว้
อาลยัแด่รัฐธรรมนูญ]. 2006a. Lok Wanni, 13 October, 2. 
Jaran returns his degree to Thammasat University to protest its administrator 
serving the CNS [จรัล คืนปริญญามธ. ประทว้งผูบ้ริหารรับใชค้มช]. 2006b. Lok Wanni, 12 
December, 1 and 12. 
 
Phuchatkan Raiwan (Manager Daily - MD) 
The Truth of 6th October and the Right to Information [ความจริง 6 ตุลาฯ กบัสิทธิการรับรู้
ข่าวสาร]. 1995. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 10 October, 10. 
3 MPs support Thaksin to set up an alternative party for the people [3 สส. หนุน ทกัษิณ 
ตั้งพรรคเพ่ิมทางเลือกใหป้ระชาชน]. 1998. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 28 May. 
Je Noi - nuisance caused members to move away to Chat Patana [เจห๊น่อย ตวัป่วนสมาชิก
ยา้ยซบชพน.]. 2000a. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 11 October, 15. 
Senate seeks a role in solving the drugs problem and proposes setting up a 
national command center [วฒิุขอเอ่ียวแกปั้ญหายาเสพยติ์ดเสนอตั้งศูนยบ์ญัชาการแห่งชาติ]]. 
2000b. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 30 October, 15. 
Behind Chaturon’s move to the Ministry of Justice [เบ้ืองหลงัเตะโด่ง จาตุรนต ์ นัง่ยติุธรรม]. 
2002. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 8 March, 14. 
PM orders ban on visas for opposition groups in neighboring countries [นายกฯสั้งหา้ม
ออกวีซ่ากลุ่มตา้นปท.เพ่ือนบา้น]. 2003. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 17 September, 14-15. 
Phumtham Wechayachai's speech to be remembered [ภูมิธรรม เวชยชยั คาํพดูท่ีตอ้งจดจาํ]. 
2005. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 23 November, 1-2. 
Phumtham's sister revealed as nominee of Je Deang [เปิดตวันอมินีเจแ๊ดง นอ้งสาวภูมิธรรม]. 
2006. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 19 April, 17-18. 
Attack on the 19th September group for referring to Pa (Prem) and fear that the old 
power will stir up trouble [จวกกลุ่ม 19 กนัยาฯ พาดพิงป๋า หวัน่ อาํนาจเก่าสวมรอยป่วน]. 2007. 
Phuchatkan Raiwan, 19 March, 16. 
What did Bandit Rittikol hide behind the skin? [บณัฑิต ฤทธ์ิถกล' ซ่อนอะไรไวใ้นเน้ือหนงั? 
(1)]. 2009. Phuchatkan Raiwan, 13 October. [cited 27 November 2009 
Access 2009]. Available from 
http://www.manager.co.th/Entertainment/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=952000
0121291. 
 
Manager Magazine  
22 years…14 October: Dynamic from the jungle to parliament and business [22 ปี 
... สิบส่ีตุลา พลวตัจากป่าสู่สภา-ธุรกิจ]. 1995. Manager Magazine. [cited 27 November 
2009 Access 1995]. Available from 
http://www.gotomanager.com/news/details.aspx?id=5498. 
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Phuchatkan Raisapda (Manager Weekly - MW)  
Phumtham-Dr.Ming main support for Somkit in establishing a party and paving 
the way to the PM’s seat [ภูมิธรรม-หมอมิ้ง กลไกหลกั อุม้สมคิด ตั้งพรรคกรุยทางนั้งเกา้อ้ีนายกฯ]. 
2007. phuchatkan raisapda, 5 March, A1 and A4. 
 
Matichon Raiwan  (Public Opinion Daily - MR)  
Jira Boonmak and the great separation: inside the memory of La-iat and Jirachon 
Boonmak [จิระ บุญมาก กบัวนัมหาวิปโยค: ความในใจของละเอียด กบัจีระชน บุญมาก]. 1983. 
Matichon Raiwan , 14 October, 5. 
Martyrs’ Monument Finally Authorised [อนุมติัแลว้ อนุสาวรียวี์รชน]. 1989. Matichon 
Raiwan , 12 November, 4. 
Prachatham presses Big Su [ประชาธรรม อดั บ๊ิกสุ]. 1992. Matichon Raiwan , 19 April, 
14. 
2 years after 14th October: bitterness of Jira Boonmak’s family [20 ปี 14 ตุลาฯ แห่ง
ความข่ืนขมของครอบครัว จีระ บุญมาก]. 1993a. Matichon Raiwan , 15 October, 
Prachachuan session, 1. 
Intention of the 20th anniversary of 14th  October: all friends turn their back on the 
Chuan government [เจตนารมณ์ 20 ปี 14 ตุลา มวลมิตรหนัหลงัให้รัฐบาลชวน]. 1993b. 
Matichon Raiwan , 16 October, 2. 
Letter from a friend to a friend before the 2nd decade since 6th October 1976 
[จดหมาย จากเพ่ือนถึงเพ่ือน ก่อน ถึง 2 ทศวรรษ 6 ตุลาฯ 19]. 1995. Matichon Raiwan , 6 
October, 23. 
United Artists Front of Thailand: Legacy and creation for society in 
commemoration of the 20th anniversary of 6th October [แนวร่วมศิลปินแห่งประเทศ
ไทย สืบสานและรังสรรคง์านเพ่ือสังคม เพ่ือร่วมรําลึก 20 ปี 6 ตุลาคม]. 1996. Matichon Raiwan , 
2 October, 31. 
Thirayuth insists the Constitution Drafting Assembly’s constitution is great [ธีรยทุธ 
ฟันธงรธน.ฉบบัสสรเจ๋ง]. 1997a. Matichon Raiwan , 18 August, 1 and 4. 
Thirayuth Boonmee points to the solution to the Ratanakosin crisis [ธีรยทุธ บุญมี ช้ีทาง
แกวิ้กฤต รัตนโกสิน]. 1997b. Matichon Raiwan , 18 August, 2. 
Thirayuth declares of the purpose of October [ธีรยทุธ ประกาศเจตนารมณ์เดือนตุลาฯ]. 1997c. 
Matichon Raiwan , 15 October, 15. 
Case study of 14th October 1973 of Thirayuth Boonmee and friends compared 
withthe arrest of Siamese intellectual Sulak [ศึกษากรณี 14 ตุลา 2516 ของธีรยทุธ บุญมี 
และเพ่ือน เปรียบเทียบ การคร่ากมุตวัปัญญาชนสยาม ส.ศิวรักษ]์. 1998. Matichon Raiwan , 11 
March, 3. 
Ministry of Education moves to add 14th October in textbooks [ศธ.เดินเคร่ืองบรรจุ 14 
ตุลา ลงตาํรา]. 1999. Matichon Raiwan , 12 April, 1 and 19. 
Grand opening of memorial for 6th October [เปิดงานใหญ่ของความทรงจาํ 6 ตุลาฯ]. 2000a. 
Matichon Raiwan , 7 October, 19. 
100th anniversary of Pridi Panomyong 1900 - 2000: from Pridi to October Hero 
[100 ปี ชาตกาล นายปรีดี พนมยงค ์ 2443 – 2543 จากปรีดี สู่วีรชนเดือนตุลา] and Saowanee 
weeps at commemoration of 100th anniversary of Pridi [เสาวนีย ์ ร่ําไห้รําลึก 100 ปี 
ปรีดี]. 2000b. Matichon Raiwan , 12 October, 23. 
Amnesty International Director protests shooting [ผอ. นิรโทษกรรมสากลคา้นยิงเป้า]. 2001a. 
Matichon Raiwan , 24 April, 19. 
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Women’s Council supports change in the abortion law [กมธ.สตรีฯวฒิุหนุนแกก้ม.ทาํแทง้]. 
2001b. Matichon Raiwan , 16 August, 20. 
Thirayuth Boonmee judges the struggle of the urban poor as a good direction for 
society [ธีรยทุธ บุญมี วิพากษแ์นวทางการต่อสู้ของ คนจนเมืองไทย ทิศทางทรงคุณค่าแก่สงัคม]. 2001c. 
Matichon Raiwan  27 August, 2. 
Government pushed to join the third world in revising drug patents [จ้ีรบ.ร่วมโลกท่ี 3 
ทบทวนสิทธิบตัรยา]. 2001d. Matichon Raiwan , 20 October, 19. 
Pijit revises compensation for victims of Cobalt-60 [พิจิต ทบทวนค่าชดเชย โคบอลต-์60]. 
2002a. Matichon Raiwan , 26 October, 16. 
People’s organisations move to overrun outside parliament [องคก์รประชาชนเคล่ือนลุยนอก
สภา]. 2002b. Matichon Raiwan  30 December, 1 and 10. 
Chaturon Chaisang clarifies his (forced) move – shift - grab as minister [จาตุรนต ์ฉาย
แสง เปิดองแกค้าํครหา รมต (ที่ถูกกระทาํ) ยา้ย-โยก-แยง่]. 2003a. Matichon Raiwan , 5 May, 
13. 
Solving the October mystery with grand 30th anniversary celebration of 14th 
October [ลา้งอาถรรพเ์ดือนตุลา ฉลองใหญ่งาน 30 ปี 14 ตุลา]. 2003b. Matichon Raiwan , 
20 August, 1 and 17. 
The cabinet does not want 14th October as Democracy day: Thaksin orders 
Chaturon to propose new name to the parliament [มติครม. ไม่เอา 14 ตุลาวนั
ประชาธิปไตย ทกัษิณ สัง่ จาตุรนต ์ถกสภาหาช่ือใหม่]. 2003c. Matichon Raiwan , 20 August, 
12. 
Seksan Prasertkul was the first to coin the term ‘khon duean tula’, which in this 
work is translated as 'Octobrist' [เสกสรรค ์ประเสริฐกุล คนแรกท่ีใชค้าํ “คนเดือนตุลา”]. 
2003d.  Matichon Raiwan , 14 October, 13. 
The NHRC secretly investigated the mother of a victim and confirmed the police 
used excessive force on gas pipeline protestors [กก.สิทธิฯบุกสอบลบัแม่เหยือ่ ยนัตร.โหด
รุมทุบมอ็บท่อก๊าซ]. 2003e. Matichon Raiwan , 16 November, 1 and 10. 
Phoomtham reveals TRT strategy to attract other parities by direct sale system [ภูมิ
ธรรมเผยกลยทุธ์ทรท ชนะดูดพรรคอ่ืน - ใชร้ะบบขายตรง]. 2005. Matichon Raiwan , 10 
February, 14. 
Force Thaksin out of PM position: Lecturers - Senators have had enough! scatter 
letters of unethical leader [ฮือไล่ส่ง ทกัษิณ พน้นายก คณาจารย ์– ส.ว. สุดทน! ร่อนจดหมายผูน้าํ
ขาดจริยธรรม]. 2006a. Matichon Raiwan  3 February, 6-7. 
Thirayuth suggests solution for the 4th stage of the crisis [ธีรยทุธ เสนอทางออก ผา่วิกฤตขั้นท่ี 
4]. 2006b. Matichon Raiwan  28 March, 2 and 12. 
Talk on 'Thailand’s crisis: when capitalists hunt (us)' on the 30th anniversary of 
Prachachat Turakij newspaper, 31 May 2006 [การปาฐกถาเร่ือง ‘วิกฤตประเทศไทย ยคุทุน
นิยมไล่ล่า’ ในงานครบรอบ 30 ปี หนงัสือพิมพป์ระชาชาติธุรกิจ 31 พฤษภาคม 2549]. 2006c. 
Matichon Raiwan  1 June, 2 and 5. 
Views from different angles on judicialisation: the risk of judicial rule [มองหลากมุม
ตุลาการภิวตัน ์ความเส่ียงของตุลาการธิปไตย]. 2006d. Matichon Raiwan  9 June, 6. 
How can Thai society get past this crucial turning point? [สงัคมไทยจะกา้วขา้มจุดเปล่ียนผา่น
คร้ังสาํคญัไดอ้ยา่งไร]. 2006e. Matichon Raiwan  9 July, 11. 
Is judicial power a weak point of Thai democracy? [อาํนาจตุลาการคือจุดอ่อนของประชาธิปไตย
ไทย?]. 2006f. Matichon Raiwan  18 July, 6. 
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The stage of the 30th anniversary of 6th October attacks the coup for taking 
Thailand backward [เวที 30 ปี 6 ตุลา รุมสบัปฏิวติัดึงไทยถอยหลงั]. 2006g. Matichon 
Raiwan  8 October, 1 and 13. 
The collapse of the October ideology [ความแตกสลายของอุดมการณ์เดือนตุลา]. 2006h. 
Matichon Raiwan  20 October, 6. 
 
Matichon sutsapda (Public Opinion Weekly - MS) [มติชนสุดสัปดาห์] 
Mr. Chamni Sakdiset [นายชาํนิ ศกํดิเศรษฐ์]. 1986a. Matichon Sutsapda, 19 May, 16. 
Before stepping on the stage: I am ready to be born in politics [ก่อนข้ึนเวที: ผมพร้อมจะเกิด
ทางการเมือง]. 1986b. Matichon Sutsapda, 8 December, 2-3. 
14th October political party approaches reality [พรรค 14 ตุลาฯ ใกลเ้ป็นจริง]. 1991. 
Matichon Sutsapda, 18 October, 5. 
Put it down nicely [วางไวอ้ยา่งง่ายงาม]. 1992. Matichon Sutsapda, 26 June, 33. 
Lao Khamhom – Pongsi National Artists [ลาว คาํหอม – ผอ่งศรี ศิลปินแห่งชาติ]. 1993a. 
Matichon Sutsapda, 1 January, 5. 
Editorial [บรรณาธิการ]. 1993b. Matichon Sutsapda, 21 May, 4. 
Political lessons from the 20th anniversary of 14th October: different conditions 
economics vs. politics [บทสรุปการเมือง 20 ปี 14 ตุลา ภาวะท่ีแปลกแยก เศรษฐกิจ vs. การเมือง]. 
1993c. Matichon Sutsapda, 15 October, 8. 
Friendship-Brotherhood-Sisterhood: Thirayuth – Seksan raise their glasses to 
celebrate 20 years since October 14th [เพ่ือนพอ้งนอ้งพ่ี ธีรยทุธ-เสกสรรค ์ ชูแกว้ฉลอง 20 ปี 
14 ตุลา]. 1993d. Matichon Sutsapda, 15 October, 72-74. 
Green light for 14th October in school curriculum [ไฟเขียวนาํ 14 ตุลา เขา้หลกัสูตร รร.]. 
1993e. Matichon Sutsapda, 22 October, 5. 
14th October VDO: Valuable historical record [เทปวีดีโอ 14 ตุลา บนัทึกลํ้าค่าทางประวติัศาสตร์]. 
1993f. Matichon Sutsapda, 5 November, 30. 
Dead end of heroic literature in the globalisation era: Seksan Prasertkul is like an 
animal chained to a typewriter [ทางตนัวรรณกรรมอีโร่ ในยคุโลกานุวตัร เสกสรรค ์ประเสริฐกุล 
เหมือนสตัวท่ี์ถูกล่ามอยูก่บัพิมพดี์ด]. 1993g. Matichon Sutsapda, 20 November, 62-63. 
Former 14th October student leader Sawanee Limmanon criticises the government 
for its unchanged ideology [อดีตผูน้าํนกัศึกษา 14 ตุลาคม เสาวนีย ์ ล้ิมมานนท ์ วิพากษ ์ รัฐบาล 
อุดมการณ์ท่ีเหมือนเดิม]. 1993h. Matichon Sutsapda, 17 December, 79 -80. 
Thirayuth Boonmee leads team to celebrate 25th anniversary of 14th Octoberwith 
Chuan Leekpai as chairperson [ธีรยทุธ บุญมี นาํทีม ฉลอง 25 ปี 14 ตุลา ชวน หลีกภยั เป็น
ประธาน]. 1998. Matichon Sutsapda, 10 March, 6. 
Thongchai Winichakul and the 1997 constitution [ธงชยั วินิจจะกูล กบัรัฐธรรมนูญ 2540]. 
2005. Matichon Sutsapda, 24 October, 8. 
Thirayuth designates OT government, believes it will lead the country out of the 
TRT crisis; punishment certain [ธีรยทุธให้สมญา รัฐบาล OT: เช่ือพา ปท.พน้วิกฤต ทรท. เจอ
โทษแน่]. 2006. Matichon sutsapda, 13 October, 7. 
Jit Phumisak 80th anniversary symphony: ‘Standing up to the challenge’ [ซิมโฟนี 80 
ปี จิตร ภูม ิศกัด์ิ "คนยงัคงยนืเด่นโดยทา้ทาย"]. 2009. Matichon sutsapda, 10 June, 24. 
 
Matuphum Raiwan (Motherland Daily) 
6th October 1976: Valuable lesson for all [6 ตุลาคม 19 บทเรียนท่ีมีค่าของทุกคน]. 1983a. 
Matuphum Raiwan, 7 October, 5. 
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Commemoration of 14th October martyrs [รําลึก วีรชน 14 ตุลาคม]. 1983b. Matuphum 
Raiwan, 14 October, 4. 
10th Year of the student movement [ปีท่ี 10 ขบวนการนกัศึกษา]. 1983c. Matuphum 
Raiwan, 17 October, 5. 
 
Nation Sutsapda (Nation Weekend - NS)  
Uniting to fight to build a martyrs’ monument and revise history [ร่วมสู ้ ร่วมสร้าง 
อนุสาวรียวี์รชน ชาํระประวติัศาสตร์]. 1997a. Nation Sutsapda, 11 April, 8-9. 
Fighting over decade for a monument to democracy and martyrs and a memorial 
to challenge the truth and correctness [การต่อสูข้า้มทษวรรษ อนุสรณ์สถานวีรชนประชาธิปไตย 
อนุสาวรีท่ีทา้ทายความจริง-ความถูกตอ้ง]. 1997b. Nation Sutsapda, 11 April, 10–12. 
The call for 14th October in school curriculum!!!: Distorted history? [ถามหา 14 ตุลาฯ 
ในตาํราเรียน ไดเ้วลาชาํระ!!! ประวติัศาสตร์ท่ีถูกบิดเบือนหรือยงั?]. 1997c. Nation Sutsapda, 11 
April, 13-14. 
Martyrs’ Monument: Vichitchai Amornkul, Chulalongkorn University [อนุสาวรียวี์รชน 
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